'Non-truth-conditional' meaning, relevance and concessives by Iten, C.B.
'NON-TRUTH-CONDITIONAL' MEANING,
RELEVANCE AND CONCESSIVES
CORINNE BEATRICE ITEN
Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of PhD
Department of Phonetics and Linguistics
University College London
2000
For my parents
- in memory of theirs
ABSTRACT
This thesis is concerned with the semantic function of linguistic elements which do
not seem to contribute to the truth conditions of an utterance, that is, with 'non-truth-
conditional' linguistic devices. The first part of the thesis is devoted to theoretical
considerations, while the second part concentrates on 'concessive' linguistic devices,
which form a sub-class of 'non-truth-conditional' expressions.
The first chapter outlines the way in which traditional semantic theories have
employed the notion of truth conditions to capture linguistic meaning and a series of
problems with this approach are pointed out. The chapter ends with an overview of
'non-truth-conditional' linguistic devices. Chapter 2 is concerned with ways in
which fundamentally truth-conditional theories of linguistic semantics have
attempted to accommodate such expressions in their frameworks. In chapter 3, the
discussion focuses on Argumentation Theory, which does not just accommodate non-
truth-conditional meaning but, ultimately, treats all linguistic meaning in non-truth-
conditional terms and leads to the untenable conclusion that the general intuition that
utterances can give information about the world is an illusion. This is followed by a
chapter devoted to Sperber & Wilson's cognitive Relevance Theory. It is argued that
this theory offers an ideal framework for a semantic analysis of 'truth-conditional'
and 'non-truth-conditional' expressions alike, while avoiding the problems
encountered by other theories.
The next three chapters investigate the nature of linguistic 'concessivity' and
provide a critical survey of existing analyses of three specific 'concessive' devices:
but, although, and even if. In each case, an original relevance-theoretic analysis in
procedural terms is proposed.
In the last chapter, the possibility of purely pragmatic (that is, unencoded)
'concessive' interpretations is explored, and, finally, the role of the concept of 'truth-
conditional content' in a theory of utterance interpretation is reassessed.
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CHAPTER 1
TRUTH CONDITIONS, LINGUISTIC SEMANTICS AND 'NON-TRUTH-
CONDITIONAL' MEANING
1.1	 Introduction
For it is a truth implicitly acknowledged by communication-theorists
themselves that in almost all the things we should count as sentences there is a
substantial central core of meaning which is explicable either in terms of truth-
conditions or in terms of some related notion [...].
(Strawson 1971: 178)
Or again it may be pointed out that even sentences to which the notion of truth-
conditions does seem appropriate may contain expressions which certainly
make a difference to their conventional meaning, but not the sort of difference
which can be explained in terms of their truth-conditions.
(Strawson 1971: 177)
These two quotes from Strawson encapsulate two striking points one comes across
repeatedly in the literature on (linguistic) meaning. The first one is that, no matter
what the background of a theorist - whether they are trying to say something about
the meaning of words or sentences in themselves, or whether they are more
interested in what speakers mean when they use words and sentences - sooner or
later they find themselves (sometimes reluctantly) making use of the notions of truth
and truth conditions. Given that there are considerable differences in general outlook
and basic assumptions among these theorists, it is truly remarkable that the notion of
truth conditions has played (and still is playing) such an all-pervasive role. In fact,
there are not many theories that have done away with the notion altogether'. An
explanation of this could lie with the undeniable fact that one, very central, way in
which speakers use language is to say something about the world, to describe states
of affairs, and the notion of truth seems to be one of the most useful tools in
describing the relation between representations 2 and states of affairs in the world.
However, for all its longevity and all-pervasiveness, the role the notion of truth
conditions plays in accounting for linguistic meaning is far from unproblematic.
'As will be seen in chapter 3, ultimately, Anscombre & Ducrot's (e.g. 1986) Argumentation Theory is
an exception.
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The other striking point, reflected in the second quote from Strawson, is that
as soon as theorists start to account for natural language meaning in terms of truth
conditions, they encounter linguistic elements which are undoubtedly meaningful,
but whose meaning does not contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance in
which they occur. Such 'non-truth-conditional' elements are of particular interest,
because their existence means that theorists who employ the notion of truth
conditions in their accounts of linguistic meaning can, at best, only account for a
subclass (albeit a large one) of all meaningful linguistic devices.
Let me clarify exactly what kind of 'non-truth-conditional' meaning it is that
this thesis is concerned with. Consider the scenario in (1).
(1)	 [Susan and Mary are talking about Mary's boyfriend Peter]
Susan: Is he good at buying you presents?
Mary: For my last birthday he bought me a pink scarf, even though I told
him that I hate pink.
In this scenario, Mary's utterance will be true if and only if Peter bought her a pink
scarf for her last birthday and (before that) she told him that she hates pink.
However, Mary 'means' something more than just that. She also 'means' (or intends
to communicate) that there is some incompatibility between Peter buying her a pink
scarf and her telling him that she hates pink. Furthermore, in the scenario above,
Susan will have every justification to assume that Mary also 'means' that Peter isn't
good at buying her presents. In other words, there are two aspects of what Mary
'means' here that don't affect the truth conditions of her utterance (and are, therefore,
'non-truth-conditional'): the assumption that there is an incompatibility between two
states of affairs and the assumption that Peter isn't good at buying Mary presents.
The difference between these two aspects of the interpretation of Mary's utterance is
that the former arises because of the linguistically encoded meaning of even though,
while the latter arises because of the particular context in which Mary made her
utterance.
2 word representation is meant to be a neutral formulation to include both the position of theorists
who believe that there is a direct language-world relation and that of those who believe it is the
language of thought which should be given truth conditions.
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No matter what the scenario in which Mary makes her utterance, as long as
she uses even though, she will always be taken to communicate that there is some
kind of incompatibility between the two clauses she uttered. By contrast, if Susan
had asked a different question (e.g. "Do you think your relationship with Peter has
any future?") Mary wouldn't (necessarily) have been taken to communicate that
Peter is bad at buying her presents (instead, the most likely assumption Susan would
take her to be communicating would probably be that Mary didn't think that her
relationship with Peter had any future). This example demonstrates the difference
between 'non-truth-conditional' meaning that arises semantically, i.e. on the basis of
meaning linguistically encoded by a constituent of the sentence uttered, and 'non-
truth-conditional' meaning that arises pragmatically, i.e. on the basis of particular
features of the context in which the sentence has been uttered3 . I cannot emphasise
enough that the focus of this chapter and the whole thesis is on the semantic kind of
'non-truth-conditional' meaning.
The next section starts with a brief discussion of what truth conditions are,
what kind of entity can have them and how traditional theories of linguistic
semantics have used the notion of truth conditions to account for sentence meaning.
I then point out a range of problems with this approach, one of which is the existence
of 'non-truth-conditional' linguistic meaning mentioned above. Section 1.3, is
concerned with a type of theory that aims to give truth conditions to utterances rather
than to sentences and, thereby, manages to avoid some of the problems encountered
by the type of theory discussed in section 1.2 (though there are many problems faced
by both). In section 1.4, I consider the idea that natural language expressions fall
into one of two semantic classes: the truth-conditional and the non-truth-conditional.
I attempt to define these classes, but on the basis of the conflicting criteria
involved I'm forced to conclude that they don't exist. The chapter ends with a list of
linguistic devices whose meaning any adequate theory of linguistic semantics should
be able to account for, but which have been, or could be, classed as 'non-truth-
conditional'.
In other words, I'm equating semantics with linguistically encoded meaning and pragmatics with
meaning that is derived inferentially, irrespective of its truth-conditional status. This is the standard
relevance-theoretic semantics/pragmatics distinction. For a discussion of how this compares with
other approaches to the distinction, see e.g. Carston (1999a).
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1.2	 Truth conditions and sentences
So far, I have referred to the notion of truth conditions without saying what they are
or, indeed, what kind of entity can have them. These two questions are inextricably
linked: It seems impossible to say what truth conditions are without also saying
something about the sort of thing that bears them. It seems equally impossible to say
what sort of an entity can be given truth conditions without also saying something
about what truth conditions are. On a very superficial and obvious level, only things
that can be true (or false) can have truth conditions. Therefore, I shall first consider
what it is for an entity to be true.
An obvious thing that can be true or false is what people say4. Intuitively,
what somebody says will be true if it corresponds to the way things are in the world.
In other words, something can be said to be true if it represents the world the way it
is. In slightly more technical terms, to give a specification of the truth conditions of
a representation is to state what the world would have to be like for the
representation to be true. Therefore, a representation has to be truth-evaluable,
capable of being either true or false, for it to be able to have truth conditions. This
means that many potentially representational entities, like for example single words,
cannot be given truth conditions. In fact, the only entities that can reasonably be
given truth conditions seem to be propositions, statements, thoughts or sentences5,
i.e. propositional entities: The truth conditions of a given proposition will be the set
of necessary and sufficient conditions for its truth. Another way of putting this
would be that truth conditions describe states of affairs in the world which have to
hold for the proposition to be true. To use Tarski's classic example, the sentence in
(2)is true just in case snow is white. In other words, the second half of (3a) gives the
truth condition of the sentence/proposition in (2).
(2)	 Snow is white.	 (Tarski 1944/1996: 38)
way the word say is used here is meant to be entirely pre-theoretic.
For the moment, propositions and sentences will be treated as interchangeable. However, as will be
made clear below, this is not a view I wish to subscribe to.
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(3)	 a.	 "Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white.
b.	 "Schnee ist weiss" is true if and only if snow is white.
In general terms, the truth condition of a sentence is given by a T-sentence of the
form in (4), where s is taken to be the name of a sentence and p the sentence itself (or
a translation of it into a metalanguage). (3b) shows that the metalanguage does not
have to be identical to the language of the original sentence.
(4)	 s is true if and only if p.
As mentioned earlier, there is a generally undisputed intuition that speakers use
language to say things about the world6. Furthermore, the intuition is that, on the
whole, we say things we at least think are true7. It seems that one of the (if not the)
most successful ways in which this 'aboutness' of language can be captured is by
means of truth conditions - it is possible to specify what an utterance is about by
saying what the world has to be like for it to be true. In other words, there clearly is
some kind of relation between language and the world. The question is what exactly
this relation is.
Possibly the simplest answer to this question is that there is a direct language-
world relation, i.e. it's not just that in using language speakers say things about the
world, but language itself says things about the world. On such a picture, the
meaning of a sentence is, in fact, given by a theorem of the form in (4), a view
advocated, for example, by Davidson (e.g. 1967/1984). On this view, the meaning of
individual words and expressions is analysed in terms of the contribution they make
to the truth conditions of the sentence containing them. Thus, the meaning of snow
in (2) would be given in terms of the contribution it makes to the truth conditions of
(2) and to the truth conditions of other sentences in which it occurs.
There is a major problem with this, as it stands so far. if the formulation "if
and only if' in (4) is taken to be equivalent to the material biconditional of logic,
sentences of the form in (4) are true just in case the propositions on either side of the
connective have the same truth value. Clearly, this condition is not only fulfilled by
(3) but also by (5).
6 As will be seen in chapter 3, Ducrot (1993) believes that this intuition is nothing but an illusion.
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(5)	 "Snow is white" is true if and only if grass is green.
Now, while (3) intuitively does say something informative about the meaning of
"snow is white", (5) clearly does not. In other words, some extra machinery is
needed to make sure sentences are given the 'right' truth conditions.
As Janet Fodor (1977: 36) says, one possibility is to introduce the notion of
necessary truth. Thus, the truth conditions of a proposition will not just be a state of
affairs that has to hold but a state of affairs that necessarily has to hold for the
proposition to be true. In the case of snow is white, it seems intuitively clear that it is
necessarily true iff snow is white but not iff grass is green. However, there are a
range of problems with the theoretical definition of necessary truth.
Davidson (1976/1984) avoids this problem and ensures that T-sentences give
the 'right' truth conditions by stressing that they don't just have to e true but law-
like and counterfactual supporting (simplistically, not just true given the way things
actually are) 8. In fact, as long as a truth-conditional theory of linguistic semantics is
compositional it will also come up with the 'right' truth conditions for each sentence.
That is, as long as a theory guarantees that the truth properties of complex
expressions are a function of the truth properties of their constituent parts and the
way in which they are combined, each sentence will be given the 'right' truth
conditions. Indeed, it's impossible to conceive of an adequate theory of linguistic
semantics, truth-conditional or not, that doesn't work compositionally. After all, it is
a commonplace that any language has an infinite number of possible sentences, all of
which can be understood by competent speakers of that language. Therefore, if, as
Davidson claims, knowing what a sentence means is knowing its truth condition, it
must be possible to compute the truth conditions of a new sentence on the basis of
the truth properties of its constituent parts. For instance, a competent speaker of
English knows that (6) is true just in case flies eat books because, simplistically, she
knows that flies refers to flies, books refers to books and x eats y is true just in case
the thing x refers to eats the thing y refers to.
(6)	 Flies eat books.
7 Note, however that I'm not claiming that speakers adhere to a maxim of truthfulness.
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Deriving truth conditions compositionally like this avoids the danger of ending up
with T-sentences that assign the 'wrong' truth conditions to sentences.9
Apart from the apparent problem of assigning the 'right' truth conditions to
sentences, Davidson (1967/1984: 3516'°) himself recognises that there are a whole
host of elements of meaning that present difficulties for a truth-conditional account
of meaning. He mentions elements which present truth-conditional accounts with
technical difficulties, such as counterfactual or subjunctive sentences, sentences
about probabilities and about causal relations, adverbs, attributive adjectives, mass
terms, like for example snow, sentences about belief, perception and intention, verbs
of action that imply purpose. All of these elements have subsequently been
addressed by truth-conditionalists and promising solutions have been found in many
cases. However, there are linguistic items that are more worrying for truth-
conditional accounts. As Davidson also recognises, there are sentences that don't
seem to have truth values at all, for example imperatives, optatives and
interrogatives, and therefore cannot be given truth conditions. In addition, there are
linguistic expressions, for instance but and after all, that do have encoded meaning
but don't seem to affect the truth conditions of sentences containing them in any
way.
The problems discussed so far don't actually threaten the Davidsonian kind of
truth-conditional account of linguistic meaning in any fundamental way 11 . At worst,
the existence of expressions that don't affect the truth conditions of their host
sentences means that this truth-conditional approach to semantics can't account for
the meaning of all natural language expressions and needs to be supplemented with a
theory of meaning that can handle such expressions. However, there is a
fundamental problem with the basic assumption that there is a direct language-world
relation, i.e. with the assumption that sentences have truth conditions. Put slightly
8 Davidson (1984: xiv) makes this point particularly clearly.
A version of such a compositional truth-conditional theory has been integrated into generative
grammar with the notion of semantic competence (cf. Higginbotham (e.g. 1988) and Larson & Segal
(1995)).
'°Page numbers refer to Davidson (1984).
As a matter of fact, the problems about to be discussed apply equally to Fregean accounts of
linguistic semantics, on which the language-world relation is not entirely direct but mediated by
senses. However, it will be seen in chapter 2 that, for Frege, the senses of sentences are truth
conditions. Because, as far as the issues central to this thesis are concerned, the predictions made and
problems encountered by Fregean and Davidsonian kinds of accounts of linguistic semantics are very
similar (if not the same), I will describe both types of accounts as 'truth-conditional' and disregard the
differences between them, which are important in other contexts.
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differently, it is questionable whether sentences and propositions are actually the
same kind of thing.
Of course, if one assumes (as some philosophers seem to do) that sentences
are propositions (or, indeed, vice versa) the question is otiose. For most linguists,
however, sentences and propositions are two very different kettles of fish. To a
linguist, strictly speaking, a sentence is a phono-morpho-syntactic entity - the
product of a linguistic system, a mentally generated form usable in a range of ways.
Sentence meaning (as opposed to utterance meaning) is the meaning yielded by the
sentence's constituents and its structure. Propositions, on the other hand, are more
abstract entities, i.e. truth-evaluable representations of states of affairs, which needn't
be tied to any linguistic form. For most linguists, sentences, strictly speaking, can't
be true or false and therefore can't be given truth conditions. However, the
sentence/proposition relationship might be that sentences express propositions. In
other words, if one wants to be precise about it, 'the truth conditions of a sentence'
should be read as shorthand for 'the truth conditions of the proposition the sentence
expresses (or encodes)'.
So far so (relatively) good. The problem with the notion of 'the truth
conditions of the proposition the sentence expresses (or encodes)' is that its
usefulness rests on the assumption that sentences do express (or encode)
propositions. This is, however, a highly doubtful assumption. Sentences, as
mentioned above, are 'bits of language' and nothing more. Therefore, any meaning a
sentence has should be evident just from the sentence itself, independent of when or
whether it is uttered. In other words, if sentences express propositions then it should
be possible for competent speakers of the language of a certain sentence to say what
proposition it expresses regardless of when and whether the sentence has been
uttered. Obviously, for many sentences this is not the case - most obviously, due to
the existence of indexicals. Take, for instance, the sentence in (7).
(7)	 She likes chocolate.
Even the most competent English speaker will not be able to say which of an infinite
number of propositions, some of which are given in (8)-(12) below, this sentence
expresses. In fact, it seems to be safest to say that this sentence, taken out of context,
doesn't express a complete proposition at all.
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(8) SUE, LIKES CHOCOLATE.12
(9) MARY LIKES CHOCOLATE.
(10) ELIZABETH II LIKES CHOCOLATE.
(11) MARGARET THATCHER LIKES CHOCOLATE.
(12) Zo1 BALL LIKES CHOCOLATE.
Even though the sentence in (7) does not itself express a complete proposition, it
seems obvious that when it is used in an act of communication, it will express a
proposition. In other words, not all sentences may themselves express propositions,
but utterances of sentences on specific occasions, in specific contexts, do.
Therefore, if one wants to use the notion of truth conditions to account for natural
language meaning, it seems that the truth conditions one should concentrate on, at
least in the case of sentences containing indexicals, are the truth conditions of the
proposition expressed by an utterance of the sentence, because the sentence itself
does not express a complete proposition. This is, in fact, the approach Higginbotham
(e.g. 1988), following Burge (1974), takes to solving the problem posed by
indexicals.
1.3	 Truth conditions and utterances
As mentioned above, although there are a good number of sentences which cannot be
given truth conditions, it seems that utterances of sentences can. Higginbotham
(1988) uses this insight to give a truth-conditional account of the meaning of
sentences that contain indexicals. He concedes that, as (13) shows, it is not possible
to give a theorem of the form in (4) that captures the meaning of sentences like (7).
(13) "She likes chocolate" is true if and only if . . . ?'
12 Here, and throughout the thesis, the subscripts 'x', 'y', etc., are intended to indicate that the concept
in question is one of a specific individual or object. For instance, SUEx is a concept of a particular
1erson and not just anyone called 'Sue'.
The reader might object that there is the possibility of "She likes chocolate" is true f and only if
some female likes chocolate. However, quite clearly, it is not enough for the truth of an utterance of
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Therefore, instead of attempting to give the truth conditions of context-dependent
sentences in terms of statements of the form in (4), Higginbotham (1988: 34)
proposes to capture them in conditional terms. For instance, on his picture, the truth
conditions of (7) can be given by the statement in (14).
(14) II x is referred to by she in the course of an utterance of (7), then that
utterance is true just in case like (x, chocolate).
This move means that a whole host of context-dependent sentences whose meaning it
seemed impossible to capture in terms of truth conditions can now be dealt with
without having to abandon the assumption that there is a direct language-world
relation in the case of most words. On this picture, it is only context-sensitive
expressions, such as indexicals, that don't relate to the world directly but via speaker
intentions (or possibly by virtue of certain features of the context). Furthermore,
while (14) means that each utterance of the sentence in (7) has different truth
conditions, there is still only one theorem, i.e. (14), which quantifies over utterances
of (7) and thus makes it possible to determine the truth conditions of this sentence on
each occasion of utterance. In what follows, I would briefly like to point out a
(relatively minor) problem with Higginbotham's account of the meaning of
indexicals before going on to discuss a more far-reaching problem for the enterprise
of giving truth conditions to sentences, whether they take the 'classic' form of (4) or
the conditional form of (14).
The problem with accounting for the meaning of sentences containing
indexicals in terms of (conditional) truth conditions alone is that it puts one in a
position where one has to choose between treating all indexicals as synonymous or
predicting that utterances in which an indexical is used inappropriately have no truth
conditions (and are, therefore, not interpretable?). Let me explain why this is.
If (14) says all there is to say about the meaning of (7), then all indexicals
will come out as synonymous. That is, all that has to be done in order to give the
truth conditions of (15)-(18) is replace '(7)' in (14) with any of '(15)'-'(18)' and
change she to he, it, you or I as appropriate.
"She likes chocolate" that some female likes chocolate. A more sophisticated version of (i) will be
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(15) He likes chocolate.
(16) It likes chocolate.
(17) You like chocolate.
(18) I like chocolate.
This means that she, he, it, you and I are all predicted to have the same linguistic
meaning or, at least, that nothing at all is captured about their individual meaning.
Now, although it is indisputable that, in different contexts, all of these indexicals can
refer to the same individual, I don't believe that anyone would want to claim that
they have the same linguistic meaning - they quite clearly don't.
As a matter of fact, Higginbotham (1988: 35) suggests a way of capturing the
differences among the above indexicals: Instead of (14) the truth conditions of (7)
are now given by (19).
(19) If x is referred to by she in the course of an utterance of (7), and x is female,
then that utterance is true just in case like (x, chocolate).
It is clear that this captures the differences, say between she and he, because the truth
conditions of (15), on this kind of picture, would be something like (20).
(20) If x is referred to by he in the course of an utterance of (15), and x is male,
then that utterance is true just in case like (x, chocolate).
It is cases in which the second conjunct of the antecedent of the truth condition is not
true that present a problem for this account. For instance, imagine Peter and Mary
are watching Peter's dog devour an entire bar of chocolate. Smiling at Peter, Mary
says emphatically "He likes chocolate". It is clear that, here, Mary refers to Peter's
dog, so the first conjunct of the antecedent of the truth condition of Mary's utterance
can be completed: x is Peter's dog. The problem is that, in our scenario, Peter's dog
is actually female, so that the second conjunct of the antecedent is false. This means
that the whole antecedent is false, which in turn means that the whole conditional is
discussed in some detail in 4.6.2.
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true regardless of whether the consequent is true or not. In other words, nothing can
be concluded about the truth conditions of Mary's utterance. This, however, is
counterintuitive. Surely, Mary's utterance is true iff Peter's dog likes chocolate, i.e.
in the above scenario Mary's utterance is surely true even if Peter's dog isn't male.
Compared with the problem I turn to next, the one just described is relatively minor.
A bigger difficulty stems from the fact that it isn't just obviously context-
dependent expressions, such as indexicals, that mean that the linguistically encoded
content of sentences doesn't encode or express complete propositions and therefore
can't be given truth conditions. Carston (1998, forthcoming b) argues that this
semantic (or linguistic) underdeterminacy is an inherent property of natural
languages. Apart from the obvious 'culprits', indexicality and ambiguity, there are a
whole range of (complete) sentences which nevertheless fail to express (or encode)
complete propositions. For instance, not even the most competent speaker of English
would be able to specify the truth conditions of any of the sentences in (21)-(25).
(21) Paracetamol is better.
(22) It's the same.
(23) She's leaving.
(24) He is too young.
(25) It is raining.
Carston (1998: 17)
The problem with these examples, as compared to the ones involving indexicals, is
that they don't overtly contain any elements to which values have to be assigned
before a complete proposition is expressed. For example, in order for (21) to express
a complete proposition, a constituent has to be supplied that specifies what
Paracetamol is better than. However, there is no indexical or other element in the
linguistic surface form of (21) to indicate this. In other words, it is hard to see how
one could provide a statement capturing the truth condition of an utterance of this
sentence at all. Unlike in the case of (7), for example, there is no she (or anything
else) that could appear in the antecedent of a conditional truth condition. I can
imagine only one way in which one might give a conditional truth condition for a
sentence like (21), i.e. the one in (26).
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(26) If x = a in the course of an utterance of (21) with logical form Paracetamol is
better than x, then (21) is true iff better than (Paracetamol, a).
In other words, if one assumes that the underlying logical form of (21) does contain a
variable even though the surface form doesn't, examples of this sort could be
accounted for reasonably successfully. However, this solution comes at the cost of
positing a lot of hidden indexicals at the level of logical form'4.
(26) highlights another problem for truth-conditional theories of linguistic
semantics: the truth conditions of utterances, such as (21), don't just depend on some
abstract properties of the 'context of utterance' (however exactly one might want to
explicate that notion), but they crucially depend on the speaker's intentions. In fact,
the same is true of all other indexicals as well (with the possible exception of pure
indexicals, such as J15) Of course, with hidden indexicals the speaker's intentions
play an even more crucial role than with others, because they themselves don't
encode any information at all about what kind of referent the hearer is to supply.
That is, while an indexical like she at least indicates that the referent is (or seems to
the speaker to be) female, the variable x in the logical form of (21) gives no hint at all
about the kind of referent the speaker intended.
In the light of the above discussion it seems fair to say that Higginbotham's
approach using conditional truth conditions is capable of capturing all there is to say
about sentence meaning, i.e. all there is to say about what is linguistically encoded,
in the examples discussed so far' 6. However, once in the territory of utterances
rather than sentences, complications given rise to by the involvement of speaker
intention are unavoidable. One such complication is that many expressions that
standardly contribute to the truth conditions of the utterances in which they occur
don't make the same contribution in the case of every single utterance.
For instance, taken out of context, i.e. just looking at its linguistically
encoded meaning, it's uncontentious that bachelor means 'unmarried adult male'.
However, as Carston (1996a) points out, speakers often use expressions to mean
14 believe that for words such as better there is a reasonably good case for postulating hidden
indexicals. However, Carston (forthcoming a) gives a number of good arguments against the view
that the problems posed by sentences that don't express complete propositions can all be solved by
stulating hidden indexicals.
See 1.5.1 for a discussion of the notion of pure indexicals.
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something more restricted or something looser than their encoded meaning.
Consider the scenarios below.
(27) [Susan is desperate to get married and have children.]
Peter: Do you think Susan will come to my party?
Mary: She only goes to places where there are lots of bachelors.
(28) Mary [about Tim who is her husband]: He is such a bachelor.
In (27), Mary clearly isn't talking about just any kind of unmarried adult male - it's
highly unlikely that Mary thinks Susan would be thrilled to visit a monastery or a gay
club, both of which are more than likely to be teeming with unmarried adult males.
The kind of bachelor Mary is talking about here is only a subset of all unmarried
adult males, i.e. straight, youngish unmarried males who are willing to get married.
In other words, what she means is something more restricted than the linguistically
encoded meaning of bachelor.
In (28), on the other hand, Mary means at the same time something looser
and something richer than 'unmarried adult males' - the extension of bachelor is
loosened to include Tim, a married adult male, but it is also restricted to exclude non-
stereotypical unmarried adult males (e.g. those who are responsible, tidy and
considerate). It is not easy to see how the truth conditions of utterances like Mary's
in (27) and (28) could be captured. Unlike in the case of (21), it isn't possible to just
introduce a variable that will allow one to capture the context dependence of
bachelor. The only way in which I can imagine one could give the truth conditions
of something like Mary's utterance in (27) is shown in (29).
(29) If in an utterance of "She only goes to places where there are lots of
bachelors" she refers to x and the speaker intends bachelor to mean
heterosexual, youngish unmarried males who are willing to get married, then
the utterance will be true iff x only goes to places where there are lots of
heterosexual, youngish unmarried males who are willing to get married.
16 This is charitably leaving aside the problems connected with indexicals, such as he and she,
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Apart from the fact that this is circular, i.e. there is a large chunk of material that is
present both on the left hand side and on the right hand side of the conditional, it also
fails to do what other conditional T-sentences, e.g. (14), do. While (14) provides a
schema on the basis of which one can work out the truth conditions of every
utterance of she likes chocolate, (29) doesn't do the same thing for utterances of she
only goes to places where there are lots of bachelors. That is, (29) only provides a
means of working out the truth conditions of a very small, specific subset of
utterances of the sentence she only goes to places where there are lots of bachelors.
In other words, while (14) could conceivably capture part of an English speaker's
semantic competence, (29) couldn't.
Of course, if sentences could be given truth conditions there would be no
need to worry about the way in which speakers use language and one could simply
say that sentences like (30) are true iff 'he' is an unmarried adult male'7.
(30) He is a bachelor.
The problem is that, as argued above, sentences can't be given complete determinate
truth conditions: the truth conditions of (30) would have to be given in conditional
form, e.g. (31).
(31) If x is referred to by he in the course of an utterance of (30) and x is male then
that utterance will be true just in case unmarried adult male (x).
The problem with this is that there are many utterances of (30) whose truth
conditions aren't adequately captured by (31). Imagine, for instance, that John utters
(30) as a follow up to "Susan should meet Jim." in the scenario in (27), or that Mary
utters it about Tim in the scenario in (28). I would argue that John's utterance will
be true iff something like (32) holds, while Mary's utterance will be true just in case
something along the lines of (33) is true.
discussed above.
Gioss (1998) gives a range of examples for which it would be considerably less straightforward to
say what contribution they make to the truth conditions of the sentences in which they occur.
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(32) Jim is a youngish, heterosexual, unmarried adult male who is willing to get
married.
(33) Tim is an untidy, inconsiderate, irresponsible adult male.
Given the considerations above, it seems that the enterprise of capturing the
meaning of linguistic devices in terms of the contribution they make to the truth
conditions of the sentences or utterances in which they occur can't succeed.
Sentences taken out of context can't be assigned complete, determinate truth
conditions. Utterances can, but the problem is that the contributions linguistic
devices make to the truth conditions of the utterances in which they occur are not
stable across contexts 18 . This might lead one to abandon the notion of truth
conditions altogether in accounting for sentence or utterance meaning. In fact,
ultimately Anscombre & Ducrot's Argumentation Theory, as will be seen in chapter
3, does just that. However, I believe that such a conclusion is only necessary if what
one is interested in is what goes on in the actual everyday process of utterance
interpretation - which, incidentally, I'm not sure is what Anscombre & Ducrot aim
for, and, of course, no truth-conditional semanticist is concerned with this either. If
one is after something more abstract - for example, the minimal propositional
content of utterances, or their encoded linguistic meaning - one probably needn't
worry unduly about phenomena like the context-dependence of non-indexical
expressions or the fact that many actual natural language sentences people utter don't
encode complete propositions. For a theorist with such aims, it seems perfectly
permissible to idealise the picture to a certain extent. It is just that it needs to be
recognised that 'truth-conditional' theories of linguistic semantics necessarily do rely
on such idealisations and, therefore, their ability to provide insights into the actual
process of utterance interpretation is only limited.
In chapter 4, I will show how the 'aboutness' of linguistic utterances
mentioned in section 1.2 can be captured within the cognitive pragmatic framework
of Relevance Theory, which, while recognising a role for truth conditions, does not
attempt to account for linguistic meaning in truth-conditional terms and, therefore,
doesn't rely on the kind of idealisation referred to above.
18 (3rnss (1998, chapter 3) considers in detail whether and how truth-conditional theories of semantic
competence can account for the pervasive context sensitivity of natural language.
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However, it will be seen in chapter 2 that traditional truth-conditional theories
offer a wealth of insights into the workings of natural language in spite of the
problems just discussed. For one thing, there is good evidence that the notion of
truth and truth conditions is a promising (maybe the most promising) way of
capturing the 'aboutness' of linguistic utterances.
1.4	 Truth-conditional 'words'
So far, I have given a great deal of attention to the notion of truth conditions and
some of the problems it encounters. What I have not done as yet is say something
about the notion of 'truth-conditional' and 'non-truth-conditional' meaning. This is a
distinction between types of linguistic meaning that one might be tempted to make
on the basis of the observation that most natural language expressions do make a
contribution to the truth conditions of the utterances in which they occur, while some
don't (e.g., as mentioned above, but and after all). Even though, standardly, the
contribution such expressions make to truth conditions is context-sensitive, they must
have some stable core of meaning and, as will be shown in 4.3.2, there is a case to be
made for distinguishing two fundamentally different types of linguistic meaning. So,
distinguishing between 'truth-conditional' and 'non-truth-conditional' meaning
might be a good starting point.
Given that I've argued (hopefully convincingly) that sentences aren't the kind
of entity that can be given truth conditions, a linguistic expression could be said to
have 'truth-conditional' meaning if it contributes to the truth conditions of the
proposition expressed by an utterance of a sentence containing the expression (rather
than of the sentence itself). Unfortunately, things are not quite as simple as that for
two reasons. The first is that, as mentioned above, not all utterances have truth
conditions (recall interrogatives and imperatives) and, therefore, there isn't a single
word in the language that always contributes to the truth conditions of the utterance.
So, at best, an expression can be said to have 'truth-conditional' meaning if it
contributes to the truth conditions of utterances that have truth conditions.
However, an utterance like (34) clearly does have truth conditions, but the
word frankly doesn't make a contribution to them.
28
(34) Frankly, I'm bored.
Surely, the truth of (34) depends only on whether the speaker is bored at the time of
utterance and not on whether she is being frank in informing the hearer of this state
of affairs. Does this mean that frankly doesn't have 'truth-conditional' meaning?
The answer to this question depends on whether the 'truth-conditional'/'non-truth-
conditional' distinction is meant to capture something about the semantics (i.e. the
encoded meaning) of an expression or whether it is meant to capture something about
the expression's behaviour on a particular occasion of use. In the context of this
chapter (and, indeed, the whole thesis) the former seems to be more useful than the
latter. If we assume this, then frankly surely should be said to have truth-conditional
meaning, because there are many cases in which the expression does contribute to
the truth conditions of its host utterance (cf. (35)).
(35) Peter spoke frankly.
It seems that a different perspective is needed if we are to make any sense of
the truth-conditional/non-truth-conditional distinction. Such a perspective is offered
by the following observation. While no linguistic device contributes to the truth
conditions of the utterance in which it occurs on all occasions, there are linguistic
devices that don't contribute to truth conditions under any circumstances. But and
although are two such examples. Therefore, it seems that we should treat as non-
truth-conditional only those expressions that never contribute to the truth conditions
of the utterances in which they occur and as truth-conditional all others.
As mentioned above, there is another question that needs a little
consideration: It is not immediately clear just exactly what it means for a word or
phrase to 'contribute' to the truth conditions of an utterance. Let's assume that (7) is
uttered to express the proposition in (8).
(7) She likes chocolate.
(8) SUER LIKES CHOCOLATE.
It's uncontentious that the word chocolate makes a contribution to the truth
conditions of (8). (8) will be true if and only if Sue likes the sweet stuff in the
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extension of the word chocolate. In other words, the meaning encoded by chocolate
enters directly into the proposition expressed. It seems that the contribution to truth
conditions made by most natural language expressions is equally straightforward.
There are, however, some expressions whose 'contribution' to truth conditions is of a
different nature.
Pronouns, such as she in (7), do seem to 'contribute' in some sense to the
truth conditions of the propositions expressed by utterances of sentences containing
them. However, the kind of 'contribution' she makes is quite different from the
contribution of chocolate to the truth conditions of an utterance of (7). So, what is
this contribution she makes?
If (7) is uttered in a context, say one in which it is clear that the speaker is
referring to Sue, its truth conditions, i.e. those of (8), will contain, obviously not the
pronoun, but its referent, i.e. Sue, in the case of (8). Through its referent, she does
'contribute' to the truth conditions of (7). However, it's a widely acknowledged fact
that the meaning of she is not to be identified with Sue or any other possible referent
it picks out. It is an equally widely acknowledged fact that pronouns do have
linguistic meaning and that the linguistic meaning of she could be said to indicate
that a suitable female referent is to be part of the proposition expressed. This
linguistic meaning of she clearly does not appear in a specification of the truth
conditions of (8). In that sense, the pronoun she does not contribute to the truth
conditions of utterances containing it, i.e. unlike chocolate, she doesn't contribute its
encoded linguistic meaning. In other words, it seems more accurate to say that
pronouns, like she, constrain (and in that sense affect) the truth-conditional content
of utterances containing them by 'pointing' the hearer towards an appropriate
referent. Pronouns do not contribute their encoded meaning to the truth-conditional
content of the sentences containing them. Thus, it could be argued that the linguistic
meaning of pronouns is non-truth-conditional.
For truth-conditional (and non-truth-conditional) meaning in general this
means that a given linguistic item should be treated as having truth-conditional
meaning if it can contribute its encoded meaning'9 to the truth conditions of the
' This needs some qualification. The existence of ad hoc concepts (see e.g. Carston 1996/1997)
means that even words like chocolate don't always contribute exactly their encoded meaning to truth
conditions of utterances. However, in those cases, at least part of what is encoded appears in the
proposition expressed. In the case of a pronoun like she, on the other hand, nothing at all of what is
linguistically encoded appears in the proposition expressed.
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utterance containing it. If it cannot contribute its encoded meaning to the truth
conditions of the utterance it will be treated as having non-truth-conditional meaning
whether it constrains (or affects) the truth-conditional content of the utterance or
not. This latter distinction will have to be captured at a different level of analysis,
which is not likely to be semantic.
In this section I have tried to make sense of a semantic distinction between
truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional meaning. In the final section of this
chapter, I will look at a range of linguistic phenomena that could be or have been
classed as 'non-truth-conditional'. I'm including not only expressions that fulfil the
criteria I arrived at above, but also those that other theorists (e.g. Wilson
(unpublished)) have referred to as 'non-truth-conditional'. It will transpire that not
all of them never contribute their encoded meaning to the truth conditions of the
utterances in which they occur. Since I will argue later on that there is no such thing
as a clearly defined and explanatorily useful class of semantically 'non-truth-
conditional' linguistic devices, it does not seem to matter so much just how that
'class' is defined.
1.5	 'Non-truth-conditional' 'words'2°
1.5.1 Indexicals
(36) He saw her yesterday.
(37) I'll have some of that.
As mentioned above, pronouns and indexicals, like he, her and yesterday in (36) and
I in (37), constrain the truth-conditional content of utterances containing them
without actually contributing their encoded meaning to it. The same goes for
demonstratives, e.g. that in (37). The linguistic meaning encoded by these
expressions merely constrains the process of reference assignment. Indexicals vary
in how much of the 'work' involved in reference assignment is done by their
linguistic meaning and how much is left to the hearer to work out inferentially. This
20 The more intuitive 'words' is being used instead of the more accurate 'linguistic devices' - of
course, the discussion includes elements, such as mood indicators, that aren't 'words' by any stretch
of the imagination.
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is captured by Kaplan's (e.g. 1989) classic distinction between pure indexicals and
demonstratives. Given a particular context of use, pure indexicals, e.g. I, here and
now, are indexicals whose linguistic meaning does practically all the work needed to
assign reference. For instance, all a hearer needs to do to assign reference to an
utterance of I is determine who is making the utterance. By contrast, in order to
assign reference to an utterance of she a hearer has to put in a fair amount of
inferential work; the linguistic meaning of she merely tells him that he is to look for
a relevant female referent. Perry (1998) has captured the differences among
indexicals in terms of two distinctions. Firstly, he distinguishes between indexicals
that call on narrow context (including speaker, addressee, time and place of
utterance) for reference assignment and those that call on wider context. Secondly,
he distinguishes between indexicals that involve speaker intention for reference and
those that don't; he calls the first 'intentional' and the second 'automatic'. In this
framework, Kaplan's pure indexicals are seen as automatic and involving narrow
context. Perry (1998: 5) points out, though, that here and now do not clearly fall on
the automatic side as they seem to involve speaker intention to determine how big an
area here is meant to designate and how large a space of time now refers to on a
given occasion.
Probably because indexicals (and demonstratives) do affect truth conditions,
many theorists who have discussed non-truth-conditional meaning have not included
pronouns in their accounts of non-truth-conditional meaning 21 . However, for the
reasons discussed above I'm including them here.
1.5.2 Non-declarative sentence types
(38) Shut the door.
(39) Do you like chocolate?
It seems to be a universally accepted fact that utterances of sentences like (38) and
(39) cannot be given truth conditions at all. Clearly, there is no state of affairs in the
world that has to hold in order for (38) or (39) to be true; (38) and (39) are simply
21 For example Frege, Grice and more recently Wilson (unpublished).
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incapable of being either true or false. Commands 22 can't be true or false, they can
only be obeyed or disregarded. Similarly, questions can be answered or not, but truth
or falsity cannot be attributed to them. However, as has been noted by many
theorists, questions and commands clearly have related propositions, which can be
given truth conditions23 . It seems uncontentious that (38) is closely related to a
proposition like (40) and (39) to one like (41).
(40) The hearer shuts the door.
(41) The hearer likes chocolate.
An utterance of (38) could be said to communicate (42) and an utterance of (39) (43).
(42) The speaker is requesting the hearer to shut the door.
(43) The speaker is asking whether the hearer likes chocolate.
In fact, it seems unlikely that the meaning of words like shut, door, like and
chocolate, which are clearly truth-conditional, should be different when these words
are used in non-declarative sentences. The element of meaning which doesn't
contribute to truth conditions is the non-declarative syntax in the cases of (38) and
(39). In a way similar to pronouns, non-declarative syntax doesn't contribute to the
truth conditions of the utterance. However, non-declarative syntax is different from
pronouns in that it doesn't constrain truth conditions either, rather it seems to
indicate that a given utterance is a question or a command/request and therefore
cannot be given truth conditions at all.
' I am using command for want of a better word. I am not claiming and do not believe that all uses
of imperative sentences constitute acts of commanding.
As far as questions are concerned, this needs some qualification. Only yes-no questions express
complete propositions, the propositions Wh-questions express are incomplete.
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1.5.3 Illocutionary and attitudinal adverbials
(44) Frankly, Peter is a bore.
(45) Sadly, I can't stand Peter.
(46) Fortunately, Mary was able to repair the car.
(47) Regrettably, Mary was unable to repair the car.
The case of (44) and (45) is slightly different from that of (38) and (39). Utterances
of sentences like (44) and (45) can be given truth conditions. However, frankly will
not figure in the truth conditions of (44), sadly will not contribute to those of (45)
and the same goes for fortunately in (46) and regrettably in (47). The truth or falsity
of an utterance of (44) will depend only on whether Peter is a bore or not and not on
whether the speaker is being frank in saying so. In the same vein, the truth or falsity
of an utterance of (45) will depend solely on whether the speaker can stand Peter and
not on whether the speaker (or anyone else) is sad about the fact that she can't stand
Peter. The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for fortunately and regrettably in (46) and
(47).
There is, however, an interesting difference between frankly and sadly, on the
one hand, and fortunately and regrettably on the other. As (48) and (49) show, both
frankly and sadly can contribute to the truth conditions of utterances containing them
when they function as manner adverbials.
(48) Peter spoke frankly.
(49) Mary smiled sadly.
Interestingly, utterances in which fortunately and regrettably contribute to the truth
conditions of utterances containing them are extremely rare, though not completely
non-existent, as (50) and (51) show.
(50) Things turned out most fortunately.
(51) She left regrettably soon after she arrived.
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In this, there seems to be a difference between frankly and sadly, on the one hand,
and fortunately and regrettably and the illocutionary particles discussed below, on
the other.
1.5.4 Illocutionary and attitudinal particle?
(52) Oh, you're such a bore.
(53) Peter is an interesting man, huh!
(54) You like Peter, eh?
(55) Alas, I can't stand Peter.
Some illocutionary particles, like eh and huh for example, seem to have an effect
similar to that of non-declarative syntax. Thus, eh roughly has the effect of turning
(54) into a question25. Others, for example oh and alas, function more like
illocutionary and attitudinal adverbials. Alas has an effect very similar to that of an
attitudinal adverbial like regrettably, while oh seems to be capable of expressing
emotions ranging from surprise to contempt.
With the exception of indexicals, all the elements discussed so far have one
thing in common, namely the fact that their use results in the construction of a
higher-level representation in which the proposition expressed by the utterance is
embedded. So, an utterance of an interrogative sentence like (39), repeated as (56)
below, can be said to communicate the higher-level representation in (57).
(56) Do you like chocolate?
(57) The speaker is asking the hearer whether he likes chocolate.
Similarly, an utterance of (44), repeated as (58), will communicate (59). However,
in addition it will also communicate (60), which corresponds to the truth-conditional
content of, or proposition expressed by the utterance.
24 It's not entirely clear that these particles are part of the language system at all, i.e. it's not clear that
they have any encoded linguistic meaning at all. However, if they do, their meaning is certainly non-
truth-conditional and for this reason I'm including them here.
It might not be immediately clear to the reader why I'm putting huh together with eh. Huh seems
to indicate that the speaker is being ironic. On the relevance-theoretic account, interrogatives and
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(58) Frankly, Peter is a bore.
(59) The speaker is saying frankly that Peter is a bore.
(60) Peter is a bore.
Finally, an utterance of (46), repeated as (61), will communicate (62) and (63).
(61) Fortunately, Mary was able to repair the car.
(62) Mary was able to repair the car.
(63) It is fortunate that Mary was able to repair the car.
This brings out an interesting difference between utterances like (56) and those like
(58) and (79) - some explanation will have to be given as to why the latter
communicates its proposition expressed while the former doesn't. This question will
be discussed in some detail in chapter 4.
1.5.5 'Stylistic differences'
At first sight, the elements listed below might seem to be too diverse to fall under the
same heading. The case of manage in particular might seem to have little to do with
'stylistic differences'. In fact, I'm not particularly attached to this title and had I
been able to think of a better one I would have used that. However, there is
something the elements below have in common and for that reason I have grouped
them together here. What they have in common is that, unlike the elements
discussed in 1.5.2 - 1.5.4, they do not result in a higher-level representation
embedding the propositional content of the rest of the utterance. Rather they could
be said to result in the construction of an entirely independent proposition, which is
not part of the truth-conditional content of the utterance.
The difference between (64a) and (b) is one of the cases Frege looked at.
(64) a. A dog ate my steak.
b. A cur ate my steak.
irony share an important feature, namely the fact that they are interpretive (or metarepresentational)
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It seems very clear that, if they are uttered in the same context, the truth conditions of
(64a) will indeed be the same as those of (64b). Whether a speaker utters (64a) or
(64b), what she has said will be true if and only if a canine ate her steak. However,
the two differ in the speaker's attitude towards the canine. If a speaker utters (64a)
her communicated attitude towards the dog can be neutral (at least as far as anyone's
attitude can remain neutral towards a creature that has just devoured a prime cut of
beef). In (64b), on the other hand, the attitude she communicates is necessarily
negative.
(65a) and (b) are truth-conditionally equivalent but, while in (64a) the
speaker's communicated attitude towards the dog can be neutral, the speaker's
communicated attitude towards the lecture is not neutral in either (65a) or (b).
Instead it is negative in the former and positive in the latter.
(65) a. You'll be spared a lecture.
b. You'll be deprived of a lecture.
(66b) is an example very similar to (64b) and (65).
(66) a.	 Peter ate my steak.
	
b.	 That bastard Peter ate my steak.
The truth conditions of (66a) and (b) when uttered in the same context will be exactly
the same. Similar to someone uttering (64b), a speaker uttering (66b) will not only
communicate that Peter ate her steak but also (and in no uncertain terms) her
negative attitude towards Peter.
(67) a. Je t'aime.
b. Je vous aime.
c. Ich liebe dich.
d. Ich liebe sie.
'I love you.'
uses of language. More will be said about this in chapter 4.
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If any of (67a-d) are uttered by the same speaker in the same context, they will be
true in exactly the same circumstances. Again, the fact that an utterance of (67a) or
(c) implies a greater degree of familiarity between the speaker and the hearer than an
utterance of (67b) or (d), is not part of the utterance's truth conditional content.
Similarly, (68a) and (b), if uttered in the same context, will both be true if and
only if Peter repaired the car. The fact that (68b) implies that it was difficult for
Peter to repair the car does not affect the truth conditions of an utterance of (68b).
(68) a. Peter repaired the car.
b. Peter managed to repair the car.
In (69) and (70), too, there is no truth-conditional difference between (a) and (b).
The fact that (69b) implies that one wouldn't have expected John to be there as early
as the time of utterance, while (69a) doesn't, is not a matter of the utterances' truth
conditions. Analogously, it is no part of the truth conditions of (70b) that Jane is
expected to get there.
(69) a. John is here.
b. John is here already.
(70) a. Jane isn't here.
b. Jane isn't here yet.
All the (b) examples above have in common the fact that they make available an
implication distinct from the truth-conditional content of the utterance.
1.5.6 Focus particles
The focus particles even, too and also in (71), (72) and (73) below do not make a
difference to the truth conditions of their host utterances 26. All three utterances will
be true if and only if John came to the party. These focus particles also seem to
communicate assumptions which aren't higher-level representations. However, the
This statement will be qualified in 4.6.7.
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assumptions these elements give rise to aren't entirely independent either. It is more
that focus particles (as the name would suggest) highlight certain aspects of the
utterance and 'comment' on these aspects.
(71) Even John came to the party.
(72) John came to the party too.
(73) John also came to the party.
For example, even in (71) seems to suggest that John's coming to the party is less
likely than other people coming to the party. Too and also in (72) and (73), both
seem to indicate, depending on what they are taken to focus on, that John wasn't the
only person to come to the party, that the party wasn't the only event John came to,
or that coming to the party wasn't the only thing John did.
1.5.7 Connectives
The case of connectives as they appear in (74) to (79) seems slightly different again.
It is possible that these connectives communicate an independent assumption as well.
It is equally possible that they indicate how the truth-conditional content of the
clauses or sentences they introduce is connected to the preceding clause or sentence.
(74) Peter is a bore but I like him.
(75) I like Peter although he's a bore.
(76) Peter is a bore. Nevertheless, I like him.
(77) Peter is a bore. However, I like him.
(78) You'll like Peter. After all, you're into bores.
(79) You seem to go for bores. So, you'll like Peter.
Again, what all these connectives have in common is that they do not affect the truth-
conditional content of the sentences or clauses they connect. So, for instance, the
proposition expressed by an utterance of (74) will be true just in case Peter is a bore
and the speaker likes him. The extra assumption, communicated by the use of but,
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something along the lines of there being a contrast or incompatibility between Peter
being a bore and the speaker liking him, is not part of the truth conditions of (74)•27
In this section, I have given an overview of the different kinds of non-truth-
conditional linguistic elements. They have been broadly divided into seven groups:
pronouns (and other indexicals), non-declarative sentence types, illocutionary and
attitudinal adverbials, illocutionary and attitudinal particles, 'stylistic' differences,
focus particles and connectives. The question now is how these elements can be
accounted for and whether they can all be accounted for in the same way. The next
chapter will look at how theorists who work within essentially truth-conditional
semantic frameworks have answered these questions28.
In chapter 3 I consider Argumentation Theory, which ultimately offers an
approach to linguistic meaning that doesn't use the notion of truth conditions at all, at
the cost of being able to capture the intuition that utterances are about things.
Chapter 4 introduces Relevance Theory, which I will argue can account for 'truth-
conditional' and 'non-truth-conditional' linguistic meaning alike, avoiding the
problems encountered by traditional truth-conditional theories of linguistic
semantics, while still capturing the 'aboutness' intuition. In chapters 5 to 7 I look at
the meaning of three particular, 'concessive', 'non-truth-conditional' expressions,
but, although and even if, before concluding with some remarks on 'concessive'
interpretations and the usefulness of the notion of truth conditions in linguistic
semantics in general.
27 Bach (e.g. 1994, 1999) would not agree with this. According to him, connectives like those
discussed here are part of 'what is said' or the truth-conditional content of the utterances in which they
occur. I discuss his view in chapter 2.
Note that not all theorists include all of the elements listed above in their accounts.
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CHAPTER 2
'NON-TRUTH-CONDITIONAL' MEANING ACCOMMODATED IN
TRUTH-CONDITIONAL FRAMEWORKS
2.1	 Introduction
The approaches to linguistic semantics discussed in this chapter have two things in
common: They are all ultimately truth-conditional, and they recognise and
endeavour to accommodate the existence of 'non-truth-conditional' linguistic
meaning of the type encoded by the devices listed at the end of chapter 1. That is,
whether the theories are primarily interested in sentence meaning or whether their
main interest lies with utterance meaning (i.e. with the meaning sentences acquire
when uttered in a context), they all use the notion of truth conditions to account for
linguistic meaning. At the same time, all these theories also recognise the limitations
of this enterprise and they introduce supplementary theoretical machinery to deal
with 'non-truth-conditional' meaning. This is what makes these theories so
interesting in the context of this thesis: Even though my ultimate suggestion will be
that sentence and utterance meaning can (and should) be accounted for in cognitive
terms without employing the notion of truth conditions, the ways in which
fundamentally truth-conditional theories of sentence and/or utterance meaning have
gone about accommodating the existence of 'non-truth-conditional' meaning in their
frameworks provides some useful insights into how one may or may not account for
the meaning of such expressions.
I will start by presenting the views of theorists interested in sentence meaning
rather than utterance meaning. These are the theorists Strawson (1971: 171) refers to
as "theorists of formal semantics". This will include the views of Frege and Kaplan,
both of whom are interested in sentence meaning rather than speaker meaning, even
though the ways in which they account for it differ greatly. The second part of this
chapter will be devoted to theorists more interested in what speakers mean when
using sentences. Strawson's (1971: 171) term for these theorists is "theorists of
communication-intentions". These are essentially the speech act theorists Austin,
Searle, Bach & Harnish, Gnce and Bach. I will also look at a variety of
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presuppositional approaches, some of which have a formal semantics background
and some of which are firmly rooted within theories of communication-intentions.
Throughout, attention will be paid to the question whether or not all elements of non-
truth-conditional meaning can be given the same treatment and thus whether the
linguistic devices listed at the end of the last chapter form a natural class at all.
2.2	 Frege: sense, reference, tone and force
Thus the content of a sentence often goes beyond the thought expressed by it.
But the opposite often happens too; the mere wording which can be made
permanent by writing or the gramophone, does not suffice for the expression of
the thought.
(Frege 1918, in McGuiness 1984: 357/8)
Bearing in mind that for Frege a thought is in fact a truth condition', the second
sentence of the above quote shows that Frege recognised that, often, the linguistic
meaning of a sentence does not yield a fully propositional form, which can be given
truth conditions. In fact, this could be seen as Frege's own version of the semantic
underdeterminacy thesis. Given that he wanted to see natural language as parallel to
logical languages as far as possible and that he attempted to give a strictly
compositional account of natural language sentences, it's interesting that Frege
recognised the existence of semantic underdeterminacy. However, it is the first
sentence of the quote which is of greater interest to the concerns of this chapter. It
indicates that Frege also recognised the fact that there are elements of linguistic
meaning which cannot be captured in truth-conditional terms. Among others, he
mentions the difference between horse, steed, nag and prad, the difference between
but and and, words like fortunately, regrettably, still and already (McGuiness 1984:
356/7). He also noted that the meaning of non-declarative sentences cannot directly
be captured in terms of truth conditions.
It is particularly important when dealing with Frege's treatment of language
to keep in mind the fact that Frege was not just a philosopher, but, perhaps first and
foremost, a mathematician and logician. In his capacity as a logician and
'More will be said about this below.
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mathematician, he was only interested in those aspects of language which would be
needed for mathematical and logical exposition. Since the logician needs language to
capture facts about the validity of arguments, i.e. to show how the truth of the
conclusion follows from the truth of the premises, it follows that Frege's main
concern was with truth-conditional meaning. However, as Dummett (1981: 83)
points out, in his capacity as a philosopher, Frege did not just want to give an
analysis of language as it is used for the purposes of logic and mathematics but of the
workings of language in general. This led to his recognition that not all linguistic
meaning can be captured in truth-conditional terms. The fact that someone like Frege
recognised the existence of such meaning, to my mind, indicates just how
fundamental it is to natural language. Presumably Frege would have liked natural
language to be as close to an ideal logical language as possible. It seems, therefore,
poignant that he had to introduce the notions of 'tone' and 'force' to capture those
aspects of meaning that escape truth-conditional treatment. The rest of this section
will provide an outline of Frege's ideas about meaning, especially his notions of tone
and force. It draws heavily on Miller (1998), which gives a very clear overview of
the points central to Frege's framework.
Frege's system is strictly compositional. In other words, the reference of a
complex expression is determined by the reference of its parts (Miller 1998: 11) and
the same goes for the sense of a complex expression (Miller 1998: 29).
Compositionality works in two ways. On the one hand, one can start with the sense
and reference of a complex expression. One can then say that the sense of a simple
expression will be what it contributes to the sense of the complex expression
containing it and the reference of the simple expression will be its contribution to the
reference of the complex expression. On the other hand, one can start with the sense
and reference of simple expressions and build the sense and reference of complex
expression out of them. It seems that Frege went the first way, i.e. starting from the
sense and reference of sentences, he worked out the sense and reference of proper
names, predicates, connectives and quantifiers. Therefore, the notions of sense,
reference, tone and force will all first be introduced as they apply to sentences.
According to Frege, the reference of a sentence is a truth-value. Since sense is that
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which determines reference, the sense of a sentence is its truth condition, Frege calls
this a thought2.
For Frege, the reference of a proper name is the object it stands for (Miller
1998: 12). The reference of a predicate is a function from objects to truth-values.
For instance, the reference of the predicate is green is a function which maps green
objects onto the value 'true' and all other objects onto 'false'. The reference of a
connective is a first-level function from truth-values to truth-values. Thus, the
reference of the connective and in sentences of the form P and Q will be a function
which takes one from the values 'true' for P and 'true' for Q to 'true' for P and Q.
Finally, the reference of a quantifier is a second-level function from concepts 3 to
truth-values (Miller 1998: 18). For example, the reference of the quantifier all in all
x are F (e.g. everyone is mortal) will be a function which takes the concept x is F as
input and yields the value 'true' if every object in the domain of quantification is
paired with 'true' in the extension of F.
Given this characterisation of the reference of proper names, predicates,
connectives and quantifiers, and the fact that sense is seen as that which determines
reference, it becomes quite difficult to see how the sense of proper names, predicates,
connectives and quantifiers can be characterised. It seems much easier to start by
looking at the sense of a sentence, i.e. its truth condition, and to say that the sense of
a proper name, a predicate, a connective or a quantifier is its contribution to the truth
condition of the sentence. After all, we do seem to have intuitions about the truth
conditions of sentences (or utterances of sentences), while it is not so easy to see how
we could have direct intuitions about what contribution individual expressions make
to the truth conditions of the sentences in which they occur4. However, as Frege
realised, there are elements of meaning which cannot be capture4in terms of sense
and reference.
Non-declarative sentences present a first problem for Frege's notions of sense
and reference. Clearly a question like (1), does not have a truth-value and therefore it
2 As Miller (1998: 33) points out it is important to recognise that Frege's notion of thought is neither
subjective nor psychological. On this picture, thoughts are abstract entities.
Note that for Frege a concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value (Miller 1998: 15).
' For further discussion of the notion of truth conditions and our intuitions about them see 4.5.2 and
8.2.1.
44
does not have reference. Since it has no truth-value it cannot have a truth condition,
which means it doesn't have sense either.
(1) Do you like chocolate?
According to Miller (1998: 57), Frege gets around this problem by saying that the
meaning of a sentence can be given by an ordered pair consisting of the sense of a
sentence and an indication of its force. Thus, (1) could be rendered as the ordered
pair in (2).
(2) <you like chocolate, force of a question>
This ties in with what was mentioned above, namely that there seems to be a general
consensus that for every non-declarative sentence there is a related proposition which
can be given truth conditions5. In other words, the constituent words of a question
like (1), for example, do have sense and reference, it is just that the interrogative
syntax indicates that the sentence is to be taken with the force of a question.
There is, however, an entirely different kind of meaning, which cannot be captured
in terms of sense or reference and, indeed, as the following quote from Frege's The
thought shows, the notion of force can do nothing towards explaining that kind of
meaning.
An assertoric sentence often contains, over and above a thought and assertion, a
third component not covered by the assertion. This is often meant to act on the
feelings and mood of the hearer, or to arouse his imagination. Words like
'regrettably' and 'fortunately' belong here.
(Frege 1918, in McGuiness 1984: 356)
A little further on Frege gives some concrete examples of this.
It makes no difference to the thought whether I use the word 'horse' or 'steed'
or 'nag' or 'prad'. The assertoric force does not cover the ways in which these
This certainly seems to be true for yes/no questions. However, as mentioned in chapter 1, in the case
of wh-questions, it is more likely that the related proposition is incomplete and can, therefore, not be
given a complete truth condition.
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words differ. What is called mood, atmosphere, illumination in a poem, what
is portrayed by intonation and rhythm, does not belong to the thought.
Much in language serves to aid the hearer's understanding, for instance
emphasizing part of a sentence by stress or word-order. Here let us bear in
mind words like 'still' and 'already'. Someone using the sentence 'Alfred has
still not come' actually says 'Alfred has not come', and at the same time hints -
but only hints - that Alfred's arrival is expected. Nobody can say: since
Alfred's arrival is not expected, the sense of the sentence is false. The way that
'but' differs from 'and' is that we use it to intimate that what follows it
contrasts with what was to be expected from what preceded it. Such
conversational suggestions make no difference to the thought.
(Frege 1918, in McGuiness 1984: 357)
Apart from words like regrettably and fortunately, stress and word-order, the
difference between horse, nag, steed and prad, words like still and already and the
difference between but and and, Frege mentions the difference between passive and
active constructions and that between sentences of the form A gave B to C and those
of the form C received B from A. As the following quote from On sense and
reference shows, although is another element which falls into this category.
Subsidiary clauses beginning with 'although' also express complete thoughts.
This conjunction actually has no sense and does not change the sense of the
clause but only illuminates it in peculiar fashion (similarly in the case of 'but',
'yet'). We could indeed replace the concessive clause without harm to the truth
of the whole by another of the same truth value; but the light in which the
clause is placed by the conjunction might then easily appear unsuitable, as if a
song with a sad subject were to be sung in a lively fashion.
(Frege 1892, in Geach and Black 1970: 73-4).
All the elements mentioned in this paragraph have what Frege refers to as tone, or
sometimes 'illumination' or 'colouring'. What is immediately striking about this is
how different many of these elements are from each other. While Frege' s statement
that tone is meant to act on the hearer's mood or feelings or to stimulate his
imagination might do the trick if one wants to account for the difference between
horse and steed, or that between dog and cur, it doesn't seem very appropriate if one
wants to account for the meaning of still and already or the difference between but
and and. Another thing one might notice is that some of the elements Frege
discusses do have sense (and reference) plus tone, while others seem to have just tone
and no sense (or reference). It is easy to see that dog and cur will have both sense
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and reference, i.e. both expressions will contribute to the truth-conditional content of
the sentences containing them. In fact, they both have the same sense and reference.
The difference between them, which cannot be captured in truth-conditional terms,
lies in their tone. The same goes for but and and6, they both make the same
contribution to the truth conditions of sentences containing them. Again, the
difference between them lies in the tone. By contrast, as (3)-(6) should show, words
like fortunately and regrettably, and still and already do not contribute to the truth
conditions of the sentences that contain them at all. In other words, they have no
sense (and no reference). They have only tone and they contribute only to the tone of
sentences containing them and not to their sense or reference. This should become
clear if one considers an example such as (3).
(3) Fortunately, Mary was able to repair the car.
(4) Regrettably, Mary was unable to repair the car.
(5) Alfred has still not come.
(6) Alfred is already here.
Clearly, the truth or falsity of (3) will depend only on whether Mary was or wasn't
able to repair the car and not on whether the speaker thinks this was fortunate or not.
Similarly, the truth or falsity of (5) will depend solely on whether Alfred has come.
As Frege pointed out, the fact that Alfred is not expected will not be enough to make
an utterance of (5) false. It is a matter of tone that (5) conveys an assumption that
Alfred is, indeed, expected and not one of sense or reference.
There are a number of problems with Frege's notion of tone. Possibly the
most serious one is that the notion seems to be little more than a convenient label for
a certain type of non-truth-conditional phenomenon. By saying that the elements
mentioned above contribute to the tone of a sentence Frege doesn't actually provide
an account of their meaning and neither does he say whether, or how, tone is
compositional. If tone is to be a theoretically useful notion at all, it needs a good deal
of explication. All Frege offers on this front is that he, as Dummett (1981: 85) points
out, associates tone with the notion of 'idea'. An 'idea', for Frege, is a subjective
6 That is certainly true on Frege's account. It will be seen in chapter 5 that not all theorists would
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"image" in a person's mind. These images, according to Frege (e.g. in Geach &
Black 1970: 60/1), cannot be shared, they are incommunicable in principle. Thus, a
certain word might conjure up a certain idea in one hearer's mind and quite a
different one in another's. The problem with this is that the difference between dog
and cur clearly lies in the conventional meaning of the two words and it should
therefore be, at least more or less, the same for all speakers of English. Frege
certainly wants meaning to be objective. Dummett (1981: 85) argues that, even if
ideas are subjective (and, therefore, tone is subjective), which is something he
doubts, it doesn't follow that they are incommunicable in principle. Dummett's
(1981: 88) explanation for Frege's "carelessness" (Dummett's words) in his
treatment of tone is lack of interest. As mentioned above, Frege's main concern was
with matters of truth and logic. Still, the very fact that Frege recognised that there is
linguistic meaning above and beyond that which makes a difference to the truth or
falsity of a sentence seems reason enough to include his ideas in this chapter.
The fact that Frege assigns reference, sense, force and tone to sentences gives
rise to the following question: In order to know what a sentence means, does one
have to know its reference, its senses, its force and its tone? Put differently, which
of these features constitute sentence meaning? As Dummett (1981: 83/4) points out,
Frege does not use an expression to cover the general, intuitive notion of 'meaning'.
It seems clear that reference cannot be identified with meaning for the following
reason. The reference of a sentence is its truth-value. Thus, all true sentences have
the same reference, i.e. 'true', and all false sentences have the reference 'false'.
Therefore, if meaning were just reference, all true sentences would have the same
meaning, i.e. 'true'. By analogy, all false sentences would have the same meaning,
i.e. 'false'. This shows that reference certainly isn't sufficient to determine meaning.
In fact, Frege points out that an expression can have a sense without having
reference. In other words, a sentence can have a truth condition without having a
truth-value.
agree.
48
The words 'the celestial body most distant from the Earth' have a sense, but it
is very doubtful if there is also a thing they mean7.
(Frege 1892, in Geach & Black 1970: 58)
So, reference is not only not sufficient to determine meaning, it isn't necessary either.
This is reflected in Dummett's (1981: 84) view that, if Frege wanted to analyse the
general intuitive notion of 'meaning', he would do so in terms of sense, force and
tone but not reference.8
To summarise this section so far, Frege accounts for the meaning of words
and sentences using the notions of sense, force and tone and (indirectly) reference.
He appeals to the notion of force to account for non-declarative sentence types. The
notion of tone is used in accounting for attitudinal adverbials, such as fortunately and
regrettably, stylistic differences, like that between horse, steed, nag and prad, and
connectives like but and although. As far as I am aware, Frege does not discuss
illocutionary adverbials or illocutionary and attitudinal particles and focus particles,
but it seems fair to say that the notion of tone, if it is theoretically useful at all, could
be applied to these phenomena too.
There is one class of expressions listed at the end of chapter 1 that I haven't
yet discussed, namely indexicals. These, as Perry (1977/1991: 146) points outpose a
serious problem for Frege's framework. In a nutshell, the problem is this: Indexicals
have a linguistic meaning or character that is stable across contexts, but the
contribution they make to the truth conditions of the utterances in which they occur
changes from context to context. The question is how the stable meaning of
indexicals can be captured in Frege's framework. Since sense is that which
determines reference and the linguistic meaning of an indexicals helps, to a greater or
lesser extent, to determine its reference, one might assume that sense can do duty as
the stable meaning of indexicals. However, as Frege sees it, the sense of a sentence
is its truth condition and the truth condition of a sentence containing an indexical
varies from context to context. Therefore, the contribution an indexical makes to the
truth condition of the sentence in which it occurs, i.e. its sense, cannot be its stable
meaning. The stable meaning of an indexical has to come in at a level prior to sense,
' It is clear from the German original that mean here should be understood as refer to.
$ This seems all the more convincing for the fact that it is very easily possible for someone to know the
meaning of a sentence without knowing whether it is true or false.
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but Frege's framework does not allow for such a level. The next section is devoted
to Kaplan who provides a theoretical framework capable of dealing with indexicals.
2.3	 Kaplan: semantics of meaning and semantics of use
Kaplan is probably best known for his treatment of pronouns and demonstratives. It
is, therefore, to be expected that Kaplan will have most to say about the elements
discussed in 1.5.1. This is certainly true for Kaplan's published work. However, in
1998 Kaplan gave a talk in Paris in which he discussed many of the other elements
listed at the end of chapter 1 in terms quite similar to those in which he discussed
pronouns and demonstratives in Kaplan (1989). In what follows, I'll give a brief
outline of Kaplan's theory of indexicals. I'll then discuss how he extends this theory
to cover a wider range of expressions with non-truth-conditional meaning.
Kaplan (1989) accounts for the meaning of indexicals using the notions of
character and content. The character of an expression is a function that yields the
(propositional/truth-conditional) content of the expression in a given context of use.
The content of a whole sentence can then be judged true or false in different possible
worlds, or circumstances of evaluation. Since, arguably, most natural language
expressions, e.g. saw in (7), contribute the same propositional component in all
contexts of use, for most expressions character and content coincide. However,
indexicals are different: The propositional components they contribute vary from
context to context. Therefore, the character of an indexical, like yesterday9 in (7), is
different from its content in a given context.
(7)	 He saw her yesterday.
If (7) was uttered on 1 January 2000, yesterday would contribute '31 December
1999' to the proposition expressed by the utterance. If it had been uttered on 25
December 1999, its contribution to the proposition expressed would be '24
December 1999'. While the propositional component contributed by yesterday (i.e.
Yesterday is a member of the special class of 'pure indexicals', briefly discussed in 1.5.1. I'm using
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its content) varies across contexts, the rule that yields this content in a given context
of use (i.e. its character) remains stable. As any speaker of English knows, yesterday
refers to the day before the utterance'°. In this way Kaplan manages to capture the
context-dependence of indexicals as well as the idea that indexicals do have some
encoded semantic meaning that remains stable across contexts.
So far, it seems that Kaplan would find it difficult to account for most of the
other elements discussed at the end of chapter 1: Not many of them contribute to the
proposition expressed by their host utterances. So, not many of them could be seen
as having content at all. As a matter of fact, even for those expressions that do make
a truth-conditional contribution, for instance cur in (8), there is an element of
meaning (e.g. the speaker's negative attitude towards the dog) that seems to be lost
on Kaplan's early picture, because it isn't part of the truth-conditional content of the
utterance.
(8) A cur ate my steak.
However, Kaplan (1998) deals with examples like (9), (10), (11) and (12), as well as
with the expressions goodbye, ouch and oops.
(9) That bastard Peter ate my steak.
(10) a.	 Jet'aime.
b.	 Je vous aime.
(11) Peter is a bore but I like him.
(12) I like Peter although he is a bore.
The idea is that these expressions share with indexicals the property that they should
be given a Semantics of Use rather than (or as well as) a Semantics of Meanings.
Contrary to received opinion in formal semantics, Kaplan (1998) argues that
yesterday as an example for simplicity's sake.
'° As with all so-called pure indexicals, this isn't true of absolutely every use of yesterday. In direct
quotations and figurative uses, for mstance, the indexical can refer to a day (or even a longer period)
other than the day before the utterance, cf. (i) and (ii).
(i) A: What did Mary say last Sunday?
B: She said: "I drank far too much yesterday".
(ii) Yesterday, all my troubles seemed so far away.
expressions like those mentioned above should be treated within its framework,
because their presence or absence makes a difference to the validity of arguments.
To support this view, he gives two examples similar to (13) and (14).
(13) That bastard Peter ate my steak.
Peter ate my steak.
(14) Peter ate my steak.
That bastard Peter ate my steak.
Kaplan's intuitions are that the argument an (13) is valid while that in (14) isn't.
Obviously, if the validity of these two arguments depended solely on the preservation
of truth, as it is normally understood, they should both be valid.
To account for examples like these, Kaplan introduces the notions of
descriptive content and expressive content. According to him, an expression has
descriptive content if it describes something that is or isn't the case, while an
expression has expressive content if it expresses (or displays) something that is or
isn't the case. Descriptive content seems to correspond to truth-conditional or
propositional content, expressive content doesn't. Descriptive content is
representational, expressive content isn't. Kaplan illustrates the difference between
expressing and describing in the following way: If someone screams, they display or
express fear, if they say I'm in fear they describe it. While the distinction between
expressing and describing is intuitively clear, there is a noticeable lack of theoretical
definition of the two notions.
Parallel to the notions of descriptive and expressive content, Kaplan
introduces the notions of descriptive correctness and expressive correctness. An
expression is descriptively correct if what it describes is the case, an expression is
expressively correct if what it expresses is the case. Let's return to the arguments in
(13) and (14). According to Kaplan, that bastard expresses derogation. Thus, the
premise in (13), That bastard Peter ate my steak, is expressively correct if the
speaker has a derogatory attitude towards Peter. It will be descriptively correct iff
Peter ate the speaker's steak.
Now Kaplan can capture the difference between the argument in (13) and that
in (14). The premise in (13) has descriptive and expressive content, the conclusion
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only descriptive content. In (14), on the other hand, the premise has only descriptive
content and the conclusion has additional expressive content not present in the
premise. Clearly, on the traditional conception of logical validity, where an argument
is valid if it is truth-preserving, this difference between (13) and (14) doesn't explain
why the former should be valid but not the latter. If Kaplan wants to preserve his
intuitions concerning the validity of these arguments he must redefine either logical
validity or truth.
Kaplan first pursues the first option. On his new definition, an argument will
be valid, not if it preserves truth, but if it observes 'information delimitation'. In
other words, an argument is valid iff the conclusion doesn't contain any semantic
information that isn't already contained in the premise. On this definition, (13) is a
valid argument because its conclusion doesn't contain any information that isn't
already present in the premise. (14) isn't valid because there is expressive content in
its conclusion that isn't there in the premise.
Kaplan also considers the second option where the notion of truth gets a
broader definition. On this broader definition a sentence will be true if and only if it
is not only descriptively correct, but also expressively correct. Kaplan calls this
'truth-plus'. if this course of action is adopted, logical validity can still be defined in
terms of truth-preservation, it's just that the 'truth' in question is truth-plus. This
redefinition, too, captures Kaplan's intuitions regarding the validity of (13) and the
non-validity of (14). (13) is valid because the expressive and descriptive áorrectness
of the premise guarantees the descriptive correctness of the conclusion. (14) is not
valid because the descriptive correctness of the premise is not enough to guarantee
the descriptive and expressive correctness of the conclusion".
On the whole, Kaplan's introduction of the notion of expressive content can
be seen as a recognition of the generally accepted fact that not all semantic meaning
can be treated in truth-conditional terms. However, Kaplan's eagerness to use the
tools of logic to capture non-truth-conditional meaning is slightly more contentious.
It is obvious that the paper Kaplan presented in Paris is programmatic in nature and,
apart from the fact that the expressing/describing distinction is only explicated in
Kaplan doesn't say which of these two options he prefers. Personally, I find the first slightly more
appealing than the second, because it leaves the possibility of distinguishing two kinds of validity:
logical (defined in terms of truth) and expressive (defined in terms of information delimitation).
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intuitive terms, there are a number of questions it doesn't answer. Possibly the most
pressing one of these is: How do the notions of descriptive and expressive content fit
in with Kaplan's earlier notions of character and content? The one thing that seems
clear is that 'content' in Kaplan's earlier work corresponds to 'descriptive content' in
Kaplan (1998). It seems equally clear that character cannot correspond to descriptive
content, because it is on a different, prior, level (recall that it is that which determines
descriptive content). Furthermore, it can't correspond to expressive content either
because that surely has to be situated on the same level as descriptive content, namely
at the level at which the sentence is evaluated for descriptive or expressive
correctness. The question, then, is whether there is such a thing as 'expressive
character', since, presumably, the notion of 'character' that leads to descriptive
content is still needed to account for the meaning of indexicals. If there is such a
thing as expressive character, what is its role? It is conceivable that if the character
of an indexical is a rule of use, the character of an expressive could be a rule of use
too. Thus, the character of yesterday could be something like 'use to refer to the day
before the day of utterance' and that of bastard something like 'use if you want to
express a derogatory attitude towards the object'. If this is right one could say that
the domain of Kaplan's Semantics of Use was character and, possibly, expressive
content, while the domain of his Semantics of Meanings would be descriptive
content. However, there is still the question of what expressive content would look
like or, indeed, how expressive character would determine expressive content in a
given context of use.
It seems that, potentially, Kaplan's Semantics of Use could account for the
majority of the expressions listed at the end of chapter 1.12 At this stage, however,
it's not clear exactly how it could do that. Nevertheless, compared with Frege's
treatment of non-truth-conditional meaning, Kaplan's approach goes a reasonably
long way towards providing a framework (or the beginnings of one) capable of
accounting for all sorts of non-truth-conditional devices.
the possible exception of non-declarative sentence types, which Kaplan doesn't discuss.
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2.4	 Presuppositional approaches
It might not be immediately clear how the notion of presupposition is connected with
non-truth-conditional meaning. However, there are many ways in which
'presupposition' can be and has been construed and on some of these construals the
notion can be used to account for some, if not all, of the phenomena listed in 1.5. I
will here briefly look at some ways in which the notion of presuppositions has been
defined by linguists and philosophers and how (or whether) the different notions of
presupposition can be used to account for expressions with non-truth-conditional
meaning.
The first definition of presupposition I'd like to look at is the classical
semantic, or logical, one. On this view, presupposition is a special sub-class of
entailment.' 3 Wilson (1975: 16) gives the following definition of logical
presupposition:
A sentence S presupposes another sentence P iff if S is true P must be true, and
if not-S is true P must be true, and if P is false or lacks a truth-value both S and
not-S must lack a truth-value.
(15) and (16) are examples that have often been used to illustrate this kind of
presupposition: If (15) is true (17) must be true, if its negation, (16), is true (17) must
be true and if (17) is false, it has been claimed, (15) and (16) lack a truth-value.
(15) Peter has stopped smoking.
(16) Peter hasn't stopped smoking.
(17) Peter has been a smoker.
Clearly, on this view, presuppositions are quite distinct from non-truth-conditional
meaning. For instance, intuitively (18b) might be seen as carrying a presupposition
like the one in (19).
13 Stalnaker (1974/1991) would not agree with this. According to him (1974/1991: 475), "On the
semantic account, presupposition and entailment are parallel and incompatible semantic relations. A
presupposes that B if and only if B is necessitated by both A and its denial. A entails B if and only if B
is necessitated by A but not by its denial." (Stalnaker's emphasis). On this view, entailment and
presupposition are mutually exclusive.
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(18) a.	 Peter repaired the car.
b.	 Peter managed to repair the car.
(19) Repairing the car was difficult for Peter.
This seems all the more convincing for the fact that (20), the negation of (1 8b), also
carries a suggestion along the lines of (19).
(20) Peter didn't manage to repair the car.
However, (19) can't be a logical presupposition of either (18b) or (20) because it's
entailed by neither of those utterances. As mentioned at the end of chapter 1, (18b) is
true iff (18a) is true - any assumptions concerning the difficulty of repairing the car
don't enter into a truth-conditional characterisation of (18b). Someone who utters
(18b) in a context where (19) is not true could not be accused of lying. At most, that
person could be accused of inappropriately uttering (18b) or, possibly, misleading her
audience. For the same reason, none of the other expressions in 1.5 can be accounted
for in terms of logical presupposition. On a different construal of presupposition,
however, the notion can be used to account for such expressions.
Stalnaker (1974/1991) argues for a pragmatic notion of presupposition.
According to him, presupposing is not something a sentence or proposition does, but
something that speakers do. On this reading, a presupposition is an assumption taken
for granted by the speaker (and assumed to be taken for granted by the hearer as
well). Stalnaker (1974/1991: 473) gives the following tentative characterisation of
pragmatic presupposition:
A proposition P is a pragmatic presupposition of a speaker in a given context
just in case the speaker assumes or believes that P, assumes or believes that his
addressee assumes or believes that P, and assumes or believes that his
addressee recognizes that he is making these assumptions.
Stalnaker points out that this characterisation shouldn't be seen as a definition of
pragmatic presuppositions because it's not clear what it is to assume or believe
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something in the relevant sense and even if it were, the definition would need further
qualification, since a speaker can presuppose things that are not known to the hearer
and not presuppose things that are known to both speaker and hearer. Nevertheless,
Stalnaker contends that the notion of shared background knowledge can be used to
account for presuppositional phenomena. According to him (1974/1991: 475),
presuppositions as shared background assumptions can arise in at least two ways.
The first of these is semantic in the sense that it is the conventional (or encoded)
meaning of the words that necessitates the assumption that a speaker in a given
context is making a certain presupposition. For example, it seems to be a semantic
property of the verb manage in sentences of the form X managed to V that it can only
be uttered appropriately in contexts where it is assumed by the speaker that the hearer
assumes that the speaker assumes, and so on, that it is difficult for X to V. Thus, the
sentence in (18b) can only be appropriately uttered in contexts where it is assumed by
speaker and hearer that it was difficult for Peter to repair the car. A speaker choosing
to use the verb manage in a given utterance in a given context can only appropriately
utter a sentence like the one in (18b) if she presupposes that it was difficult for Peter
to repair the car.
The second way in which a pragmatic presupposition can arise is entirely
pragmatic. In other words, it is possible that sometimes a presupposition arises
simply because it would not make sense for a rational speaker to utter a sentence
expressing proposition P if she wasn't presupposing Q. Stalnaker (1974/1991: 476)
discusses the example of know in sentences of the form X knows that P. He believes
that the fact that in most cases where a speaker utters a sentence of this form she will
be taken to be presupposing P can be explained without claiming that there's some
presuppositional constraint built into the semantics of the verb know. He argues as
follows. If a speaker were to utter X knows that P in a context where the truth of P
was in doubt or dispute, she would be saying something that could be challenged on
two counts. It would be unclear whether her main point was to make a claim about
the truth of P or to make a claim about the state of X's knowledge. In other words,
the speaker would be leaving it unclear where she wanted the conversation to be
going. Therefore, given what X knows that P means and the fact that "people
normally want to communicate in an orderly way, and normally have some purpose
in mind" (Stalnaker 1974/1991: 476), it would generally be unreasonable for a
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speaker to utter X knows that P in a context where the truth of P isn't established. In
such a context, the speaker could communicate more efficiently by making a
different utterance. Obviously, if any of the examples in 1.5 are to be treated in
pragmatic presuppositional terms, the presuppositions should be seen as arising in the
first way, i.e. as a result of a semantic property of the expressions discussed.
Like Stalnaker, Recanati (1998: 626-627), too, is not convinced by the logical
notion of presupposition. He finds it more appealing to assume that presuppositions
are part of conventional (i.e. encoded) meaning of an utterance without entering into
its truth conditions. For Recanati, presuppositions, like the one associated with the
verb stop in (15) and (16), should be construed as "conditions of use or constraints on
the context". In other words, the verb stop is seen as encoding the information that
the context should contain a certain proposition, i.e. (17) in the case of (15) and (16).
The claim is then that an utterance of (15) or (16) will only be appropriate in a
context where (17) is available.
Unlike the logical notion of presupposition, the contextual constraint notion
can easily be applied to a case like manage along the lines described above.
However, the notion of contextual constraint needs some clarification. For instance,
does a discourse adverbial like fortunately in (21) constrain the context? One could
argue that an utterance of (21) is appropriate only in contexts in which (22) is
available and, thus, that fortunately encodes a contextual constraint.
(21) Fortunately, Mary was able to repair the car.
(22) The speaker is happy about something.
This shows that if the notion of presupposition is seen as nothing other than a
constraint on context, a whole range of phenomena that have not traditionally been
accounted for in presuppositional terms can be seen as carrying presuppositions.
Many of these phenomena, however, do not intuitively seem presuppositional. For
instance, while most people will grant that an utterance of (23) presupposes (24), no
one seems to believe that (21) presupposes (22).
(23) The king of France is bald.
(24) There is a king of France.
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Depending on the definition of the notion of contextual constraint, practically all the
expressions listed in 1.5 could be said to carry presuppositions in Recanati's sense.
However, it's unclear what would be gained by treating many of them in
presuppositional terms, since the information they convey does not have to be part of
shared background knowledge. If the notion of presupposition is equated with that of
constraint on context it loses its intuitive appeal. It seems to me that the question of
presupposition and that of non-truth-conditional semantics are completely distinct, If
one wants a notion of presupposition that captures intuitions, an account like
Stalnaker's seems most promising, but it will not deliver at the same time an account
of non-truth-conditional meaning. That is something that might well be done using
the notion of contextual constraint, but not before it has been given more substance
than Recanati seems to do.
2.5	 Speech-act theory
2.5.1 Introduction
Unlike Frege and other theorists of formal semantics, speech-act theorists are
primarily interested in natural language as it is used in everyday communication. In
fact, it was against theorists like Frege and his followers, who were firmly rooted in
the tradition of formal logic and were trying to give a formal account of language,
that speech-act theorists were reacting. Where Frege was concerned with sentence
meaning, speech act theorists were interested in speaker meaning. In other words, for
them, the most interesting question is not 'what does the sentence mean?' but 'what
did the speaker mean by uttering the sentence?'. Probably the most famous speech
act theorists are Austin, Searle and Grice. In what follows, I will start with the
speech act theory of Austin and Searle and its developments in the hands of Bach &
Harnish and Recanati, who seem to have most to say about the meaning of non-
declarative sentence types and illocutionary and attitudinal adverbials. The section
following that is concerned with Grice's own version of speech act theory which has
more to say about the meaning of certain non-truth-conditional connectives. Finally,
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a small section is devoted to Bach's more recent criticism of Grice's approach to
non-truth-conditional connectives.
2.5.2 Austin and Searle: the locutionary and the illocutionary
In How To Do Things With Words, Austin (1962:1) starts with the observation that
language can be used for many more things than the making of statements that are
either true or false. This leads him to look at a class of verbs, i.e. performative verbs,
which he believes are not used to make statements (at least not when used in a certain
way in the first person singular) but, as the name suggests, to perform actions. An
example of this is I warn you in (25).
(25) I warn you that there's a bull in that field.
The investigation of the actions we perform when we produce utterances containing
performative verbs then led Austin to consider what sorts of actions we perform
when producing utterances in general. This resulted in the, by now classic,
distinction between locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, all of which
can be (and are) performed in producing utterances (Austin 1962: 95-101).
The locutionary act is the act of saying something. Austin (1962: 92-98)
further analyses the locutionary act as being constituted by phonetic, phatic and rhetic
acts. The phonetic act is the act of uttering certain noises, the phatic act is the act of
uttering certain words in a certain construction, i.e. the uttering of certain noises that
are part of the grammar of a certain language, and, finally, the rhetic act consists in
uttering the words of a certain language in a certain construction with a definite
meaning (which Austin construes as 'sense' and 'reference'). Another way of
characterising locutionary acts, would be to say that they are the uttering of a
sentence with a certain locutionary meaning. It seems that Austin would want to say
that the locutionary meaning of an utterance of (25) would be something along the
lines of (26).
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(26) There's a bull in fieId.'4
This seems problematic because I warn you that certainly must be part of the
phonetic and phatic acts performed in an utterance of (25), i.e. part of the noise made
and also part of the words that are uuered in a certain construction. The only thing
Austin might want to deny is that I warn you that forms part of the rhetic act, i.e. he
might want to deny that these words are uttered with a particular sense and reference
in this kind of context. However, this is only possible if 'sense' and 'reference' are
understood in the Fregean way, i.e. as pertaining to the truth condition of the
utterance. Even then, though, Austin would have to show that 1 warn you that does
not contribute to the truth condition of (25). Quite apart from the worry just voiced,
Austin's characterisation of locutionary meaning is not entirely clear and it has been
interpreted in different ways by different theorists. This will be discussed in some
detail below. For the time being, I will let it stand as it is and move on to the notion
of illocutionary act.
The illocutionary act is the act performed in saying something (Austin 1962:
99). Put differently, it is the act of uttering a sentence with a certain illocutionary
force. In general, whenever someone performs a locutionary act, they also perform
an illocutionary act (though not necessarily the illocutionary act indicated in the
locutionary act' 5). In the case of (25), the illocutionary act performed is an act of
warning. In other words, the sentence is uttered with the illocutionary force of a
warning. Note that this illocutionary force does not have to be explicitly indicated by
a performative verb. For example, an utterance of (25) without I warn you that could
still be used to perform an act of warning. Finally, perlocutionary acts are the acts
performed by saying something, i.e. the act that affects the hearer's feelings, thoughts
or actions (Austin 1962: 101). (25) could, for example, be used to perform the
perlocutionary act of frightening the hearer.
As mentioned above, there is some debate concerning what Austin intended
to fall under the notion of locutionary act. Put slightly differently, there is a question
mark around what exactly constitutes the locutionary meaning of a sentence, on the
one hand, and what makes up the illocutionary force of an utterance, on the other.
subscript x is meant to indicate that a specific field is being referred to.
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This question is particularly important in the context of this chapter, because it is
expressions with non-truth-conditional linguistic meaning that seem to bring out the
problems with Austin's distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts most
clearly. These problems are the following.
Broadly, there seem to be two ways of construing locutionary meaning (with
some intermediate possibilities). The first way is to equate the locutionary meaning
of a sentence with its linguistic meaning, i.e. with what is encoded, plus reference
assignment and disambiguation 16. The second way is to equate locutionary meaning
with propositional content, i.e. the truth conditions of the sentence on an occasion of
utterance. The intermediate possibilities all seem to amount, one way or another, to
equating locutionary meaning with propositional content plus some, but not all, non-
truth-conditional linguistic meaning. Austin seems to believe that explicit
performatives, such as I warn you in (25), are not part of locutionary meaning.
However, I warn you is clearly part of the linguistic meaning of (25). This indicates
that he did not intend locutionary meaning to be construed the first way. Apart from
explicit performatives, like I warn you, the problematic elements are mood
indicators, such as the non-declarative syntax in (27) and (28), illocutionary
adverbials, such as frankly in (29), and possibly also the meaning encoded by the
illocutionary particle eh in (30).
(27) Shut the door.
(28) Do you like chocolate?
(29) Frankly, Peter is a bore.
(30) You like Peter, eh?
Like I warn you, all of these expressions have linguistic meaning (with the possible
exception of eh), i.e. they encode something, but it seems that the information they
encode is more illocutionary than locutionary. That is, the imperative syntax in (27)
could be linked with the illocutionary act of telling to, ordering, suggesting, etc. The
interrogative mood of (28) seems to indicate that the utterance is to be taken with the
15 See Recanati (1987: 258-260).
16 NB. This is meant to amount to (encoded and inferred) truth-conditional content plus encoded non-
truth-conditional content (cf. Recanati 1987: 248).
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force of a question. Frankly in (29) might indicate that the speaker is performing an
act of confessing or admitting something (or, at least, of speaking frankly). And
finally, eh in (30) seems to have an effect similar to the interrogative mood in (27).
As mentioned above, different theorists have interpreted Austin in different
ways or, in some cases, drawn their own distinctions. Searle (1968/1973), for
example, interprets Austin as intending one of the intermediate possibilities.
According to Searle, Austin's locutionary meaning includes all truth-conditional but
only some non-truth-conditional linguistic meaning. Searle bases this interpretation
on a quote from Austin (1962: 95), in which he gives the following examples of
reports of phatic and rhetic acts: 'He said "I shall be there" (reports phatic act), 'He
said that he would be there' (reports rhetic act); 'He said "Get out" (phatic), 'He told
me to get out' (rhetic); 'He said "Is it in Oxford or Cambridge?" (phatic), 'He asked
whether it was in Oxford or Cambridge' (rhetic). From these examples, it seems that
one could conclude that Austin intended locutionary meaning to amount to
propositional content plus an indication of generic illocutionary force, i.e. saying,
telling and asking. If this is how Austin intended locutionary meaning to be defined,
Searle argues, the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts collapses.
Here is his argument.
Searle (1968/1973: 147) points out that the above reports of the rhetic act
(and thus the locutionary act) already contain the illocutionary verbs say, tell and ask.
Now, Searle grants that these are generic illocutionary verbs, but, he maintains, they
are still illocutionary verbs. The fact that Austin has used these verbs in
characterising locutionary acts, means that he has, inadvertently, characterised
locutionary acts as illocutionary acts and, therefore, that the distinction between the
two has collapsed.
Instead of Austin's notion of locutionary act, Searle (1968/1973: 155)
introduces the notion of propositional act, i.e. the act of expressing an illocutionary
force-neutral proposition. This, according to Searle, captures the difference between
the force of an utterance and its content. To sum up, Searle (1968/1973)
distinguishes between the following acts performed when uttering a sentence: the
phonetic act, the phatic act, the propositional act and the illocutionary act. On this
picture, it seems that all the elements discussed in 1.5, with the exception of
indexicals, will have to be accounted for in terms of illocutionary force, since none of
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them make any contribution to the proposition expressed. As mentioned above, for
non-declarative sentences, illocutionary adverbials and particles this might not be
problematic, but it is hard to see how attitudinal adverbs and particles, the stylistic
differences communicated by some expressions (e.g. dog vs. cur) and discourse
connectives (e.g. but and although) could be accounted for in terms of illocutionary
force. In short, Searle's taxonomy leaves some elements of linguistic meaning
unaccounted for.
Strawson (1973) considers roughly the same evidence as Searle (1968/1973)
but reaches slightly different conclusions. Strawson (1973: 50-56) looks at three
possible interpretations of locutionary meaning in turn. His first interpretation is
identical to the first one mentioned above, namely that locutionary meaning amounts
to all linguistic meaning plus reference assignment and disambiguation. Strawson
(1973: 52) concludes that this could not be what Austin had in mind, because Austin
(1962: 73-76) lists a number of elements with linguistic meaning, such as mood,
stress, adverbs and connectives, saying of them that they make clearer the force of the
utterance and that their role could be taken over by explicit performatives (though not
without "change or loss", as Austin (1962: 73) puts it). Since these elements are seen
as making clear the illocutionary force of the utterance and not making more precise
the meaning of the sentence, they cannot be part of the locutionary meaning of the
sentence and locutionary meaning must be less than linguistic meaning.
The second interpretation Strawson examines is the same as the second one
mentioned above. On this interpretation, locutionary meaning amounts to no more
and no less than the truth-conditional content of the sentence as uttered on a certain
occasion. Strawson (1973: 54) comes to the conclusion that this is not likely to be
the intended interpretation either, because the way in which the locutionary meaning
is assessed (as being true or false) depends on what it is that is being assessed, i.e.
whether it is a statement or advice, for example. This leads to the third interpretation
which Strawson considers and adopts.
Like the interpretation Searle (1968/1973) went for, Strawson's third
interpretation is what has been referred to above as an intermediate possibility.
Strawson also concludes from the way in which Austin (1962: 95) characterises the
rhetic act that for Austin it must involve more than just specifying sense and
reference. Therefore, he argues, locutionary meaning should include a rough
asa/
with the force of a!
by way of
(1)
(2)
L (3)
classification of what is said into 'declarative', 'imperative', 'interrogative' and, as
Strawson (1973: 55) puts it "perhaps one or two more". Unlike Searle (1968/1973),
Strawson does not find this idea problematic. In fact, he proposes a schema of
interpretation based on it (1973: 60). In this schema, given in (31), locutionary
meaning and illocutionary force are specified separately. The locutionary meaning of
declaratives is the proposition expressed and that of imperatives is, in Strawson's
(1973: 60) words, the "imperative expressed". Strawson adds that, for the other
general classes of what is said, terms parallel to 'proposition expressed' and
'imperative expressed' will have to be introduced, but he does not suggest what they
could be.
(31)	 1(1) proposition (that S is P)
X issues the	 (2) imperative (that Z (person) is to Y (act))
L 3	?
}
accusation, report, forecast, conclusion,
objection, hypothesis, guess, verdict,
etc.
command, request, piece of advice,
prayer, invitation, entreaty, etc.
9
(Strawson 1973: 60)
On this interpretation of the locutionary/illocutionary distinction, just as on Searle's
(1968/1973) interpretation, most of the elements listed at the end of chapter 1 would
have to be accounted for in terms of illocutionary meaning. The interesting
difference between Searle and Strawson, though, is that while for the former non-
declarative syntax is treated as determining illocutionary force, it looks as though for
the latter it determines what kind of locutionary meaning one is dealing with, i.e.
whether the locutionary meaning is a proposition, an imperative or something else.
Presumably, this approach would be better equipped to explain why statements have
truth conditions but questions and requests don't.
Bach & Harnish (1979) seem to have a conception of locutionary meaning
very similar to Strawson's (1973). They characterise locutionary acts in terms of
what is said, a notion which has itself been given many different interpretations, for
example, most famously, by Gnce and more recently by Bach as discussed in the
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next two sections. Corresponding to sentence mood, they distinguish different kinds
of saying. Thus, according to Bach & Harnish (1979: 25), the locutionary act S
performs in uttering a declarative sentence amounts to (32) and that performed in the
utterance of an imperative to (33). For interrogatives, there are two possibilities: in
the case of a yes/no-interrogative it is (34a) and it is (34b) in that of a wh-
interrogative ('wh-x' stands for the unknown component of F).
(32) S is saying that it is the case that P.
(33) S is saying that H is to make it the case that P.
(34) (a)	 S is asking (or saying that H is to tell S) whether or not it is the case
that P.
(b)	 S is asking (or saying that H is to tell 5) (wh-x P).
In fact, Bach & Harnish's characterisation of imperatives and interrogatives
encounters some serious difficulties. These will be discussed in chapter 4, where I
will advocate an alternative account proposed by Wilson & Sperber (1988).
Recanati's construal of the notion of locutionary act is subtly different from
all of those discussed so far. Although Recanati agrees with Strawson and Searle that
Austin is likely to intend at least some indication of the type of speech act performed
to be part of locutionary meaning, he does not conclude from this that the
locutionary/illocutionary distinction collapses. Recanati (1987: 258-260) stresses the
difference between actual illocutionary acts and indicated illocutionary acts.
According to him, indicated illocutionary acts are the result of linguistic meaning
which encodes information about illocutionary force rather than content 17. For
Recanati, locutionary meaning amounts to the propositional content of the utterance
with all linguistic meaning (including indicated, or 'non-truth-conditional', linguistic
meaning). It is Recanati's argument that indicated illocutionary acts are not the same
as actual illocutionary acts and that, therefore, locutionary and illocutionary acts are
not the same. Recanati's basis for this distinction is the fact, that no matter how
precisely the linguistic meaning of a sentence indicates the illocutionary force with
"It is important to note at this point that Recanati (1987) does not regard explicit performatives as
force-indicating devices in this sense According to Recanati (1987), utterances of sentences
containing explicit performatives are only indirectly performances of the illocutionary acts described
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which it is to be taken, on every occasion on which the sentence is uttered the hearer
still has to determine whether the speaker actually intended to utter the sentence with
that force. For instance, a speaker might utter (28), whose linguistic meaning clearly
indicates that it is to be taken as a question' 8 . However, the speaker might be an
actress who is just saying her lines and doesn't intend it to be a question at all.
Another possibility is that the speaker is aping somebody and the illocutionary act
she actually performs is not one of asking a question but one of mocking the hearer
(if that, indeed, is an illocutionary act...).
(28) Do you like chocolate?
However this may be, the point Recanati is making is that, even where the
illocutionary act actually performed is the same as the indicated illocutionary act, the
hearer has to work out that it is. Therefore, the locutionary act, i.e. the indicated
illocutionary act, is not the same as the illocutionary act, i.e. the illocutionary act
actually performed. Since, on Recanati's view, locutionary meaning encompasses all
linguistic meaning, all the elements discussed in the final section of chapter 1 have to
be seen as contributing to locutionary meaning. The question now is how locutionary
meaning can be characterised. None of the speech act theorists mentioned in this
section seem to have an answer to this question. What is clear is that on this last
construal and the intermediate ones only a certain amount of locutionary meaning can
be accounted for in truth-conditional terms.
2.5.3 Grice: saying and conventionally implicating
Maybe the most important thing to be said about Grice is that he can be seen as a
hybrid figure, so to speak, straddling the divide set out above between philosophers
interested in (formal) sentence meaning and 'ordinary language' philosophers. This
becomes clear when one looks at his theory of meaning and his theory of
conversation. While he firmly believed in characterising meaning in terms of
by the performative.
IS Of course, this is a gross oversimplification of what the interrogative mood encodes, but for present
purposes it is all that is needed. For a more detailed treatment of the interrogative see 4.6.3.
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speakers' intentions, he also wanted to preserve the notion that some natural
language words, like for example and, can be given the same semantics as their
logical counterparts, the truth-functional connective '&' in the case of and.
In Meaning, Grice (1957/1989: 213-223) characterises utterer's meaning as
follows.
"A meant something by x" is (roughly) equivalent to "A intended the
utterance of x to produce some effect in an audience by means of the
recognition of this intention"; and we may add that to ask what A meant is to
ask for a specification of the intended effect.
(Grice 1989:220)
Timeless meaning (i.e. linguistic meaning) is then characterised in terms of utterer's
meaning as the following quote from Grice shows.
"x means (timeless) that so-and-so" might as a first shot be equated with
some statement or disjunction of statements about what "people" (vague)
intend (with qualifications about "recognition") to effect by x.
(Grice 1989: 220)
As these two definitions stand, meaning, be it timeless meaning or utterer's
meaning, is not confined to linguistic meaning. Grice wants the term 'utterance' to
be taken broadly, i.e. not confined to linguistic utterances but to all kinds of actions,
like for example gestures or the showing of a photograph, that can be used to produce
an effect in an audience in the way described above. In later essays, both the notion
of utterer's meaning and that of utterance-type meaning (i.e. timeless meaning), are
given much more sophisticated definitions (see e.g. Grice (1968/1989 &
1969/1989)), though the fundamental concern to explicate sentence and word-
meaning in terms of utterer's meaning and thus in terms of an utterer's intentions
remains 19 . What also remains is that the notion of utterer's meaning goes beyond
linguistic meaning. However, Grice also wanted to give an account of linguistic
meaning, which, it seems fair to say, is a special case of meaning.
Lycan (1999: 108-112) argues convincingly that this enterprise is doomed to failure. Once
ultimately has to give up the idea that speaker meaning alone can explicate sentence and word meaning
and, in effect, ends up with a traditional truth-conditional theory of meaning.
Obviously, what is of particular concern for the purposes of this chapter is
how Grice accounts for 'non-truth-conditional' linguistic meaning. In order to
explain how he does this, let me start with what is possibly Grice's most fundamental
distinction. In Logic and conversation, Grice (1967/1975/1989:24/5) distinguishes
two ways in which a speaker can mean something, namely by 'saying' it or by
'implicating' it. At this point, he merely says that he wants 'what is said' to be
closely related to the conventional meaning of the words uttered. Later, he
(1969/1989, 1968/1989) tackles the task of expanding on this notion of 'what is said'
and links it with the notions of utterer's meaning and timeless meaning.
Grice (1969/1989: 87) gives the following, as he says, "hideously
oversimplified" definition of what it means for an utterer U to 'say' that p:
"U did something x	 (1)	 by which U meant that p.
(2) which is an occurrence of an utterance type S
(sentence) such that
(3) S means 'p'
(4) S consists of a sequence of elements (such as
words) ordered in a way licensed by a system
of rules (syntactical rules)
(5) S means 'p' in virtue of the particular
meanings of the elements of S, their order
and their syntactical character."
He then goes on to say that this is still too wide for the following reason. U's doing
something might be uttering a sentence like (35).
(35) She was poor but she was honest.
Both what U means by uttering (35) and what the sentence means will contain an
element contributed by the word but. However, Gnce does not want the contribution
but makes to be part of 'what is said' in his special sense. He says a little more about
this in Utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning (Grice 1968/1989).
There, he focuses on the distinction between 'what U said' and 'what U
conventionally meant'. For Grice (1968/1989: 121) 'what U conventionally meant'
is defined by the necessary and sufficient conditions in (36).
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(36) U conventionally meant that p iff
(a) when U uttered X, the meaning of X included "p"
(b) part of what U meant when he uttered X was that p.
It seems that on this picture, 'what is conventionally meant' is both more and less
than 'what is said': It is more in that the contribution but makes to the meaning of
(35) is part of what is conventionally meant, but not of what is said; it is less in that
what is said will contain the values of referential expressions which are not part of
what is conventionally meant. Again, Grice (1968/1989: 120-122) makes it clear that
he does not consider this contribution, made by elements like but, therefore and
moreover, to be part of 'what is said'. The following quote should illustrate this.
Now I do not wish to allow that, in my favored sense of "say", one who utters
S 1 [Bill is a philosopher and he is, therefore, brave] will have said that Bill's
being courageous follows from his being a philosopher, though he may well
have said that Bill is a philosopher and that Bill is courageous. I would wish to
maintain that the semantic function of the word 'therefore' is to enable a
speaker to indicate, though not say, that a certain consequence holds.
(Once 1968/1989: 121)
Since the only two kinds of 'meaning' Grice envisages are what is said and what is
implicated, and he clearly doesn't want 'non-truth-conditional' expressions to be part
of what is said, they have to be part of what is implicated. Therefore, he
(1967/1975/1989:25) introduces the notion of conventional implicature to capture
the meaning of expressions such as but.
However, while it is crystal clear that Grice doesn't want elements like
therefore to contribute to 'what is said', his reasons for this are quite mysterious. All
he says about this is that he expects this sense of 'say', which excludes the meaning
of words like therefore, "to be of greater theoretical utility" than other possible ways
of construing it (1968/1989: 121). The only way of making sense of this is to assume
that Once wants 'what is said', at least in the case of assertions, to coincide with the
truth-conditional content of the utterance. This is, at any rate, how Neale (1992)
understands it.
Although Grice is not as explicit as he might have been, it is clear upon
reflection (and from scattered remarks) that what is said is to do duty (with a
proviso I will get to in a moment) for the statement made or proposition
expressed by U. Where the sentence uttered is of the type conventionally
associated with the speech act of asserting (i.e. when it is in the "indicative
mood") what is said will be straightforwardly truth-conditional.2°
(Neale 1992: 520-521)
For the purposes of this chapter, this means that the interesting elements will be
precisely those, like but and therefore, that are part of what a speaker conventionally
meant but not part of what the speaker 'said'.
In order to ensure that 'what is said' will not contain contributions made by
words like therefore, Grice amends his definition of what is said. He does this by
specifying that there is a special, central sub-class of speech-act, which seems to
include asserting something and telling somebody to do something 21 . He
(1968/1989: 121/2) then specifies that a speaker uttering X will have 'said' that p just
in case she has performed a central speech-act with the content p, and X embodies
some conventional device whose meaning is such that it indicates the performance of
this central speech act. For instance, a speaker uttering (37) has said that the grass is
green because, in uttering the grass is green, she has performed the central speech act
of asserting that the grass is green and, presumably, it is the conventional meaning of
the indicative mood indicators in this sentence to indicate the performance of an
assertion.
(37) The grass is green.
Grice's way of excluding words like therefore, moreover and but from what is said
on this new definition is to say that they indicate the performance of certain non-
central speech-acts. For example, moreover indicates the performance of the speech
act of adding (Grice 1989: 122)22.
20 The proviso in question is that Grice sees what is said as part of what is meant. Therefore, not every
proposition expressed by an utterance counts as what is said. For instance, the proposition expressed
by ironical utterances or a metaphorical utterance like John is a lion does not count as what is said,
because it is not part of what the speaker of the utterance means.
21 Once (1968/1989: 118-119) only mentions these two, but, presumably, asking questions also counts
as a central speech act.
22 As Blakemore (2000) points out, there is something odd about applying the notion of speech act to
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In strand five of his Retrospective Epilogue, Grice (1989: 359-368) says more
about this. He starts out trying to find a 'central' kind of signification and he ends up
postulating two different kinds of centrality: formality and dictiveness (1989: 360).
Signification will be formal if it falls under the conventional meaning of the
expressions used. Dictiveness, on the other hand, is linked with what is said. Thus
Gnce says that
[... ]special centrality should be attributed to those instances of signification in
which what is signified either is, or forms part of, or is specially and
appropriately connected with what the signifying expression (or its user) says
as distinct from implies, suggests, hints, or in some other less than fully direct
manner conveys.
(Grice 1989: 360)
In other words, an expression will be dictive if its meaning is linked (and here Grice
is not being as clear and specific as one could wish) to what is said.
The elements which are of special interest to the concerns of this chapter, i.e.
those which, in Grice's earlier terminology, carry conventional implicatures, are now
analysed as being formal but non-dictive. This just seems to be another way of
saying that they are part of what a speaker conventionally meant but not of what the
speaker said. According to Grice, it might be quite surprising, "slightly startling" as
he (1989: 362) puts it, that there are such elements which are formal but not dictive.
As before, he enlists the help of speech-acts to account for this weird and wonderful
possibility. The example he uses is (38).
(38) My brother-in-law lives on a peak in Darien; his great aunt, on the other hand,
was a nurse in World War I.
(Grice 1989: 361)
Gnce points out that a hearer presented with (38) might well be baffled and will
certainly start wondering what the contrast is between the speaker's brother-in-law
living on a peak in Darien and the great aunt being a nurse in WWI. If it should turn
out that the speaker had no contrast in mind, she could certainly be accused of
such a thing as 'adding'.
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misusing the expression on the other hand. However, it would not be enough to
make her statement in (38) false. Grice's (1989: 362) explanation for this is that, in
uttering (38), a speaker in effect performs several speech-acts at different but related
levels. Thus, a speaker uttering (38) is making the ground-floor statements in (39a)
and (b) and at the same time she's performing the higher-order speech-act of
commenting on the performance of the two lower-order speech-acts. In the case of
on the other hand (and, presumably, also but, although and a number of other
expressions) this comment is one of contrasting.
(39) (a)	 My brother-in-law lives on a peak in Darien.
(b) His great aunt was a nurse in World War I.
(c) There is a contrast between asserting (a) and asserting (b).
In the case of (38), this higher-order speech-act is one of contrasting the two ground-
floor statements. This could be rendered as (39c).
To sum up this section, Once accounts for the meaning of non-truth-
conditional connectives by saying that they encode conventional implicatures which
concern the performance of a higher-order speech-act, commenting on lower order
speech-acts. It does not seem too difficult to imagine that Grice could account for the
meaning of illocutionary and attitudinal adverbials, illocutionary and attitudinal
particles along similar lines. For instance, frankly could be seen as commenting on
the performance of the ground-floor speech act by indicating that it is being
performed in a frank manner. However, it's more difficult to imagine what sort of
higher-order speech act would be performed in the use of focus particles. It is even
less clear how Grice would deal with the 'stylistic differences' listed in 1.5.5. What
does seem clear, though, is that Once would not treat indexicals as encoding
conventional implicatures. In his view, at least their referents 23 are part of 'what is
said', which, according to him, is determined by the meaning of the words,
disambiguation and reference assignment (Once 1967/1975/1989: 25).
It's unclear in what terms Grice would want to account for the linguistic content of indexicals.
2.5.4 Bach: against 'conventional implicature'
As the last section showed, the central notion Grice employs in his treatment of those
'non-truth-conditional' expressions that he considers is that of conventional
implicature. Bach (1999) takes issue with this notion. His (1999: 327) starting point
is that the notion occupies an uncomfortable position within Grice's framework in
that it describes meaning that is semantic (i.e. linguistically encoded) without being
part of what is said. He then goes on to argue that all expressions that have
traditionally been analysed as carrying conventional implicatures fall into one of two
categories. Either they are really part of what is said or they are vehicles of second
order speech acts24. Here, I will only give a brief outline of Bach's argument and its
import for the treatment of the 'non-truth-conditional' devices under discussion in
this chapter.
Bach's (1999) first step in his argument against the notion of conventional
implicature is to show that a whole host of linguistic devices that have traditionally
been seen as carrying conventional implicatures really contribute to what is said. To
show that this is the case, he subjects them to what he calls the "IQ", or indirect
quotation, test. This test is based on his (1999: 339) belief that "the 'that'-clause in
an indirect quotation specifies what is said in the utterance being reported". This
poses a problem for the assumption that connectives like but and although are not
part of what is said, because as (40) and (41) show, they can both occur perfectly
easily in an indirect quotation.
(40) Mary said that Peter is a bore but she likes him.
(41) Mary said that she likes Peter although he is a bore.
While each of these sentences could be understood in a number of ways, the crucial
point is that they can be understood as indirect reports of John's utterances of (11)
and (12) respectively.
' Given that Grice himself analyses conventional implicatures in terms of higher-order speech acts, it
is somewhat baffling that Bach argues against such a notion at the same time as analysing the meaning
of a number of expressions in terms of higher-order speech acts. So, the main import of his position is
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(11) Peter is a bore but I like him.
(12) I like Peter although he is a bore.
From this, Bach concludes that connectives like these that can occur in indirect
quotations really contribute to what is said. However, he (1999: 343-350) recognises
that there are a number of factors that conspire against such a conclusion so he sets
out to defuse each one of them.
First, he observes that but doesn't encode a unique contrastive relation but has
an import that varies from context to context. 25 For this reason, he claims, any
particular account of the meaning of but in truth-conditional terms is vulnerable to
counterexample. His answer to this problem is to make the truth-conditional
contribution of but underspecified and context-dependent, by saying that but encodes
something like "there is a certain contrast between the two conjuncts". This seems to
require a process of pragmatic enrichment ('completion' in Bach's terms) in order to
derive the proposition communicated (parallel to his treatment of indexicals
discussed in 4.6.2).
Second, the contrast that but indicates is often not part of what the speaker is
asserting but is taken to be part of shared background knowledge, i.e. to be
pragmatically presupposed. His way of disposing of this argument is to say that not
everything that is said has to be equally important and that there is, therefore, nothing
incompatible between the contribution but makes being part of what is said and its
being pragmatically presupposed.
Third, most people would say that an utterance of (42), for example, is true
just as long as both conjuncts are true, even if there is no discernible contrast
between the two conjuncts.
(42) Peter is a nice guy but I like him.
Bach believes that this intuition is the result of a forced choice. According to him,
one should allow for the possibility that one and the same sentence can express more
that a small subset of Grice's conventional implicature cases are really part of what is said.
Neale (1999: 58) also makes this observation. For a full discussion of the range of interpretations
but can receive, see 5.2.
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than one proposition and can, therefore, be partly true and partly false26. For
instance, (42) could be seen as expressing the primary propositions that Peter is a
nice guy and that John likes him and the secondary proposition that Peter's being a
nice guy contrasts with John's liking him. In this case, the two primary propositions
could be judged to be true, while the secondary one could be judged to be false. The
argument then is that the falsity of the secondary proposition isn't enough to make
the whole utterance false precisely because it is secondary. Thus, if one gave people
more than just a choice of saying that the whole utterance is true or the whole
utterance is false, they might well say that an utterance of (42) is partly true and
partly false.
Finally, Bach (1999: 347) concedes that the idea of but contributing to what is
said might be unattractive because it seems to result in the claim that what is said by
an utterance containing but, contains an extra clause. For instance, what is said by an
utterance of the two clauses in (42) would have to be specified in three clauses,
something like those in (43). In fact, Bach claims that it was considerations like this
that made Grice opt for a conventional implicature treatment.
(43) a.	 Peter is a nice guy.
b. John likes Peter.
c. There is a certain contrast between someone being a nice guy and
other people liking them.
Bach counters this kind of wony by saying that what is said can be specified or
reported by a sentence including but and that there is no need to assume that there has
to be an extra clause. Further on, he (1999: 350-355) argues that expressions such as
but function as operators on propositions that preserve the original proposition(s),
while also yielding a new one. For instance, Bach (1999: 352) sees still as an
operator that indicates that the state of affairs described by the sentence without still
has obtained during some interval up to the time of reference. Unfortunately, Bach
doesn't say how he would see but affecting the two propositions it operates on.
It will be seen in chapter 8 that Bach (199)and Neale (1999) both independently reach this
conclusion.
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There is much that could (and, at some point, should) be discussed and
criticised about Bach's view. More will be said about his suggestion that a single
sentence may express more than one proposition in 8.2. For a full critical discussion
of Bach's approach to conventional implicature and what is said, see Carston & Iten
(forthcoming). For the purposes of this chapter, it's enough to note that only a small
number of the expressions listed in 1.5 behave like but and although when it comes
to Bach's IQ test. Focus particles, such as even in (44), and elements listed under the
heading of 'stylistic differences' in 1.5.5, such as that bastard in (45) and manage in
(46), obviously can occur in indirect quotations. One would, therefore, expect Bach
to want to account for these expressions along similar lines to still and but (that is, as
elements of what is said but probably not as propositional operators).
(44) Jack said that even John came to the party.
(45) Jack said that that bastard Peter ate his steak.
(46) Jack said that Peter managed to repair the car.
(47)-(5 1), on the other hand, show that other connectives, illocutionary and
attitudinal adverbials and illocutionary and attitudinal particles don't pass the IQ test.
(47) *John said that Peter is a bore nevertheless he likes him.
(48) *John said that franldy, Peter is a bore.
(49) *John said that sadly, he can't stand Peter.
(50) *John said that Peter is an interesting man, huh.
(51) *John said that oh, Peter is such a bore.
All these expressions that don't pass the IQ test, Bach analyses in terms of second-
order speech acts. This analysis seems to amount to nothing other than Grice's own
analysis of conventional implicatures in terms of higher-order speech acts.
Finally, there are a number of devices listed in 1.5 for which it isn't clear if
and how the IQ test could work. For instance, although (52) is an acceptable
sentence of English, it clearly can't do duty as an indirect report of John's utterance
of(7).
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(52) John said that he saw her yesterday.
(7)	 He saw her yesterday.
It seems that one would have to utter something like (53) in order to report John's
utterance.
(53) John said that Jim saw Ruth on 22 May 2000.
Therefore, it seems that the linguistic meaning of indexicals isn't part of what is said
on this picture. It will be seen in 4.6.2 that this is not Bach's position on what is said
by sentences containing indexicals and that the IQ test, in these cases, doesn't quite
make the predictions that fit with Bach's conception of what is said.
It seems clear that non-declarative utterances can't occur in indirect
quotations without some modification. For instance, (1) obviously must be reported
as (54) rather than (55).
(1)	 Do you like chocolate?
(54) John asked whether Jack liked chocolate.
(55) *John said that does Jack like chocolate.
It seems, then, that mood indicators don't affect what is said, but rather what kind of
saying is involved (cf. Bach & Harnish 1979: 25, as discussed in 2.5.2). However, it
seems that 'saying' in Bach's (and Bach & Harnish's) technical sense is a far cry
from the natural language 'saying' that introduces indirect quotations. In other
words, it's doubtful whether Bach's IQ test is the right tool for getting at 'what is
said' in his technical sense.
Summing up, in this section, I have briefly introduced Bach's treatment of
some of the 'non-truth-conditional' devices in 1.5 and I have shown that he treats
some of them as truth-conditional, while the others receive a second-order speech act
analysis in line with Grice's conventional implicature. Finally, it isn't clear from
Bach (1999) how he would treat indexicals and mood indicators.
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2.6	 Conclusion
In this chapter, I've discussed the ways in which, in the last one hundred years, a
number of theorists have treated the range of 'non-truth-conditional' expressions
listed in 1.5 within their essentially truth-conditional frameworks. As the different
sections have shown, there doesn't seem to be a single theorist or tradition that can
account for the meaning of all of these expressions. What is more, there isn't a
single theorist or tradition that accounts for all expressions with non-truth-conditional
meaning in the same terms. Such rare consensus among linguists and philosophers
can indicate only one thing, namely that the label 'non-truth-conditional meaning' is
both non-explanatory and descriptively inadequate; it's a label for a heterogeneous
class of expressions framed in terms of what they are not rather than what they are
and, therefore, is of little use when it comes to providing a semantic account of these
expressions.
In the next chapter, I'll look at Argumentation Theory - a framework that,
ultimately, aims to account for all linguistic meaning in non-truth-conditional terms.
I will argue that this is not a viable alternative to semantic accounts that rely on the
notion of truth conditions. The chapter following that, is devoted to Relevance
Theory, which, I will argue, provides a cognitive framework within which the kinds
of meaning encoded by all the 'non-truth-conditional' expressions listed at the end of
the last chapter can be captured, and which envisages a role for truth conditions,
albeit not quite the traditional one.
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CHAPTER 3
ARGUMENTATION THEORY: ACCOMMODATING THE 'NON-TRUTH-
CONDITIONAL' AT THE COST OF THE 'TRUTH-CONDITIONAL'
3.1	 Introduction
The theories discussed in chapter 2 are all truth-conditional, at least to some extent.
That is, the notion of truth conditions plays a more or less central role in each one of
them. This chapter is concerned with Anscombre & Ducrot's (henceforth A & D)
Argumentation Theory (AT), which starts out as an essentially truth-conditional
theory with a way of accommodating 'non-truth-conditional' meaning, but ends up
being completely non-truth-conditional, i.e. with no place for truth conditions at all.
Obviously, this fact alone makes the theory worth investigating. However, the theory
also stands out because it offers a number of interesting and promising accounts of
the meanings of some of the 'non-truth-conditional' expressions listed in 1.5. For
instance, Anscombre & Ducrot (1977) offers an AT account of the meaning(s) of
French but, which will be discussed in some detail in chapter 5. In this chapter, I
concentrate on the theoretical underpinnings of such accounts and only consider A &
D's analyses of particular expressions where theare needed to illustrate a theoretical
point. Obviously, it would quite likely be the work of a lifetime to capture AT, a
theory which has been evolving for a quarter of a century, in all its detail and to do it
justice in every nuance. Therefore, all I can hope to do here, is give a (possibly too)
broad charactensation of the theory and some of its development, and point out some
of the difficulties it runs into.
In its present state, AT is a non-cognitive, non-truth-conditional semantic
theory, which takes linguistic utterances (as opposed to abstract sentence-types) as its
domain. Its aim is to provide a semantic deep structure for each utterance, which
includes a specification of the argumentative potential of the utterance (Nyan 1998).
As mentioned above, the theory has produced some promising accounts of linguistic
expressions encoding non-truth-conditional meaning, notably but and even (see e.g.
A & D (1983), Nyan (1998)). However, as will be shown in this chapter, the theory
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itself suffers from some very serious flaws, especially in its later incarnations (e.g.
Ducrot (1993)).
In sections 3.2 to 3.5, I will give an outline of the central points of AT and
show its development spanning two decades. In these sections I will mostly keep
criticisms and queries to footnotes so as not to distract from the presentation. I will
give a fuller critical discussion and evaluation of the theory in section 3.6, paying
special attention to the move from a semantics with some truth-conditiona1 and some
non-truth-conditional elements to a completely non-truth-conditional semantics as it
is argued for by Ducrot (1993).
3.2 The beginnings of Argumentation Theory
AT is based on the view that it is a fundamental characteristic of utterances that they
can be used as premises or conclusions in arguments. It's important to note that the
nature of these arguments is such that they cannot be captured by the standard rules
of logic.
Anscombre & Ducrot (1976) observed that utterances with the same
informational (i.e. truth-conditional) content cannot always be used as arguments in
favour of the same set of conclusions. For instance, according to A & D, (1) and (2)
have the same informational content, i.e. the same truth conditions'. However, (1)
can be used as an argument in favour of both (3a) and (b). (2), on the other hand, can
only be used as an argument in favour of (3a). Thus, (4a) and (b) are both perfectly
acceptable, whereas (Sb) is unacceptable.
(1) Peter is the same height as Mary.
(2) Peter is as tall as Mary.
(3) a.	 Peteris tall forhis age.
b.	 Peter is short for his age.
1 In fact, this is an arguable point. It could also be claimed that as tall as has the semantic value of at
least the same height as. For further discussion of this topic see Atlas (1984), who, incidentally,
argues against both positions and offers a third possibility.
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(4)	 a.	 Peter is tall for his age: he's the same height as Mary who is a year
older.
b.	 Peter is short for his age: he's the same height as Mary who is a year
younger
(5)	 a.	 Peter is tall for his age: he's as tall as Mary who is a year older.
b.	 *peter is short for his age: he's as tall as Mary who is a year younger.
(examples translated and adapted from Anscombre & Ducrot 1976:
10)
Examples of this sort led Anscombre & Ducrot to believe that a purely truth-
conditional semantics was not sufficient and that the argumentative potential of an
utterance was an important aspect of its meaning.
In early AT (e.g. A & D 1976), the argumentative potential of an utterance
was characterised in terms of the conclusions it could be used to support. Thus, it
would be part of the meaning of (1) that it can be used as an argument for both (3a)
and its contrary (3b). In fact, A & D would say that the argumentative orientation of
(1) was neutral (see e.g. Moeschler & Reboul (1994:314/5)). Similarly, the fact that
(2) can only be used to support the conclusion in (3a) is part of the meaning of (2).
Unlike (1), the argumentative orientation of (2) is not neutral; this utterance is
oriented towards conclusions of the type in (3a).
The fact that (1) and (2), and other examples of the same sort, clearly differ in
their encoded meaning, even though they don't differ in their truth-conditional
content2, led A & D (1976: 8) to postulate an integrated pragmatics (pragmatique
integrée). They call it a 'pragmatics' because it is concerned with the sort of
meaning that can't be captured in terms of traditional truth-conditional semantics.
What they mean by 'integrated' is that the non-truth-conditional aspects of the
meaning of as... as in (2) are, nevertheless, aspects of its encoded meaning and do not
depend on the recovery of some prior truth-conditional semantic meaning the way,
for example, Gricean conversational implicatures depend on the recovery of the
truth-conditional content of the utterance ('what is said'). In perhaps more intuitive
2 see fn. 1
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terms, A & D's integrated pragmatics could be seen as a non-truth-conditional
semantics, which they saw, at that time, as existing alongside a traditional truth-
conditional semantics. In effect, it seems that, the postulation of an integrated
pragmatics means that there is no semantics/pragmatics distinction in AT, since it is
not clear that A & D also allow for a non-integrated pragmatics which deals with
non-encoded aspects of utterance meaning. It will be seen at the end of this chapter
that this is an important issue.
3.3	 Argumentative contents, the law of negation and the law of inversion
3.3.1 Sentence (phrase) and utterance (énoncé)
Before presenting A & D's (1983) more detailed way of accounting for examples like
(1) and (2), let me say something about A & D's conception of the basic notions of
sentence (phrase) and utterance (énoncé). As mentioned in the introduction, A & D
(1983) are interested in utterance meaning. By 'utterance' (énoncé) A & D (1983:
84) mean utterance token, i.e., as they put it, linguistic material with 'historical'
characteristics (e.g. a specific position in space and time). They contrast this with the
notions of utterance type (énoncé-type) and 'sentence' (phrase). According to them,
the utterance type is the linguistic material the utterance consists of. Thus, for A &
D, (6b) and (7), which they see as an 'act of hoping', are tokens of the same utterance
type because, at least in French, they both contain exactly the same linguistic
material.
(6) a.	 Est-ce que Pierre va venir au rendez-vous?
'Is Peter coming to the meeting?'
b.	 J'espère.
'I hope so'
(7) J'espère.
'I'm hoping.'
(A&D 1983: 84)
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A & D's 'sentence' (phrase), on the other hand, is a theoretical construct, the deep
structure underlying an utterance (token). Thus, for A & D (6b) is a token of the
'sentence' in (8), while the 'sentence' underlying (7) will be just J'espère.
(8) J'espèrequep.
'I hope that p.'
For A & D, utterance tokens are the starting point, the 'observable facts' (A & D
1983: 80-8 1; Ducrot 1984: 180) on which their work is based. In a bid to account for
the meaning of utterances, each of them is assigned a 'sentence' or deep structure.
While statements concerning utterances are intended to describe the 'facts', those
concerning 'sentences' are intended to explain them. This shows that A & D's
notion of 'sentence' (phrase) is significantly different from what is generally
understood by 'sentence' in linguistics and philosophy. For this reason, I am
following Nyan (1998) in referring to A & D's phrase as 'deep structure' rather than
'sentence' in the rest of this chapter.
A & D (1983: 85) and Ducrot (1984: 180) call the semantic value of
utterances sense and the semantic value of deep structures signification. Analogous
to utterances and deep structures themselves, senses are observable, but significations
are not (Ducrot 1984: 180). According to Ducrot (1984: 181-183), the signification
of a deep structure is a set of instructions as to how to assign sense to the utterance.
Thus to know the signification of the deep structure underlying (9), is to know what
to do to interpret an utterance of it.
(9) The weather's nice.
(from Ducrot 1984: 181)
Ducrot (1984: 181) claims that it is part of the signification of the deep structure
underlying (9) that the hearer is instructed to look for the place the speaker is talking
about and to accept that the speaker is asserting the existence of fine weather in that
place. The sense of the utterance, on the other hand, Ducrot (1984: 182) describes as
a description of the event of making the utterance (énonciation). This includes
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information about the illocutionary force of the utterance and its argumentative
potential.
According to Ducrot (1984: 180), the systematic association between senses
and utterances is an 'observable fact'. To explain this observable association, Ducrot
chooses to associate the theoretical construct of signification with the deep structures
that underlie utterances. Ducrot (1984: 180) believes that this is an interesting way
of proceeding because he supposes that it's possible to formulate laws to calculate
the signification of a deep structure on the basis of its lexico-grammatical properties
and different laws to predict the sense of an utterance on the basis of the signification
of the deep structure that underlies the utterance. While Ducrot (1984) sees the
signification of deep structures in terms of instructions, A & D (1983) saw it in terms
of contents (contenus). This is what the next sub-section is concerned with.
3.3.2 Contents (contenus)
Anscombre & Ducrot (1983: 79-113) give a detailed analysis of the meaning of
utterances like (1) and (2) above. First, they make it clear that they don't want to
assign meaning to utterances themselves, but rather to the deep structures underlying
them. Thus, each deep structure is given a set of 'contents' (contenus), some of them
asserted, some of them presupposed. The asserted contents are equivalent to
informational or 'factual' (or, indeed, truth-conditional) contents, and at least some
of the presupposed contents are seen as argumentative. According to Anscombre &
Ducrot (1983: 102), (2) will have the asserted content in (lOa) and the presupposed
content in (lOb).
(2)	 Peter is as tall as Mary.
(10) a.	 [Peter's height equals Mary's height].
b.	 [[Peter's height equals Mary's height] and [Peter is tall] have the same
argumentative orientation]3
3 The square brackets indicate that we are dealing with contents.
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Although they don't spell this out, it seems reasonable to assume that they would say
that (1) has the same asserted, or factual, content as (2), i.e. (lOa), but that it lacks the
(argumentative) presupposed content in (lOb). Hence its neutral argumentative
orientation. The idea is that these contents are arbitrarily assigned to a finite number
of core deep structures (phrases-noyaux) and that the contents of more complex deep
structures can be calculated on the basis of the contents of the core deep structures
which make up the more complex deep structure (A & D 1983: 97). This is done
with the help of two basic rules: the law of negation (la Loi de Negation) and the law
of inversion (la Loi d'Inversion), which will be illustrated below.
All in all, A & D's semantic description involves three steps or mechanisms.
The first assigns a set of asserted (factual) contents and presupposed contents, some
of which are argumentative, to each core deep structure. The second derives new
contents from those that make up the meaning of the core deep structure using the
laws of negation and inversion. The third uses the results of the first two
mechanisms to assign an argumentative orientation to the whole (complex) deep
structure.4 The best way to see how this works is to look at some examples.
3.3.3 The law of negation (la Loi de Negation)
Anscombre & Ducrot (1983: 99-104) account for the meaning of (11) as follows.
(11) Peter is wrong to believe that he's as tall as Mary.
(12) a.	 But he is quite tall.
b.	 *But he is quite short.
First of all, they observe that an utterance of (11) can be followed quite easily with an
utterance of (12a) but not with an utterance of (12b). They analyse the meaning of
but in such a way that it can only felicitously connect two clauses with opposite
argumentative orientation5. Therefore, A & D predict that (11) and the clause after
NB. The first two mechanisms assign argumentative orientation to contents and not to the deep
structure. Also note that, from this point onwards, the argumentative orientation of deep structures
and utterances is only ever given in comparative terms, e.g. 'same as' or 'opposite'.
Clearly, this can't be the only condition for the felicitous use of but. If it were, utterances of the form
'P but not-P' should be felicitous, since, presumably, P and not-P have opposite argumentative
but in (12a) have opposite argumentative orientations, while (11) and the clause after
but in (12b) have the same argumentative orientation (hence the infelicity when (11)
is followed by (12b)). They then proceed to show that this is the case by appealing to
the law of negation.
A & D start by assuming that P in (13) has the asserted content a and the
presupposed content b. They then assign the whole deep structure in (13) the
asserted content a and the presupposed contents f3 and 132 in (14)6.
(13) X is wrong to believe that P.
(14) a:	 [not-P]
13 i :	 [b]
13 2 :	 [X believes that a]
As mentioned above, (2) is assigned the asserted content a and the argumentative
presupposed content b in (15).
(2)	 Peter is as tall as Mary.
(15) a:	 [Peter's height equals Mary's height]
b:	 [[Peter's height equals Mary's height] and [Peter is tall] have the same
argumentative orientation]
Now (11) can be assigned contents on the basis of the contents of (2) and (13). (11)
will thus have the asserted content a and the presupposed contents f3 and 132 in (16),
where 13 is an argumentative content.
(11) Peter is wrong to believe that he's as tall as Mary.
orientations. However, utterances of this form clearly are not felicitous: For instance, Peter is tall but
he's not tall, is not acceptable. It is quite conceivable that, at this stage, A & D would say that such
utterances are not acceptable because their asserted contents are contradictory. For a fuller AT
account of but see A & D (1977).
6 It seems curious that there is no asserted content along the lines of 'X is wrong about something'.
(16) a:	 [Peter's height doesn't equal Mary's height]
13 i :	 [ [Peter's height equals Mary's height] and [Peter is tall] have the same
argumentative orientation]
13 2 :	 [Peter believes that his height equals Mary's]
Now, the argumentative orientation of the deep structure underlying (11) cannot be
calculated on the basis of (16) because the presupposed content 13 k, which is
concerned with argumentative orientation, does not apply to the asserted content a,
but to its unnegated counterpart. This is where the law of negation comes in. A &
D's law of negation is given in (17).
(17) Law of Negation:
If c 1 and c2 are two contents and if a deep structure has the content C3: [c 1 is
an argument for c2], then this can be re-written as [-'c 1 is an argument for
-'c2].7
(A&D 1983: 101)
Since 'c 1 is an argument for c2 ' is equivalent to 'c 1 and c2 have the same
argumentative orientation', the law of negation can be applied to 13 in (16) to yield
given in (18).
(18) 13':	 [-'[Peter's height equals Mary's height] and -'[Peter is tall] have the
same argumentative orientation]
A & D call this process of deriving a presupposed content which applies to the
asserted content of a deep structure from one which doesn't apply to the asserted
content with the help of the laws of the second mechanism centrage (A & D 1983:
103).
The third mechanism assigns an argumentative orientation to a deep structure
on the basis of its argumentative presupposition after this presupposition has been
'centred' on the asserted content of the deep structure. This means that now an
argumentative orientation can be assigned to the deep structure underlying (11) by
using in (18). In this way, (11) comes out as having the same argumentative
orientation as 'Peter is not tall', which is obviously the opposite of the argumentative
orientation of 'Peter is tall'. This explains why the use of but to connect (11) and
(12a) is felicitous, while the result of using but to connect (11) with (12b) is rather
less acceptable.
3.3.4 The law of inversion (la Loi d'Inversion)
As Anscombre & Ducrot (1983: 104-111) observe, the law of inversion concerns two
sets of argument and conclusion. First, the law of inversion is given at the
(observational) level of the utterance (as opposed to the theoretical level of the deep
structure of the utterances, i.e. what A & D refer to as the 'sentence'). It states that if
utterance u is a stronger argument for conclusion c than utterance u' for conclusion
c', then the negation of u' (not-u') will be a stronger argument for not-c' than not-u is
for not-c. This shows again that A & D's argumentative laws are a far cry from the
rules of standard logic. Before saying more about the law of inversion and its
applications, let me say something about the notion of the comparative strength of
arguments, which, as A & D (1983: 105) note, is basic to AT.
According to A & D (1976: 15), u is a stronger argument than u' in favour of
c if a speaker who uses u' as an argument for c would also have to admit u as an
argument for c, but not vice versa. For example, (20) could be seen as a stronger
argument in favour of (21) than (19), because, intuitively, a speaker accepting (19) as
an argument for (21) would also have to accept (20) as an argument for the same
conclusion8 . Conversely, a speaker accepting (20) as an argument for (21) would not
necessarily have to admit (19).
This shows clearly that 'is an argument for' is not equivalent to the material conditional and that
argumentative laws are not based on the rules of standard logic. For, from P - Q, -P -* -'Q does not
follow.
8 As will be discussed below, there are counterarguments, which pose a problem for this definition of
comparative argumentative strength (and other central AT notions) and which led A & D (1983: 163-
179) to adjust their definitions.
(19) Jane has a sore throat.	 u'
(20) Jane has pneumonia.	 u
(21) Jane can't sit the exam this afternoon.	 c (= c')
This explains the notion of argumentative strength for utterances supporting the same
conclusion.
Examples (19)-(21) can also be used to show that the law of inversion states
something intuitively correct in cases where u and u' are arguments for the same
conclusion. Let (20) be u, (19) u' and (21) both c and c'. Now, it has been shown
above that (20) is a stronger argument in favour of (21) than (19). According to the
law of inversion, the negation of (19) should therefore be a stronger argument for the
negation of (21) than is the negation of (20). The negations of (19)-(21) are given in
(22)-(24).
(22) Jane doesn't have a sore throat. 	 not-u'
(23) Jane doesn't have pneumonia. 	 not-u
(24) Jane can sit the exam this afternoon.	 not-c = not-c'
Intuitively, the law of inversion makes the right prediction in this case. (22) does
indeed seem to be a stronger argument than (23) in favour of (24): a speaker who
accepts that the fact that Jane doesn't have pneumonia is an argument in favour of
her being able to sit an exam that afternoon will also have to accept Jane's not having
a sore throat as an argument for the same conclusion. However, someone accepting
Jane's not having a sore throat as an argument for Jane's being able to sit an exam
will not necessarily have to accept Jane's not having pneumonia as an argument for
the same conclusion. After all, Jane could have a heavy cold, a state of affairs
compatible with her not having pneumonia, which would nevertheless be an
argument for her not sitting the exam. This seems to show that, intuitively, the law
of inversion is right for cases where c = c'. However, the law of inversion is also
supposed to apply to cases where two utterances are arguments for different
conclusions. The problem with this is that A & D do not make it clear how their
notion of argumentative strength applies to utterances that are arguments for different
conclusions9. All they do is give an example of a case where c and c' are not
identical but opposites.
According to A & D (1983: 107), the but in (25) is scalar in nature, i.e. it not
only indicates that the two clauses (p and q) support contradictory conclusions (or
have opposite argumentative orientations) but it also indicates that q (Peter has
cleared the table) is a stronger argument for c (Peter is quite helpful) than p (Peter
didn't do the dishes) is for not-c (Peter isn't helpful).
(25) (Peter is quite helpful): (he didn't do the dishes) but (he cleared the table)q.
If this is correct, the law of inversion should be applicable to p and q and c and not-c,
i.e. not-p should be a stronger argument for not-not-c (= c) than not-q is for not-c.
Therefore, it should be possible to construct an acceptable utterance of the form 'not-
not-c (= c): not-q but not-p'. As (26) shows, this is indeed possible.
(26) (Peter is quite helpfu1): (he didn't clear the table)notq
but (he did the dishes)0.
Anscombre & Ducrot (1983: 107-109) contrast this with (27), where, according to
them, but is not scalar in nature and where, consequently, an utterance of the form
'not-not-c (= c): not-q but not-p' would not be acceptable to a speaker uttering (27),
as (28) shows.
(27) (I like Peter): (his manners are bad) but (his intentions are good)q.
(28) (1 like Peter): (his intentions are bad), q but (his manners are good),,.
Thus, A & D argue, in cases of scalar but, like the one in (25), an utterance of 'p but
q' supports the conclusion q supports because q is a stronger argument for c than p is
for not-c. In cases of non-scalar but, like the one in (27), on the other hand, this is
supposed to be because the speaker gives more importance to q than she does to p.
The problem with this is that, intuitively, in (27), too and not just in (25), q is a
In fact, this oversight is not redressed in later definitions.
stronger argument for c than p is for not-c. At least to me, it seems that Peter's
intentions are good is a stronger argument for I like Peter than Peter's manners are
bad is for I don't like Peter. Interestingly, the law of inversion doesn't apply here: I
certainly wouldn't accept that Peter's manners are good is a stronger argument for I
like Peter than Peter's intentions are bad is for I don't like Peter. Since A & D don't
actually define their notion of argumentative strength for arguments with different
conclusions, it's impossible to test whether my intuitions are right and Peter's
intentions are good really is a stronger argument than Peter's manners are bad. If
my intuitions were right, A & D's law of inversion would be in trouble, since there
would be at least one case where it should apply but doesn't. Whatever may be the
case, it seems to me that the difference between (25) and (27) doesn't lie in the fact
that they contain a different kind of but, but that their contents are different and that
(28) is not acceptable simply because most people won't accept that Peter's good
manners are a better argument for liking him than his having bad intentions is for
disliking him. In fact, I have a nagging suspicion that, for many people, Peter's
manners are not a factor at all when it comes to liking or disliking him. Putting these
worries aside for the moment, let's look at the formal use of the law of inversion.
A & D (1983: 110/1) use (29) to show how the law of inversion, this time
formulated at the level of contents, works formally.
(29) Peter is wrong to believe that he is taller than Mary and even that he is as tall.
In fact, they don't actually give the formal version of the law of inversion, but it
seems plausible that, analogous to the law of negation, this law for contents would
look something like (30).
(30) Law of Inversion
If c 1 , c2 and c3 are contents and a deep structure has the content C4: [c 1 is a
stronger argument than c 2 for c3], then this can be rewritten as [not-c2 is a
stronger argument than not-c 1 for not-c3].'°
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Before looking at its application to (29), a word needs to be said about A & D's
analysis of even. According to them (1983: 105), even in an utterance of the form 'p
and even q' indicates that p and q support the same conclusion and that the speaker
sees q as a stronger argument than p for that conclusion. Thus, A & D's prediction is
that Peter is wrong to believe that he is as tall as Mary is a stronger argument than
Peter is wrong to believe that he is taller than Mary for some conclusion c which
they both support, because, otherwise, (29) would not be felicitous.
As has been shown above, (11), the second conjunct of (29), has the asserted
content a and the argumentative presupposed content given in (16).
(11) Peter is wrong to believe that he's as tall as Mary.
	
(16) a:	 [Peter's height doesn't equal Mary's height]
	
3:	 [[Peter's height equals Mary's height] and [Peter is tall] have the same
argumentative orientation]
Without going into the question in more detail, A & D (1983: 110) state that (31), has
the asserted content a' and the presupposed content b' in (32).
(31) Peter is taller than Mary.
(32) a':	 [Peter's height> Mary's height]
	
b':	 [[Peter's height > Mary's height] and [Peter is tall] have the same
argumentative orientation]
If this is combined with what was said above about the contents of 'X is wrong to
believe that P', (33), the first conjunct of (29), can now be assigned the asserted
content a' and the argumentative presupposed content ' in (34).
(33) Peter is wrong to believe that he is taller than Mary.
(34) a':	 -'[Peter's height > Mary's height]
10 Note that this only covers the case where both arguments support the same conclusion. Since these
are the only cases A & D discuss in any detail, this version of the law of inversion seems sufficient.
13 k ':	 [[Peter's height > Mary's height] and [Peter is tall] have the same
argumentative orientation]
At this point A & D make use of an axiom of the second mechanism, which states
that if [x > y] and [x = y] are two contents that are arguments for the same
conclusion, then [x > y] is always the stronger argument than [x = y] . if one applies
this axiom to the contents of (11) and (33), the two conjuncts of (29), (29) can be
assigned the argumentative content y in (35).
(35) y:	 [[Peter's height > Mary's height] is a stronger argument than [Peter's
height = Mary's height]
Now the law of inversion can be applied to (35) to yield (36).
(36) y':	 [-'[Peter's height = Mary's height] is a stronger argument than
-'[Peter's height > Mary's height]
The third mechanism, which assigns argumentative relations to deep structures
(rather than contents), contains the law in (37)11, which explains the use of even (A &
D 1983: 111).
(37) if A and A' are two deep structures with the asserted co-oriented contents a
and a' respectively and the second mechanism derives from the conjunction
of A and A' the argumentative content [a is a stronger argument than a'],
then A and A' have the same argumentative orientation and A is stronger than
A'.
This means that it follows from (36) that (11) and (33), the two conjuncts of (29),
have the same argumentative orientation and that (11) is a stronger argument than
(33), which explains why the use of even in (29) is felicitous.
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3.3.5 A counterexample and some revised definitions
As mentioned in footnote 8 above, A & D's (1976) definition of comparative
argumentative strength runs into counterexamples. A & D (1983: 164-166) discuss
the following case.
On their original definition, u is a stronger argument than u for some
conclusion c if a speaker who accepts u as an argument for c also has to accept u,
but not vice versa. One of the examples A & D use is the utterance pair in (38). The
original AT account of the meaning of nearly (presque) states that the word indicates
that an utterance containing it has the same argumentative orientation (i.e. supports
the same types of conclusion) as the corresponding utterance without nearly and that
p is a stronger argument than nearly p. In other words, if the AT account of nearly is
correct, (38b) should be a stronger argument than (38a) for the same type of
conclusion'2.
(38) a.	 The barrel is nearly empty.
	 u
b.	 The barrel is empty.
	 U
(adapted from A & D 1983: 164)
It seems clear that, on A & D's definition, (38b) is indeed a stronger argument than
(38a) for a conclusion like (39), for example: Any speaker who accepts that (38a) is
an argument for (39) will also have to accept that (38b) is an argument for the same
conclusion, but not vice versa.
(39) We need to get a fresh barrel.
11 1t is not entirely clear what the motivation of this law is, apart from the fact that it is needed to
account for these examples. In general, there seems to be a proliferation of laws and axioms in AT at
this stage, whose motivation is not always clear.
12 NB. There is, of course, a truth-conditional difference between (38a) and (b). However, A & D
(1983: 165) don't want their explanation to hinge on this, because they're already moving towards
abandoning truth conditions and they certainly don't want the truth conditions of an utterance to take
priority over its argumentative properties.
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However, as A & D (1983: 164) point out, if the conclusion were not (39) but
something like (40), their definition of the notion of stronger argument would not
apply.
(40) We need to drink just a little more.
(adapted from A & D 1983: 164)
As (41a) and (b) show, it is not the case that any speaker who accepts (38a) as an
argument for (40) also has to accept (38b); for (38b) isn't an argument for (40) at all.
(41) a.	 The barrel is nearly empty. So, we need to drink just a little more.
b.	 The barrel is empty. So, we need to drink just a little more.
The existence of examples like (41a) and (b) means that A & D's definition of
argumentative orientation and stronger argument and their account of the meaning of
nearly cannot all be right. At this stage A & D (1983: 166) change their definitions
of argumentative orientation and argumentative strength. However, as will be seen in
the next section, at a later stage their definitions, and the account of the meaning of
words like nearly 13 , underwent some changes of a more far-reaching sort.
A & D's first step in changing the definition of argumentative strength is the
introduction of a new distinction, between argumentation and the act of arguing (A
& D 1983: 163-166). According to A & D (1983: 163) an argumentation is a
discourse with at least two utterances u and u, one of which is the premise (or
argument) and the other the conclusion. An act of arguing, on the other hand, is an
illocutionary act 14
 which is part of the meaning of every utterance, whether it is used
as a premise or as a conclusion in a given argumentation. This act consists in
attributing a certain degree of a certain property (e.g. tallness, helpfulness, emptiness,
etc.) to one or more entities or objects. This, according to A & D (1983: 166), is part
See Moesehier & Reboul 1994: 320-321
14 The fact that Ducrot (1984) states in the preface that he studied and was influenced by the works of
Austin and Searle, might lead one to assume that A & D's notion of illocutionary act is identical to that
of Austin (1962) or Searle (1969, 1979), i.e. an act performed in speaking, such as warning,
requesting, promising, etc. However, it is not entirely clear that A & D's notion is the same. At the
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of the meaning of the utterance in the sense that the utterance "presents itself" as
accomplishing such an act. The idea is that the kind of property a given utterance is
taken to attribute to an object on a given occasion determines the kind of conclusion
in favour of which the utterance can be used.
In their new definition of argumentative strength, A & D make use of this
notion of act of arguing. Instead of defining argumentative strength and
argumentative orientation in terms of conclusions, they now define them in terms of
the properties the utterances attribute to objects and the degrees to which they do so.
On A & D's (1983: 167) new definition, two utterances have the same argumentative
orientation if they attribute the same property to the same objects' 5. They have
opposite argumentative orientations if they don't, to any degree, attribute the same
property to the same objects 16 . A & D's (1983: 166) new definition of argumentative
strength is the following: u is a stronger argument than u if they both present their
object as possessing the same property R and u indicates a higher degree than u. In
those cases where u and u support the same conclusion, u will do so more strongly
than u, but the definition of argumentative strength no longer demands that they
should support the same conclusion, because the definition of argumentative
orientation is no longer given in terms of conclusions' 7. This solves the problem
very least, the illocutionary act of arguing is different from all other illocutionary acts in that it is
supposed to be performed by every single utterance.
15 This might make it look as though (1) and (2) have the same argumentative orientation, because
they seem to attribute the same property to the same entity, i.e. they both seem to attribute height to
Peter. However, A & D would be likely to say that as tall as attributes tallness, whereas the same
height as can attribute tallness or shortness. This highlights a general worry about what a property is
on this picture, i.e. why are tallness and shortness different properties? Similarly, it isn't clear why
there couldn't be a property of near-emptiness, which would mean that (38a) and (b) don't attribute the
same property to the same object - one could attribute emptiness and the other near-emptiness.
16 change in the definition of opposite argumentative orientation has an undesirable effect on A &
D's account of the meaning of but. Remember that it was a necessary (and, in the case of non-scalar
but, also sufficient) condition of the felicitous use of but that the two conjuncts should have opposite
argumentative orientation without contradicting each other. When argumentative orientation was
defined in terms of conclusions and two utterances were said to have opposite argumentative
orientation if they supported opposite conclusions, (i) would have been ruled out, because it is hard to
see what opposite conclusions could be supported by Peter likes chocolate and Most birds can fly.
(i)	 ?Peter likes chocolate but most birds can fly.
However, given A & D's new definition of opposite argumentative orientation, (i) should be
acceptable, because the two conjuncts do indeed not attribute the same property to the same object to
any degree whatsoever and the two conjuncts certainly don't contradict each other.
17 It's interesting that, by this stage, A & D seem to have given up (or at least forgotten) the idea that
different degrees of argumentative strength can also be attributed to arguments with different
argumentative orientations (as allowed for by the law of inversion). If the new definition of
argumentative strength given here is the whole story, A & D can no longer claim that there is such a
thing as the scalar but discussed above - the law of inversion will no longer be applicable in cases
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posed by (41a) and (b) without a change in the account of nearly, because even in
those examples (38b), the barrel is empty, attributes a greater degree of emptiness to
the barrel than does (38a), the barrel is nearly empty, and, therefore, (38a) and (b)
have the same argumentative orientation and (38b) is a stronger argument than (38a)
on the new definitions. It's just that in (41a) and (b) the two utterances can't support
the same conclusion. It will become clear below that this change is the first step in
the direction of topoi and topical forms.
3.4	 Argumentative operators, topoi, topical forms and topical fields
3.4.1 Argumentative operators
In argumentation theory, expressions like as ... as, nearly, but and many others are
referred to as 'argumentative operators' (e.g. Nyan 1998: 52)18. As the discussion
above may have made clear, these argumentative operators can be seen as
determining the argumentative orientation, or constraining the argumentative
potential, of utterances. Thus, the presence of as tall as in (2) had the effect of
adding the (argumentative) presupposed content (lOb) to the meaning of the
utterance. (1), on the other hand, which has the same asserted content as (2), but
doesn't contain as tall as, doesn't carry this presupposed content.
(1) Peter is the same height as Mary.
(2) Peter is as tall as Mary.
Similarly, nearly in (38a) has been analysed as determining the argumentative
orientation of its host utterance, in that it indicates that an utterance containing it has
the same argumentative orientation as a corresponding utterance without nearly.
This would be a banal observation if it wasn't for the fact that, from the point of view
of informational content, 'nearly X' is equivalent to 'not X'. This is made even more
interesting by the fact that the argumentative orientation of an utterance containing
where two utterances don't attribute the same property to their objects, because the notion of
argumentative strength only applies to utterances that attribute the same property.
18 Nyan also uses the term 'metalinguistic operator'.
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barely, e.g. (42), is the opposite of that of the same utterance without barely, e.g.
(38b), in spite of the fact that 'barely X' is informationally equivalent to 'X'.
(38) a.	 The barrel is nearly empty.
b.	 The barrel is empty.
(42) The barrel is barely empty.
While (38a) and (b) support the conclusion in (39), (42) can, in the same context,
only be used to support its negation, (43).
(39) We need to get a fresh barrel.
(43) We don't need to get a fresh barrel.
However, Nyan (1998: 52-3) shows that there are examples where there is an
argumentative operator present but the operator doesn't seem to affect the
argumentative orientation of the utterance19.
(44) It's eight o'clock.
(45) It's only eight o'clock.
(44) and (45) could be said to have the same factual (or truth-conditional) content.
However, (45) contains the argumentative operator only, while (44) doesn't. Given
what was said above about argumentative operators constraining the argumentative
orientation of the utterance containing them, one would expect (44) to be capable of
being used as an argument in favour of some conclusions for which (45) cannot be
used. However, Nyan claims that (46a) and (b) and (47a) and (b) show that both (44)
and (45) can be used as arguments in favour of hurry up or take your time. In other
words, both (44) and (45) are neutral from the point of view of argumentative
orientation. Thus, the presence of only in (45) doesn't seem to make a difference to
the utterance's argumentative potential.
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(46) a.	 Hurry up: it's eight o'clock.
b.	 Take your time: it's eight o'clock.
(47) a.	 Hurry up: it's only eight o'clock.
b.	 Take your time: it's only eight o'clock.
As a matter of fact, at first glance, (47a) does not look terribly acceptable. However,
if a suitable context is set up, it becomes perfectly acceptable. Imagine for example
that Peter and Mary are going to a concert which starts at half past eight and it takes
them twenty minutes to get there. Peter is not quite ready and has started slowing
down, believing that it's quarter past eight and too late for them to make the first half
of the concert. In this context it seems perfectly natural for Mary to utter (47a). As
this shows, the presence of only in (45) doesn't necessarily make a difference to the
range of conclusions that can be reached on its basis. Nevertheless, A & D feel that
only does make a difference to the argumentative content of (45). The notions of
'topos' (based on Aristotle's notion) and 'topical form' were introduced to capture
the difference in argumentative content between (44) and (45). These notions take
further the ideas behind the new definitions discussed in 3.3.5.
3.4.2 Topoi and topical forms
According to Moeschler & Reboul (1994:317-322) and Nyan (1998: 52-59), a topos
is an argumentative rule shared by a given community (which need have no more
members than the speaker and the hearer). This argumentative rule is used to license
the move from an argument to a conclusion. It is an important feature of topoi that
they are scalar in nature. The general form of a topos is given in (48).
(48) The more/less object 0 possesses property P. the more/less object 0'
possesses property P'.
As Moeschler & Reboul (1994: 317) point out, if one assumes that proposition A =
'object 0 possesses property P' and proposition B = 'object 0' possesses property
19 In fact, it's unclear whether it does or doesn't on the definition of argumentative orientation
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P", then a topos can have the four forms in (49a)-(d), with (49a) reading "the more 0
is P, the more 0' is P", (49b) "the less 0 is P, the less 0' is P", and so on.
	
(49) a.	 <+A, +B>
b. <-A,-B>
c. <+A,-B>
d. <-A, +B>
If we assume that A is something like 'the weather is warm' and B 'the beach will be
pleasant', the four possible topical forms will be something like (50a)-(d).
	
(50) a.	 (The warmer the weather)+A, (the more pleasant the beach)+B.
b. (The colder the weather) A, (the less pleasant the beach).B.
c. (The warmer the weather)^A, (the less pleasant the beach)B.
d. (The colder the weather). A, (the more pleasant the beach)+B.
As (50) illustrates, there are two incompatible underlying topoi to each set of topical
forms. Thus, a speaker who accepts (50a) (or (49a) in the general case) will also
have to accept (50b) (or (49b)), but she will not be able to accept (50c) or (d) (or
(49c) or (d)). In Anscombre & Ducrot's (1989: 83) terminology (49a) and (b) are
'converse' topoi (topoi inverses), as are (49c) and (d). Nyan (1998: 55) refers to the
topos underlying (50c) and (d) ((49c) and (d) in the general case) as "the converse
topos". Moeschler & Reboul (1994: 317) use the expression 'contrary topoi' (topoi
contraires) to refer to the two incompatible topoi underlying (49a,b) and (49c,d)
respectively. To avoid confusion I'll refer to incompatible topoi as contrary topoi.
Different sequences from argument to conclusion will be licensed by different
topoi. Let us call the topos underlying (50a) and (b) Ti and the topos underlying
(50c) and (d) T2. In that case, the sequences in (51) and (52) will be licensed by Ti,
while those in (53) and (54) will be licensed by T2.
discussed in 3.3.5, because it isn't clear what property (44) and (45) attribute to what object.
(51) It's warm. Let's go to the beach.
(52) It's not warm. Let's not go to the beach.
(53) It's warm. Let's not go to the beach.
(54) It's not warm. Let's go to the beach.
So, how do the notions of topos and topical form solve the problem that examples
(47a) and (b) present for the argumentative operator only?
Recall that the curious thing about (47a) and (b) is that the presence of the
argumentative operator only doesn't seem to make a difference to the argumentative
potential of its host utterance, since both (47a) and (b) are acceptable, just like their
operator-free counterparts (46a) and (b).
(46) a.	 Hurry up: it's eight o'clock.
	
b.	 Take your time: it's eight o'clock.
(47) a.	 Hurry up: it's only eight o'clock.
	
b.	 Take your time: it's only eight o'clock.
Let us first look at the different topical forms underlying the sequences in (46) and
(47). They are given as TF1-TF4 in (55).
(55) TF1: The more time one has, the more one needs to hurry.
TF2: The less time one has, the less one needs to hurry.
TF3: The more time one has, the less one needs to hurry.
TF4: The less time one has, the more one needs to hurry.
The interesting thing now is that (46) and (47) cannot both be licensed by the same
set of topical forms. (46a) can be licensed by TF1 or TF4 and (46b) by TF2 or TF3.
In other words, the argument it's eight o'clock can lead to the conclusion hurry up
via two different routes and the same goes for the conclusion take your time. This is
illustrated in (56).
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(56)
TF1
('uIurry up
It's eight o'clock
your time
TF3
(adapted from Moeschler & Reboul 1994: 319)
The case of (47), however, is different. (47a) can only be licensed by TF1 and (47b)
only by TF3. Thus, as illustrated in (57), the presence of the argumentative operator
may not restrict the class of conclusions reached but it does restrict the route taken to
reach those conclusions.
(57)
TF1
Huny up
hto'clock ----------------------
our time
It S eig	
TF2 TF3
	
Ta y
(adapted from Moeschler & Reboul 1994: 319)
3.4.3 Topical fields
The introduction of topical forms means that A & D (e.g. 1989) no longer want to
capture the meaning of utterances in terms of asserted and presupposed contents
assigned to deep structures. Rather they see the meaning of the deep structure as "the
set of topoi whose application is said to be valid when uttered" (A & D 1989: 80).
They (1989:8 1) describe linguistic predicates as bundles of topoi and they introduce
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the notion of topical field for networks of topoi. 2° Thus, the meaning of a predicate
like work, for example, is given by a bundle of topoi involving gradations of work.
Some topoi that could be part of the meaning of work are given in (58).
(58) a.	 The more work, the more success.
b. The less work, the more relaxation.
c. The more work, the more fatigue.
d. The less work, the more happiness.2'
Another way of looking at this would be to say that gradations of work are linked, via
different topoi, with a series of other gradations, e.g. of success, relaxation, fatigue
and happiness. These gradations, in turn, are themselves linked to different
gradations still. For instance, gradations of happiness could be linked with
gradations of health, appetite, etc. This network of gradations, linked via an infinite
number of topoi, is what A & D (1989: 81) mean by a topical field.
It is interesting to note at this point that A & D (1989: 82) "in no way claim
that all individuals of the same linguistic community share the same topical field, nor
even that a given individual always uses the same one." This seems to raise the
question as to whether any linguistic predicate can ever have a meaning stable across
a linguistic community (and even for the same individual across time).
Unfortunately, A & D do not discuss this point.
Obviously, these developments of AT bring with them accounts of examples,
like (2), that are quite different from the accounts given in earlier AT.
(2)	 Peter is as tall as Mary.
20 As they put it: "A sort of topical field is then substituted for the usual lexical field" (A & D 1989:
81). I assume that what is meant by "the usual lexical field" is the neo-Saussurean notion, discussed,
for example in Lyons (1977: 250-261), i.e. a structured collection of lexemes which cover a
conceptual field, e.g. that of colours or 'knowledge and understanding'.
21 As a matter of fact, not only these topoi are linked with work, but also their opposites, i.e. 'the less
work, the more success', 'the more work, the more relaxation', 'the less work, the more fatigue', etc.
This makes the AT conception of meaning seem somewhat bizarre, as the meaning of the predicate
work contains contradictory parts. What is more, the information given by the topoi looks much more
like world knowledge than linguistic knowledge and it is not clear that world knowledge should or
could be part of linguistic meaning.
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On their revised account of (2) 22, Anscombre & Ducrot (1989: 83-85) analyse the
deep structure underlying the utterance as requiring that Peter and Mary should be
located at the same degree of the initial gradation of tallness in all topoi that link
tallness with other gradations, like for instance 'the taller, the better at basketball',
'the taller, the more clumsy', etc. In other words, it is part of the meaning of (2) that
any conclusion that can be drawn from Mary's location on the scale of tallness can
also be drawn from Peter's location on the same scale and vice versa.
Probably the most important aspect of the move from asserted and
presupposed contents to topical fields is the fact that it is also a move from a
semantics with some truth-conditional (i.e. asserted contents) and some non-truth-
conditional elements (i.e. argumentative presupposed contents) to one which is
wholly non-truth-conditional. As will be seen in the next section, this move is highly
questionable and creates some very serious problems for AT.
3.4.4 New definitions of central AT notions
The introduction of topoi and topical form to replace the idea that the meaning of
utterances can be captured in terms of the conclusions for which they can be used as
arguments means that the definitions of the central notions of AT, such as
argumentative orientation and argumentative force, given in previous sections can no
longer be correct. It is therefore remarkable that nowhere in A & D's work (as much
of it as is available to me at least) have I been able to find any explicit reformulations
of the basic AT definitions. Because it seems important to have at least some idea of
how A & D would (or could) now define the notions of argumentative orientation
and argumentative strength, I will attempt a guess on the basis of their slightly
revised definitions discussed in 3.3.5.
Where in A & D (1983: 167) they said two utterances would have opposite
argumentative orientations if they didn't attribute the same property to the same
object to any degree whatsoever, it seems possible that they'd now say that two
utterances have opposite argumentative orientations if they are linked to topoi with
22 Presumably, the same would hold for (1).
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different initial gradations and, maybe, converse second gradations, like for example
T and T' in (59).
(59) T:	 The nicer the weather, the more pleasant a walk.
T':	 The more work one has to do, the less pleasant a walk.
Now, T could be seen as underlying the first conjunct in (60) and T' the second, and
indeed, since but can felicitously link the two conjuncts in (60), they would have
been said to have opposite argumentative orientations on A & D's old definitions.
(60) The weather is nice, but I have a lot of work to do.
It's a little less hard to see how the notion of argumentative strength would be
defined now. In A & D (1983: 166), they say that an utterance u will be
argumentatively stronger than utterance u if they both attribute the same property to
the same object and if u does so to a greater degree than u. The only way I can see
in which this could be translated into terms of topical forms is that u will be
argumentatively stronger than u if u places its object higher than u on the initial
gradation of all topoi linked with the utterances. Thus, (61b) will be stronger than
(61 a), because the former places its object (i.e. the weather) higher on the gradation
of niceness than the latter.
(61) a.	 The weather is nice.
b.	 The weather is very nice.
3.5	 The end of informational contents
3.5.1 Introductory remarks
As mentioned above, Anscombre & Ducrot (1989) constitutes a move away from the
earlier AT position where argumentative contents were seen as an integral part of the
semantic structure of the deep structures underlying utterances, but not the only kind
of content; informational or truth-conditional (asserted or factual) contents were also
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part of the semantic structure of utterances. In their own words, A & D (1989: 77/79)
move from a position of considering "argumentation as a component of meaning" to
one of "radical argumentativism". As will be seen shortly, this move has some very
far-reaching and ultimately, I believe, undesirable implications. However, first of all,
let us look at the justification A & D (1983, 1989), and especially Ducrot (1993),
give for this move.
3.5.2 Ascriptivism
The idea that the argumentative function of language, and thus the argumentative
aspects of linguistic meaning, should be seen as primary first seems to emerge in
chapter 7 of A & D (1983). In this chapter, A & D (1983: 169) say that, even though
so far their accounts had made it look as though they saw language as having two
separate functions, namely an informative one and an argumentative one, they really
want to work towards a position where the argumentative function of language, and
with it argumentative meaning, is primary and the informative function of language
secondary. In that sort of an account, any informational (or truth-conditional)
meaning would be derived from an underlying argumentative meaning. The wish to
give such an account seems to stem from the view that many utterances, like for
example those in (62)-(64) below, which look as if they are purely informative, i.e. as
if they describe some objective state of affairs or other, do not, in fact, describe any
such state of affairs.
(62) Peter is intelligent.
(63) This hotel is good.
(64) This act is voluntary.
A & D (1983: 169-174) maintain that the assumption that, for example (62), is a
description which predicates the objective property 'intelligent' of Peter is wrong.
This, they say, would presuppose that there is a state of affairs in the world which
would make (62) true or false, and that there is an objective concept 'intelligent'. A
& D believe that there is no such concept, or, if there is a scientific concept, for
example based on the notion of IQ, that concept would not capture the meaning of
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the natural language word intelligent. Instead, A & D (1983: 170) want to follow in
the footsteps of 'ascriptivists', like Hare (1952), who would account for the meaning
of (62) by saying that it is used to praise Peter, the meaning of (63) by saying that it is
used to recommend the hotel, and the meaning of (64) by saying that it is used to
attribute responsibility for the act to the agent.
A & D's (1983: 172) account, though in the same spirit as the ascriptivist
view, is slightly different. They suggest that utterances like (62)-(64) should be
accounted for in purely argumentative terms. That is, according to them, the
meaning of (63), for example, should be captured by saying that the utterance can be
used as an argument in favour of a conclusion r, with r being something like
'favourable view of the hotel' 23. There are two potential problems with this, both of
which have been used as arguments against ascriptivism (see e.g. Searle 1969: 136-
141; Geach 1972: 250-269).
The first problem is that it is very easily possible to utter something like (63)
without recommending the hotel. Thus, (65) is perfectly acceptable.
(65) This hotel is good, but I don't recommend it.
A & D (1983: 172) avoid this problem by saying that it is the meaning of (63) that it
can be used as an argument for a favourable view of the hotel, which does not mean
that it actually always has to lead to that kind of conclusion. In fact, they argue that
the very presence of but in (65) indicates that the two conjuncts are arguments for
opposite conclusions and that this supports their view.
The second, graver, problem is that utterances like (63) can be used in
syllogisms, like the one in (66).
(66) a.	 If this hotel is good, it is expensive.
b. This hotel is good.
c. Therefore, it is expensive. 	 (A & D 1983: 172)
23 This shows that A & D started thinking about abandoning informational contents before they'd
introduced the notions of topoi and topical forms, at a time when they still defined the central AT
notions in terms of conclusions, rather than topoi.
24	 fn. 23
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The problematic point here is the conditional in (66a). It seems unlikely that the
meaning of the antecedent here can be captured by saying that it is an argument for a
favourable view of the hotel (or that it is used to recommend the hotel). However, if
the meaning of the antecedent is different from that of (66b), the argument can't go
through. Anscombre & Ducrot (1983: 173) offer a solution involving the notion of
'delocutivity' (délocutivite'). An expression E2 is derived from an expression E 1 via
delocutivity if the form of E2 is based on that of B1 but the meaning of E2 is based,
not on the encoded meaning of E1 (i.e. its semantic value), but on some pragmatic
value connected with the utterance of E1.
A & D now maintain that there is an B 2 : X is good which attributes a certain
property to X and which is derived, via delocutivity, from an E 1 : Xis good which has
as its meaning that it is an argument for a favourable view of X. According to them,
a general law of discourse states that any utterance which is used to argue for
something presents itself as being justified by a property of the object with which the
argumentation is concerned. After all, A & D believe, if one takes the trouble to
argue for a favourable view of an object, then this object must have certain properties
which justify the argument. It is this 'pragmatic' aspect of the utterance of E 1 : X is
good that gets transferred to the expression E 2: X is good. The idea is now that
syllogisms, like the one in (66), contain expression E2, which does attribute a
property to an object, and not E 1, from which B2 is derived. Before moving on, let
me point out some difficulties with this account.
A major worry, which will no doubt have struck the reader, is that the
delocutivity account of is good is completely counterintuitive. It seems odd, to say
the least, that the is good that attributes a property to objects is derived from the is
good that is an argument for a favourable view, rather than the other way around.
From a more theoretical point of view, there are two ways of construing A & D's
account. The first is that they are saying that is good has just one meaning (i.e. that it
has a unitary semantics), namely that the utterance is an argument for a favourable
view of its object(s), and that the delocutive meaning has to be derived
(pragmatically) on certain occasions. The problem with this is that the delocutive
meaning will have to be derived on many occasions. What is more, it isn't clear how
the meaning of good in utterances like (67) could be accounted for.
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(67) Good hotels are hard to come by.
It seems obvious that it isn't part of the meaning of (67) that it is an argument for a
favourable view of the hotel, but it isn't clear how a hearer could work out on the
basis of (67) that good here attributes a certain property to an object if that isn't part
of the meaning of good.
The second way of construing A & D's delocutivity account is that it amounts
to the postulation of an ambiguity in is good. However, this is completely
unnecessary, because, if the meaning of is good were assumed to be that it attributes
certain positive properties to objects, it would fall out quite naturally that an
utterance containing such an attribution is often an argument for a favourable view of
the objects. Admittedly, there is still a question about what property exactly it is that
is good does attribute - a possible answer to this will be discussed in .. .
In spite of the fact that A & D (1983, ch. 7) say they want to move towards a
completely non-truth-conditional semantics, which is based on the view that no
meaning is primarily descriptive or informational, they (1983: 169) admit that there
are a number of utterances, like for example (68)-(70), which seem to be irreducibly
informative, and for which they can't account in purely argumentative terms.
(68) The table is square.
(69) The tablecloth is red.
(70) Peter has arrived.	 A&D(1983: 169)
As a matter of fact, it's less than obvious that (68)-(70) are radically different from
(62)-(64). What counts as square and what as red varies across circumstances,
purposes and individuals, so that the property communicated by utterances such as
(68) and (69) is no more fixed or objective than the properties communicated by
intelligent, good and voluntary.
3.5.3 Radical argumentativism
3.5.3.1 Examples
Ducrot (1993: 88) goes further than A & D (1983) in his rejection of truth-
conditional meaning. He maintains that no part of meaning is purely objective, i.e.
not touched by any, as Ducrot puts it, "pragmatic intentions" (intentions
pragmatiques). Note, though, that the examples Ducrot (1993: 89) uses are very
close to (62)-(64), the examples used by A & D (1983) to show that some utterances
could be accounted for in purely argumentative terms, but not to (68)-(70), the
examples A & D (1983) give of purely informative utterances. In other words,
Ducrot does not address the examples that one would expect to be addressed by
someone making the 'no objectivity' claim. The first set of Ducrot's examples are
given in (71) and (72).
(71) The film was interesting.
(72) The meeting was pleasant.
As with (62)-(64), the argument is that there simply are no objective properties
'interesting' or 'pleasant' and that, therefore, it is impossible to capture the meaning
of (71) and (72) in truth-conditional terms. From this, Ducrot (1993: 89) concludes
that the meaning of these two utterances must be given in purely argumentative
terms. As will be discussed below, I don't believe that the move from the
assumption that the meaning of a certain expression is not an objective (fixed,
determinate) concept to the assumption that it must be non-truth-conditional (or, at
least, that there is no state of affairs corresponding to the concept conveyed by the
expression on a given occasion) is legitimate. Nor do I believe that the move from
the assumption that the meaning of a certain expression is non-truth-conditional to
the assumption that it must be argumentative is acceptable. Nevertheless, the point
that there is no single objective property 'interesting' or single property 'pleasant' is
valid and any account of the meaning of words like interesting and pleasant will have
to take this into account.
Ducrot's next two examples, also intended to demonstrate the impossibility of
giving truth conditions to utterances, require a greater leap of the imagination. The
first one of these is given in (73), uttered by a parent to a child who is getting a bit
too close to a dog.
(73) Don't touch: it's dirty.
Ducrot (1993: 89) is interested in the indicative it's dirty. He claims that the
meaning of this is not, as one might expect, that it gives a description of the dog, but
rather that it is an argument for not touching it. Ducrot starts by saying that for the
child, it's dirty can't be a description of the dog, because the child doesn't know
anything about the adjective dirty, other than that it is used as a justification for
orders not to touch, not to eat, or, more generally, to stay away from things. He
admits that the parent uttering (73), will see it's dirty as a description of the dog
which is part of an argument with the conclusion don't touch. However, Ducrot
believes that this is an illusion, because the parents would find it difficult to define
dirtiness in terms which don't allude to the fact that it justifies forbidding things.
The final example Ducrot (1993: 89) uses is (74), which should be imagined
as uttered by a speaker who is trying to get the hearer to do something.
(74) Be reasonable.
Ducrot believes that (74) is not a case of a proposition (the hearer is reasonable)
being uttered with directive illocutionary force as the standard speech act account
would have it (e.g. Searle 1979). According to Ducrot, the semantic value of the
adjective reasonable consists in the fact that it presents an act as one that must be
performed. In other words, for Ducrot (1993: 89-90), the meaning of reasonable is
purely argumentative; the word does not encode a propositional constituent. His
justification is that he can't see what propositional constituent that could be.
Ducrot's accounts of is dirty in (73) and be reasonable in (74) are both
incredibly counterintuitive. I, for one, have no difficulty at all in thinking of a
definition of dirtiness which has absolutely nothing to do with forbidding things. In
fact, a quick glance at any dictionary of English (or French, or any other language
with a word corresponding to dirty) will show that there are numerous definitions of
dirtiness which don't have anything to do with forbidding things. Similarly, I can see
reasonably easily what fragment of a proposition reasonable could encode (and,
again, I'm sure most dictionaries would be on my side). Furthermore, if the meaning
of be reasonable is described exhaustively by saying that it describes acts as ones that
must be performed, what is the meaning of an utterance like (75)?
(75) Susan has always tried to be reasonable.
To return to Ducrot, after using the examples discussed above to argue against a
truth-based semantics, he goes on to state how a purely argumentative semantics
could work. For this, he uses the notion of topos introduced above, and the notion of
polyphony, which will be discussed briefly here.
3.5.3.2 Polyphony
Polyphony is a central notion of AT. It is based on the idea that the views of more
than one person can be behind a text or utterance. This idea was first explored in
literary criticism, e.g. by Bakhtin. According to Ducrot (1984: 173), his own work is
an extension of Bakhtin's from literary criticism into linguistics. In what follows, a
brief description of polyphony in linguistics will be given, along with some of its
applications in AT. I will also mention some criticisms of Ducrot's linguistic theory
of polyphony.
According to Ducrot (1993: 90), the meaning of an utterance consists in a
characterisation of its own uttering. This uttering is characterised as the
confrontation of different 'voices' or 'points of view', which interact with each other.
The idea is that the (usually unique) speaker (locuteur) doing the uttering stages a
dialogue inside her own monologue between different points of view (énonciateurs).
It is important to note that neither locuteur nor énonciateurs are construed as real
people. Rather, Moeschler & Reboul (1994: 326) stress that they are theoretical
constructs, although actual people can get to be identified with locuteurs and
énonciateurs. This notion that every utterance is a manifestation of different
interacting points of view is what is referred to, in AT, by the term 'polyphony'25.
The following are some of the linguistic phenomena which, according to
Ducrot (1984), exhibit the points of view of more than one (theoretical) individual
(or of someone other than the individual who is actually doing the uttering): direct
and indirect reported speech, ironical utterances, utterances containing but and
negative utterances. The most obvious of these are cases of reported speech, be it
direct reported speech, as in (76a), indirect reported speech, as in (76b), or free direct
reported speech, as in (76c).
(76) What did Mary say?
a. She said: "I like you".
b. She said she liked me.
c. Ilike you.
(76a) and (b) clearly represent the points of view of both the actual speaker (say,
Peter) and Mary. (76c), although physically uttered by Peter, actually represents
Mary's point of view.
On Ducrot's (1984: 210-213) account, if (77) is uttered ironically, it will
represent not the actual speaker's view, but somebody else's (whether that person
actually uttered the words or not and whether there actually is a specific person
whose view is being expressed or not)26
(77) Life is beautiful.
In an utterance containing but, the presence of two different points of view makes
itself felt in a different way. Remember that A & D analyse but as indicating that the
two conjuncts have opposite argumentative orientations. Thus, Peter is rich will have
opposite argumentative orientation to I like him in (78).
25 For a discussion of polyphony see also Moeschler & Reboul (1994: 323-347), Nyan (1998: 60-63)
and Zagar (1999).
Ducrot's account of irony is based on Sperber & Wilson (1978).
(78) Peter is rich but I like him.
Remember also that, at least in earlier AT, two utterances were said to have opposite
argumentative orientations if they were arguments for opposite conclusions. In (78),
Peter is rich could, for example, be an argument for I don't like Peter, whereas I like
him clearly is an argument for 1 like Peter. Now, the point is that one and the same
person (or theoretical individual) can't argue for I like Peter and I don't like Peter at
one and the same time27.
Finally, negation is the simplest example of polyphony, according to Ducrot.
The idea is that every utterance containing a negation involves the presentation of at
least two points of view: the positive counterpart of the utterance and the negative
utterance itself. Thus, (79), taken from Nyan (1998: 60), will be analysed as
comprising the two viewpoints in (80a) and (b).
(79) Ludwig isn't an ordinary dog.
(80) a.	 Ludwig is an ordinary dog.
b.	 Ludwig isn't an ordinary dog.
In most cases, the speaker will be seen as identifying with the viewpoint in (80b), but
in cases of irony, for example, the speaker will be seen as identifying with (80a).
This might be seen as a good way of accounting for the intuition that utterances
containing negations always also make immediately accessible their positive
counterparts.
The biggest problem with Ducrot's linguistic notion of polyphony, as pointed
out by Moeschler & Reboul (1994: 332-333), is that it leads to an incredible
proliferation of theoretical entities: Not only can each utterance comprise a multitude
of énonciateurs and more than one locuteur on a basic level, but Ducrot (1984: 224)
also conceives of cases where first-level énonciateurs are manipulated by higher-
level énonciateurs. What's more, this proliferation of theoretical entities wouldn't be
necessary if, instead, a notion were developed of real people representing other (real)
27 am here deliberately reverting back to the 'old' AT definition of argumentative orientation, since
neither Nyan (1998) nor Moeschler & Reboul (1994) give an account of but using the notions of topoi
and topical form.
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people's thoughts and utterances (or, indeed, thoughts and utterances which are not
attributed to anybody in particular)28.
3.5.3.3 Some radical consequences of radical argumentativism
Overall, the picture Ducrot (1993) paints is the following. All linguistic meaning can
be captured in purely argumentative terms. That is, every utterance can be described
as a collection of topoi, which constitute different points of view, and there is nothing
about language as such that is informative, i.e. language is not cut out to be used to
describe states of affairs. As Ducrot (1993: 96) points out, this gives rise to some
important questions.
The first question Ducrot mentions is this: if language really does not say
anything true or false about the world, how come speakers believe that they are using
language to give true descriptions of the world (at least sometimes)? Ducrot's (1993:
97) answer to this question is that speakers' (and hearers') impression that language
is informative is an illusion.
The second question he raises is: given that linguists use language to describe
how language works and given that that language (as assumed by Ducrot) cannot say
anything about the world, how can linguists ever say anything true about language?
Ducrot (1993: 97) first notes that this question is too important and too far-reaching
in its implications for it to be answered in a few words. He then considers the
possible answer that linguists should try to construct a metalanguage which is
descriptive in nature (a logical language, such as the predicate calculus, for example).
After stating that this is what all linguists, including himself in the present chapter,
are trying to do, he says that he feels that it is an impossible task. Finally, he
concludes that linguistics should be seen, not as a scientific discipline, but as an
essentially critical one and that the aim of semantics should not be to try and describe
the actual meaning of utterances but to destroy the illusion that utterances convey
information about things. In his own words:
Une deuxième issue possible est de fixer a Ia sémantique linguistique un
objectif essentiellement critique:.[sic] Elle ne viserait pas a décrire ce que
28 cf. Sperber & Wilson's (1995: 224-231) notion of interpretive use.
signifie vraiment le discours: elle viserait seulement a détruire l'illusion sans
cesse renaissante selon laquelle le discours donnerait des informations sur les
choses. Elle enseignerait avant tout a se mefier de la parole.
Ducrot (1993: 98, his emphasis)
3.6 AT evaluated
So far in this chapter I have sketched the beginnings of AT, its most important
developments and the point it seems to have reached at present. At each stage, I have
pointed out problems with A & D's accounts either in footnotes or in the body of the
text. In this section, I would like to recapitulate some of the problems mentioned
earlier and expand on those that have merely been hinted at. First, however, let me
mention some of AT's strong points.
Without a doubt, a lot of good, analytical work has been done within the
framework of AT and, in its earlier forms, it is based on some interesting
observations. Argumentation Theory is obviously right, and certainly not alone, in
noticing the existence and the importance of non-truth-conditional aspects of
linguistic meaning, and in pointing out the existence of words whose meaning is
essentially subjective, like interesting, pleasant, etc. Anscombre & Ducrot' s work
highlights some very interesting linguistic phenomena, such as the difference
between as tall as and the same height as discussed above, the difference between
little and a little discussed in A & D (1989: 82-83), and the difference between he is
36 and he is only 36 (Nyan 1998: 52). These are all phenomena a successful
semantic theory will have to account for. A & D's (e.g. 1976 & 1983) accounts of
the meaning of but and even are particularly insightful. Finally, there is the idea,
discussed for example by Zagar (1999:1-2), that utterances like (44) are not usually
made just to let a hearer know what time it is, but also to communicate something
else, for example any of (81a)-(d).
(44) It's eight o'clock.
(81) a.	 Hurry up!
b.	 Take your time!
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c. Turn on the radio!
d. Go brush your teeth!
(from Zagar 1999: 2)
Clearly, this idea has been widely accepted by linguists and philosophers of language,
at least since Grice. However, it is doubtful whether topical forms, which are part of
the meaning of the deep structure underlying an utterance, are the right tool for
explaining this phenomenon. Now, let me move on to some of my worries with AT.
As argumentation theorists would no doubt be the first to agree, in AT's
earlier incarnations there were problems with specific definitions, especially those of
argumentative potential, argumentative orientation and strength, when they were
couched in terms of conclusions. Furthermore, at the stage where A & D accounted
for the meaning of utterances by assigning asserted and presupposed content to their
underlying deep structures there was a proliferation of mechanisms, laws and axioms
whose existence wasn't always independently justified (for instance, the law
governing the use of even discussed in section 3.3.4). Another worry at that stage in
the theory's development was that the compositionality of the meaning of deep
structures was only guaranteed to the level of core deep structures, whose meaning
could not be decomposed further. In other words, the contribution made by
individual lexical items that are not argumentative operators and the syntactic
structure of the sentence are not addressed.
The intermediate step of introducing the notion of act of arguing solved some
of those problems but also created some new ones, notably for A & D's account of
the meaning of but. However, it is the last step in the development of AT, namely
the introduction of topoi and topical forms along with abandoning any kind of
informational, descriptive or truth-conditional contents, which has created the most
serious problems for the theory. In particular, I will here discuss two problems with
later AT.
The first is this: Given that the meaning of each utterance merely provides an
entry point to a topical field and thus gives access to an infinite number of topoi, how
can it be that any conclusions are ever reached? For example, an utterance like (82)
gives access to a multitude of topoi, including Ti: 'the warmer the weather, the nicer
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the beach', T2: 'the warmer the weather, the less pleasant the work', T3: 'the warmer
the weather, the shorter the skirts', etc., and their opposites.
(82)	 It's hot.
How do A & D explain that, on any given occasion, competent hearers are usually
able to figure out which conclusion(s) the speaker is intending him to draw (and,
therefore, which topoi to use). Furthermore, how does the hearer know that it's the
weather the speaker is talking about and not the food the hearer has just placed in
front of her? And how does the hearer know that with the word hot the speaker
meant to describe the temperature and not the spiciness of the food? Clearly, these
are the questions a pragmatic theory is traditionally expected to answer. However, A
& D's integrated pragmatics does not seem to address, much less answer them. What
is needed here is clearly a non-integrated pragmatics, a notion for which A & D do
not seem to make any provision. At this point an argumentation theorist might
protest: This criticism isn't fair, because A & D never set out to answer the questions
above; AT is strictly a semantic theory. Let's assume that this is so, even though A
& D do not explicitly state it anywhere. In that case, one would expect AT to meet
the basic requirements of a semantic theory, such as compositionality. However, if
the meaning of predicates is given by bundles of topoi, it is not clear how the
compositionality requirement can be met. Furthermore, while AT does offer
accounts of the meaning of predicates like work and argumentative operators like but,
it is not clear how the meaning of other linguistic elements, such as referential
expressions, quantifiers, tense, etc., would be characterised in AT. However, these
are small worries compared with the second problem I want to discuss here.
In a nutshell, a theory which ends up saying that language cannot be used to
describe the world, be it the actual or some other possible world, and doesn't have a
good explanation of why it is that people nevertheless not only believe that language
is used to convey information but are also prepared to act on information they have
been given by purely linguistic means, simply cannot be adequate. After all, people
act on purely linguistically conveyed information all the time. For example, I go to
the station for 11 o'clock because my friend has told me that her train arrives at
eleven, and she is quite likely to have gone to the station at a certain time at her end
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because someone told her there'd be a train then. More generally, and more
importantly, there are many things we only know today because someone wrote them
down or told them to someone else. If our impression that we are conveying
information using language is just an illusion, it must be an illusion so strong and
widespread that every single human in the world not only believes in it but also
regularly acts on it. As mentioned above, the step from recognising the existence of
non-truth-conditional meaning to abandoning the notion that language is used to
represent the world is not supported with enough evidence. What is more, even if the
meaning communicated by most words is subjective, this does not mean that the
notion of truth conditions has to be abandoned altogether.
These two problems with later AT show that the theory is let down by its
failure to make a principled distinction between semantics and pragmatics and by its
resolutely anti-cognitive stance. In the next chapter I will look at how a cognitive
theory with a clear semantics/pragmatics distinction can solve problems concerning
linguistic subjectivity without discarding the notion of truth conditions or the idea
that people use language to convey information about the world, while at the same
time acknowledging that this is not all language is used for. I will show that and how
Sperber & Wilson's (1986) Relevance Theory can account for the fact of
'subjectivity' without throwing out the representational baby with the subjective bath
water.
3.7	 Ending on a conciliatory note
In spite of the problems with, particularly later, AT just discussed, there is much that
the theory shares with other theories of utterance meaning or interpretation. For
instance, Griceans, relevance theorists (and any other pragmatist worth their salt)
would agree that utterances like (44) are not usually made just to inform the hearer of
the time and that, indeed, speakers are likely to want to convey something additional,
e.g. any of (81a)-(d).
(44)	 It's eight o'clock.
120
(81) a.	 Hurry up!
b. Take your time!
c. Turn on the radio!
d. Go brush your teeth!
As mentioned above, AT explains this phenomenon with the help of scalar topoi,
which are part of the meaning of (44), licensing the conclusions in (81). Obviously, a
Gricean would explain it in terms of the Co-operative Principle and conversational
maxims. Thus, a Gricean might say that a hearer must assume that a speaker uttering
(44) also means any of the things in (81) in order to preserve the assumption that the
speaker is observing the Co-operative Principle and conversational maxims. It will
be seen in the next chapter that RT has a different, cognitive, explanation. What
primarily distinguishes the AT approach from others is that its topoi are necessarily
scalar and are seen as part of the (semantic) meaning of (44). While it isn't clear that
this scalarity is actually necessary in cases like (44), in other utterances, e.g. those
involving even, it does, indeed, seem to play a central role.29
In sum, while there is much that seems problematic about AT, there is also
much that is valuable. In particular, when it comes to the analysis of specific 'non-
truth-conditional' expressions one might do well to take heed of A & D's insights
and intuitions. Indeed, it will be seen in chapter 5 that their account of but, in
particular, has been ground-breaking and deservedly influential.
29 See chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 4
RELEVANCE THEORY AND 'NON-TRUTH-CONDITIONAL' MEANING
4.1	 Introduction
In chapter 1, I discussed various linguistic expressions that have been classed as
having 'non-truth-conditional' meaning and, in chapter 2, I looked at the ways in
which some theorists have attempted to accommodate them in their still essentially
truth-conditional frameworks. The conclusion I reached was that the notion of non-
truth-conditional meaning doesn't cover a natural class of expressions and that
calling an expression 'non-truth-conditional' isn't a theoretically useful way of
describing it. Chapter 3 gave an overview of the ultimately completely non-truth-
conditional account of utterance meaning provided by Argumentation Theory with
the many problems that brings with it. In this chapter I'll introduce the cognitive
pragmatic framework of Relevance Theory (RT). I will show that this framework
enables the theorist to account for the meaning of all linguistic expressions regardless
of whether (and when) they contribute to the truth-conditional content of the
utterances in which they occur.
First, I'll introduce the relevance-theoretic view of communication and
utterance interpretation. This will motivate the existence of two different types of
information a linguistic device can encode: conceptual and procedural. This
semantic distinction will be explored in section 4.3. Section 4.4 is devoted to the
ways in which assumptions can be communicated, i.e. explicitly or implicitly. I'll
argue that the conceptuallprocedural distinction captures a fundamental semantic
difference between two types of linguistic phenomena, while the (pragmatic)
distinctions between implicitly communicated and two types of explicitly
communicated assumptions explain when and whether a given expression contributes
to the truth-conditional content of an utterance. In section 4.5, I'll take another look
at the notion of truth conditions and I'll suggest that it's possible and, indeed,
desirable to give an account of utterance meaning that doesn't rely on the notion at
all, at least not in the way in which it has been explicated in chapter 1. Finally, in
section 4.6, I'll suggest how RT can be, and has been, used to account for the 'non-
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truth-conditional' phenomena listed in chapter 2 without having recourse to
describing them as truth-conditional or non-truth-conditional.
4.2	 Relevance and (ostensive) communication
4.2.1 The cognitive principle of relevance
Within the framework of Relevance Theory (RT), linguistic communication is seen
in the broader context of human cognition and ostensive communication in general.
The basic idea is that humans are predisposed to pay attention to relevant stimuli.
This is captured in the cognitive principle of relevance, according to which human
cognition is geared towards maximising relevance (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995:
46-50; 261-263). In absolute terms, a stimulus is relevant to a cognitive system at
time t iff the information it carries interacts with information already within the
system at t in one of three basic ways'. The result of this interaction is called a
cognitive effect in RT. The three main types of cognitive effect are illustrated in (1)-
(3).
(1) Joan is lying in bed. She can hear a patter on the roof and concludes that it's
raining. She gets up, opens the shutters and sees that it is indeed raining.
In the scenario in (1), the new information Joan gains from looking out of the
window interacts with a belief she's already formed. The new information, i.e. it's
raining, strengthens an existing assumption of Joan's, namely the assumption that
it's raining.
(2) As before, Joan is lying in bed. Given that there's no audible patter on the
roof she assumes that it isn't raining. Again, she gets up and opens the
shutters and she sees that it's raining.
There may well be more ways in which new information can interact with old. For instance, it's
conceivable that some new information, rather than giving rise to a contextual implication,
strengthening or contradicting and eliminating existing assumptions, leads to a reorganisation in the
information already stored in the memory. More emotional types of effects, such as making
somebody feel good, are also conceivable. However, the three types of effects described above are
those usually cited in the literature
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In (2), again the new information, it's raining, interacts with an existing assumption
of Joan's, namely that it isn't raining. Here, the new information contradicts and
eliminates Joan's existing assumption.
(3)	 Again, Joan is lying in bed. She decides that if it's raining she won't go for a
run. She gets up, opens the shutters and sees that it's raining.
In (3), the new information that it's raining interacts with Joan's existing assumption
that she won't go for a run if it's raining. In this case, the two assumptions together
logically imply a third assumption, i.e. that Joan won't go for a run. This third
assumption is a contextual implication of the new information, in a context
described by (3). Note that neither Joan's existing assumption nor the new
information could have given rise to this third assumption on their own; the
contextual assumption only arises once old information and new information are
combined. In all of these cases, the information that it's raining is relevant, because
it achieves at least one cognitive effect. So much for the definition of relevance in
absolute terms.
It seems clear that relevance is not just an absolute concept but that different
stimuli will achieve different degrees of relevance. For instance, imagine two stimuli
A and B. They both carry the same information but A is a lot easier and quicker to
process than B. In such a case A would surely be more relevant than B. Similarly, if
two stimuli C and D were to demand an equal amount of processing but C gave rise
to more cognitive effects than D, C would be more relevant. In other words, the
more processing effort a stimulus requires, the less relevant it is; the more cognitive
effects it achieves, the more relevant it is. This is the relative definition of relevance.
The question now is what role relevance plays in communication. Before I go into
this, let me say what relevance theorists mean by 'communication'.
4.2.2 Ostensive communication
The kinds of stimuli discussed so far (in particular in the scenarios in (1)-(3)) all
convey information in a way Grice (1957/1989) would characterise in terms of
natural meaning. For example, the patter on the roof 'naturally means' that it's
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raining. Clearly, the patter on the roof doesn't communicate that it's raining. It
seems that the notion of communication should be much closer to Grice's
(1957/1989) notion of non-natural meaning or meaning, discussed in chapter 2,
which involves the hearer's recognition of the speaker's intentions 2. In fact, Sperber
& Wilson (1986) define ostensive communication in a way which is very close to,
but also significantly different from, Grice's notion of meaning.
Taking for granted that communication crucially involves the transmission of
information, Wilson & Sperber (1993: 3-4) note that a stimulus (e.g. a linguistic
utterance) can convey information in a variety of ways. Only in some of these cases
can the information be said to have been ostensively communicated. Consider the
scenarios in (4)-(8).
(4) Peter overhears Joan talk on the phone. He notices her Irish accent and
gathers from this the information that Joan is Irish.
Even though the stimulus (i.e. the utterance) produced by Joan conveys to Peter the
information that she's Irish, it seems ridiculous to say that Joan in (4) has
communicated to Peter that she is Irish, because she clearly had no intention of
transmitting this information. In fact, Joan's utterance here seems to have natural
rather than non-natural meaning: Joan's Irish accent 'means' that she's Irish much in
the way the pattering on the roof 'means' rain. It seems clear that, at the very least,
the kind of communication that is central to pragmatics has to involve the
intentional transmission of information. However, the fact that information is
transmitted intentionally is not sufficient for it to be ostensively communicated. This
is illustrated in (5).
(5) Joan deliberately puts on her best Irish accent to make Peter think that she's
Irish. However, she doesn't want Peter to realise that she wants him to think
that she's Irish.
2 The terms hearer and speaker are used in place of the more cumbersome addressee and
communicator. I'm using speaker to refer to writers and non-verbal communicators as well as bona
fide speakers. The same goes, mutatis mutandis, for the terms hearer and addressee.
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In (5), if Joan's display is successful, Peter will end up believing that Joan is Irish for
the same reason as in (4) - because Peter takes Joan's Irish accent to 'mean' that
she's Irish. Joan's intention to make him think that she's Irish plays no role in his
actually coming to think that. Even though Joan has intentionally transmitted the
information that she's Irish, she surely, hasn't ostensively communicated it. In this
case Joan does have what Sperber & Wilson (1986: 29) call an informative
intention, i.e. she intends to inform Peter of her Irishness. However, an informative
intention alone is not enough to turn information transmission into the kind of
communication involved in everyday verbal (and non-verbal) exchanges. It seems
that for Joan to communicate that she is Irish she must not only intentionally convey
the information but also intend Peter to realise that she wants to convey the
information in question. However, as (6) shows, this is still not quite enough to
guarantee that information transmission is a case of fully overt communication.
(6)	 Joan says something in a Irish accent. She intends to inform Peter that she is
Irish and she wants Peter to realise that she has this informative intention.
However, she doesn't want him to realise that she wants him to discover her
informative intention.
In (6), Joan intends Peter to think that she has an informative intention, but, for some
reason, she wants to hide this higher-level intention from him. So, if Joan's
intentions succeed, Peter will feel that he has seen through her by realising that she is
intentionally putting on her best Irish accent to make him think that she is Irish.
This, too, isn't a case of ostensive communication. Because Peter doesn't think that
Joan wants him to recognise her informative intention, his recognition of her
intention can't play a role in its fulfilment. (6), like (5), is a case of covert
'communication'. For Joan to ostensively communicate that she is Irish, she not only
must have an informative intention, but she must also intend this informative
intention to be mutually manifest to her and Peter. In other words, she must have a
communicative intention (Sperber & Wilson 1986: 29). Consider the scenario in
(7).
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(7)	 Peter asks Joan where she's from. In reply she utters
"Why, what could she have done, being what she is?
Was there another Troy for her to bum?" 3 in an obviously Irish accent.
Here, it stands to reason that Joan not only intends to make it manifest (or more
manifest) to Peter that she's Irish, but that she also wants to make mutually manifest
her intention. In other words, in the scenario in (7), Joan has both an informative and
a communicative intention, which means that this is a case of ostensive
communication. Note, however, that there is still a difference between this and the
standard case of verbal communication: Although Joan has ostensively
communicated that she is Irish by her utterance of "Why, what could she have done,
being what she is?...", she has not, in Sperber & Wilson's (1986: 178) terms, 'said'
that she is Irish, she has, instead, provided direct evidence that she is 4. This becomes
particularly clear, if one compares (7) with (8).
(8)	 Peter asks Joan where she's from. She says "I'm Irish".
In this scenario, Joan makes it mutually manifest that she wants to make manifest
that she's Irish by saying that she is, i.e. she utters words that go a long way towards
linguistically encoding (or conventionally meaning) that she is Irish. By contrast,
there is nothing about the linguistically encoded content of Joan's utterance in (7)
that means that she is Irish. Peter will derive that assumption purely inferentially, i.e.
on the basis that someone's Irish accent (possibly along with their knowledge of an
Irish poem) 'naturally' means that they are Irish.
In (8), as well as in (7), Joan has a communicative as well as an informative
intention.	 In both scenarios, the very fact that Peter recognises Joan's
communicative intention will help fulfil her informative intention. In other words,
3 These are the last two lines of W. B. Yeats' poem No Second Troy. I'm grateful to Anne Golden for
suggesting this poem.
4 Joan's utterance in (7) is very similar to an example from Searle (1965/1996: 115). In this example,
an American soldier captured by the Italians in World War II utters "Kennst du das Land, wo die
Zitronen blUhen?" ('Do you know the land where the lemon trees bloom?') in order to convince them
that he is a German officer. Searle argues that the soldier shouldn't be seen as having meant that he
is a German officer by his utterance of "Kennst du das Land...", even though Grice's definition of that
notion would predict that he has. As a matter of fact, I don't believe that there is anything wrong with
saying that the soldier meant this - I would certainly want to say that, if successful, the soldier has
the very fact that Peter recognises that Joan wants it to be mutually manifest that she
wants him to believe that she's hish helps fulfil Joan's informative intention. In RT,
acts that are manifestly intended to achieve ostensive communication, such as Joan's
utterances in (7) and (8), are referred to as ostensive stimuli.
So far, I've used the notion of mutual manifestness without explicating it.
Let me remedy this. According to Sperber & Wilson (1986: 39) an assumption is
manifest to an individual at a certain time if and only if she's capable of entertaining
the assumption at that time and accepting it as true or probably true. An assumption
A is mutually manifest to two (or more) people iff they are capable of entertaining
and accepting as true or probably true, not only A, but also the assumption that A is
manifest to them. In other words, in order for a certain assumption A to be mutually
manifest to Joan and Peter it's not necessary for either of them to actually be
entertaining A, or the assumption that they are entertaining A, or the assumption that
it is mutually manifest that they're entertaining A. It's enough that they both could
entertain all of these assumptions and, if they did, accept them as true or probably
true.
The above discussion should have made it clear that communication, as it is
defined by Sperber & Wilson, is not just a matter of coding and decoding - in (7)
Joan ostensively communicates that she is Irish without any of that information being
encoded by her utterance at all. An ostensive stimulus, on this picture, is not a signal
that is decoded to yield a message. Rather, the ostensive stimulus is a piece of
evidence, evidence, more precisely, of the speaker's communicative and informative
intentions, which the hearer uses as input to a series of non-demonstrative inferential
processes. In cases like (8), part of this evidence is linguistically encoded, but even
in such cases, what is ostensively communicated goes far beyond what is encoded.
As will be seen below, the communicative principle of relevance explains what
guides the inferential processes that lead the hearer to the recovery of the
assumptions the speaker intended to communicate.
ostensively communicated that he is a German officer, much in the same way in which Joan
ostensively communicates that she is Irish by her utterance in (7).
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4.2.3 The communicative principle of relevance
When a speaker has a communicative intention it seems reasonable to assume that
she'll do her best to help the hearer recognise her informative intention. After all, the
whole point of ostensive communication is that the speaker wants an informative
intention fulfilled partly by virtue of the hearer's recognition of it. Since humans are
geared towards paying attention to relevant stimuli, it will be in the speaker's interest
to produce a stimulus that's at least relevant enough to be worth the hearer's
attention. Therefore, once a speaker has attracted the hearer's attention and made it
clear that she has a communicative intention, the hearer is licensed to expect a certain
level of relevance from the ostensive stimulus the speaker has produced. This is
captured by Sperber & Wilson's (1986: 158; 1995: 266-7) communicative principle
of relevance. According to this principle, every act of ostensive communication
communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance. An ostensive stimulus is
optimally relevant iff it is (a) relevant enough to be worth the hearer's attention and
(b) the most relevant stimulus the speaker could have produced given her abilities
and preferences (Sperber & Wilson 1995: 270).
Because processing effort increases as the accessibility of an interpretation
decreases (and thus relevance decreases), the hearer is licensed to follow a path of
least effort, accessing interpretations as they occur to him and stopping as soon as
he's recovered an interpretation that meets his expectation of relevance5.
On this picture, utterance interpretation is seen as a process of hypothesis
formation and evaluation. Taking the ostensive stimulus a speaker produces as
evidence of her communicative intention, the hearer will consider hypotheses
concerning the content of the speaker's informative intention in their order of
accessibility, stopping as soon as his expectations of relevance have been met.
Within RT, a linguistic utterance is seen as simply a special kind of ostensive
stimulus. It differs from non-verbal gestures and other non-linguistic ostensively
communicative behaviour in that it involves a certain amount of linguistic coding
and decoding. In other words, while the addressee of an ostensive hand movement,
for example, has to recover the communicator's meaning purely inferentially, the
addressee of a linguistic utterance is given a certain amount of encoded information,
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though not enough to render inference unnecessary as the decoding of the linguistic
meaning of an utterance yields a sub-propositional conceptual representation.
Taking this representation as the input to a series of pragmatic computations
(constrained by the communicative principle of relevance), the hearer will come up
with a hypothesis as to what (fully propositional) assumptions the speaker intended
to communicate. Let me illustrate this with an example.
In the scenario in (9), in interpreting Mary's utterance the hearer (Peter)
initially has access to the information in (10).
(9) Peter: Does Susan have a boyfriend?
Mary: She's a lesbian.
(10) a.	 Mary has uttered "She's a lesbian".
b.	 Mary intends the information conveyed by this utterance to be (or at
least appear to be) optimally relevant to me.
Ultimately, Peter will, for example, have derived (at least) (11).
(11) Mary intends to communicate i.e. intends me to realise that she intends me to
believe that
a. Susan is a lesbian.
b. Most lesbians don't have boyfriends.
c. Susan isn't likely to have a boyfriend.
Without going into the intermediate steps of this process, it's clear that
metarepresentation is an integral part of utterance interpretation on this picture.6
As will be shown in the next section, because the process of utterance
interpretation as described above involves representation and computation, it is
plausible that linguistic stimuli may encode two different types of information:
conceptual and procedural.
As discussed by Sperber (1994a), just what this expectation of relevance is depends on the
circumstances, including the degree of the hearer's sophistication.
6 For a more detailed account of how hearers work out what speakers intend to communicate, on the
RT picture, see Wilson & Sperber (forthcoming).
4.3	 Concepts and procedures (two types of information)
4.3.1 Representation and computation
Implicit in what has been said about RT so far is that it is a cognitive theory of
utterance interpretation that subscribes to a particular view of the mind, i.e. the kind
of computational representational theory of mind Fodor (e.g. 1985/1990) argues for.
This view of the mind is based on the assumptions that (a) intentional mental states
(e.g. beliefs and desires), i.e. states which represent (are about) the world, are real,
and that (b) by virtue of their contents, they enter into causal relations with each
other and play a causal role in behaviour.
Let me expand on this a little: Say, I look out of the window and form the
belief that it is raining. I might then remember that I've left a book in the garden
and, further, access my knowledge that things left outside in the rain get wet and that
paper, when wet, has a tendency to disintegrate. Combining all these pieces of
information (and some I haven't mentioned - e.g. my belief that books are made of
paper), I may well form the belief that if I don't go and fetch my book from the
garden immediately it will be destroyed. If I have a desire to preserve my book, I
will, therefore, go and get it from the garden without delay. This is a typical
commonsense explanation of behaviour: If I suddenly rush into the garden and
someone asks me why I did this, I'm likely to give an explanation very much like the
one I've just given. Clearly, if this is roughly what actually does lead to my
behaviour, assumptions (a) and (b) above are right: I have mental states with
representational content, e.g. the belief that it is raining or the desire to save my book
and there are causal relations among these on the basis of their contents, e.g. my
belief that my book will be destroyed if I don't fetch it from the garden is caused by
my beliefs that it is raining, that things left in the rain get wet and that paper tends to
disintegrate when wet (etc.).
A theory of the mind that holds that the commonsense explanation of
practical reasoning is roughly right has to be both representational and
computational: The former is required to account for the assumption that mental
states have contents (i.e. that they are about things) and the latter provides the means
for explaining their causal properties. Fodor (e.g. 1985/1990) argues convincingly
that the only way one can make sense of a computational representational theory of
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the mind, while also taking into account the productivity and systematicity of mental
representations (thoughts), is by postulating a compositional system of
representation, i.e. a syntactically articulated system, or 'language' of thought
(sometimes known as Mentalese). On this view, mental representations are
'sentences' in the language of thought, which is conceived of as being similar to
public languages like French and English in that it has both structural (syntactic) and
semantic properties. The 'words' in the language of thought, on this view, are
concepts, i.e. atomic mental representations. The idea is, then, that mental
representations undergo the computations they do by virtue of their syntactic rather
than their semantic properties. This means that mental processes are similar to
inference processes in formal logic in that they can rely on purely syntactic
considerations because the formal, syntactic properties of mental representations
reflect their semantic contents. For instance, the way in which my belief that if it's
raining things left outside get wet and my belief that it is raining cause the belief that
things left outside will get wet is parallel to the logical inference from P 
-k Q and P
toQ.
Obviously, on this kind of computational representational theory of the mind,
many cognitive processes involve both mental representation and computation. This
doesn't just go for thought processes of which we have a commonsense
apprehension, but also for such unconscious mental processes as are involved in
perception. For instance, visual perception is seen as involving the construction of a
series of visual (and finally conceptual) representations linked by a variety of
computations. Similarly, reasoning, is seen as involving logical computations (or
inferential operations, as demonstrated above) leading to a number of logical, or
conceptual, representations and it is this kind of representation that concerns me
here. If one places the process of utterance interpretation in the context of the kind
of view of the mind discussed above, mental representation and computation are two
crucial ingredients in the process. Both the output of the language module (the
logical form) and the end result of the whole interpretation process (i.e. all
communicated assumptions) are structured conceptual representations. However, the
conceptual output of the language module, the logical form, is, crucially, never fully
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propositional7. The result of the interpretation process as a whole is a set of fully
propositional conceptual representations (assumptions or thoughts) the hearer will
take the speaker to have communicated either explicitly or implicitly (more on this in
section 4.4).
The role of computation in utterance interpretation is twofold. Firstly, the
language module takes as input a phonetic representation and, after performing a
number of phonological, syntactic and semantic computations, it delivers the output
of a sub-propositional conceptual representation (the logical form). For instance, if
all a hearer does is decode the linguistic content of an utterance of (12), the result
will be a very minimal schematic conceptual representation like (13).
(12) He likes her.
(13) ____ LIKE
As mentioned in chapter 1, he and she don't linguistically encode their referents and,
therefore, mere linguistic decoding will provide neither the subject nor the object of
the proposition (12) is uttered to express.
Like, for instance, the visual perception system, the language system is what
Fodor (1983: 41) terms an input system and input systems are modular. According
to Fodor, the following are some of the properties that characterise modular systems:
they are domain specific, they perform their computations automatically, they are
informationally encapsulated and they are fast. In the context of this thesis, the type
of computation involved in these modular systems is of relatively little interest.
Computation plays a more interesting role as far as this chapter is concerned
at a different stage of utterance interpretation; namely the stage at which
computations take the output of the language module as their input and deliver the
set of assumptions the speaker intended to communicate. These computations are
much more variable in that, with them, the same input does not lead to the same
output in all contexts and the systems that perform them do not carry the functional
or architectural hallmarks of Fodor's (1983) input modules (though they may well be
relatively fast and domain specific and perhaps even 'modular' in a different way , as
Sperber (1994b) argues). Rather, these computations are generally assumed to fall
' This is captured in the semantic underdeterminacy thesis. For a discussion of this and the related
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within the class of central systems, which, according to Fodor (1983: 101-119), are
non-modular (not automatic and not encapsulated). At this point, the hearer
integrates the logical form with other information available to him from memory and
from the output of other input systems (e.g. visual or auditory perception). As
mentioned above, this process is constrained by pragmatic principles, for instance,
the communicative principle of relevance. Since the logical form is not fully
propositional, as demonstrated by (13), but the assumptions a speaker is
communicating generally are, communication would not be possible without the
inferential processes involved in fleshing out the logical form and deriving
contextual implications or implicatures.
4.3.2 Conceptual and procedural encoding
On a cognitive view of utterance interpretation like the one described here, it seems
natural to assume that many, if not most, natural language words encode
representational information - the building blocks of the logical form, so to speak.
After all, the output of the language module is a conceptual representation. To give
an example, sky and grey in (14) can respectively be seen as leading to mental
representations (or concepts) of the sky and of the colour grey.
(14) Theskyis grey.
However, as Blakemore (1987) has pointed out, in a framework such as RT, where
inferential processes are seen as playing a central role in utterance interpretation, it
seems at least possible that some linguistic information is concerned with the
inferential phase of utterance interpretation (or computation) rather than
representation. In fact, the existence of this type of linguistic information is not just
possible but likely, because it's in the speaker's interest to produce utterances that
require as little processing effort as possible to achieve the intended effects. Since
processing effort is essentially effort expended in the computational process of
constructing and testing interpretive hypotheses, any information that constrains
question of effability with arguments for the position taken here see Carston (1998, forthcoming b).
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these computational processes will be effort-saving. This is the basis for the
distinction between conceptual and procedural encoding.
On this picture, most natural language expressions are seen as encoding
conceptual information. That is, like grey and sky, they lead directly to mental
representations or concepts. However, some expressions seem to be more
appropriately accounted for as encoding procedural information. Blakemore (1987:
70-76) reasons along the following lines.
(15) a. Joan loves Bach. b. She is very discerning.
Confronted with an utterance of (15), for example, it might not be immediately
obvious to a hearer how the speaker intends him to interpret it. In particular, it might
not be obvious to the hearer how the speaker intended (15b) to achieve relevance in
the light of (iSa), i.e. how he is supposed to process the utterance and what effects he
is intended to derive. For instance, (iSa) could be seen as a premise leading to the
conclusion in (15b), but, equally well, (15b) could be the premise and (iSa) the
conclusion. Therefore, it would be useful if the speaker had some linguistic means at
her disposal for indicating just what kind of inferential relationship she's envisaging
between (15a) and (b). According to Blakemore (1987: 85-91), so in (16) and after
all in (17) perform precisely this function. That is, so indicates that (16b) is a
conclusion derived as a contextual implication from (16a) 8, and after all indicates
that (17b) is a premise that strengthens the existing assumption (17a).
(16) a. Joan loves Bach. b. So she is very discerning.
(17) a. Joan loves Bach. b. After all, she is very discerning.
Quite generally, for any utterance there will be an indefinite range of possible
contextual assumptions to access and cognitive effects to derive. Therefore, the
speaker will find it useful to employ linguistic constructions, such as so and after all,
that constrain the inferential phase of utterance interpretation and thus narrow down
8 Blakemore also sometimes puts this differently, i.e. she says that so indicates that what follows is a
conclusion derived from an accessible assumption in the context. Obviously, the proposition
expressed by (16a) will be such an accessible assumption in the context of (16b). This reformulation
allows for cases in which so is uttered discourse-initially, i.e. where nothing is communicated before
the utterance introduced by so.
the range of possibilities the hearer may have to consider. Speakers can do this, as in
(16) and (17), by indicating what kind of cognitive effect the hearer is to expect.
Blakemore (1989) has analysed but (at least on one of its uses) along similar lines,
i.e. as encoding the instruction that the main cognitive effect of the utterance of the
clause that follows it is one of contradiction and elimination. I will discuss
Blakemore's account of the meaning of but in detail in chapter 5 and suggest some
modifications to it.
On the basis of the discussion so far it would be natural to conclude that all
procedural information indicates what kind of cognitive effect the speaker intends
her utterance to achieve. However, as Blakemore (2000) points out, this is not the
case. It seems that procedural information can also give an indication of the type of
context in which the utterance should be processed, or the kind of inferential process
the hearer should go through. For instance, Blakemore (2000) analyses nevertheless
as encoding the information that the segment it introduces is relevant as an answer to
a question whose relevance has already been established in the preceding discourse
and that it should be processed in a context which supports a contrary answer.
(18) It's raining. Nevertheless, I need some fresh air.
(19) Jack loves dolls but Jill hates them.
Thus, in (18), I need some fresh air could be seen as a positive answer to the question
Are going to go for a walk?. In this case, the first clause, it's raining, provides the
context that suggests a negative answer. It also seems that but, as used in (19),
indicates the type of inferential process the hearer should go through rather than what
contextual effects he should look for. It's not easy to find an assumption that Jack
loves dolls gives rise to and Jill hates them contradicts and eliminates. It seems
much more likely that but (at least here) indicates that the hearer should follow an
inferential path that leads him to the derivation of assumptions with contradictory
predicates. Obviously, I've only been able to sketch these possibilities here - I will
discuss examples involving but in greater detail in chapter 5.
The distinction between conceptual and procedural encoding outlined above
raises a number of questions. For instance, what exactly does it mean for an
expression to encode procedural meaning? It's all very well to say that linguistic
constructions with procedural meaning encode information that constrains the
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inferential phase of communication, but something should be said about just how it
does this. A further, slightly smaller question is whether a given expression only
ever encodes either conceptual or procedural information or whether one and the
same expression can encode both types of information. Finally, how does the
theorist decide which expressions (or which aspects of an expression's encoded
meaning) are conceptual and which procedural?
Section 4.3.3 is devoted to the third question. Here, I'll briefly discuss the
first two questions. The first question is probably the most difficult of the three and
there is no general answer to it. However, there are a whole range of possible
answers, some of which will be explored in chapters 5, 6 and 7, where I'll investigate
how the meanings of but, although and even if can be given a procedural account.
On the whole, it seems easier to say what procedural information doesn't look like
than saying what it does look like. Just from the fact that procedural information is
not representational the following can be concluded: Procedural information doesn't
appear as part of conceptual representations, therefore it doesn't have logical
properties. This means that it can't entail or contradict concepts and assumptions, it
can't be true or false and it can't represent states of affairs in the world (or aspects of
states of affairs in the world). At least this negative characterisation enables the
theorist to devise some tests to determine whether a given expression or a given
aspect of the meaning of an expression is conceptual or procedural. A range of such
tests will be discussed in 4.3.3.
Moving on to the second question, it is quite conceivable that a single
expression could encode both conceptual and procedural information. For example,
Takeuchi (1998) offers an account of the Japanese cause-consequence conjunctive
particles kara and node in which she argues that they should be analysed as encoding
the same causal conceptual meaning while differing in the procedural constraints
they impose on foregrounding and backgrounding of assumptions. Deirdre Wilson
(unpublished) has suggested that but and if, too, could encode both conceptual and
procedural meaning. In the case of but, there is a possibility that what is encoded is
both a conjunctive concept and the procedural information referred to above. I'll
look at this in more detail in chapter 5.
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4.3.3 Tests for distinguishing conceptual and procedural aspects of meaning
As mentioned above, just from the fact that procedural meaning is not
representational, without knowing how and whether procedural meaning is
represented in the mind or the exact nature of the mechanisms involved in
'constraining' the inferential phase of communication, certain conclusions can be
drawn as to the properties procedural meaning has. These properties concern
roughly three areas: cognition, truth-evaluability and compositionality. In all of
these areas tests can be found that help the theorist decide whether a given
expression encodes conceptual or procedural meaning (or whether a given aspect of
the meaning of an expression is conceptual or procedural). Some of these tests have
been explored by Wilson & Sperber (1993), Rouchota (1998a, b) and Iten (1998.
The first area, that of cognition, provides the most intuitive argument, which,
on its own, wouldn't be very compelling. Nevertheless, in conjunction with the other
arguments discussed below it provides a good indication of the type(s) of meaning an
expression is likely to encode. Here is how it does this. Given that concepts are
mental representations in the framework of RT, it seems plausible that the meaning
of conceptual linguistic devices is directly accessible to speakers' and hearers'
consciousness. Thus, if one asks any native speaker what the words tree, freedom or
because mean, one is likely to be given a more or less satisfying paraphrase straight
away. What is more, Deirdre Wilson (unpublished) points out that English speakers
are generally able to say whether two conceptual expressions, for instance the
prepositions over and on, are synonymous or not without having to think about it for
any length of time, and, in particular, without having to test whether they are
intersubstitutable in all contexts. The case of procedural expressions, on the other
hand, is different. Since procedures are non-representational constraints on the
inferential phase of communication, there is no reason to assume that they are (easily
or at all) accessible to consciousness. In fact, it seems that procedures might be very
much like linguistic rules in that they are adhered to (or executed) without ever being
consciously accessed. Thus, if one asks English speakers what words like but, so and
although mean, one is much less likely to be given a straightforward answer. In fact,
even theorists are most likely to tell one how these expressions are used, rather than
what they mean.
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Similarly, people aren't generally able to decide whether words like but and
however, although and nevertheless are synonymous without testing their
intersubstitutability. Finally, there is some evidence from second language
acquisition that expressions that are likely to encode procedural information are
much harder to learn than clearly conceptual linguistic devices. For instance, foreign
learners of English find it notoriously hard to learn the meaning (or even the proper
use) of expressions such as well, even and just. The same goes for the acquisition of
doch and ja for non-native speakers of German. All of these differences can be
explained on the assumption that some linguistic devices encode representational
information which is directly accessible to consciousness and some encode
procedural (or computational) information which isn't9.
The second set of tests or arguments is connected with a property of concepts
discussed above, namely their truth-evaivability. Since concepts are
representational, they can represent aspects of states of affairs in the world.
(20) The cat is in a tree.
For example, (20) can be uttered to represent a state of affairs in the actual world,
e.g. that Mary's cat is in a tree at lOam on 12 May 2000. The word tree contributes a
constituent to the representation of this state of affairs. In other words, the presence
of the word tree in (20) determines an aspect of a representation that can be true or
false. This means that the contribution tree makes to this representation can affect
truth or falsity too, i.e. it may correspond to an aspect of an actual state of affairs in
the world, in which case the representation will be true, or it may not correspond to
an aspect of a state of affairs in the actual world, in which case the representation
will be false. In the case of (20), the concept encoded by tree truly represents an
aspect of a state of affairs if it is a tree the cat is in at lOam on 12 May 2000. This
means that the presence of a given conceptual expression in an utterance can be
What I say here about the accessibility to consciousness of conceptual linguistic meaning seems to
be in direct opposition to Recanati's (1993: 246) claim that linguistic meanings are not directly
accessible to consciousness. I believe that this is only a superficial disagreement which stems from
the fact that the examples Recanati considers at the point where he makes his claim all happen to
involve procedural meaning. Given that he says that linguistic meanings of sentences are "very
abstract", it is also conceivable that Recanati would view all linguistic meaning in procedural terms.
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objected to by an utterance of "That's not true". For instance, a hearer objecting to
the presence of tree in (20) could utter (21) to make known her objection.
(21) That's not true; the cat is on the mat.
Interestingly, this property of truth-evaluability doesn't just seem to apply to cases
where a conceptual expression is judged to contribute to 'the truth-conditional
content of the utterance'. Consider, for example, (22).
(22) Sadly, I can't come to your party.
Here, most people would judge that, sadly doesn't contribute to the truth-conditional
content of the utterance: for most people, (22) is true iff the speaker can't go to the
hearer's party and the utterance's truth or falsity does not depend on whether or not
the speaker is sad that she can't go to the party. Nevertheless, someone objecting to
the speaker's use of sadly could felicitously utter (23).
(23) That's not true: you're not at all sad.
This indicates that sadly contributes a constituent to a representation communicated
by the utterance.
Now, since procedural expressions don't encode representations of any kind,
they can't be true or false. Therefore, one would expect it to be impossible to object
to the inappropriate use of a procedural expression with an utterance of "That's not
true". Indeed, there are expressions that fall into this category. For example, a
hearer objecting to the speaker's use of after all in (17) couldn't utter (24).
(17) a. Joan loves Bach. b. After all, she is very discerning.
(24) That's not true: you're not using she's very discerning as a premise.
or: That's not true: loving Bach doesn't follow from being discerning.
Finally, we should expect to find significant differences between conceptual and
procedural expressions as far as compositionality is concerned. It seems reasonably
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clear what it means for two or more concepts to combine: generally atomic concepts
combine to form complex larger conceptual representations. For instance, the
concepts BLUE and EYES combine to form the complex concept BLUE EYES. Of
course, this isn't always completely straightforward and there are a number of
questions around the issue of just how it is that two or more concepts combine (see,
for instance, Lahav 1989). Whatever the precise workings of compositionality of
concepts, it is undisputed that concepts can combine and modify each other. When it
comes to procedural expressions, the issue of compositionality is much less clear.
Obviously, several procedural expressions can occur in one and the same utterance,
so, one way or another, they have to 'combine'. For instance, Rouchota (1998a, b)
argues that so, then and too in (25) and (26) all encode procedural meaning and in the
utterances below so and then and so and too must interact in some way.
(25) A:	 There's a bird in the garden.
B:	 So, the cat didn't eat them all then.
Rouchota (1998a: 117)
(26) Jane has a year off. So she's going to finish her book too.
Rouchota (1998b: 37)
However, it seems unlikely that these procedures combine to form 'larger' or more
complex procedures. It seems much more likely that they apply either all at the same
time or one after another, but not so likely that they can modify each other or be
modified by concepts in the same utterance. For instance, where it is easily possible
to combine words that encode conceptual information with each other to an almost
infinite degree of complexity, combining procedural expressions doesn't seem to
work. For instance, it's impossible to apply descriptive negation or adverbials to
discourse connectives like so, but, however, after all, etc. For example, while the
adverbial very much can clearly modify as a result in (27), an attempt at using the
same adverbial to modify so (which might be seen as roughly synonymous with as a
result in these examples) leads to the unacceptable (28).
(27) He kept teasing me. Very much as a result, I hit him.
(28) He kept teasing me. *Very much so, I hit him.
I will not discuss the issue of compositionality further at this point. However, my
discussion of but and although in chapters 5 and 6, as well as observations on even,
too and also in section 4.6.7, will provide more detailed arguments.
Having just outlined some tests that should make it possible to distinguish
what is encoded conceptually from what is procedurally encoded I would like to
issue the following caveat: It is far from clear that all procedural, or rather 'non-
conceptual', meaning is cut to the same pattern. For instance, after all and
nevertheless are both likely to encode procedural meaning, but, while after all is
likely to indicate the type of cognitive effect the hearer should derive, nevertheless, if
Blakemore's (2000) analysis is correct, constrains the context in which the hearer is
to process the utterance. Therefore, the best course of action seems to be to deal with
the meaning of apparently non-conceptual expressions on a one-by-one basis, tlying
to give an account of individual expressions rather than starting with assumptions
about the properties all non-conceptual expressions share and trying to build an
account of individual expressions on the foundation of general assumptions about
procedural meaning. Of course, it will be desirable, in the long term, to compare
different procedural semantic accounts and draw any generalisations there might be
to draw, either concerning all procedural meaning or at least concerning different
sub-classes of procedural meaning.
4.4	 Explicature and implicature (what is communicated)
4.4.1 Some ways in which the explicit/implicit distinction could be (and has
been) drawn
The second central distinction in Relevance Theory is one between ways in which
assumptions can be communicated. I've mentioned above that what is
communicated is sets of assumptions (entertained mentally as conceptual
representations). It is widely accepted that assumptions can be communicated
explicitly or implicitly and the distinction between explicit and implicit
communication has been drawn in many different ways. I will not here discuss the
literature on the explicit/implicit distinction in any detail (for an exhaustive
discussion see Carston (1998)). However, I will look at the ordinary language use of
the terms 'explicit' and 'implicit', explain how the distinction is drawn in RT and
give some justification for drawing it in this way.
Let me start with an unproblematic example. If Mary utters (29) thereby also
intending to convey (30), I think the general consensus would be that Mary has
communicated explicitly the information in (31) while she has implicitly
communicated (30).
(29) It's cold in this room.
(30) Someone should close the window.
(31) It's cold in rooms.
Now, for most people, 'explicit' seems to be synonymous with 'linguistically
encoded'. The question is whether this ordinary language understanding of the term
'explicit' can be employed when it comes to characterising 'what is communicated
explicitly'. In other words, is the hypothesis that an assumption is communicated
explicitly iff it is linguistically encoded tenable? Examples like (32) show that it isn't
and that, therefore, one should differentiate between the ordinary language use of
'explicit' and what is 'explicitly communicated'.
(32) scenario: Joan and Mary are discussing where they should take Susan on
holiday. Joan suggests they take her to Munich.
Mary: She's been there.
What, if anything, has Mary communicated explicitly here? I believe that most
people would say that Mary explicitly communicated the information in (33) and
implicitly communicated (34).
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(33) Susan's been to Munich.'°
(34) Joan and Mary shouldn't take Susan to Munich.
This presents a problem for the hypothesis that explicitly conmiunicated information
has to be linguistically encoded. As discussed in chapter 1, indexicals like she and
there do not linguistically encode their referents. Therefore, what's explicitly
communicated by Mary's utterance in (32), namely (33), contains at least two
constituents, Susan and Munich, that are not linguistically encoded by the utterance
but rather are derived pragmatically. In such a case, and there are many more like it,
if only what's linguistically encoded can be communicated explicitly, what's
explicitly communicated cannot be fully propositional. In fact, the semantic
underdeterminacy thesis predicts that what is linguistically encoded hardly ever (and
possibly never) determines a complete proposition. This means that, on the 'explicit
= encoded' view, what is explicitly communicated is hardly ever (or even never)
fully propositional, yet surely what speakers communicate has to be fully
propositional. This means that the first hypothesis, that only what is linguistically
encoded can be communicated explicitly, does not constitute a coherent position:
what is communicated has to be fully propositional, while, due to semantic
underdeterminacy, what is linguistically encoded hardly ever is.
What is more, even if semantic underdeterminacy didn't exist and every
sentence encoded a complete proposition, the hypothesis that only what is
linguistically encoded can be explicitly communicated would not be tenable because
of the undeniable existence of semantic ambiguity. In cases of semantic ambiguity,
where a linguistic expression encodes more than one sense, what is linguistically
encoded doesn't yield just one proposition but several. Surely, it's counterintuitive
to claim that in such cases the speaker is explicitly communicating several
assumptions, but the only alternative in the above framework is to say that the
speaker isn't explicitly communicating anything, and that is no less counterintuitive
than the first option. This means that equating explicit communication with
linguistic encoding doesn't yield a satisfactory explicit/implicit distinction.
' This is slightly oversimplified. In fact, Mary is most likely to have communicated something like
'Susan has been to Munich recently enough for her not to want to go again in the near future'. It's
unlikely that Mary will be taken to have communicated that Susan's been to Munich at some point in
her life (maybe when she was a baby).
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On the basis of the examples discussed so far one might consider a
modification to the above definition of explicit meaning along the following lines.
True, disambiguation and reference assignment are pragmatic processes without
which nothing fully propositional can be explicitly communicated. However, in both
cases, although the elements in question don't encode their contribution to what's
explicitly communicated, there is linguistic material (either an indexical or an
ambiguous expression) in the utterance that licenses the derivation of a constituent of
the explicitly communicated proposition. Therefore, a second hypothesis would be
that an assumption is explicitly communicated iff it is linguistically licensed. There
are, however, many examples for which this second hypothesis won't work. First,
consider Mary's utterance in (35), say uttered to communicate the assumptions in
(36) and (37). It seems uncontentious that, in the given scenario, the assumption in
(37) is communicated implicitly, while that in (36) is explicitly communicated.
(35) Peter: Let's go for a walk.
Mary: It's raining.
(36) It's raining at time of utterance in the place where Peter wants to go for a
walk.
(37) Mary doesn't want to go for a walk (at the time of utterance).
Though this may not be immediately obvious, even after reference assignment and
disambiguation the linguistic expressions in Mary's utterance in (35) don't determine
a complete proposition: in order for the implicitly communicated assumption in (37)
to be derivable, a place constituent has to be supplied. After all, if Mary and Peter
were in North London and Mary was explicitly communicating that it was raining in
Timbuktu (an assumption perfectly compatible with the linguistic material Mary has
uttered), Peter wouldn't be justified in assuming that Mary was implicitly
communicating that she didn't want to go for a walk in North London: There is no
sound inference leading from the premise that it is raining in Timbuktu to the
conclusion that someone doesn't want to go for a walk in North London, while there
is such an inference from the premise that it is raining in North London to this
conclusion. The problem this poses is that there is no overt indexical in Mary's
utterance that linguistically licenses the derivation of the place constituent needed.
Therefore, the only way in which one could preserve the hypothesis that only
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linguistically licensed assumptions are communicated explicitly would be by
postulating non-overt or 'hidden' indexicals (see e.g. Stanley (2000)). Carston
(forthcoming a) and Wilson & Sperber (forthcoming) argue convincingly against
such a course of action, which means that hypothesis two, too, has to be abandoned.
Another, reasonably intuitive, option is to say that an assumption is
communicated explicitly if it corresponds to the truth-conditional content of the
utterance. This hypothesis seems to make the right predictions for the examples
discussed so far. (31) is the truth-conditional content of the utterance in (29), (33)
that of Mary's utterance in (32), and (36) that of Mary's utterance in (35). This
hypothesis can also account for examples involving semantic ambiguity. However, it
runs into difficulties when it comes to utterances of non-declarative sentence types.
Let's assume that, in the scenario described in (32), Joan next utters (38).
(38) Has she been to Madrid?
Obviously, (38) has no truth conditions and therefore, on the second hypothesis, Joan
can't be explicitly communicating anything with her utterance here. This goes
against intuitions. Surely by her utterance of (38) Joan has explicitly communicated
the information in (39), or something along similar lines.
(39) Joan is asking whether Susan has been to Madrid.
The discussion so far has shown that neither the hypothesis that explicit
communication amounts to linguistic encoding, the hypothesis that what's explicitly
communicated has to be linguistically licensed, nor the hypothesis that what's
explicitly communicated is the truth-conditional content of the utterance makes the
right predictions. I'll now introduce Sperber & Wilson's (1986) explicit/implicit
distinction and claim that it comports with intuitions better than the three possibilities
discussed so far.
4.4.2 The relevance-theoretic distinction
Sperber & Wilson (1986: 182) claim that all communicated assumptions fall into one
of two categories: They're either implicatures (a notion familiar from Grice) or
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explicatures (a notion defined by Sperber & Wilson to parallel Grice's notion of
implicature). According to them, an assumption communicated by an utterance is an
explicature iff it is a development of a logical form encoded by that utterance. As
mentioned above, the logical form of an utterance is a (sub-propositional) conceptual
representation or assumption schema. The notion of development of the logical form
is somewhat problematic. At this stage, I'll just say that it is meant to cover (a) the
processes that take the hearer from the logically incomplete logical form to a
complete proposition expressed and (b) the processes involved in embedding the
proposition expressed under speech act or propositional attitude descriptions. On
this view, explicatures are derived by a mixture of linguistic decoding and pragmatic
inference. Implicatures are given a mainly negative definition: They are any
communicated assumptions that are not explicatures, i.e. their conceptual content is
supplied purely inferentially. Let me demonstrate that this distinction makes the
right predictions for the examples discussed so far in this section.
Clearly, the assumption in (31) is derived by decoding and just a little bit of
pragmatic inference, namely reference assignment to the expression this room, so it
is an explicature of the utterance in (29). (30), on the other hand, is not a
development of a logical form encoded by (29), it is derived purely pragmatically
and is, therefore, an implicature of (29). (33) is a development of a logical form
encoded by Mary's utterance in (32) as it, too, is derived by decoding and reference
assignment 11 . (36) is a development of the logical form encoded by (35), derived by
decoding, reference assignment and enrichment. Finally, (39) is a development of a
logical form encoded by (38). Here, the processes that lead to the recovery of the
explicature are not just decoding and reference assignment but also an embedding of
the proposition expressed under the speech act description Joan is asking whethe?2.
On this picture, the proposition expressed, which is the most deeply
embedded explicature, has traditionally been seen as determining the truth-
conditional content of the utterance. However, the proposition expressed is not
always communicated and therefore not always an explicature of the utterance in
If, as suggested in footnote 10, what Mary communicates explicitly is something like 'Susan has
been to Munich recently enough for her not to want to go again in the near future', the developments
of the logical form involved would include enrichment along with reference assignment.
12 Note that this speech act description itself is derived partly by decoding (of the syntactic inversion)
and partly by pragmatic inference. More will be said about the relevance-theoretic treatment of non-
declarative sentence types below.
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question. For instance, the utterance in (38) expresses the proposition in (40), as
would the corresponding declarative, but this isn't one of its explicatures because it
isn't communicated.
(40) Susan has been to Madrid.
Explicatures that are embeddings of the proposition expressed are referred to as
higher-level explicatures. The way the explicitlimplicit distinction is drawn in RT
allows for more than linguistically encoded content and more than truth-conditional
content to count as what is communicated explicitly. At the same time, not all
linguistically encoded content necessarily contributes to what is communicated
explicitly on a given occasion. Procedural linguistic meaning, which, by definition,
doesn't appear in the logical form(s) encoded by the utterance, can affect either the
explicit or the implicit side of communication. Conceptual linguistic meaning, on
the other hand, necessarily is part of what is explicitly communicated, since it
appears in the logical form(s) encoded by the utterance and will, as a consequence,
also be part of any 'development' of a logical form. This means that the two central
distinctions made in RT yield a three-way classification of linguistic expressions in
use. In principle (and in fact), there could be conceptual expressions that contribute
to explicit communication, procedural expressions that contribute to explicit
communication (as will be seen in section 6 of this chapter), and procedural
expressions that contribute to implicit communication.
We now have the machinery to classify all natural language expressions,
including, of course, the 'non-truth-conditional expressions' discussed in chapter 2.
In section 4.6, I'll indicate how some of these expressions could be (and, in some
cases, have been) analysed within the relevance-theoretic framework outlined so far.
Before that, let me look at what role the notion of truth conditions plays in the
framework of RT.
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4.5	 The role of truth conditions in Relevance Theory
4.5.1 'Subjectivity' and 'aboutness'
So far in my discussion of Relevance Theory, I have been referring to the notion of
truth conditions, for instance in talking of 'the truth-conditional content of the
utterance', without saying exactly what role truth conditions play in the framework
of RT. In the following two sections, I would like to remedy this. I will first explain
how the relevance-theoretic approach can avoid some of the problems encountered
by essentially truth-conditional theories of linguistic semantics, which I discussed in
chapter 1 and which have also been highlighted by argumentation theorists (as
mentioned in chapter 3), while at the same time capturing the intuition that utterances
are 'about' things. I will then discuss the somewhat problematic notion of 'the truth
conditions of the utterance' and how this hangs together with the notion of 'the
proposition expressed by the utterance'.
From the discussion of the relevance-theoretic view of linguistic meaning in
section 4.3 it should be clear that RT does not offer a truth-conditional account of
linguistic semantics. Where truth-conditional theories of linguistic semantics assume
a (more or less) direct language-world relation, RT assumes no such direct relation.
As shown above, on the RT picture, linguistic entities map directly onto mental
entities (either representations or computations), which act as input to or constraints
on inferential processes. It is the outputs of these inferential processes, i.e. the set of
communicated assumptions, that can and should be described in terms of their
relation to the world and the best way of doing this may well be through the use of
truth conditions' 3 . This means that the relation between language and the world on
the RT view is neither mediated by Fregean senses nor is it direct. It is, rather,
mediated by mental representations that are not themselves completely encoded by
the linguistic material in the utterance. However, crucially, there still is such a
relationship, which means that RI succeeds where AT failed, i.e. it can capture the
widespread (and undoubtedly correct) intuition that when we use language we say
things about the world. At the same time, by making the language-world relation as
indirect as it does, RT is in a position to account for the all-pervasive 'subjectivity'
Carston (1999a) makes this point in her discussion of the way the semantics-pragmatics distinction
is drawn within RT.
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discerned by argumentation theorists, which I'd prefer to describe as context-
dependence. Let me demonstrate this by using one of Ducrot's (1993:89) examples.
(41) The film was interesting.
Recall that, according to Ducrot, there is no objective state of affairs an utterance of
(41) is about, because there is no objective property 'interesting' that could be said to
have been predicated of the film in question. Recall also, that examples like this lead
Ducrot to conclude that the general intuition that utterances say things about the
world is an illusion. In the last chapter I argued that that's a non-sequitur (and a very
undesirable one at that). Here, I'd like to suggest how RI can accommodate the
'subjectivity' of utterances, like (41), without having to claim that they aren't
actually 'about' anything.
As should be clear from the discussion so far, on any relevance-theoretic
account, (41) would be seen as encoding an incomplete conceptual representation.
That is, as it stands, the representation encoded by (41) is merely a template for a
fully propositional (mental) representation. In other words, what is encoded by the
words in (41) is a radical underspecification of the proposition expressed (which, on
the RT view, is entertained as a conceptual representation) - for example, the
referent of the film and the temporal reference of the past tense have to be supplied
pragmatically. However, when it comes to the question what exactly the word
interesting encodes, there are two possibilities.
The first possibility is to say that interesting encodes a concept which will
have to be narrowed down and/or expanded, according to the context. This would
mean that the concept that appears in the mental representation (thought) of a speaker
uttering (41) (and in that of a hearer who has understood the utterance' 4) is not the
same as the concept encoded by the word interesting; they are rather what Carston
(1996a, 1998) calls 'ad hoc' concepts, pragmatically constructed by the hearer in the
process of interpretation.
" NB. There is no claim that the concept entertained by the hearer has to be identical to that
entertained by the speaker for communication to be successful. In fact, Sperber & Wilson (1998:
197/8) note that a duplication of meanings is not necessary for successful communication. Often, all
that is required is a sufficient degree of similarity.
The second possibility is that interesting does not encode a full concept at all,
but rather what Sperber & Wilson (1998: 184/5) have termed a 'pro-concept'. This
would mean that the semantic contribution of interesting in any utterance must be
contextually specified. The difference between the two possible accounts is that, on
the first one, interesting does have a literal (conceptual) meaning, which will get
enriched or loosened depending on the context. On the second account, on the other
hand, interesting does not have a literal, determinate meaning: rather, as in the case
of pronouns, its meaning on any given occasion has to be contextually determined.
For the purposes of this chapter, it seems unimportant which one of these
possibilities is chosen, though in the case of interesting the latter seems to capture the
facts better than the former, because things are generally interesting to somebody.
On either account, once the hearer has narrowed down or filled in the concept
encoded by interesting (to yield the concept INTERESTING*, where the asterisk
indicates that it is an ad hoc or filled in pro-concept), figured out which film the
speaker is talking about and assigned temporal reference, she will have derived a
fully propositional assumption, which the speaker intended to communicate. In other
words, she will have recovered the proposition expressed by the speaker's utterance
in (41). This proposition could, for example, be something like (42).
(42) THE FILM MARY WENT TO SEE ON 22 MAY 2000 WAS INTERESTING*.
Clearly, this communicated assumption is about something, in fact it is predicating
the property of being 'interesting' in a certain specific way (i.e. 'interesting*') of the
film. If one is that way inclined, the relationship between this assumption and the
world can be captured in terms of truth conditions. What this shows is that an
expression like interesting may not in itself 'pick out' a particular (objective)
property, but once it's been used in a context it certainly can. In fact, in this the
behaviour of interesting in (41) is not all that different from the behaviour of the film
in the same example. After all, the expression the film does not, in itself, 'pick out' a
particular film.
The above discussion should have shown that Relevance Theory provides a
framework for handling subjective aspects of meaning without having to make the
unacceptable claim that language cannot be used to convey information about the
world.
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4.5.2 'The proposition expressed' and 'the truth-conditional content of the
utterance'
Despite the fact that RI does not subscribe to truth-conditional linguistic semantics
and none of the theory's basic ingredients depend on the notion of truth conditions,
relevance theorists quite standardly talk of 'the truth conditions of the utterance'.
For instance, in section 4.4.2 I said that the truth conditions of an utterance are
determined by the proposition it expresses. So, the question is: what are 'the truth
conditions of the utterance' and what is 'the proposition expressed by the utterance'?
Let me start with an obvious point. Utterances aren't propositions;
utterances, at a first pass, are bits of linguistic material, produced by a certain
individual at a certain time in a certain place.' 5 This means that it doesn't strictly
make sense to talk of 'the truth conditions of an utterance', since, as discussed in
chapter 1, only propositional entities can reasonably be given truth conditions.
Therefore, 'the truth conditions of the utterance' should be seen as a convenient
shorthand for something like 'the truth conditions of the proposition expressed by the
utterance'. This, however, raises the question as to which one of all the propositions
an utterance can express or communicate determines its truth conditions.
There seems to be a general assumption that for every (single-sentence)
utterance that is capable of being true or false, there is a unique proposition that
determines what it takes for it to be true. For instance, given the scenario in (32),
Mary's utterance won't have been false if it turns out that she doesn't think that the
fact that Susan has already been to Munich is a reason for Joan and Mary not to take
her there, even if that's what she intended to communicate. Should it, however, turn
out that Susan hasn't been to Munich, Mary's utterance would certainly have been
false.
(32) scenario: Joan and Mary are discussing where they should take Susan on
holiday. Joan suggests they take her to Munich.
Mary: She's been there.
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So, it seems that Grice's (1989: 359) intuition that there is a certain central core of
meaning that is more 'important' than the rest is one that is shared by many. This
leads us back to the question what it is that determines 'the truth conditions of the
utterance' or, more precisely, what proposition communicated by or linked to the
utterance it is that determines its truth-conditional content.
The answer seems to be that we should trust our intuitions in this question:
We should ask ourselves 'What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the
truth of this utterance?' Intuitions about the truth conditions of a given utterance can
be sharpened by applying the standard test for truth-conditionality, which consists of
embedding the utterance in question in the scope of a logical or causal connective
(see e.g. Carston 1988: 172-173, Ifantidou 1994: 136-148 and Carston 1998: 123-
125). For the time being, I'll assume that specifying the truth conditions of an
utterance is unproblematic in all cases. I will, in the final chapter, return to the
question of truth conditions and it will be seen there that intuitions on what it takes
for an utterance to be true are often far from clear and that the usefulness of the
embedding test in making intuitions clearer is limited. Leaving this aside for the
moment, it seems that one way of characterising the proposition expressed by an
utterance is to say that it is the proposition that has to be true for the utterance to be
true.
The problem with this charactensation is that only declarative utterances have
truth conditions. Nevertheless, as mentioned in chapter 1, the similarities between
non-declaratives, e.g. imperatives and interrogatives, and their corresponding
declarative utterance are captured by saying that they all 'express the same
propositions'. In this, RT goes along with the standard speech act account. Thus,
(43)-(45) would all be seen as expressing, for example, the proposition in (46).
(43) You read books.
(44) Read books.
(45) Do you read books.
(46) PEmR READS BOOKS.
15 This is a very crude characterisation, but it will (have to) do for present purposes. No doubt, a
Obviously, only an utterance of (43) can be true or false and therefore it is only for
(43) that one can ask 'what does it take for this utterance to be true' and conclude
that the proposition that has to be true for the utterance to be true is the proposition
expressed. So, it seems that 'the proposition expressed by the utterance' can be
equated with 'the truth-conditional content of the utterance' only in the case of
declarative utterances. This leaves the question as to how we know what the
proposition expressed is for utterances that don't have truth conditions and the
related question as to what purpose is served by the notion of 'the proposition
expressed by the utterance'. I'll leave this until later and concentrate on another
aspect of 'the proposition expressed by the utterance' in the next few paragraphs.
Within RI, there seems to be a second characterisation of or, maybe, a
second condition on 'the proposition expressed by the utterance'. Since the
proposition expressed often is an explicature of the utterance (as in the case of (43)),
it has to be a development of a logical form encoded by the utterance, according to
the relevance-theoretic definition. This leads to another question, namely, what is
the connection between 'the proposition expressed by the utterance', 'the truth
conditions of the utterance' and 'the utterance's explicatures'?
In the most straightforward case, a seriously and literally uttered declarative,
like (43), the answer to this question is simple. In such a case, the proposition
expressed by the utterance is that explicature whose development from the logical
form does not involve any embedding in higher-level descriptions, which determines
the truth conditions of the utterance. Unfortunately, as hinted at above, the picture is
not as straightforward as this for all utterances. In the case of non-declarative
utterances, the answer seems to be that the proposition expressed is not an
explicature because it is not communicated and it does not determine the utterance's
truth conditions because the utterance has no truth conditions. From this, one might
be tempted to conclude that the fact that non-declaratives don't have truth conditions
explains the fact that the proposition expressed is not communicated. However, non-
serious utterances, for instance Mary's ironical utterance in (47), show that there is
no such simple correlation between an utterance having truth conditions and its
proposition expressed being one of its explicatures.
whole thesis could be written on the question what exactly an utterance is.
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(47) [Peter, who is 32, has just put together a jigsaw for 5-year olds]
Mary: You're a genius.
Here, the proposition Mary expresses by her utterance is something like (48).
Clearly, this assumption is not one that Mary is communicating, i.e. it isn't one of the
set of assumptions she manifestly wants to make manifest or more manifest to Peter.
On the contrary, what Mary is communicating here is something like (49)16
(48) PETER IS A GENIUS.
(49) It's a ridiculous to believe that Peter is a genius because he's put together a
jigsaw for 5-year olds.
Nevertheless, there seems to be a broad consensus that ironical utterances, like
Mary's in (47), do have truth conditions and, in fact, that they are strictly speaking
false. This means that it can't be the case that only utterances that communicate their
propositions expressed have truth conditions (or, indeed, that utterances with truth
conditions must communicate their propositions expressed). Therefore, it seems that
there is something else that determines the relationship between the proposition
expressed by an utterance and the utterance's truth-conditional status.
The most promising hypothesis I can come up with is that what determines
whether an utterance has truth conditions is its mood indicators. As will be seen in
more detail in section 4.6.3, in RT, declarative mood indicators are analysed as
encoding the information that the proposition expressed by the utterance is a
description of an actual state of affairs (though not necessarily one endorsed by the
speaker). Similarly, imperative mood indicators indicate that the proposition
expressed is a description of a potential and desirable state of affairs, and
interrogative mood indicators indicate that the proposition expressed resembles (in
content) a relevant thought or utterance. Given this, it makes sense that it is only in
cases where the proposition expressed is presented as a description of an actual state
of affairs that the utterance has truth conditions in the actual world, which are
determined by the proposition expressed. In fact, this approach seems to capture
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accurately, not only what goes on in cases of literal and serious uses of declaratives
and non-declaratives, but also in the case of irony looked at above.
Because the mood indicators on Mary's utterance in (47) are declarative, it
encodes the information that the proposition expressed is a description of an actual
state of affairs. For this reason, the utterance can be given truth conditions.
However, in the scenario described, it is clear that, although she has used a linguistic
form that encodes the information that the proposition expressed is a description of
an actual state of affairs, Mary does not actually indicate that she thinks this is so.
For this reason, the proposition expressed is not communicated, i.e. Mary does not
make mutually manifest an intention to make it manifest. This still has not answered
the question as to how one knows which proposition is 'the proposition expressed by
the utterance' in non-declarative utterances. This can be tentatively answered along
the following lines.
As mentioned above, the proposition expressed by an utterance must be a
development of a logical form the utterance encodes. Assuming that one knows
what logical form(s) non-declarative utterances encode, one knows at least what sorts
of proposition are candidates for being the proposition expressed, i.e. only those that
are developments of the logical form. Apart from the proposition expressed, only
higher-level explicatures fulfil this criteria. So, all that is needed is a way of
distinguishing between higher-level explicatures and the proposition expressed. This
should be possible thanks to the fact that, while the derivation of the proposition
expressed involves reference assignment, enrichment, etc., the derivation of higher-
level explicatures involves an embedding under a speech act or propositional attitude
description. So, the proposition expressed by an utterance can be characterised as a
development of a logical form encoded by the utterance, where 'development', in
this case, excludes the process of embedding under a speech act or propositional
attitude description.
In this section, I hope to have made a little clearer how the notions of 'the
proposition expressed by an utterance', 'the truth conditions of the utterance' and
'the utterance's explicatures' hang together. However, there is at least one question I
posed above that I still haven't answered: What purpose does the notion of 'the
proposition expressed by the utterance' serve in the framework of RI? I will not
16 For a detailed relevance-theoretic account of verbal irony see Sperber & Wilson (1981; 1986: 237-
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attempt to answer this question here but, in the final chapter, I will suggest that the
notion of 'the proposition expressed', in fact, serves no useful purpose in RT and is
not needed for a cognitive account of utterance interpretation.
4.6	 Varieties of 'non-truth-conditional' meaning
4.6.1 Preliminary remarks
As promised in the introduction to this chapter, in this section I will give an
indication of how the different types of 'non-truth-conditional' devices listed in
chapter 2 can be (and in some cases have been) treated within the relevance-theoretic
framework outlined above. Obviously, I won't be able to do more than give rough
sketches of analyses - giving complete analyses of each type of device (never mind
each individual device) would mean writing several more theses (and for some
devices, people have written whole theses). The one sub-set of non-truth-conditional
devices I will discuss in depth are the 'concessive' expressions but, although and
even f There is good evidence, which I will present in chapters 5, 6 and 7, that they
encode procedural meaning that affects the implicit side of communication. To
these, the next three chapters are devoted.
4.6.2 Indexicals
(50) She kissed him yesterday.
(51) I'll have some of that.
The propositions expressed by utterances of (50) and (51), e.g. those in (52) and (53),
obviously contain some concepts (e.g. SUSANX 17) that are there because of the
speaker's use of the indexicals she, he, yesterday, I and that.
(52) SusAN, KISSED PETERY ON 1 APRIL 2000
(53) MARYx WILL HAVE SOME OF THE CARROT CAKE
243), Wilson & Sperber (1992) and Wilson & Sperber (1998).
17 The subscript x is used to indicate that the concept in question is an individual concept, i.e. a
concept of a particular Susan.
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For instance, the individual concept SUSAN appears in the proposition expressed by
(50) at least partly because the speaker has uttered the word she. However, it's
equally obvious that the way in which she leads to the concept SUSAN is
fundamentally different from the way in which kiss leads to the concept KISS. In
simple (if not banal) terms, the difference is this: Independent of the context in which
(51) is uttered, kiss will (at least initially) always lead to the concept KISS. The
concept that she 'leads to', on the other hand, differs across contexts; not even
initially does she always lead to the concept SUSAN.
Since indexicals always seem to lead to a concept that integrates with the rest
of the conceptual material encoded by an utterance, the question whether they affect
explicit or implicit communication can be answered relatively simply: They always
affect the explicatures of an utterance. The answer to the question whether they
encode conceptual or procedural information is slightly less straightforward to
answer, though there is a fair amount of evidence to support the hypothesis that
indexicals encode procedural information.
One such piece of evidence is simply that, if indexicals were to encode
concepts, it's hard to see what those concepts could be. As just mentioned,
indexicals 'contribute' or 'lead to' different concepts in different contexts. So, it
seems quite obvious that she, for instance, doesn't encode SUSAN. However, there
is a possibility that she could encode a much more general concept, like A CERTAIN
FEMALE, which always has to be enriched to someone much more specific before it
can appear in the explicit content of an utterance. This seems to be the approach
taken by Bach (1987: 175-194). Even if this was the right way of accounting for
what is encoded by the pronoun she, there would be a fundamental difference
between she and other expressions with conceptual meaning, like kiss, for example:
The proposition expressed by an utterance containing she never contains the encoded
conceptual content of she, while the proposition expressed by an utterance containing
kiss often does just contain the concept the word encodes. For instance, a speaker
uttering (54) cannot be taken to intend to express the proposition in (55), (54) always
has to express a more specific proposition, such as the one in (56).18
18 Indexicals also highlight a problem for Bach's IQ test, discussed in 2.5.4. According to Bach (e.g.
forthcoming), 'what is said' is determined only by what is linguistically encoded by the utterance plus
narrow context (e.g. speaker and time of utterance) and speaker intentions don't enter into the picture
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(54) She likes chocolate.
(55) A CERTAIN FEMALE LIKES CHOCOLATE.
(56) JANEx LIKES CHOCOLATE.
This means that, at the very least, the conceptual representation A CERTAIN FEMALE
can't be all that is encoded by she. In addition there must be something that tells the
hearer that he is to supply a particular referent. This additional something is most
likely to be procedural. Therefore, at the very least, pronouns like she must encode
conceptual and procedural information.
4.6.3 Mood indicators
(57) You eat an apple a day.
(58) Eat an apple a day.
(59) Do you eat an apple a day?
As mentioned in chapter 1, what (57), (58) and (59) have in common when they are
uttered to the same hearer in the same context is that they all express the same
proposition, for instance something like (60).
(60) JOHNx EATS AN APPLE A DAY
Of course, (57), (58) and (59) are also crucially different from each other, e.g. in that
only an utterance of (57) communicates the proposition expressed. The standard
speech act account captures these differences by saying that the mood indicators
encode information about the type of speech act the speaker intends to perform in
making her utterance. Thus, declaratives are linked with assertive speech acts which
commit the speaker to the truth of the proposition expressed, imperatives with
at this level. Since the linguistic meaning of she is 'a certain female', on Bach's account, and speaker
intentions are crucial for reference assignment in this case (she isn't a pure indexical), 'a certain
female' must be what appears in 'what is said'. Therefore, if the IQ test is right, it should be possible
to report Joan's utterance of She likes chocolate as Joan said that a certain female likes chocolate.
Clearly, this isn't an adequate report of the utterance and the result of the IQ test doesn't tally with
Bach's account of the pronoun she (and any other non-pure indexicals).
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directive speech acts which are seen as requests for the hearer to perform the action
described by the proposition expressed, and interrogatives are linked with a special
sub-type of directive speech act, namely a request for information.
Wilson & Sperber (1988a) argue convincingly against such a standard speech
act account and, indeed, against any account that analyses the meaning encoded by
mood indicators in speech act terms. Here, I will just look at some of the arguments
Wilson & Sperber (1988a) give against the standard speech act account of
imperatives.
Charitably leaving aside non-literal and non-serious cases for the time being,
Wilson & Sperber (1988a: 80-81) argue that there are a whole host of utterances in
the imperative mood which are not requests by the speaker for the hearer to perform
the action described by the proposition expressed. Imperatives cannot just be used to
perform requests for action but a range of other (non-directive) speech acts, such as
giving advice, as in (61), giving permission, as in (62), or wishing people well, as in
(63).
(61) [instruction on a carton of fruit juice]: Shake well before opening.
(62) [adult to a child who is looking longingly at a box of chocolates]: Take one.
(63) [exceptional shop assistant to customer who's leaving the shop]:
Have a nice day.
In none of these examples are the conditions for a felicitous performance of a
directive speech act met, yet they are all perfectly acceptable, humdrum uses of the
imperative. In (61), the author of the note isn't trying to get the consumer to do
anything, she is merely indicating that it would be in the hearer's interest to shake the
carton of fruit juice well before opening it. In (62), too, the adult isn't trying to get
the child to take a chocolate, she is simply indicating that it's all right for the child to
do so. Finally, in (63), the shop assistant isn't trying to get the customer to have a
nice day - whether people do or don't have nice days is usually not up to them - she
is just indicating that she regards it as desirable that the customer should have a nice
day.
Wilson & Sperber (1988a) (also Sperber & Wilson (1986)) capture the
semantics of mood indicators in terms of propositional attitudes. They distinguish
between descriptive and interpretive propositional attitudes. Descriptive attitudes,
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according to them (1988b: 149), are attitudes to states of affairs. For instance,
believing is seen as a descriptive attitude, because it is an attitude to a state of affairs.
For example, if Mary believes that there are five eggs in her fridge, she has an
attitude to the state of affairs of there being five eggs in her fridge, namely she sees it
as an actual state of affairs, that is, a state of affairs that holds in the actual world.
Interpretive propositional attitudes, on the other hand, are attitudes towards
representations of states of affairs, such as propositions, thoughts and utterances.
Wilson & Sperber analyse declarative and imperative mood indicators as encoding
information about descriptive attitudes, while they see interrogative mood indicators
as encoding information about interpretive attitudes. On their analysis, declaratives
encode the information that the speaker entertains the proposition expressed as a
representation of an actual (or possible) state of affairs. Imperatives encode the
information that the speaker entertains the proposition expressed as a representation
of a desirable and potential state of affairs. Finally, interrogatives encode the
information that the speaker entertains the proposition expressed as an interpretation
of a relevant representation.
It is standard practice within RT to capture the propositional attitude
information encoded by the main clause mood indicators of an utterance in terms of
general speech acts. Thus, a standard way of representing what is communicated by
utterances of (57)-(59) is by giving the higher-level explicatures in (64)-(66).
(64) Mary is saying that John eats an apple a day.
(65) Mary is telling John to eat an apple a day.
(66) Mary is asking whether John eats an apple a day.
In order to avoid the counterexamples standard speech act accounts of mood
indicators run into, Wilson & Sperber define the speech acts of saying, telling and
asking in terms of the propositional attitudes encoded by the mood indicators. This
means that saying is analysed as presenting the proposition expressed as a
description of an actual state of affairs, telling to as presenting the proposition
expressed as a description of a desirable and potential state of affairs and asking as
presenting the proposition expressed as an interpretation of a relevant representation.
Given the assumption that all main clause mood indicators encourage the
construction of a higher-level explicature, like those in (64)-(66), it seems safe to say
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that they affect the explicit side of communication. It also seems more plausible to
assume that they encode procedural rather than conceptual information for the
following reasons.
First, at least in English, mood indicators are not what could be called
'words' by any stretch of the imagination. So, it isn't easy to imagine even what it is
the meaning of which one would be trying to bring to consciousness. Along similar
lines, it's hard to imagine what it is one would be trying to 'combine' with other
expressions to test the compositionality of mood indicators. Finally, it doesn't look
as if the meaning of mood indicators is truth-evaluable - B's utterance in (67) is
completely unacceptable.
(67) A:	 Do you eat an apple a day?
B:	 *That's not true. You're not asking me whether I eat an apple a
day/You don't think that 'I eat an apple a day' resembles a relevant
thought or utterance.
On the other hand, the assumption that mood indicators encode procedural
information that guides the hearer in the inferences he goes through in the process of
deriving the higher-level explicatures of the utterance is quite plausible 19. They
could do this, for example, by making more accessible certain kinds of speech act or
propositional attitude descriptions. For a much more detailed account of mood
indicators in an RT framework see Sperber & Wilson (1986), Wilson & Sperber
(1988a) and Clark (1991), for example.
4.6.4 Illocutionary and attitudinal adverbials
(68) Frankly, Peter is a bore.
(69) Sadly, I can't stand Peter.
(70) Fortunately, Mary was able to repair the car.
(71) Regrettably, Mary was unable to repair the car.
19 Obviously, this holds only for mood indicators on main clauses. Subordinate clauses, on the whole,
don't have their own explicatures (but see 6.4.1).
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This type of 'non-truth-conditional' device has been dealt with in an RT framework
in great detail by Ifantidou-Trouki (1993) and ffantidou (1994). Therefore, I won't
do more here than sum up her account. According to Ifantidou (148-152),
illocutionary and attitudinal adverbials, such as those in (68)-(71), encode concepts.
The most convincing piece of evidence for this is the fact that they all have
synonymous 'truth-conditional' counterparts that are clearly conceptual. For
instance, in (72)-(75), frankly, sadly, fortunately and regrettably all contribute
concepts to the proposition expressed by the utterance.
(72) John spoke frankly.
(73) Mary smiled sadly.
(74) Things turned out quite fortunately for her.
(75) She left regrettably soon after she arrived.
There are only two ways of accounting for the ability of these adverbials to appear
either in the proposition expressed or a higher-level explicature of the utterance:
Either one claims that they are ambiguous or one assumes that the discourse
adverbials and the corresponding manner adverbials are one and the same lexical
item, in which case the simplest hypothesis is that they encode conceptual
information. The first possibility doesn't seem very plausible because it would result
in a systematic ambiguity not just for the adverbials mentioned above but for
countless others as well. Furthermore, there is extra evidence in favour of the
illocutionary and attitudinal adverbials in (68)-(71) encoding concepts. The most
compelling argument for this is that all these adverbials are compositional, that is,
they combine with other concepts to form larger adverbials. Consider (76)-(79), for
example.
(76) Frankly speaking, Peter is a bore.
(77) Very sadly and regrettably, I can't stand Peter.
(78) Fortunately for Peter, Mary was able to repair the car.
(79) Most regrettably, Mary was unable to repair the car.
Interestingly (and possibly somewhat worryingly), these tests don't show such clear
results for all illocutionary and attitudinal adverbials. For instance, while actually in
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(80) seems to have a synonymous truth-conditional counterpart, as in (81), it's not so
clear that it felicitously combines with any other elements to form more complex
adverbials. Some attempts at doing this are shown in (82).
(80) Actually, I don't like Peter.
(81) Mary didn't just pretend, she actually ate the bug.
(82) a.	 *yery actually, I don't like Peter.
b. *sadly but actually, I don't like Peter.
c. *Surprisingly and actually, I don't like Peter.
d. Actually (and maybe surprisingly), I don't like Peter.
A possible explanation for this rather mixed behaviour of actually is that the
expression in its use as a discourse adverbial is in the process of being
'proceduralised'. This is based on the, at this stage rather vague, idea that many
expressions that now have clearly procedural meaning historically started life as
conceptual expressions, became routinely associated with certain inferential
processes and finally lost their conceptual nature completely. It is at least
conceivable that actually on its discourse use has become associated with a certain
inferential process (I'm leaving open what that process could be) and is gradually
becoming dissociated from its conceptual counterpart without having lost its
conceptual nature completely as yet.
4.6.5 Illocutionary and attitudinal particles
(83) Oh, you're such a bore.
(84) Peter is an interesting man, huh!
(85) You like Peter, eh?
(86) Alas, I can't stand Peter.
There is a fair amount of doubt as to whether these items encode any linguistic
meaning at all. I will not consider this question here. However, if they do encode
any linguistic meaning at all, then it seems clear that the meaning they encode will
have to be procedural.
First considering the argument from cognition, it's exceedingly difficult to
'bring to consciousness' the meaning of oh, huh, eh and alas (though it might be
somewhat easier in the case of alas - at least some crossword puzzle compilers seem
to think that alas means unfortunately). Both the truth-evaluability and the
compositionality arguments provide very convincing evidence in favour of these
'particles' encoding procedural rather than conceptual meaning. For instance,
(assuming that oh conveys surprise) (87) shows clearly that its meaning is not truth-
evaluable, B's utterance here is unacceptable.
(87) A: Oh, it's five o'clock.
B: *That's not true, you're not surprised that it's five o'clock at all.
(88) and (89) show that, while, as expected, i'm surprised combines happily with
other expressions to form a larger conceptual representation, oh is not compositional.
(88) I'm really surprised it's five o'clock.
(89) *Really oh, it's five o'clock.
This leaves the question as to whether these particles contribute to the explicit or
implicit side of communication. Looking at an example like A's utterance in (87) it
seems reasonable to assume that oh constrains higher-level explicatures; it seems at
least plausible that the contribution oh makes to the overall interpretation of this
utterance is that it leads the hearer to the construction of a higher-level explicature
expressing an attitude to the proposition expressed, as in (90).
(90) The speaker is surprised that it's five o'clock.
However, oh can perfectly happily occur as an utterance in its own right, like for
example in (91).
(91) Mary discovers that someone has sent her a letter in a heart-shaped envelope
and says: Oh!
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In this case, Mary's utterance does not encode any conceptual meaning at all, which
means that it doesn't have a logical form, which in turn means that it can't have any
explicatures. Here, if anything, oh must be constraining the implicatures of Mary's
utterance (because the only assumptions it communicates are implicatures). In sum,
if items like oh, huh, eh and alas encode any linguistic meaning at all, it's very likely
to be procedural meaning that can constrain either the explicatures or the
implicatures of an utterance.
4.6.6 'Stylistic differences'
This is a 'class' of 'non-truth-conditional' devices that has been given little attention
in RT so far. Since this is a thesis primarily about concessive constructions I will not
be able to do more than make a few very vague suggestions as to how they might be
accounted for in the framework of RT.
(92) a. A dog ate my steak.
b. A cur ate my steak.
(93) a. You'll be spared a lecture.
b. You'll be deprived of a lecture.
	
(94) a.	 Peter ate my steak.
	
b.	 That bastard Peter ate my steak.
(95) a. Je t'aime.
b. Je vous aime.
c. Ichliebedich.
d. Ich liebe sie.
'I love you.'
(96) a. Peter repaired the car.
b. Peter managed to repair the car.
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(97) a. John is here.
b. John is here already.
(98) a. Jane isn't here.
b. Jane isn't here yet.
There seem to be at least three distinct types of phenomena listed in this category: (a)
dog/cur, tu/vous, spare/deprive, (b) that bastard, manage and (c) yet, already. The
elements in group (a) all clearly contribute a concept to the proposition expressed by
the utterance: dog and cur by encoding it, tu and vous most likely by instructing the
hearer to supply such a concept. Moreover, it seems at least possible that each pair
of expressions contributes the same concept (in the same context). The differences
between the members of each pair seem to stem from conventions of use rather than
anything they linguistically encode. At least in the case of the tu/vous (or dulsie)
distinction, the conventions governing when each expression should be used are
strongly reminiscent of such social conventions as how one should greet people of
different social standing (e.g. by bowing to them, shaking their hand or giving them a
peck on the cheek): The knowledge of a German speaker that she should use du to
address children, friends and relatives and sie to address anybody else seems very
similar to the kind of knowledge that tells us whom we can greet with a peck on the
cheek and whom we'd better shake by the hand or greet with a nod. In other words,
unlike Levinson (1983: 128-130), who proposes that the difference between tu and
vous is a matter of conventional implicature, I doubt that the difference is one of
linguistic meaning proper at all.
That bastard and manage are also both likely to encode concepts, but it's not
at all clear that these concepts are part of the proposition expressed by the utterance.
That bastard and other expressions like it has a strongly parenthetical feel about it. It
is at least conceivable that utterances, such as (94b) actually express two
propositions: one the same as that expressed by (94a) and the other something like
(99).
(99) PETER IS A BASTARD.
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The possibility of a single utterance expressing multiple propositions, as considered,
for example, by Bach (1999) and Neale (1999), will be discussed in greater detail in
chapter 8.
Finally, the elements in (c) are much more likely to encode procedural
information that constrains the implicit side of communication. For instance, already
might be analysed as indicating that the utterance should be processed in a context
which contains the negation of the proposition expressed by the utterance. In the
case of (97b), this would mean that the utterance should be processed in a context
that contains the assumption that John isn't here (or that someone believes that he
isn't here).
4.6.7 Focus particles
These expressions seem to be prime candidates for encoding procedural rather than
conceptual information: it's hard to bring their meaning to consciousness and they
don't seem to be truth-evaluable, as demonstrated by (103)-(105).
(100) Even John came to the party.
(101) John came to the party too.
(102) John also came to the party.
(103) A: Even John came to the party.
B: ?That's not true. John was quite likely to come to the party.
(104) A: John came to the party too.
B: ?That's not true. John was the only one who came to the party.
(105) A: John also came to the party.
B: ?That's not true. Coming to the party was the only thing John did.
When it comes to compositionality, things are not quite so straightforward. It seems
that at least even can combine in interesting ways with certain other expressions, e.g.
f and not in (106) and (107).
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(106) Even if you write 2000 words every day, you won't finish your thesis by the
end of July.
(107) Not even Bill came to the party.
The case of even's interaction with if will be looked at in some detail in chapter 7.
At a first pass, all of these particles seem to place constraints on context. One
way or another, they all seem to indicate that the utterance containing them should be
processed in a context that contains a range of related propositions. Focus plays an
important part in determining what these propositions are, i.e. they are propositions
that are identical to the proposition expressed by the utterance in everything but the
constituent the focus falls on. 20 For instance, assuming the focus in an utterance of
(100) falls on John, that utterance is to be processed in the context of propositions
like those in (108).
(108) a.	 Mary came to the party.
b. Jim came to the party.
c. Joan came to the party.
d. Janet came to the party.
Tentatively, also and too seem to indicate that at least one of these related
propositions is true, while even seems to indicate the same, as well as that these
related propositions come on a scale of probabilities and that the proposition
expressed is the least likely of them all. A full relevance-theoretic account of the
meaning of even will be given in chapter 7.
Interestingly, it seems that these focus particles are free to affect either the
explicit or implicit side of communication. For instance, while they don't seem to
affect the propositions expressed (or the higher-level explicatures) of the utterances
in (100)-(102) it seems at least possible that they do affect the propositions expressed
in (109)-(111).
(109) Mary was annoyed that John even ate the cake.
(110) Mary was annoyed that John ate the cake too.
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(111) Mary was annoyed that John also ate the cake.2'
In all of these cases, the fact that the cake wasn't all that John ate seems to be a
crucial component of what the speaker is saying Mary is annoyed about.
4.7	 Conclusion
In this chapter I have introduced the cognitive pragmatic framework of Relevance
Theory. I hope to have shown that this framework makes it possible to account for
all linguistic meaning using two basic distinctions: the semantic distinction between
conceptual and procedural encoding and the pragmatic distinction between explicit
and implicit communication. This chapter has also shown how it is possible, at one
and the same time, to capture the fundamental intuition that utterances are about
things and to account for 'subjective' meaning. I therefore conclude that RT
provides a viable alternative both to the fundamentally truth-conditional theories of
linguistic meaning discussed in chapter 2 and the ultimately completely non-truth-
conditional (but also counterintuitive) Argumentation Theory discussed in chapter 3.
In the following three chapters I will concentrate on semantic accounts of
'concessives', such as but and although, and 'concessive conditionals', typically
expressed by even if. In each case, I will give an overview of some of the accounts
proposed in the literature before offering my own relevance-theoretic analyses.
20 This is a very rough characterisation of what goes on here. For a more detailed discussion of focus-
related phenomena in the framework of RT see Sperber & Wilson (1986: 202-2 17).
21 I'm grateful to Robyn Carston (personal communication) for these examples.
170
CHAPTER 5
CONCESSIVES I: BUT
5.1	 Concessivity and its expression
As promised in chapter 1, the next three chapters are devoted to the topic of
'concessives'. The most obvious question to ask is what is meant by 'concessives' or
'concessivity' in language. Quirk et al. (1972: 674) have the following to say:
Concessive conjuncts signal the unexpected, surprising nature of what is being
said in view of what was said before that.
This is demonstrated, for instance, by an utterance of (1), where the information that
Peter went out could be seen as surprising in the light of the information that it was
raining.
(1) It was raining but Peter went out.
As (2) shows, the same kind of relation between two clauses can also be expressed
using although. Here, however, the speaker is free to present the 'surprising'
information first, as in (2b)
(2) a.	 Although it was raining, Peter went out.
b.	 Peter went out although it was raining.'
Finally, (3) shows that, at least in certain circumstances, an even f utterance can
convey something very similar to (1) and (2).
(3) a.	 Peter will go out, even if it's raining.
b.	 Even if it's raining, Peter will go out.
In these, as in most (or possibly all), examples even though can replace although without making any
difference to the interpretation. I will briefly discuss the difference between although and even though
in chapter 6. However, unless otherwise stated, assume that any example with although would work
equally well with even though.
171
In fact, there is a whole host of linguistic constructions which allow a speaker to
convey this kind of meaning. Some of these are given in (4).
(4)	 a.	 It was raining. Nevertheless, Peter went out.
b. It was raining. Still, Peter went out.
c. It was raining, yet Peter went out.
d. Despite the fact that it was raining, Peter went out.
Apart from the fact that they can receive similar interpretations, (1), (2a, b) and (4a-
d) also share the same truth conditions, i.e. they are all true just in case it was raining
and Peter went out. In other words, 'concessive' linguistic devices have 'non-truth-
conditional' meaning. Obviously, the truth conditions of (3a, b) are different due to
the presence of if (more will be said on the subject of the truth-conditional status of
even in 7.6.2).
The above examples show that 'concession' can be expressed in a multitude
of ways. In these chapters, ui nok- attempt to give a comprehensive overview
of the myriad different linguistic devices that can be used in English to express
'concession' as defined by Quirk et al.. Rather, I will concentrate on but and
although, which are widely accepted to be the two most frequent 'contrastive'
conjunctions in English (see e.g. Grote et al. (1997), Oversteegen (1997), Rudolph
(1996), Winter & Rimon (1994) and Konig (1986)), and on even if, which Konig
(1986: 234) sees as the most typical form of 'concessive (or irrelevance)
conditional'. My reasons for doing this are the following.
First, as the many taxonomic attempts in the literature show (e.g. Quirk et al.,
Halliday & Hasan 1976, Mann & Thompson 1986, 1988, Hovy & Maier 1994,
Rudolph 1996, Bell 1998), defining a relation of concession is not entirely
straightforward. For instance, although the definition given by Quirk et al. quoted
above seems initially plausible, it is surely not necessary for concession to involve an
element of surprise. Instead, many theorists have used the notion of
'incompatibility', which may or may not involve surprise. Second, it's not clear
what would be gained even if one did have a satisfactory definition of the notion of
concession. I am interested in utterance interpretation and, in particular, in the
contribution 'non-truth-conditional' linguistic elements make to it. Therefore,
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having a definition of concessivity is of interest only if there is a principled way of
associating certain linguistic expressions with concessive interpretations. However,
as e.g. Mann & Thompson (1986) point out and as will be seen below, there is no
straightforward one-to-one correspondence between linguistic devices and
interpretations. Furthermore, as demonstrated above, an enormous variety of
linguistic devices can be used to convey concession, but surely one wouldn't want to
say that all of these expressions are synonymous. Clearly, there is more to be said
about the meaning of but, although, even if and any of the other expressions listed
than that they can be used to express concession. Therefore, the enterprise of
accounting for the semantics (i.e. linguistically encoded meaning) of individual
expressions, such as but, although and even if, is much more tangible and potentially
more fruitful than that of trying to give a taxonomy of all 'concessive' linguistic
expressions. While many taxonomic approaches seem to regard classificatory
categories like 'concession' as primary, I would argue that such categories may be
definable in a secondary way, as generalisations from the linguistic meaning of
certain expressions.
This chapter is devoted to the analysis of but, on which there is a vast
literature. Chapter 6 is concerned with although, on which much less has been
written. Generally, the assumption seems to be that although covers a sub-set of
interpretations that but can be given and, therefore, not much else needs to be said
about although. I will argue that this assumption misses some important differences
and that although deserves its own analysis. Finally, chapter 7 deals with even if
(and, of necessity, much of it is concerned with the meaning of even).
I start this chapter by looking at the range of interpretations but can be given,
before giving an overview and critical discussion of the early literature, which
assumes that but is at least two ways ambiguous or polysemous. I follow this with
some general remarks about the Gncean framework and its attitude to lexical
ambiguity and polysemy. This leads to a longer theoretical discussion of the
arguments for and against the assumption that English but is ambiguous or
polysemous. I conclude that the arguments for an ambiguity are not overwhelming
and that it is at least worth investigating whether a unitary semantics could account
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for all possible interpretations of the connective but.2 For this reason I then consider
a range of unitary, or potentially unitary, semantic analyses of but, concluding the
chapter with my own suggestions for an account of the meaning of but within the
framework of Relevance Theory, as encoding a single constraint on inferential
processes.
5.2	 Interpretations of P but Q
5.2.1 Introductory remarks
One of the most prominent points of agreement in the literature on but is that there
are a number of ways in which but-conjunctions of the form in (5) can be interpreted.
(5)	 PbutQ3
However, as will be seen, there is a significant degree of difference among theorists
when it comes to listing and describing these different interpretations. First, though,
I'd like to consider a point all interpretations seem to have in common. There is
widespread agreement that the truth-conditional content of utterances of the form in
(5) doesn't go beyond that of (6).
(6) P&Q.
For instance, the majority of theorists are agreed that (7) is true just in case John is a
Republican and John is honest.
(7) John is a Republican but he is honest. 	 (G. Lakoff 1971: 67)
2	 leaving aside the 'exception' use of but on which it combines with universal quantification, as in
(i)	 Everyone but Bill came to the party.
Throughout the literature P and Q are used to stand for both, linguistic clauses and propositions
expressed. I am largely adhering to this convention in this and the next chapter. Wherever the
difference between the linguistic material and the proposition expressed is crucial, I state explicitly
what is meant (on the whole, P and Q are reserved for linguistic clauses, in those circumstances, and
different labels are used for propositions).
(1996: 47), Bach (1999: 350-355) and Neale (1999: 58) would not agree.
174
As mentioned in 4.5.2, the standard way of testing whether a given aspect of
meaning is truth-conditional is to embed the sentence in question in the scope of a
logical operator, such as if... then or either... or, or a causal connective like because.
The aspect of meaning is truth-conditional just in case the operator takes scope over
it. For instance, embedding a sentence containing after, such as Peter went to see
Mary after he'd eaten, under the scope of because gives (8).
(8) Because Peter went to see Mary after he'd eaten, he refused her offer of food.
Clearly, someone uttering this is saying that the reason that Peter refused Mary's
offer of food is not only that he went to see her and that he had eaten, but, crucially,
that he had eaten before going to see her. In other words, the meaning of after is in
the scope of because and, therefore, makes a difference to the truth-conditions of its
host utterance.
Applying this test to, say, (7) shows that the meaning of but doesn't make a
difference to the utterance's truth conditions.
(9) Because Peter is a Republican but he is honest, there is still hope for the
Republican party.
A speaker uttering (9) is clearly saying that there is still hope for the Republican
party for the reason that Peter is both a Republican and honest. The assumption that
there is something unexpected about his being honest in light of the fact that he is a
Republican clearly doesn't fall into the scope of because. Therefore, the truth
conditions of P but Q are the same as those of P & Q.
However, it is equally widely agreed that P & Q does not capture the entirety
of the meaning of P but Q. In other words, the very least one seems to be able to say
without encountering too much resistance is that P but Q amounts to P & Q plus
something else. Of course, the question of what this "something else" is (and
whether it has the status of an entailment, a presupposition, an implicature, etc.)
meets with a far smaller degree of unanimity. However, there is one more thing that
one can say fairly safely and that is that the "something else" just referred to arises
because of the linguistically encoded meaning carried by the conjunction but and not
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just because of the contents of P and Q and/or the context of the utterance. This is
demonstrated quite nicely by the examples in (10) and (11).
(10) My mother recommended this book and I read it.
(11) My mother recommended this book but I read it.
Clearly, P and Q have exactly the same contents in both of these examples: P is my
mother recommended this book and Q I read it. One can easily imagine these two
examples being uttered in exactly the same context, so that any difference in their
interpretations must be down to the difference between and and but. Quite
obviously, this difference is not negligible: The hearer will be able to infer radically
different assumptions about the speaker's relationship with her mother from them.
I now turn to the question of what exactly it is that but adds to the meaning of
utterances containing it, starting with an interpretation that has been recognised by
just about every theorist in the literature.
5.2.2 Denial of expectation
Possibly the most famous example in which but receives a 'denial of expectation'
interpretation is that in (7), repeated here.
(7)	 John is a Republican but he is honest.	 (G. Lakoff 1971: 67)
No doubt this example has proved so popular because of its mildly humorous effect,
which stems from the fact that it seems to suggest that Republicans are not normally
honest. According to R. Lakoff (1971) this and other 'denial of expectation' uses of
but involve an implication relation between the two conjuncts. The idea is that the
first conjunct (e.g. John is a Republican) implies an assumption that is then
contradicted by the second conjunct (e.g. He is honest). In other words, on the basis
of the first conjunct one might be led to expect something that is then denied - hence
the name 'denial of expectation'. In the case of G. Lakoff's example (7), it is highly
unlikely that the average hearer actually would come to expect that John isn't honest
on the basis of the assertion that John is a Republican. Rather, it is likely that the
hearer will only derive this implication once he's processed the whole utterance and
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only because of the speaker's use of but - hence the slightly humorous effect. But
indicates that he is honest contradicts an assumption implied by John is a
Republican.
(1) provides a rather more ordinary example of a denial of expectation use of
but.
(1)	 It was raining but Peter went out.
This lacks the humour of (7) because the implication from It was raining to Peter
didn't go out is a pretty everyday one and, therefore, the average hearer might well
expect that Peter didn't go out once he's been informed that it was raining.
In general terms, one might say that P but Q on a denial of expectation
interpretation gives rise to (or makes use of) an assumption that P implies -'Q. So far
so good. There is general agreement in the literature on but that something along the
lines just described does, indeed, go on in the interpretation of but-conjunctions like
(7) and (1). There is slightly less agreement when it comes to capturing the detail.
The two most contentious points are (a) the status of the assumption 'P implies -'Q'
and (b) the nature of the implication that links P and -'Q.
The two most frequent answers to question (a) are that the assumption is a
presupposition or that it is a Gricean conventional implicature of the utterance. The
general, vague, answer to question (b) is that the implication linking P and 
-'Q is
defeasible. Indeed, given that P but Q is generally agreed to entail P & Q, the
implication leading from P to 
-'Q must be defeasible, because otherwise the
conjunction of P and Q would be contradictory.
(12) *peter kissed Mary but he didn't kiss anyone.
(12) shows that in cases where P (Peter kissed Mary) entails (i.e. non-defeasibly
implies) -Q (Peter kissed someone) an utterance of P but Q is contradictory and
therefore unacceptable.
Some theorists, e.g. Anscombre & Ducrot (1977), Abraham (1979), KOnig
(1985) and Blakemore (1989), also distinguish a slightly different case of denial of
expectation use of but. Consider an utterance of (13).
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(13) It's raining but I need some fresh air.
Clearly, this can't be understood as conveying that P (it's raining) implies 
-'Q (I
don't need any fresh air). Instead, there seems to be an indirect relation between P
and Q . A plausible scenario in which (13) could be uttered is one where the speaker
and the hearer are debating whether to go for a walk or not. In such a scenario, P
(it's raining) could easily be understood as implying that the speaker didn't want to
go for a walk, while Q (I need some fresh air) would imply just the opposite. Konig
(1985: 5-6) refers to this kind of interpretation as "adversative". In more fonnal
terms, following Anscombre & Ducrot (1977), this can be captured as (14).
	
(14) a.	 P--'R
b. Q—R
c. Q carries more weight
Applying this to (13) P (= It's raining) implies -'R (= I don't want to go for a walk),
Q (= I need some fresh air) implies R (= I want to go for a walk) and, overall, the
speaker seems to implicate that, on balance, she wants to go for a walk, that is Q (1
need some fresh air) carries more weight than P (It's raining).
Apart from capturing the most likely interpretation of (13), (14) has the
advantage of also being able to account for (1). (1), and other examples like it, fit the
schema in (14) if one assumes that R = Q. This means that the schema would read
something like (15).
(15) a.	 P--'Q
b.
c. Q carries more weight
In other words, P (It was raining) implies 
-'Q (Peter didn't go out), Q (Peter went
out) trivially implies Q, Q carries more weight than P and, therefore, P but Q implies
Q (also trivially, because Q is entailed). Thus, cases in which the first conjunct P
implies the negation of the second conjunct Q are simply a special case of the general
denial of expectation use of but, according to which the two conjuncts support
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opposite conclusions (or have contradicting implications), with the second
outweighing the first.
5.2.3 'Semantic Opposition' or contrast
On some uses, it seems that but doesn't involve the denial of an expectation or an
implication. Consider (16).
(16) John is tall but Bill is short.	 (R. Lakoff 1971: 133)
It is not immediately obvious that an interpretation of (16) has to involve a
suggestion that either the first conjunct implies the negation of the second or that the
two conjuncts have contradicting implications, although such interpretations can, of
course, be imagined. It seems at least possible that (16) could be uttered simply to
draw attention to the difference in height between John and Bill. This is in fact how
R. Lakoff (1971) interprets it. According to her, there is no implicational
relationship between the two conjuncts in this example or in others like it. Instead,
there is a contrast between them due to the presence of antonymous lexical items in
the two clauses (i.e. tall vs. short). For this reason, R. Lakoff (1971: 133) dubs this
'semantic opposition' but. However, as she herself concedes the lexical items
involved don't always have to be strictly antonymous (assuming there is an adequate
definition of that notion to start with).
Blakemore (1987: 132) considers a whole range of examples which don't
involve antonymy by any stretch of the imagination, and which don't, on the face of
it, look like cases of denial of expectation either. (17)-(20) are adaptations of
Blakemore's examples.
(17) Susan is tall but Anne is of average height.
(18) The onions are fried but the cabbage is steamed.
(19) Mary likes skiing but Anne plays chess.
(20) His father owns Mini but mine has a Porsche.
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Because the 'opposition' in these cases is not of a semantic nature, Blakemore
prefers to call them 'contrast' uses of but.5 For instance, in (18) fried and steamed
are clearly not antonyms. At the same time, it's not very likely that a speaker
uttering this sentence would want to implicate that the onions being fried somehow
implies that the cabbage isn't steamed6. However, it is more easily imaginable that
there is an indirect incompatibility between the two clauses, i.e. that the onions are
fried has an implication which is contradicted by an implication of the cabbage is
steamed. For instance, (18) could be uttered by Joan to the health conscious Susan
who is worried about the fat content of the meal. In such a context, the onions are
fried might well imply that the meal is going to be high in fat, while the cabbage is
steamed would imply that the fat content of the meal isn't going to be very high. So,
there is a denial of expectation reading available for these examples.
In fact, Abraham (1979: 106-107), Foolen (1991: 84-85) and Winter &
Rimon (1994: 373-374) all argue that R. Lakoff's semantic opposition and
Blakemore's (1989) contrast uses of but can be reduced to denial uses. For instance,
Foolen (1991: 85) maintains that semantic opposition or contrast readings are the
artificial result of looking at examples out of context and that, if one were to look at
examples like (16) in a natural context, one would find that they actually involve the
denial of an expectation. (21) gives a scenario along the lines proposed by Foolen.
(21) A:	 John and Bill are both quite tall, aren't they?
B:	 Actually, John is tall but Bill is short.
When uttered by B in this scenario, it does indeed seem that (16) is interpreted as
involving an indirect denial of expectation: P (John is tall) is an argument for -'R (A
is right - John and Bill are both quite tall), Q is an argument for R (A is wrong -
John and Bill aren't both quite tall) and P is the stronger argument (therefore, the
speaker is wrong - John and Bill aren't both quite tall). I will return to the question
As a matter of fact, Blakemore (1987: 138) argues that 'contrast' uses of but, too, involve the denial
of an assumption. From this, Foolen (1991: 84) concludes that Blakemore (1987) argues for a
reduction of contrast but to denial of expectation but. However, later she (1989) seems to want to
distinguish the two uses of but.
6 Again, such a reading is conceivable. For instance, the onions are fried could be taken to imply that
everything else will be fried too.
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as to whether semantic opposition or contrast but can really be reduced to denial of
expectation but when I attempt my own account of the meaning of but below.
5.2.4 Correction (sondernisino)
While it is at least conceivable that 'semantic opposition' or 'contrast' but may be
reduced to (or is a special case of) 'denial of expectation' but, there is another use of
but which doesn't seem to involve denied implication in any way, shape or form.
This use of but has been distinguished by many theorists (e.g. A & D 1977, Abraham
1979) on the following cross-linguistic grounds. As used in all the examples above,
but translates into German as aber and into Spanish as pero. However, in certain
circumstances, but must be translated as sondern in German and sino in Spanish.
(22a) gives an example of this with the German translation in (22b).
(22) a.	 That isn't my sister but my mother.
b.	 Das ist nicht meine Schwester, sondern meine Mutter.
It seems that there is neither direct nor indirect denial involved in the interpretation
of an utterance of (22a). It is not the case that the first conjunct (that isn't my sister)
implies the negation of the second (that's not my mother) and neither is it the case
that the first conjunct implies something that is denied by an implication of the
second conjunct. In English, such a reading is possible only if there is no ellipsis.
(23) a.	 That isn't my sister but it is my mother.
b.	 Das ist nicht meine Schwester, aber (es ist) meine Mutter.
Thus, an utterance of (23a) would have to be interpreted as a denial of expectation.
For instance, the first conjunct (that isn't my sister) implies that the woman in
question isn't related to the speaker, the second conjunct (it is my mother) implies
that she is related to the speaker, and the whole utterance clearly (analytically)
implies that the woman in question is related to the speaker. Note, however, that
such a reading can only be achieved in German if but is translated as aber.
If the utterance is as in (22a), and so but is translated into German as sondern,
then the interpretation has to be something along the following lines. In the first
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clause (that isn't my sister) the speaker is negating an assumption that her hearer has
either voiced explicitly or that the speaker is attributing to the hearer, i.e. that the
woman in question is the speaker's sister. The function of the second clause (it is my
mother) is one of correction, i.e. the second clause provides a correct replacement for
the 'offending' part of the negated assumption, which is why I've dubbed this use of
but 'correction'. (24) gives a natural scenario for an utterance of (22).
	
(24) A:	 You look a lot like your sister.
	
B:	 That isn't my sister but my mother.
A: Du siehst deiner Schwester aber ähnlich.
B: Das ist nicht meine Schwester, sondern meine Mutter.
Because correction uses of but seem to occur most naturally in circumstances
in which the hearer has either communicated the assumption that's being negated in
the first clause or the negated assumption can at least be attributed to the hearer, this
use of but has been associated with the phenomenon of metalinguistic negation (see
e.g. A & D 1977: 26-27, Horn 1989: 407). ". s m. 	 re intu1v y i	 3i't.
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5.2.5 Compensation (dafur)
Apart from a denial of expectation but (corresponding to German aber and Spanish
pero) and correction but (corresponding to German sondern and Spanish sino),
Abraham (1979: 112-115) further distinguishes a use of but on which it can be
translated into German as dafter (literally 'for that'). Grote et a!. (1997: 97) also
discuss this kind of but, using the notion of substitution. Both (25 a) and (26a) can be
translated into German using daftir (cf. (25b) and (26b)).
(25) a.	 He is a bit short of breath but he has long legs.
	
b.	 Er ist etwas kurzatmig, dafUr hat er lange Beine.
(26) a.	 There was no chicken, but I got some fish.
	
b.	 Es gab kein Huhn, dafür habe ich Fisch gekauft.
According to Abraham, the relation between the two clauses is the following. The
first clause is usually not followed by the second, i.e. there is a denial of expectation.
However, in addition, the predicate of the second clause is signalled as preferred to
that of the first, and the second clause is 'dominant', i.e. the second clause "receives
the stronger accent of the two events" (Abraham 1979: 113). In the case of (25),
these conditions indeed seem to be fulfilled (although the denial or incompatibility
between the two clauses is more likely to be indirect than direct): the first clause (he
is a bit short of breath) could, for instance, imply he isn't a good runner, while the
second clause (he has long legs) would imply he is a good runner. The property
attributed to 'him' in the second clause (i.e. that of having long legs), is clearly
preferred to that attributed in the first clause (i.e. that of being a bit short of breath).
Finally, the second clause does indeed seem to be "dominant", i.e. it carries more
weight - the overall conclusion seems to be that 'he' is likely to be a reasonably
good runner. Abraham (1979: 113) labels these kinds of examples "compensatory"
or "negatively concessive". I'm sticking with the former because one way of
translating Abraham's dafur examples into English is by using the phrase (but) to
make up for that. For instance, (25b) could also be rendered as (27).
(27) He is a bit short of breath, but, to make up for that, he has long legs.
I will consider Abraham's account in more detail below. For the moment, let me just
observe that it is striking how much these 'compensation' examples look like
examples of denial of expectation but. Indeed, I will argue below that there is no
reason at all for assuming that there is a separate daflir interpretation of English but.
5.2.6 Discourse but
I'll end this section by looking at two types of occurrence of but that don't so much
involve different interpretations as different, possibly 'non-standard', uses of but.
Bell (1998: 527) contends that there is a use of but that can't be accounted for in
terms of denial of expectation (and it clearly isn't a correction use either). He calls
this 'discourse' or 'sequential' but and gives the example in (28).
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(28) A:	 We had a very nice lunch. I had an excellent lobster.
B:	 But did you get to ask him about the money?
According to Bell, but in B's utterance signals a return to the main topic of discourse.
In general, Bell (1998: 530) sees the but clause in its 'discourse' use as cancelling
"the topic domain" of what went before. This use of but seems to be quite
widespread in newspapers, where but is often used to introduce a new paragraph.
(29), taken from an article dealing with illegally kept DNA samples, gives an
example of this.
(29) Disclosure of the degree to which police are failing to use new forensic
technology is embarrassing to the police at a time when the government is
making a further £36m available to develop the national DNA database.
But the most significant aspect revealed by the inspector of
constabulary report, Under the Microscope, is its confirmation that "many
thousands of such samples are being held outside the rules".
The Guardian, 1 August 2000
Most of the accounts of the meaning of but that will be considered below do not deal
with this use of but, which is, nevertheless, very standard. This is unfortunate,
because it's not immediately clear how the notions of denial of expectation, contrast,
correction, or even compensation could shed light on this particular use of but. I will
consider a possible solution to this problem in my discussion of the relevance-
theoretic approach to but.
5.2.7 Utterance- and discourse-initial but
Before moving on to consider different accounts of the semantics of but, I'd like to
say a word about but as it occurs utterance-initially. There seem to be at least two
ways in which this can happen. Either, but starts a rejoinder to a previous utterance,
as in (30) and (31), or but appears not just utterance- but discourse-initially, as in
(32).
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(30) A:	 John's in Paris at the moment.
	
B:	 But I've just seen him in Oxford Street.
(31) A:	 It's time for bed now.
	
B:	 But you said I could watch the end of Brookside.
(32) [Peter puts some salmon on Mary's plate]
Mary: But I'm allergic to fish. 	 Rouchota (1998b: 25)
I won't discuss this type of example at great length here but it seems clear that there
is nothing strange or marked about these uses of but. Therefore, any adequate
account of the meaning of but should at least acknowledge their existence and show
that it isn't in conflict with them (ideally, of course, such an account would explain
how and why but can be used utterance- and discourse-initially).
5.3	 The Lakoffs' account of but
R. Lakoff (1971) distinguishes two uses of but: 'denial of expectation' and 'semantic
opposition'. G. Lakoff's (1971: 66) account of P but Q on a denial of expectation
reading, rendered in (33), is fairly typical of the type of analysis that uses the notion
of presupposition.
(33) Assertion	 PandQ
Presupposition:	 There is an expectation that P implies -'Q.
R. Lakoff seems to subscribe to the same view of denial but. She also describes
semantic opposition but in terms of presupposition. According to her:
in this type of sentence the presupposition is a part of the lexical item that is
contrasted, rather than residing in the speaker's knowledge of the world, and
therefore his expectations. The presupposition here is just that of antonymy:
that A and B share all semantic features but one.
R.Lakoff(1971: 134)
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As far as I understand what R. Lakoff means by this, the presupposition in (16) must
be that tall and short are antonyms. However, it's not clear to me why this
presupposition "is part of the lexical item that is contrasted" (tall or short?).
Presumably, the idea is still that but triggers the presupposition - it would seem
absurd to claim that the presupposition is carried by tall or short. Quite apart from
this and any problems there might be in defining exactly what it takes for two words
to be antonyms7, R. Lakoff herself admits that 'semantic opposition' doesn't always
have to be a matter of the semantics of a specific lexical item. For instance, she uses
example (34) to make the point that in some sentences it isn't clear which but one is
dealing with.
(34) John is rich but dumb.	 R.Lakoff(1971: 133)
According to her, there are two ways in which this utterance could be interpreted. A
denial of expectation reading could be achieved in a scenario in which a woman is
looking for a rich man who is dumb, but has found that all the rich men she
encounters are clever. When she finally comes across John she could utter (34) and
thereby convey that John is rich would lead to the expectation that he's clever.
In a slightly less laboured scenario, one could imagine (34) being uttered by a
daughter in reply to her mother who's urging her to marry John because he is rich.
In such a case, R. Lakoff (1971: 134) maintains, one would be dealing with a
semantic opposition: being rich is a good thing, being dumb is a bad thing.
Interestingly, she adds in brackets "so it might not be such a good idea to marry
him." This suggests very strongly that, far from being a (very peculiar) case of
semantic opposition, this is actually a case of indirect denial of expectation: P (John
is rich) implies -'R (it's a good idea to marry him), Q (he is dumb) implies R (it isn't
a good idea to marry him) and the utterance overall implies R.
In parallel to a distinction she draws between symmetric and asymmetric uses
of and, R. Lakoff (1971: 135) also distinguishes symmetric and asymmetric but. For
instance, the and-conjunction in (35) is symmetric, i.e. the order of the clauses can be
For instance, R. Lakoff (1971: 134, fn. 4) discusses the cases of hot/cold and hot/warm and points
out that both of these pairs differ in just one feature, i.e. hot might be seen as [+temperature] and cold
as [-temperature], while hot might be [+intensive] and warm as [-intensive]. Nevertheless, only
hot/cold would traditionally be seen as antonyms.
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switched without change to the interpretation. (36), on the other hand, is asymmetric
- switching clauses here leads to the dubious (37).
(35) Fords can go fast, and Oldsmobiles are safe.
(36) Fords can go fast, and Harry just got a ticket for speeding.
(37) Harry just got a ticket for speeding, and Fords can go fast.
To parallel (35) and (36) R. Lakoff sets up the but-conjunctions in (38) and (39).
(38) Fords can go fast, but Oldsmobiles are safe.
(39) Fords can go fast, but Harry will never get a ticket for speeding.
According to her, (38) is an example of semantic opposition but: two different
virtues of cars or two different reasons for buying them are contrasted. (39), on the
other hand, is a case of denial of expectation: the assertion that Fords can go fast,
combined with the assumptions that Harry drives a Ford, that one will go fast if one
can and that one gets a speeding ticket if one goes fast, leads to the expectation that
Harry will get a speeding ticket sooner or later, which is denied by the second clause.
Because of the similarity between (35) and (38), on the one hand, and (36) and (39),
on the other, R. Lakoff (1971: 136) describes the former as symmetric and the latter
as asymmetric. She argues that this is supported by the fact that it is possible to
reverse the clauses of (38) to form (40) without a change in meaning, while doing the
same with (39) results in (41), which must be interpreted quite differently.
(40) Oldsmobiles are safe, but Fords can go fast.
(41) Harry will never get a ticket for speeding, but Fords can go fast.
I believe that switching clauses makes a difference in both cases. Surely, someone
uttering (38) would be more likely to go out and buy an Oldsmobile, while a speaker
uttering (40) seems to be more in favour of Fords. This, of course, is the kind of
interpretation one would expect on an indirect denial of expectation use of but. In
such a case, Fords can go fast might imply that the speaker (or someone else) should
buy a Ford, Oldsmobiles are safe might imply that the speaker should not buy a Ford,
but an Oldsmobile, and whichever clause is uttered last carries more weight (an
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observation which seems to demand some explanation rather than just being stated
like this). This, once more, casts doubt on the distinction between denial of
expectation and semantic opposition but, as it is yet another example of a prima facie
semantic opposition example turning out to be best analysed in tenns of indirect
denial of expectation.
It is not clear to me that R. Lakoff's analysis could deal with correction,
discourse- or utterance-initial uses of but. Presumably, though, denial of expectation
could account for compensatory but. I suspect that R. Lakoff might want to treat
some of those as involving semantic opposition, e.g. between the negative
characteristic of being short of breath and the positive one of having long legs in
(25a).
(25) a.	 He is a bit short of breath but he has long legs.
Similarly, she might attempt to account for correction uses, such as (22a), in terms of
semantic opposition, maybe as contrasting a negative with a positive statement, or
seeing the first conjunct as [-female relative] and the second as [^female relative].
(22) a.	 That isn't my sister but my mother.
However, I don't find either of these semantic opposition possibilities very plausible.
There are two questions regarding this account of but that I haven't yet
addressed, i.e. what is the nature of the 'presuppositions' carried by but and does the
fact that there are two, supposedly, different presuppositions associated with but,
depending on whether it's used for a denial of expectation or a semantic opposition,
mean that but is lexically ambiguous?
The answer to the first question seems to be that the notion of presupposition
the Lakoffs work with is 'pragmatic' along the lines suggested by Stalnaker (1974),
i.e. they see presuppositions as assumptions that are taken to be part of a shared
background between speaker and hearer (see 2.4). More precisely, the type of
presupposition associated with but is triggered by a particular linguistic form (i.e.
but), rather than arising as a result of general conversational principles. For this
reason, it seems that saying that there are two different presuppositions associated
with but amounts to postulating at least some distinction in encoded meaning
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between denial of expectation and semantic opposition but. Of course, this still
leaves open two possibilities: lexical ambiguity (homonymy) or polysemy. Since
neither of the Lakoffs address this question, and what they say doesn't provide any
hints as to which way they'd be likely to go, it's impossible to decide whether they'd
opt for postulating two separate lexical items of the form but or a single polysemous
but.
5.4	 Abraham's three buts
Abraham (1979) distinguishes three types of but: denial of expectation, correction
and compensation. His main reason for making these distinctions seems to be that
there are (at least) three different ways of translating but into German. Denial of
expectation but is best translated as aber, as in (42), which is the German counterpart
of(7).
(7)	 John is a Republican but he is honest.	 (G. Lakoff 1971: 67)
(42) John ist Republikaner, aber er ist ehrlich.
As already shown in sections 5.2.4 and 5.2.5, correction but is translated as sondern
and compensatory but as daflir.
Abraham (1979: 93-97) also attempts to show that the distinction between
but/aber and but/sondern amounts to true ambiguity by looking for two situations in
which the same sentence containing but is true on one reading and false on the other,
and vice versa. According to him (1979: 93), (43) is true on a denial of expectation
(or aber) interpretation, while it is false on a correction (or sondern) interpretation.
(43) Pluto is not a horse but an animal.
Thus, the German translation using aber, given in (44), is acceptable and true, while
the same sentence using sondern, as in (45), is "incorrect", in Abraham's (1979: 93)
words.
(44) Pluto ist kein Pferd, (wohl) aber em Tier.
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(45) Pluto ist kein Pferd, sondern em Tier.
Unfortunately, I find neither of these sentences particularly acceptable and, although
Abraham places wohi into brackets to indicate that he doesn't feel it's absolutely
necessary, I find (44) without it completely unacceptable. Furthermore, given the
right context (which is, admittedly, not easy to supply), I find (45) perfectly
acceptable. It seems to me that Abraham's intuitions concerning the truth and falsity
of these sentences depend on whether the negation in the first clause is taken to be
metalinguistic or descriptive rather than on the interpretation but receives. In
particular, (45) is "false" only on the assumption that the negation is descriptive.
At least it is clear that Abraham wants to treat the differences between
but/aber, but/sondern and but/daflir as due to there being three lexical items, i.e. he
believes that there is not just one but in English, but that there are (at least) three
homonymous buts. He (1979: 115-116) captures the semantics of these three buts in
the presupposed conditions of use in (46)-(48). Each definition is followed by a
typical example.
(46) DENTAL OF EXPECTATION: P, aber Q
a. There is an R, s.t. R usually follows P and -iR usually follows Q.
b. It is not the case that P usually follows Q, or (more precisely), where
X is the predicate of P, and V that of Q, it is not the case that Ya entails
Xa.
(7)	 John is a Republican but he is honest.	 (G. Lakoff 1971: 67)
(47) CORRECTION: Nicht P', sondern Q (P = nicht P')
a. An opposition between P' and Q entails -'P' and Q
b. The assertion of -'P' is represented by explicit (unincorporated)
negation.
c. It is not the case that Q usually follows P' or P' usually follows Q, or
that there is any kind of dependence between P' and Q (i.e. they don't
entail or contradict each other)
(22) a.	 That isn't my sister but my mother.
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(48) COMPENSATION: P. dafl4r Q
a. -'Q usually follows P.
b. Q is preferred to P.
c. Q receives the stronger accent than P.
(25) a.	 He is a bit short of breath but he has long legs.
As indicated in section 5.2.5, the most problematic aspect of this is the fact that
Abraham distinguishes between denial of expectation (or, as he calls it,
"concessive") but and compensation but. Indeed, my impression that Abraham's
daflir cases can be analysed as instances of indirect denial without missing anything
is confirmed by Grote et al.'s (1997: 96) discussion of a áafllr example of their own,
which is given in (49a) and translated into German in (49b).
	
(49) a.	 Mary doesn't own a car, but a bike instead.
	
b.	 Mary hat kein Auto, dafUr hat sie em MotorradfFahrrad.8
They say about this kind of reading that
an, apparently negative, statement is made, and another one serves as -
possibly partial - compensation.
Grote et a!. (1997: 96)
In the case of (49), the idea is that Mary's not having a car is negative (e.g. because it
means she's not mobile), while her having a bike compensates for her lack of a car
(e.g. because it means that she is mobile after all). This, as mentioned above,
reinforces the impression that the 'substitution' use of but is no more than a (possibly
slightly special) version of denial of expectation but.
(25) a.	 He is a bit short of breath but he has long legs.
I give two options here, because German doesn't have a single word to cover both bicycles and
motorcycles.
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For instance, (25a) is most likely to be uttered in the scenario of a discussion about
how good different people would be at running. In that case, P (he is a bit short of
breath) could be seen as implying -'R (he wouldn't make a good runner), Q (he has
long legs) as implying R (he would make a good runner), and Q carries more weight
than P.
In fact, I suspect that daflr isn't a way of translating but into German at all.
It is worth noting that in all the examples above it would be more natural to translate
the English version containing but into German using both dafur and aber: (50)-(52)
seem to do a better job at capturing the meaning of the English (25a), (26a) and (49a)
than their corresponding (b)-sentences.
(26) a.	 There was no chicken, but I got some fish.
(50) Er is etwas kurzatmig, dafUr hat er aber lange Beine.
(51) Es gab kein Huhn, aber dafur habe ich Fisch gekauft.
(52) Mary hat kein Auto, dafUr hat sie aber em MotorradlFahrrad.9
It is equally interesting that, in order to capture exactly what the German examples
say, the English examples should (and in the case of (49) do) contain an expression
like instead or to make up for that. Thus, (25a) and (26a) should probably look more
like (53) and (54).
(53) He is a bit short of breath, but, to make up for that, he has long legs.
(54) There was no chicken but I got some fish instead.
As already mentioned, Abraham makes it very clear that he believes that the three
different interpretations of but he lists are not just three distinct senses of a single
lexical item, but rather that there are three distinct, homonymous, lexical items in
English.
The question as to the nature of the presuppositions Abraham associates with
but or, more precisely, the three different buts, is slightly more tricky. On the one
hand, he seems to see them as necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of use, but,
The relative position of aber and dafl4r in the second clause doesn't seem to make much difference
to its meaning, i.e. there seems to be no difference in interpretation between Er 1st etwas kurzarmig,
daflfr hat er aber lange Beine and Er 1st etwas kurzatmig, aber daflir hat er lange Beine.
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on the other hand, he seems to think that whether the conditions are met in a given
situation determines the truth or falsity of a but utterance. The former seems to
indicate that his idea of presupposition is pragmatic and quite close to that of the
Lakoffs, while the latter indicates that he operates with a semantic notion of
presupposition. However, this is surely not a tenable position, as there is a fair
amount of evidence in favour of the view that but doesn't affect the truth conditions
of utterances containing it (see 5.2.1).
5.5 An AT account
5.5.1 Two mais
The treatment of the meaning of but (or rather its French equivalent, mais) given by
Anscombre & Ducrot (1977) is probably the most influential account in the
literature, certainly as far as denial of expectation but is concerned. They distinguish
two kinds of but: denial of expectation and correction (though they use different
labels). This basis for the distinction lies in the cross-linguistic fact that both
German and Spanish have (at least) two non-synonymous expressions to translate but
or mais. As already mentioned in section 5.2, denial of expectation but is translated
into German as aber and into Spanish as pero. Correction but, on the other hand, is
translated as sondern in German and sino in Spanish. For this reason, A & D term
correction but "maispA" and denial but "maissN". I'll start by looking at A & D's
treatment of correction but.
5.5.2 MaiSSN
According to A & D (1977: 24-25), the conditions in (55) have to obtain for
correction but to be able to connect two sentences P and Q.
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(55) Correction (maisg)
a. P has the form of not P'
b. The same speaker is uttering all of P but Q'°
c. The speaker presents Q as her reason for rejecting P'
d. Q has to refute P' directly, i.e. Q and P' have to characterise the same
kind of fact (in ways which the speaker deems incompatible with each
other). Q has to be capable of replacing P'.
Clearly, in (22), our correction example from above, these conditions are met.
(22) a.
	
That isn't my sister but my mother.
b.	 Das ist nicht meine Schwester, sondern meine Mutter.
The first conjunct does, indeed, contain an overt, unincorporated negation (not or
nicht), both conjuncts are uttered by the same speaker, the second (she is my mother)
is presented as the reason for rejecting the positive counterpart of the first (she is my
sister) and P' (she is my sister) and Q (she is my mother) do indeed describe the same
kind of fact in an incompatible way (the woman in question can't simultaneously be
the speaker's sister and her mother). However, there are a number of problematic
aspects of the conditions given by A & D.
First, the notion of 'the same kind of fact' is vague and could do with some
explication. For instance, somebody being the speaker's sister and somebody being
her mother are intuitively the same kind of facts, but it is doubtful whether the same
can be said for attending peace talks and tending pea stalks, as should be the case,
since an utterance of (56) is clearly acceptable (and equaiiy clearly a correction use
of but). In fact, this point will probably hold for virtually all corrections of linguistic
form.
(56) Peter didn't attend the peace talks but tend the pea stalks.
10 In fact, A & D (1977: 39) ultimately translate this condition into the claim that uttering P maissN Q
amounts to the performance of a single speech act, while an utterance of P mais Q involves the
performance of two distinct speech acts. As will be seen, Blakemore's (1989) account of but echoes
this claim.
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(57), a similar example in German, must contain sondern for it to be interpreted
parallel to (56) - (58), the same example using aber can only be interpreted as a
denial of expectation (a suitable context for which is not easy to find).
(57) Fritz hat nicht Hilfe gebraucht, sondern die Hälfte geraucht.
'Fritz didn't need help but smoke half.'
(58) Peter hat nicht Hilfe gebraucht, aber die Hälfte geraucht.
(56) is most likely to be uttered to correct someone who has misheard an utterance of
"Peter tended the pea stalks" as "Peter attended the peace talks" and maybe asked
"Which peace talks did Peter attend?". In such a scenario Peter attended the peace
talks and Peter tended the pea stalks don't describe the same kind of fact but they
represent the same utterance. This seems to indicate that, rather than describing the
same kinds of fact, an utterance P' and an utterance of Q should perform the same
communicative function.
A further problem is also connected with condition (d): The requirement that
the speaker should deem P' and Q incompatible is open to interpretation. It is
reasonably clear what this incompatibility is in the case of (22), because the
likelihood of one and the same person being the speaker's sister and her mother is
small to say the least. However, it is much less clear how the facts described by P'
(we saw the hippopotamuses) and Q (we saw the hippopotami) in (59) can be
incompatible, since they clearly describe exactly the same fact.
(59) We didn't see the hippopotamuses but the hippopotami.
Again, it seems that the incompatibility isn't between facts but between utterances.
Of course, I'm being somewhat facetious because it is clear that in both (56) and (59)
the negation in the first clause isn't descriptive but metalinguistic, i.e. the speaker is
not so much concentrating on the propositional content of the utterance as objecting
to it on other grounds (though (56) might prove to be a bit of a headache in that
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respect, as the propositional content of P' is at least part of what the speaker is
objecting to11).
Anscombre & Ducrot (1977: 26-27) state that the negation in P must have
what they call 'polemic' character, not in its strict sense, in which it can only be used
to object to an actual preceding utterance, but in a looser sense, i.e. one in which it
can also be used to object to a potential utterance. Clearly, A & D's 'polemic'
negation is very close indeed to Horn's (1985, 1989) metalinguistic negation. In
fact, by saying that metalinguistic negation
occur[s] naturally oniy as responses to utterances by other speakers earlier in
the same discourse contexts, or as mid-course corrections after earlier utterance
by the same speakers
Horn (1989: 375) makes it clear that his metalinguistic negation corresponds to A &
D's strictly interpreted polemic negation. It seems that Carston's (1996b) definition
of metalinguistic negation is much closer to A & D's polemic negation interpreted
more loosely (as it has to be in order to apply to all sondern-type uses of but). She
(1996b: 320) argues that
The correct generalization about the metalinguistic cases is that the material in
the scope of the negation operator, or some of it at least, is echoically used, in
the sense of Sperber and Wilson (1986), Wilson and Sperber (1988[b], 1992).
Crucially, echoic use does not necessarily involve an actual thought or utterance.
Instead,
the thought being echoed may not have been expressed in an utterance; it may
not be attributable to any specific person, but merely to a type of person, or
people in general; it may be merely a cultural aspiration or norm.
Wilson & Sperber (1992: 60)
"On Carston's (1996b: 322-325) view of metalinguistic negation, there is nothing surprising about it
being used to object to the propositional content of an utterance (actual or potential). However, note
that Carston (1999b: 379) distinguishes two types of 'echoic' negation: 'metalinguistic' and
'metaconceptual'. The former is used to object to an aspect of form, the latter to an aspect of content.
So, she would describe the negation here as 'metaconceptual' rather than 'metalinguistic'.
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In other words, Carston (1996b) gives a full account of metalinguistic negation that
tallies with A & D's intuitions on the type of negation that is involved in the use of
but on which it corresponds to sondern (or sino).
In spite of the problems discussed above, there is much about A & D's account of
sondern and correction but that seems right: They can't combine with incorporated
negation and the second clause is, indeed, understood as replacing the first (or a
particular aspect of it) rather than denying an expectation created by it. Furthermore,
it also seems absolutely right that P but Q on a correction interpretation must be
uttered by the same speaker, or, if it isn't, as in (60), it must be understood as the
second speaker continuing the first speaker's utterance rather than making her own
new utterance.
(60) a.	 A:	 Peter isn't a hero...
B:	 But a complete and utter prat.
b.	 A:	 Peter ist kein Held...
B:	 Sondern em kompletter Idiot.
In the final section of this chapter, I will try to show how a general relevance-
theoretic constraint can capture A & D's intuitions concerning the correction use of
but, while avoiding the vagueness endemic to concepts such as "the same kind of
fact".
5.5.3 Maisp
The second kind of but (or mais) A & D recognise is equivalent to German aber and
Spanish pero - hence maiSpA. As already noted, they (1977: 28) claim that the rules
in (61) govern the appropriate use of this kind of but.
(61) Denial of expectation (mais
a. P is an argument for -'R.
b. Q is an argument for R.
c. Q is a stronger argument for R than P is for -'R.
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Leaving aside any reservations regarding the notions of 'is an argument for' and 'is a
stronger argument', which have been discussed at some length in chapter 3, this is a
very elegant account. Without a doubt, it captures what goes on in (13):
(13) It's raining but I need some fresh air.
Uttered in the scenario described above, i.e. one in which speaker and hearer are
debating whether or not to go for a walk, P (it's raining) is an argument for -'R (I
don 't want to go for a walk), Q (I need some fresh air) is an argument for R (I want
to go for a walk) and, intuitively Q is the stronger argument, because the overall drift
of the speaker's utterance will surely be that she wants to go for a walk (i.e. the
overall conclusion is R). However, the beauty of this account is that (61) not only
does a good job in accounting for examples that involve indirect denial of
expectation and for which G. Lakoff's presupposition couldn't account, it is also
perfectly suited to account for his own examples, which involve direct denial of
expectation. For instance, (7) could be analysed as follows.
(7)	 John is a Republican but he is honest.	 (G. Lakoff 1971: 67)
P(John is a Republican) is an argument for -'R (John isn't honest), Q (he is honest) is
an argument for R (he is honest) and Q is the stronger argument than P. As this
shows, in such a case R = Q, and the condition that Q be a stronger argument for R
than P for -iR is fulfilled trivially, since it is hard to imagine that P could be a
stronger argument for something else than Q is for itself.
Assuming that compensation but and contrast but can be reduced to denial of
expectation but, A & D's account is very successful. Although it is not, on the face
of it, equipped to deal either with discourse but or with utterance- and discourse-
initial uses of but, it is at least conceivable that the account could be modified so as
to accommodate these uses. For instance, if P was allowed to be not just the
propositional content of a linguistic clause, but, instead, was free to be any kind of
assumption accessible in the context, discourse uses of but and but in utterance- and
discourse-initial positions, such as (32), would no longer be problematic.
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(32) [Peter puts some salmon on Mary's plate]
Mary: But I'm allergic to fish.
This, however, would be quite a radical move away from A & D's account and into
the kind of account I will ultimately want to give in an RT framework.
It is a sign of the success of A& D's (1977) account of but that many theorists
have adapted it to fit their own frameworks, or even adopted it wholesale. For
instance, Winter & Rimon (1994) give an account of but (and other "contrastive"
connectives) in the formal semantic framework of Veltman's (1986) data logic,
which is based on A & D's intuitions about denial but. However, they (1994: 374)
believe that A & D's Argumentation Theory does not provide "an explanatory model
of the facts" and is "rather informal". By contrast, Konig (1985: 6) more or less
adopts A & D's account of flÜjSPA as it is to define his notion of "adversative'
relations", which, according to him, are typically expressed by but. Recanati
(forthcoming) also seems to base his conventional implicature encoded by denial but
largely on A & D's (1977), without, however, subscribing to AT.
5.6 How many buts?
5.6.1 Ambiguity or no ambiguity?
Given the wide range of different interpretations utterances of the form P but Q can
be given, the question is what accounts for this diversity? The answer given by the
theorists whose accounts have been discussed so far seems to be that at least some of
these interpretations arise because English but has two (or, for Abraham, three)
distinct senses. Indeed, at least Anscombre & Ducrot and Abraham seem to believe
that there isn't just one lexical item but in the English language, but that there are
several. In other words, according to them English but isn't just polysemous, but
lexically ambiguous'2.
12 In what follows I will largely ignore the difference between polysemy and ambiguity. My
justification for this is that, from a cognitive point of view, it seems to make very little difference
whether one claims that there is one lexical item with several distinct senses or that there are several
different homonymous lexical items - both these versions amount to several items, either meanings or
lexical items, being stored in the mental lexicon. For a discussion of polysemy in almost entirely
pragmatic terms, see Papafragou (forthcoming).
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If one bears in mind that most of these analyses date from a time at which
Grice's pragmatic programme hadn't taken root as firmly as it subsequently has, it is
not surprising that none of these theorists seem to be unduly worried about
postulating lexical ambiguities. Indeed, pre-Grice, there didn't seem to be any really
convincing way in which one could have accounted for differences in interpretation
using general pragmatic principles rather than postulating lexical ambiguities or
polysemies.
However, Grice's pragmatic programme, using his Co-operative Principle
(CP) and maxims, provides a means of explaining how one and the same lexical item
can receive different interpretations in different contexts. Once there is this
possibility of pragmatic accounts of differences in meaning, there must be a way of
choosing between them and the more traditional homonymy or polysemy accounts.
Grice's (1978) Modified Occam's Razor, which states that senses shouldn't be
multiplied beyond necessity, provides a heuristic for making this decision according
to which pragmatic explanations should be preferred whenever their explanatory
power is equal to that of ambiguity accounts. Ultimately, of course, the answer to
the question of whether English but is lexically ambiguous depends on whether or
not a specific unitary account of but can be found, on the basis of which the various
different interpretations of but can be explained pragmatically. However, before
considering this, I think it is worth asking what, if any, reasons there are to assume
that English but has more than a single encoded meaning. For, if there were any
good reasons, trying to give but a unitary semantics would be a pointless enterprise.
In the rest of this section I will examine the reasons, particularly those given by A &
D (1977), for assuming that but is ambiguous.
5.6.2 The case for ambiguity
In general, what seems to have led to the idea that English but (and French rnais)
could be ambiguous is cross-linguistic data that shows that there are several
languages with more than one lexical item corresponding to English but. Thus, Horn
(1989: 406) seems to speak for many theorists when he states that, where the two
functions of but (i.e. denial and correction, which he terms 'concession' and
'contrast') are concerned,
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the cross-linguistic evidence supports the hypothesis that there is a lexical
rather than merely a pragmatic ambiguity involved.
Horn (1989: 406) adds weight to his argument by observing that the same distinction
is made lexically not just in German and Spanish, as discussed by A & D (1977), but
also in Swedish and Finnish (and it could be added that a distinction is also made in
Hebrew 13). Surely, one could argue, if so many different languages make the same
lexical distinction, then there must be a distinction in languages with only one
surface form, such as English and French, too. In fact, I will argue in section 5.6.3
that, intuitively enticing though this line of argument may be, it isn't actually
logically compelling at all.
Horn (1989: 407) seems to use as an argument for an ambiguity the fact that
correction but and denial but show different distributional properties. In this, he
echoes A & D (1977: 33) who argue that there are distributional and syntactic
properties that distinguish the two types of French mais (and by extension English
but). They (1977: 34-40) use six arguments to show this. In what follows I will
discuss only three of them, since the other three don't seem to work in English as
well as they do in French.
First, they argue that, because the first clause of P but Q on a correction
reading has to contain an explicit negation, while it obviously doesn't on a denial
reading, the two clauses can be reversed with acceptable results in the latter case but
not in the former. For instance, while both (62a) and (b) are okay, only (63a) is
acceptable. This becomes particularly clear (to German speakers like myself, at
least) when these sentences are translated into German, as in (64) and (65).
(62) a.	 He isn't tall but he is strong.
b.	 He is strong but he isn't tall.
(63) a.	 He isn't tall but very tall.
b.	 *He is very tall but not tall.
(64) a.	 Er ist nicht gross, aber (er ist) stark.
b.	 Er ist stark, aber (er ist) nicht gross.
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(65) a.	 Er ist nicht gross, sondern sehr gross.
b.	 *Er ist sehr gross, sondern nicht gross.
Second, A & D (1977: 35) observe that but can be interpreted as involving correction
only if the negation in P is unincorporated - incorporated negation is not enough.
Thus, (66a) and (67a) are acceptable while (66b) and (67b) aren't.
(66) a.	 It isn't possible but necessary.
	
b.	 *It is impossible but necessary.'4
(67) a.	 Es ist nicht moglich, sondem notwending.
	
b.	 *Es is unmoglich, sondern notwendig.'5
The third argument A & D give is that, in the case of correction but, if P' (the
unnegated P) and Q have any part in common, that part is deleted. In the case of
denial but, however, this shared part is either there explicitly or referred to
anaphorically. For instance, but in (68) can't be given a correction interpretation
(though it can of course be interpreted as a denial of expectation). In order to get a
correction interpretation, the material the two clauses have in common has to be
ellipsed, as in (69).
(68) She isn't my sister but she is my mother.
(69) She isn't my sister but my mother.
Note that in German, where the difference between denial of expectation and
correction is clearly linguistically encoded, both readings can be achieved with or
without ellipsis - (70a) and (b) and (71a) and (b) are all equally acceptable.
' See Dascal & Katriel (1977) on aval and ela.
14 Of course, as with many of the English examples given, there is an interpretation on which an
utterance of this would be perfectly acceptable. For example, in a scenario in which B has to finish an
assignment by the next day and A has just told B that that's impossible, B could utter (66b) using but
to express a denial of expectation: it's impossible could imply that B won't try to finish the
assignment, while it's necessary would imply that she will.
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(70) a.	 Sie ist nicht meine Schwester, sondern sie ist meine Mutter.
b.	 Sic ist nicht meine Schwester, sondern meine Mutter.
(71) a.	 Sic ist nicht meine Schwester, aber sic ist meine Mutter.
b.	 Sic ist nicht meine Schwester, aber meine Mutter.
In fact, A & D (1977: 36) claim that if material is ellipsed and the first clause
contains an explicit negation but can only be given a correction interpretation. This
seems right: Consider the scenario in (72)
(72) A:	 You look a lot like your sister.
B:	 She isn't my sister but she is my mother.
B':	 She isn't my sister but my mother.
Here, B's utterance will be interpreted as involving a denial of expectation: P (she
isn't my sister) implies that A was wrong, while Q (she is my mother) implies that A
wasn't totally wrong (because the woman in question is close relative of B's). B', on
the other hand, can only be taken to be correcting A's mistake without comforting A
that he wasn't completely wrong.
5.6.3 The case against ambiguity
I've shown in the last section that the two main reasons for assuming an ambiguity in
English but are that a number of other languages have separate lexical items for
correction and denial uses of but and that the two interpretations have different
distributional properties. In this section I will argue that neither of these arguments
is compelling.
Granted, the fact that other languages have two (or more) non-synonymous
lexical items to capture different interpretations of a single English word makes it
tempting to assume that the English word is, therefore, ambiguous. And it certainly
is the case that clearly ambiguous words do get several different translations
corresponding to their different meanings. For instance, the English word bat is
Unlike its English counterpart, this sentence isn't acceptable in any context.
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translated into German as Schlager or Fledennaus, into French as batte or chauve-
souris and into Italian as mazza or pipistrello, depending on whether it is interpreted
as 'cricket bat' or 'flying rodent'. In fact, it seems highly unlikely (though, of
course, possible) that there is another language that has one and the same word to
describe a hitting implement and a flying rodent. In this, but is quite different from
an undoubtedly ambiguous word like bat: There are at least as many languages that
use the same word for correction and denial of expectation as there are languages
that have a separate word for each.
Furthermore, there are many instances where a single word in one language
has two non-synonymous translations in another, where the single word is clearly not
ambiguous. For instance, surely nobody would want to maintain that the English
cousin is ambiguous. Nevertheless, German has two different words: Vetter for a
male cousin and Base for a female. To give one more, maybe slightly more
contentious, example: Depending on what the adjective awkward is combined with,
it receives different translations in German. Thus, (73a)-(c) receive the translations
in (74a)-(c), with awkward being translated as veflixt, peinlich, or linkisch.
(73) a.	 This is a very awkward situation.
b. There was an awkward silence.
c. He's an awkward lad.
(74) a.	 Das ist eine verflixte Situation.
b. Es entstand eine peinliche Stille.
c. Er ist em linkischer Junge.
In spite of awkward receiving three different translations, there is no reason to
assume that it is actually ambiguous (or even polysemous). What the three German
adjectives have in common is that they all attribute various kinds of difficulty or
uncomfortableness to the nouns with which they combine. In other words, it seems
at least possible that awkward means something quite general, e.g. "involving
uncomfortable feelings". Whether this particular example works or not, I believe
there is sufficient evidence to urge caution in drawing conclusions about the
semantics of a word in one language on the basis of evidence from other languages -
although other languages might act as an inspiration, the proof of the pudding has to
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be found within one and the same language. In other words, the claim that but is
ambiguous in English must be supported with evidence from English. This is, of
course, what the discussion of different distributional properties aims to do.
However, showing, in effect, that correction but and denial but have
complementary distributions is a curious way of supporting the ambiguity claim.
Complementary distribution of senses across linguistic environments is clearly not a
property of uncontentiously lexically ambiguous items. For instance, both senses of
the word bank are possible in virtually any linguistic environment and there are
certainly no syntactic constraints pertaining to one but not the other. Even in (75),
where the linguistic context heavily biases things towards a 'financial institution'
reading, bank could have its 'river bank' sense.
(75) Peter took the cheque to the bank.
However, it is difficult to find examples where English but could genuinely receive
either a correction or a denial interpretation. Indeed, it seems to follow from A &
D's arguments that it is always clear which interpretation but should receive from the
linguistic environment in which it appears. So, there don't seem to be any genuinely
ambiguous utterances containing but. The only conceivable environment in which
but could receive either a correction or a denial reading is one in which ellipsis isn't
possible, i.e. one in which the negated first clause and the second clause don't share
any linguistic material at all. It seems that such utterances, e.g. (76), can only
receive a denial interpretation.
(76) John didn't make a salad, but Jack bought a cake.
Quite clearly, this isn't because there is no convincing scenario in which a speaker
might want to negate John made a salad and replace it with Jack bought a cake -
there's nothing whatsoever wrong with the German sondern-utterance in (77), which
has precisely that interpretation.
(77) John hat keinen Salat gemacht, sondern Jack hat einen Kuchen gekauft.
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This shows that the reasons for believing that English but is ambiguous aren't nearly
as good as they might at first seem. It seems, then, that the search for a unitary
semantics for but might be worthwhile. The next few sections of this chapter are
devoted to the discussion of analyses that have attempted to do just that and where
better to start than with the father of Modified Occam's Razor.
5.7 But the Gricean way
In this section I will very briefly look at some approaches to but that could, roughly,
be seen as Gricean. I start with what Grice himself did say and what he probably
would have said if asked. This is followed by a look at Rieber's (1997)
reinterpretation of the Gricean notion of conventional implicature and how this
applies to but. Finally, I consider how Bach (1999) sees but. Even though these
three approaches differ in some important aspects, they also share some interesting
features. In particular, they all account for the meaning of but using a notion of
contrast. Apart from the analyses discussed here, Rudolph (1996) and Fraser (1998)
also use a general notion of contrast and, therefore, share many of the problems of
the accounts I'm about to discuss.
Let me start with Grice. As already hinted at, he never actually gave a
detailed analysis specifically of but. All he says is that She was poor but honest
implies
(very roughly) that there is some contrast between poverty and honesty, or
between her poverty and her honesty.
(Grice 1961: 127)
He also makes it clear that he regards this implication of contrast as neither part of
what is said, i.e. the truth-conditional content of the utterance, nor as what he would
later come to call a conversational implicature. Instead, he (1961: 129) maintains
that "the fact that the implication obtains is a matter of the meaning of the word
'but". In other words, the implication of contrast is what he (1975/1989: 25-26)
later refers to as a conventional implicature. Since the notion of conventional
implicature was discussed at some length in chapter 2, I will say no more about it
here. Let me just say that it is most likely that Grice would say that but (like on the
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other hand, discussed in 2.5.3) indicates the performance of a higher-order speech
act of contrasting two ground-floor speech acts. However, it is difficult to see how
the notion of contrast can account for all the different interpretations of but. At the
very least, much more needs to be said about what counts as a contrast. At any rate,
given his fondness for Modified Occam's Razor, my guess would be that Grice
would have wanted to see the 'contrast' encoded by but in terms general enough to
cover all possible uses of but, perhaps with more specific interpretations derived
pragmatically.
Rieber (1997) has his own take on the notion of conventional implicature,
which he sees in terms of parenthetical performatives. For instance, according to
him (1997: 53), an utterance of (78) can be analysed as (79).
(78) Sheila is rich but she is unhappy.
(79) Sheila is rich and (I suggest this contrasts) she is unhappy.
Rieber (1997: 54) makes it clear that the contrast in question can be manifested in a
variety of ways, i.e. it may be a contrast between the contents of the two clauses, or a
contrast between implications of the clauses. It seems, therefore, that it is Rieber's
intention to make the notion of 'contrast' general enough to cover all possible
interpretations of but, which is precisely what I would have expected Grice to do. I
will not discuss Rieber's treatment of but further, except for some general comments
at the end of this section. Blakemore (2000) gives a comprehensive and convincing
critique of Rieber's approach to but (and other discourse markers).
Finally, Bach (1999) completely rejects the notion of conventional
implicature, opting, instead, for a framework in which single utterances can express
multiple propositions. In other words, the meaning of but (and other 'non-truth-
conditional' expressions) contributes to 'what is said'.' 6 According to him (1999:
347), an utterance of (78), for example, expresses the three propositions in (80a)-(c).
(80) a.	 Sheila is rich.
b. Sheila is unhappy.
c. There is a certain contrast between being rich and being unhappy.
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As this shows, Bach also opts for the notion of contrast in accounting for the
meaning of but and he, too, ensures that 'contrast' covers as many interpretations of
but as possible by making it as general as possible. The notion of a 'certain contrast'
will be pragmatically enriched on particular occasions of utterance. For instance, in
the case of (78), the contrast is likely to be that, in general, wealth combats
unhappiness.'7
All three accounts (and also those of Rudolph (1996) and Fraser (1998)) have
in common the fact that they use a concept of contrast to account for the meaning of
but: Grice himself might have seen but as indicating the performance of an
illocutionary act of contrasting, Rieber sees it as indicating the performance of a
speech act of suggesting a contrast, and Bach seems to see it as encoding the vague
concept of 'a certain contrast'. It also seems that all three of them would at least try
to account for the different interpretations or uses of but in the same terms, i.e. their
notion of contrast has to be vague or general enough to cover a whole range of
interpretations. This means that the job of defining 'contrast' is quite difficult. In
fact, it is telling that neither Grice, nor Rieber or Bach actually make explicit what
they mean by contrast. Intuitively, any two things in the world can contrast each
other (just as any two things in the world will have some degree of similarity with
each other). So, it seems unlikely that contrast will amount to something as
straightforward as contradiction. In fact, I believe that it isn't possible to define the
concept of contrast in terms that cover all possible uses of but. Instead, I shall argue
that a functional or procedural account of the meaning of but, such as Blakemore's
(1987, 1989) relevance-theoretic one, or the accounts of but as a cancellation marker
or marker of denial discussed in the next section, are much better suited to the job of
capturing a variety of uses or interpretations on the basis of a unitary semantics.
Furthermore, no matter how generally or vaguely it is defined, it is hard to
see how contrast could cover correction but: Clearly, neither (81) nor (82) does
justice to the meaning of (22a).
16 For a more detailed discussion of Bach's (1999) approach to 'non-truth-conditional' meaning, see
2.5.4.
11 Neale's (1999: 58-59) view of but is very close to Bach's. He, too, believes that the 'contrast'
encoded by but is only vague and has to be pragmatically enriched on particular occasions of use. As
mentioned in 2.5.4, the two also agree on the issue of single sentence expressing multiple
propositions.
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	(22) a.	 That isn't my sister but my mother.
(81) That isn't my sister and (I suggest this contrasts) that is my mother.
(82) a.	 That isn't my sister.
b. That is my mother.
c. There is a certain contrast between that not being my sister and it
being my mother.
Finally, none of the accounts discussed above are equipped, as they stand, to deal
with discourse but or but in utterance- or discourse-initial but - they all rely on but
linking two clauses.
5.8	 Functional views of but
5.8.1 But as a cancellation marker
Dascal & Katriel, D & K, (1977), provide what must be the first unified account of
the meaning of but. This is particularly remarkable since they're mainly considering
data from Hebrew, which, like German, Spanish, Finnish and Swedish, has two
words for but, roughly corresponding to denial and correction but. Thus, it would be
understandable if they, too, had reached the conclusion that but must be ambiguous.
However, while recognising that Hebrew aval and ela perform subtly different
functions, their analysis indicates that there is no reason at all to assume that English
but can't be accounted for in a unified way.
The claim at the heart of D & K's (1977) analysis is that utterance meaning
has several "layers",
ranging from the more to the less explicit, from an inner 'core' of content to
contextually conveyed implicatures via layers and sublayers such as
presuppositions, modality, illocutionary force and felicity conditions.
D & K (1977: 153)
The idea is that, generally, the speaker and hearer assume that all of these layers are
conveyed simultaneously. The function of but in this framework is to indicate that
not all of these layers are accepted by the speaker. As D & K (1977: 153) put it:
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The point of using an 'aval' or 'cia' utterance is to mark explicitly some
particular separation between a pair of layers (or sublayers), or a contrast
within a given layer. Such sentences foremostly indicate a refusal to accept all
the layers of meaning of an utterance en bloc.
They then proceed to demonstrate the variety of layers of meaning that aval and ela
can be used to cancel, covering the whole gamut from semantic presuppositions and
assertions to conversational implicatures (via illocutionary force, modality and
felicity conditions). In what follows, I give an example of each of these categories
(indicating in brackets whether the particle used in the Hebrew example was aval or
ela).
According to D & K (1977: 154-155), what B and C's utterances in (83)
cancel is the minor assertion that the Pope is the only leader of the Christians, while
in (84) they cancel the semantic presupposition that Dan beat his wife.
(83) A: The Pope, who is the only leader of the Christians, is elected by the
cardinals.
B: That's right, but the Christians have other leaders. (aval)
C: He's not the only leader but one of the most important. (ela)
(84) A: Dan stopped beating his wife a long time ago.
B: But he has never beaten her. (aval)
C: He didn't beat her but only threatened to do so. (ela)
D & K (1977: 156) subdivide iiiocutionary acts into 'phrastic' (propositional
content), 'tropic' (mood) and 'neustic' (commitment of the speaker to what she
says). On this picture, the layer of illocutionary force consists of 'tropic' and
'neustic', both of which can be cancelled by aval and ela. For instance, D & K claim
that B and C's utterances in (85) cancel A's commitment to the command she's
issued (i.e. the 'neustic').
(85) A: Throw out all this material.
B: Okay, I'll throw it out, but I know that tomorrow you'll want it again.
(aval)
C: You don't really mean that I should throw it out but just say so. (ela)
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What is cancelled in (86), according to D & K (1977: 157) is the modal force of A's
utterance.
(86) A: It is possible to postpone the exam for next week.
B: But three exams have already been set for next week. (aval)
C: It's not possible but obligatory. (ela)
(87) shows that aval and ela can cancel felicity conditions. Here, B and C's
utterances cancel a preparatory condition of A's request, i.e. that the hearer is in a
position to perform the required action (D & K 1977: 158).
(87) A: Open the door, please.
B: But it's open. (aval)
C: It's not closed but only looks closed because it's made of glass. (ela)
Finally, D & K (1977: 159) see aval in B's utterance in (88) as cancelling a
conversational implicature of the first conjunct of her utterance. They don't give an
example of ela cancelling a conversational implicature and it seems that that's not
possible.
(88) A: What do you think of the new Prime Minister?
B: He has a clever wife but I don't mean to imply that there is anything
wrong with him.
So far, I've only reported how D & K see aval and ela as functioning in similar
ways, i.e. as cancellative operators. However, there are differences between the two
- D & K (1977: 160-161) discuss the following three.
First, P aval Q functions to separate different layers of meaning, i.e. P
indicates acceptance of one layer and Q indicates the rejection of another. An
utterance of P ela Q, on the other hand, relates statements belonging to the same
layer of meaning, i.e. P indicates the rejection of one element and Q indicates its
replacement by another of the same order. Second, ela utterances are symmetrical in
the sense that they explicitly mention both what is cancelled and its replacement,
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whereas in aval utterances acceptance of one layer of meaning is often implicit.
Finally, the function of negation in the first conjunct differs between aval and eta
utterances. With aval if there is a negation in P it expresses a negative assertion,
while it expresses denial, i.e. rejection of a previously made statement, in eta
utterances. This tallies well with Anscombre & Ducrot's and Abraham's
observations concerning the differences between correction but, which seems to
correspond to eta, and denial but, which corresponds to aval.
Summing up, D & K (1977: 171) state that
Both [P aval Q] and [P ela Q] utterances are to be primarily understood as
reactive speech-acts, through which some cancellatory function relative to a
prior utterance or its contextual equivalent is performed.
This quote brings out both the strong points and the weaker points of D & K's
analysis. One of its weaker points is the claim that but utterances are reactive speech
acts, which seems to imply not only that discourse-initial uses of but are impossible,
but also that it is impossible to open a discourse with a complete but utterance, i.e. an
utterance of the form P but Q
. 
As seen above, both of these things are, of course,
perfectly possible. Perhaps an explanation for such a counterintuitive conclusion lies
with the kind of examples D & K consider: Unlike anyone else in the literature they
base their analysis almost exclusively on examples that involve exchanges between
two people with the but utterance being made as a reaction to an initial utterance.
Now, while these uses of but are certainly possible, I doubt that they are as typical as
D & K seem to think (though, of course, I can only speak for their frequency in
English and not in Hebrew). Another point of D & K's analysis one might want to
question is the detail of their view of the different layers of meaning. While it is
standard practice to assume that utterances convey several propositions or
assumptions, some explicitly and some implicitly, it is doubtful whether utterances
actually communicate assumptions about their felicity conditions. However, these
are relatively small worries. The great strength of D & K's analysis lies in providing
a basis for a unitary semantic analysis of but in English. In the spirit of D & K, but
could be seen as a general cancelling operator, which, unlike Hebrew aval and ela,
doesn't encode any information about what "layer" of meaning is being cancelled.
Bell (1998) provides just such an analysis of but based on Dascal & Katriel's work.
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Bell (1998) analyses but (and other 'contrastive' markers) in terms of
cancellation. According to him (1998: 527), a relation of cancellation obtains
between two discourse segments, P and Q, if "an aspect of information derived from
P is canceled in Q
.
" and
An aspect of information is any piece of information which is derivable,
though not necessarily derived, by the hearer from the prior discourse context
either globally or locally with respect to any feature of the act of
communication such as propositional content, illocutionary force,
perlocutionary effects in terms of face, politeness, mood, etc., and
conversational conventions such as turn-taking and topic change.
Unlike D & K, Bell (1998: 528) seems to allow for the possibility of but cancelling
aspects of information that don't just arise from immediately preceding linguistic
material but as "operating on aspects of information within the global and local
discourse context". This could be interpreted as saying that the information that is
being cancelled doesn't necessarily have to be the result of communication, which
would mean that Bell can account not just for utterance-initial but also for discourse-
initial uses of but. However, Bell (1998: 529) doesn't seem to intend this, he states
that "Cancellation, therefore, can be understood as acting on all aspects of
communication". This seems to imply that but can't be used to initiate
communication the way it does in (32).
(32) [Peter puts some salmon on Mary's plate]
Mary: But I'm allergic to fish.	 Rouchota (1998b: 25)
While Bell may have some difficulty in accounting for discourse-initial but, he has
no problems explaining denial of expectation and discourse but. According to him,
the (discourse) use of but in examples like (28) indicates the cancellation of the
"topic domain" of the previous paragraph.
(28) A:	 We had a very nice lunch. I had an excellent lobster.
B:	 But did you get to ask him about the money?
He will, however, have some work to do to explain correction but: the but-clause in
(22) certainly can be seen as cancelling something, i.e. the assumption that the
213
woman in question is the speaker's sister, but that something is quite clearly not part
of what is communicated, at least not by the speaker uttering (22).
(22) a.	 That isn't my sister but my mother.
Furthermore, the way in which Bell (1998: 529) sees what is communicated,
following coherence theory, is not entirely uncontentious. Nevertheless, I believe
that, like Dascal & Katriel, Bell is essentially on the right track.
5.8.2 Denying various expectations
Foolen (1991) gives an account of but which has much to recommend it. He sees but
as having functional meaning relevant to the integration of new information, i.e. the
but-clause, into the previous discourse, i.e. the first clause and its context. In
particular, he analyses but as indicating denial of expectation. As mentioned in
section 5.2.3, he (1991: 84-85) argues that contrast or 'semantic opposition' uses of
but still involve denial of expectation. He shows this using the examples in (89)-
(9 1).
(89) A: John and Peter don't live in the same place, do they?
B: No, John lives in Amsterdam and/??but Peter lives in Rotterdam.
(90) A: John and Peter both live in Amsterdam, don't they?
B: No, John (indeed) lives in Amsterdam but/??and Peter lives in
Rotterdam.
(91) A: Where do John and Peter live?
B: Well, John lives in Amsterdam and/but Peter lives in Rotterdam.
These examples show that but can only introduce the second clause in contexts in
which it can be seen as denying an expectation. In (89), where there is an
expectation that John and Peter don't live in the same place and, therefore, there is no
expectation for the but-clause to deny, but sounds odd. In (90), on the other hand,
where there is an expectation that John and Peter do live in the same place, which is
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denied by the second clause, the use of but is more felicitous than that of and.
Finally, in (91), either but or and can be used because there is no specific expectation
apparent. However, Foolen (1991: 85) maintains that the use of but indicates that B
thinks that A might have thought that John and Peter live in the same place (maybe
because A asked about them in the same breath). I find Foolen's argument
convincing. There does, indeed, seem to be a marked difference between the use of
and and but in these examples (and in general). So, Foolen's account can deal with
denial of expectation and contrast without any problems. How about the other uses
of but?
Foolen's position on correction but is interesting, to say the least. He
acknowledges that the difference between denial but and correction but could readily
be seen as a case of polysemy, but he prefers to maintain that the denial of
expectation function of but is its univocal core meaning and remains even in
correction uses. According to him (1991: 88) correction but indicates "that the
second conjunct denies the possible expectation that the previous, quoted, assertion
might be a true one". And in his conclusion (1991: 90) he says that
for example, not big but small might be paraphrased as: 'small and not big',
"big" being a reasonable expectation on the basis of the previous discourse.
I believe that this creative way of looking at correction but is moving in the right
direction. However, it cannot be right, because it can't explain metalinguistic cases.
For instance, Foolen's paraphrase of the perfectly acceptable (92), would be the
unacceptable (93).
(92) She's not happy but ecstatic.
(93) *She's ecstatic and not happy.
More generally, the idea that but denies an expectation seems too strong. It will be
seen in section 5.11.2 that but can be used to deny assumptions that nobody expects
and, more importantly, that nobody anticipates to be expected by anyone.
Even though Foolen doesn't consider discourse uses of but, I believe that his
account could handle them. Arguably, the first paragraph of (29), the example from
The Guardian, raises the expectation that the article is dealing exclusively with the
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police's failure to use DNA technology, which is promptly denied by the second
paragraph, which is about the police's illegally holding samples. Furthermore,
utterance-initial uses of but present no problem for this account, because it analyses
but as indicating the denial of an expectation raised (or supposedly raised) in the
previous discourse, which may or may not have been produced by the same speaker.
Unfortunately, Foolen's account, just like Dascal & Katriel's and Bell's, doesn't
seem too well equipped to deal with discourse-initial uses of but. In the next section,
it will be seen that Blakemore's relevance-theoretic account has no problems
accounting for discourse-initial uses of but. In the final section of this chapter, I will
propose a unitary account of the meaning of but that combines the best points of the
functional analyses discussed in this section with the best points of Blakemore's
account.
5.9	 But as a constraint on relevance - Blakemore's account
5.9.1 Denial of expectation
Out of all the potentially different interpretations or uses of but Blakemore (1987,
1989) concentrates on denial of expectation and contrast. 18 She gives an account of
but on both of those interpretations in procedural terms. While she gives the same
account of denial but in 1987 and 1989, her analysis of contrast but changes in
interesting and important ways. Let me start by looking at how she accounts for
denial of expectation examples, such as (7).
(7)	 John is a Republican but he is honest.
According to Blakemore, the procedure encoded by but reduces the hearer's
processing effort by pointing him towards the intended contextual effects of the
clause it introduces. More precisely, but indicates that what follows contradicts and
eliminates an available assumption. This means that but not only indicates to the
hearer how the clause it introduces is relevant, but it also provides some evidence as
to how the speaker thinks the hearer might have interpreted the previous clause (or
discourse). But, on this picture, functions as a discourse connective, that is, the
However, as will be seen below, she also considers utterance and communication initial uses of but.
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structure of P but Q is really more accurately captured by P. But Q in parallel to P.
However, Q, for instance. In other words, a speaker uttering (7), or any other denial
of expectation example, makes two separate utterances. For instance, John is a
Republican and But he is honest. In the case of (7), the fact that but indicates that he
is honest contradicts and eliminates an accessible assumption may well mean that the
speaker thought it at least possible that the hearer derived the assumption that John is
dishonest from John is a Republican. In this case, the denial is direct, i.e. the
proposition expressed by the but-clause directly contradicts (and eliminates) the
assumption that John is dishonest.
Blakemore (1987: 129; 1989: 25-27) notes that the but-clause doesn't always
deny an assumption directly, i.e. that it's not always the propositional content of the
but-clause itself that contradicts the assumption. For instance, in (94) it is an
implication of the but-clause that contradicts (and eliminates) an implication of the
previous clause.
(94) John isn't an economist, but he is a businessman.
Say Jim utters this sentence in reply to Jack who's just suggested that they consult
John on a financial matter because he is an economist. In this case, Jack may well
infer from the first clause that they shouldn't consult John, the second clause,
however, implies that they should consult John after all. Thus, the second clause has
an implication that contradicts and eliminates an implication of the first. By using
but to introduce the second clause, Jim indicates that the first clause may have led
Jack to derive an assumption that is going to be contradicted. In this case, the denial
is indirect.
The advantage of this account over, say, R. Lakoff's, Anscombre & Ducrot's,
D & K's or Bell's is that it can handle not just utterance initial, but also discourse
initial uses of but. This is because it only claims that but indicates that the clause it
introduces contradicts and eliminates (or denies) an assumption accessible in the
context, i.e. there is no requirement that the assumption has to have been
communicated. In fact, it will be seen later that this point is crucial. Let me
demonstrate how Blakemore's account works for B's utterance in (31) and Mary's
utterance in (32).
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(31) A:	 It's time for bed now.
B:	 But you said I could watch the end of Brookside.
(32) [Peter puts some salmon on Mary's plate]
Mary: But I'm allergic to fish.
There are (at least) two ways in which B's utterance (31) can be interpreted as a
denial. It could be seen as (indirectly) denying the proposition expressed by A's
utterance, i.e. as implying that it isn't time for B to go to bed. Another option is that
B's utterance indirectly denies an implication of A's utterance - maybe something
like it's reasonable forA to ask B to go to bed now. Note that there is a considerable
amount of inferential work involved in deriving this kind of interpretation. (95)
gives some idea of the kind of inferential process A has to go through in order to
interpret B's utterance.
(95) a.	 I said to B "It's time for bed", thus implicating that she should go to
bed.
b. My utterance also came with an implication that I have a right to tell B
to go to bed and that it was reasonable for me to do so.
c. B has said to me "But you said I could watch the end of Brookside".
d. Brookside hasn't finished yet.
e. I did say that B could watch the end of Brookside.
f. It is an implication of my saying that, that B shouldn't have to go to
bed yet.
g. It is unreasonable for me to tell B to go to bed now when I earlier told
her something that has the implication that she doesn't have to go to
bed now.
h. B is implicating that it's unreasonable for me to tell her to go to bed
now and that she shouldn't have to do it.
This observation is particularly interesting because it seems unlikely that B's
utterance without but could be interpreted in any other way than her but-utterance.
However, the presence of but makes life easier for A, because it makes her look for a
suitable assumption that B's utterance could be contradicting.
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In (32), again, but indicates that Mary's utterance denies an accessible
assumption. Since Peter hasn't actually communicated with Mary at all, this
assumption can't be one he communicated. However, in the scenario in which he
has just put a piece of salmon on Mary's plate it is relatively easy to access an
assumption that is (indirectly) denied by her utterance. For instance, most people
will put food on other people's plates with the expectation that the recipient is going
to eat the food. Thus, Peter is highly likely to be entertaining the assumption that
Mary will eat the salmon as he is putting it on her plate. However, Mary's utterance
clearly implies that she won't eat the salmon, because she is allergic to fish. In this
way, Mary's utterance denies an assumption Peter is likely to entertain. Again, Mary
could have left but out of her utterance and it would have been likely to be
interpreted the same way. By using but, however, she may well have saved Peter
some processing effort, because the presence of but right at the beginning of her
utterance alerts him straight away to the fact that the utterance is going to be relevant
as a denial of an accessible assumption.'9
5.9.2 Contrast
When it comes to dealing with "contrast" examples, such as (16), Blakemore's
approach is less clear and straightforward than it is for denial of expectation uses of
but. For one thing, she offers one analysis in her 1987 book and a slightly, but
importantly, different one in her 1989 paper.
(16) John is tall but Bill is short.
Blakemore (1987: 137-138) essentially believes that but indicates that the clause it
introduces is relevant as a denial in all instances. It may not be immediately obvious
that this is the case in (16), but Blakemore (1987) makes a convincing case for her
position. The key, she argues, is to consider in what kinds of circumstances someone
would utter something like (16). The answer is that there are roughly two
I fear that my way of putting this, and particularly my use of alert, makes it sound as thougb Peter
will be very aware of what but indicates. I don't believe that that is the case. On the contrary, the
procedure encoded by but will have its effect without Peter ever having to be aware of it at all. It will
simply guide Peter's inferential processes along a certain path, maybe by making it more accessible
than any other inferential path, i.e. by highlighting it in some way.
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possibilities. The first is that, there is some reason to believe that one might take the
first clause (i.e. John is tall) to imply that Bill is tall too (say, because they're twin
brothers). In such a scenario, (16) would receive a straightforward denial of
expectation interpretation: Bill is short directly denies an implication of John is tall.
While this is a perfectly possible scenario, it is, perhaps, not the most likely. It is
much more likely that (16) will be uttered to convey something like 'Bill isn't like
John'. In such a case, what the but-clause denies, according to Blakemore (1987:
138), is the consequent of a conditional premise. This conditional premise will be
something like 'If Bill is like John, then he is tall'. By denying the consequent of
this premise, the but clause gives rise to the implication that Bill isn't like John.
However, she doesn't give a complete explanation of why this conditional
assumption concerning the ways in which John and Bill are alike (rather than one
concerning ways in which they differ) should be accessed. I'll return to the question
of how "contrast" uses of but can be accounted for in section 5.11.
As mentioned above, Blakemore's (1989) account of "contrast" but is
different from her (1987) account. It seems that she (1989: 17) now believes that but
has more than a single meaning and that the interpretation of "contrast" cases
involves a different procedure from the one involved in denial uses. The most
important difference between the two meanings of but is that but is seen as a
discourse connective only on a denial of expectation reading, while contrast but is a
conjunction. That is, where Blakemore (1987) saw P. But Q. as the 'real' structure
of P but Q on either reading of but, she now sees it as applying only to "denial" but.
The structure of a but utterance on the "contrast" reading, she now maintains, is
conjunctive, i.e. captured adequately by P but Q. What the "contrast" but in (16)
indicates, according to Blakemore (1989: 34), is that the hearer should derive a
proposition of the form not (F(Bill)). It is the function of the first clause to give the
hearer access to a property F whose ascription is negated in the second clause.
5.10 One or two constraints?
Given the discussion in the preceding section, the question is whether but really is
ambiguous or whether Blakemore (1987), framed in the Gricean spirit, was right.
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My first step towards answering this question will be to examine the reasons for
Blakemore's change of heart from 1987 to 1989.
It seems that there are two reasons. The first is the mistaken assumption that
there are a number of languages, e.g. German, Spanish and Hebrew, that use two
different lexical items to express contrast and denial of expectation. As seen above,
while these languages do indeed have two (or more) lexical items to express different
uses or interpretations of English but, they use the same expression for denial and
contrast. For instance, our standard denial example (7) is translated using aber, as
(42) shows, and (96) demonstrates that (16), our standard contrast example, is also
translated using aber.
(42) John ist Republikaner, aber er ist ehrlich.
(96) John ist gross, aber Bill ist klein.20
Of course, the distinction between aber and sondern, pero and sino, and aval and ela
is not one between denial and contrast, but one between denial and correction, so
cannot provide evidence of any sort for the correct treatment of the denial and
contrast cases. Also, as discussed in section 5.6, the general shape of this sort of
argument from lexical distinctions to an ambiguity in another is not compelling.
Blakemore's second reason seems to be based on the assumption that, while
an utterance with denial but isn't really a conjunction, contrast but is truly
conjunctive (I'll look at Blakemore's reasons for thinking this shortly). Another way
of putting this is that, according to Blakemore (1989) contrast but has and as part of
its meaning, while denial but doesn't. If this is true, then it seems almost impossible
to treat but as monosemous, or even polysemous. It is hard to see how one and the
same lexical item could function both as conjunction and as discourse connective,
although, of course, the ambiguity will be of a semantically uninteresting kind if the
conjunction but and the discourse connective but both encode the same constraint. It
is not clear to me whether this is Blakemore's (1989) stance or not.
As mentioned above, Blakemore's (1989) belief that contrast but does contain
and as part of its meaning also constitutes a shift in her approach. In her book (1987:
20 There is a possible complication here, in that the translation of (16) could also be John ist gross.
Bill, aber, ist klein, in which case a denial of expectation reading is ruled out and aber seems to be
closer to on the other hand (or German hingegen).
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139), she maintains that but doesn't mean 'and plus something else' on either of the
uses she discusses. To non-relevance theorists even the question whether or not but
amounts to 'and plus something else' must seem a bit of a mystery. As mentioned
right at the beginning of this chapter (in section 5.2.1), any utterance of P but Q is
true just in case P is true and Q is true. In other words, truth-conditionally, P but Q
clearly is equivalent to P and Q. However, if a speaker utters P. Q, then, surely, the
full content of what she uttered will be true just in case P is true and Q is true. In
other words, truth-conditionally the juxtaposition of P and Q seems to be equivalent
to P and Q, too. This means that the question of whether or not the meaning of but
includes the meaning of and is not a question of truth-conditional import - in a way,
if one analyses and as having no linguistic meaning beyond that of the truth-
functional operator &, nothing very interesting has been said, and but, and a whole
host of other conjunctions (e.g. although, while, so, etc.), can be analysed as having it
as part of their meaning.
The important aspect of and, as far as Blakemore is concerned, is its import
in relevance-theoretic terms. According to Blakemore (1987: 120), the point about
conjoined utterances is that
a hearer who is presented with a conjoined utterance cannot be expected to
undertake the processing entailed by the use of and unless the conjoined
proposition that is expressed has relevance over and above the relevance of
each conjunct taken individually.
The assumption this is based on is that a speaker who utters P and Q makes one
single utterance, which expresses one single proposition, while a speaker who utters
P.Q makes two utterances, each of which expresses one proposition. Since the
hearer is entitled to expect every utterance of the speaker's to be relevant enough to
be worth the effort needed to process it (as stated in the communicative principle of
relevance), a hearer confronted with a conjoined utterance is licensed to assume that
the complete utterance is optimally relevant, but there is no guarantee that the
individual conjuncts will be relevant in their own right. Now, cutting a long story
short, the point is that denial of expectation but, and, according to Blakemore (1987),
also contrast but, indicates the way in which the but-clause achieves relevance. In
other words, but guarantees that the second 'conjunct' is relevant in its own riglit - a
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fact that Blakemore seems to believe is incompatible with the assumption that a but-
conjunction expresses a single conjoined proposition.
Blakemore (1987: 135) gives another argument against but (at this point
specifically contrast but) encoding 'and plus something else'. She points out that it
is a well-known, but unexplained, fact that and can conjoin any number of elements,
while but can only ever link two. For instance, (97) can be understood to link all
four conjuncts symmetrically, while but in (98) can only be seen as contrasting the
last clause with the conjunction of all the others21.
(97) Mary votes Labour, Susan votes Lib Dem, Anne votes Tory, and Jane votes
for the BNP.	 (adapted from Blakemore 1987: 135)
(98) Mary votes Labour, Susan votes Lib Dem, Anne votes Tory, but Jane votes
for the BNP.
Blakemore (1987: 136, 1989: 32) rightly points out that if there is a but that does
nothing other than express a contrast between two things, then there is no reason at
all why it shouldn't also be capable of expressing a contrast between more than two
things. After all, it is possible to contrast any number of things with each other. For
instance, there is a reading of (97) on which the four conjuncts are all contrasted with
each other, i.e. in which the hearer will be expected to derive four sets of contrasting
implications, or, indeed, just the assumption that Mary, Susan, Anne and Jane all
hold different political beliefs.
Let me consider these points in turn, it seems to me that the mere fact that but
can't be seen as linking more than two units doesn't mean that it isn't a conjunction.
After all, it could just (and, indeed, it is likely to) be the case that the "something
else" that but encodes is of a nature that only allows a "connection" between two
entities. For instance, if but is analysed in terms of cancellation (or denial), then it
follows quite naturally that it can only 'link' two entities: one entity is cancelled and
the other is doing the cancelling. At least syntactically, but seems to be no different
from and, in that it can at least occur in a list of more than two entities (though see
21 This difference between and and but is also apparent in the fact that constructions of the form P and
Q and R and S are perfectly acceptable, while the acceptability of P but Q but R but S is rather more
doubtful.
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(103) John is a Republican and he is honest.
All of this suggests that Blakemore's first argument for treating only contrast but as a
conjunction is not very convincing - contrast but and denial but behave in exactly the
same way with regard to whether or not the 'connection' they express can also be
expressed by juxtaposed or conjoined sentences.
A further argument in favour of treating only contrast but as a conjunction is
that P but Q can be embedded in the scope of a logical operator, such as if.. then,
only if but is interpreted as indicating contrast and not if it signals denial of
expectation (Blakemore 1989: 28-29). Thus, she claims that but in (104) could not
be construed in its denial of expectation sense.
(104) If Susan is coming but Anne is not, then I shall cancel the lecture.
There are two reasons for not accepting this argument. First, I believe that but in
(104) could easily be understood in its denial sense. It could, for instance, be uttered
in reply to A's utterance in the scenario in (105), where but is clearly used to indicate
the denial of an assumption derived from the first clause.
(105) Scenario: As is well known to A and B, Anne goes wherever Susan goes.
A: Susan is going to the lecture but Anne isn't.
Furthermore, I absolutely agree with Rouchota (1990: 71) that even clear denial of
expectation uses of but can be embedded under the scope of if... then. For instance,
(106) is every bit as acceptable as (104).
(106) If John is a Republican but he is honest, there is hope for the Republicans yet.
The overall conclusion from this section is that there is no reason at all to believe that
the contrast and denial uses of but are anything other than just that, i.e. two different
uses of one and the same lexical item, which may or may not have and as part of its
meaning. In other words, there is no reason at all to believe that Blakemore (1987)
was wrong in claiming that but encodes a single constraint on the interpretation of its
host clause. In the final section of this chapter I will suggest how Blakemore's
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analysis can be modified to give a more explicit unitary semantics for but and I will
demonstrate how a single constraint can account for all the interpretations of but that
have been listed in section 5.2
5.11 Building on Blakemore
5.11.1 Arguments for a procedural account
if one thing is clear from the discussion in this chapter, it is that any unitary account
of the meaning of but has to be quite general and abstract in order to capture the wide
variety of uses and interpretations this connective can be given. I would argue, in
line with Blakemore (1987, 1989), that this can only be achieved if one assumes a
procedural semantics for but. As indicated in section 5.7, one of the arguments in
favour of this is that the task of finding a concept but could encode which is general
enough to capture all its uses is very difficult, if not impossible. Furthermore,
examining but in the light of the three tests for procedural meaning identified in 4.3.3
yields more evidence in favour of it encoding procedural meaning.
First, I would argue that most English speakers would find it hard to answer
the question "what does but mean?". Surely, it is easier to answer "how is but
used?". This indicates that the meaning of but is of a procedural nature and can't
easily be brought to consciousness in the way that conceptual components can.
Second, whatever exactly it is that but conveys - it's not truth-evaluable. For
instance, B's reply in (107), which is objecting to the 'contrast' or 'incompatibility'
between John is a nice guy and an assumption prompted by John is gay suggested by
but, is not felicitous. B' shows that this isn't because this suggestion is intrinsically
something that can't be objected to.
(107) A: John is gay but he's a nice guy.
B: *That's not true - there's no incompatibility between him being nice and
him being gay.
B': Come on. You can't seriously suggest that being gay is incompatible
with being nice.
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The final test is that of compositionality, where the argument is that
conceptual expressions easily combine with other conceptual expressions to form
larger conceptual representations, while procedural expressions don't enter into this
kind of compositional construction. It seems that but can't combine with anything
else23. However, the problem is that there isn't much one can compare but with. As
far as I'm aware, the only other co-ordinating conjunction in English is and, which
can't be combined with anything either. So it looks as if there is something about the
syntactic status of co-ordinating conjunctions that doesn't allow anything to modify
them. It is even difficult to find examples in which descriptive negation applies just
to and or but. (108) is my attempt at making a negation apply just to and.
(108) He didn't paint the hallway AND strip the floorboards - because two hours
isn't enough to do both.
Obviously, the difficulty here is that and doesn't have any encoded meaning beyond
that of the truth-functional connective & and so it is difficult to see what the negation
could be negating. Indeed, Carston (forthcoming b, section 4.7.2) presents an
interesting and attractive argument in favour of the assumption that and has no
linguistic meaning at all (whether conceptual or procedural) and that its truth-
functional properties and its propensity for pragmatic enrichment to temporal and
causal interpretations can be explained purely by its syntactic function as a co-
ordinating conjunction. If this is the case, as I think it may well be, then the
question, discussed at some length above, of whether but contains and as part of its
meaning becomes otiose. Furthermore, it is clear that no linguistic element
whatsoever can in any way combine its meaning with that of and to yield a complex
meaning.
Leaving the question of the compositionality of the meaning of and, it seems
that, although but obviously does have linguistic meaning, that linguistic meaning is
not compositional - (109) demonstrates that descriptive negation clearly can't apply
just to but.
Of course, in a trivial sense of the word, but and and are both "compositional". That is, they both
combine with other linguistic elements to form sentences. The kind of compositionality at issue here
crucially involves the interaction of meanings modifying each other.
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(109) ??John isn't gay but he's a nice guy - (because) there's nothing incompatible
between his niceness and his sexuality.
All in all, then, there is a lot of good evidence in favour of but encoding a procedure
rather than a concept. The million dollar question now is, of course, what that
procedure is.
5.11.2 Denying accessible assumptions
I would like to suggest that what I take to be Blakemore's (1987) position is
essentially right and just needs some minor modification and further spelling out, and
application to the full range of examples. In other words, I believe that but indicates
that the clause it introduces is to be processed as a denial, i.e. as an assumption that,
either directly or indirectly, contradicts and eliminates an assumption accessible in
the context. This differs from Blakemore's account of denial but only in one
important detail. According to Blakemore (1987: 129),
[...] but is a denial [...] of a proposition which, although not part of the
propositional content of the sentence just uttered, is understood as being part of
its interpretation. (my emphasis)
In other words, on her account, the denied assumption is taken to be manifest.
Recall that, according to Sperber & Wilson (1986: 39) an assumption is manifest to
an individual at a certain time just in case she is capable of entertaining it and
accepting it as true or probably true. What I mean by "accessible in the context" is
something weaker than that. That is, by saying that the but-clause denies an
assumption which is accessible, but not necessarily manifest, I mean that the
assumption must merely be 'entertainable' and doesn't necessarily have to be
accepted as true or probably true. Indeed, sometimes it is more likely to be deemed
false or probably false. In other words, the denied assumption is merely one that the
speaker judges to be likely to occur to the hearer for consideration in the context.
Of course, more often than not, the accessible assumption will also be
manifest. For instance, in the standard denial of expectation examples (1) and (13),
the denied assumptions, i.e. Peter didn't go out and the speaker doesn't want to go
228
for a walk are highly likely to be manifest (and not just accessible) at the time the
but-clause is uttered.
(1)	 It was raining but Peter went out.
(13) It's raining but I need some fresh air.
However, there are a range of circumstances in which assumptions are accessible
while being the very opposite of accepted as true or probably true (i.e. manifest). I
am, of course, thinking of negative and subjunctive utterances, for example. It is
generally accepted (as discussed in section 3.5.3.2) that negative utterances make
immediately accessible their positive counterparts. For instance, (110) makes
accessible (111).
(110) John doesn't eat chocolate.
(111) John eats chocolate.
Similarly, the subjunctive utterance in (112) makes accessible the assumption in
(113).
(112) John could be brilliant.
(113) John is brilliant.
So, (111) and (113) are both accessible in the context of the utterances in (110) and
(112), respectively, but quite clearly neither of them is manifest, i.e. accepted as true
or probably true, either to the speaker or the hearer.
The point of the above discussion is that in cases of correction but the denied
assumption is just accessible and not manifest. For instance, in (22a) that is my
mother denies that is my sister, which is accessible but not manifest on the basis of
the utterance of that isn't my sister.
(22) a.	 That isn't my sister but my mother.
The claim that but-clauses can deny assumptions that are merely accessible and not
manifest is further strengthened by the acceptability of utterances like (114), where
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John isn't brilliant denies the assumption John is brilliant, which is clearly not
manifest on the basis of John could be brilliant, but equally clearly is accessible.
(114) John could be brilliant but he isn't.
So far, I hope to have shown that the general constraint I believe but encodes, i.e.
'process the clause that follows as a denial of an accessible assumption', can account
for denial of expectation and correction uses of but without any difficulty. I believe
that Foolen is probably right in claiming that all so-called 'contrast' uses of but can
be analysed in terms of denial of expectation. However, if he weren't right, there's
still a way my account could deal with such examples. For instance, take an
utterance of (16).
(16) John is tall but Bill is short. 	 (R. Lakoff 1971: 133)
Obviously, it is possible that this utterance is processed in a context in which John is
tall makes manifest the assumption that Bill is tall, too. However, it is at least
conceivable that it could be processed in a context in which this assumption is
merely accessible. It seems plausible that an utterance of John is tall gives access to
a schema of the form X is tall. Now, at the point at which the hearer has reached Bill
in her processing of (16) it seems at least possible that he will access the assumption
Bill is tall, maybe just for a split second. After all, he has the schema X is tall readily
accessible and Bill provides an obvious value for X.
It should be clear that my general constraint can also account for discourse
but (along the lines I suggested that Foolen's analysis could account for it) and
utterance- and discourse-initial uses of but. For instance, whether or not Peter, in
(32), puts the salmon on Mary's plate ostensively, the assumption that he expects her
to eat it is highly accessible (in normal circumstances) and most likely also mutually
manifest to Mary and Peter. Therefore, it is easy for Peter to realise that it is this
assumption that Mary's utterance is intended to deny.
(32) [Peter puts some salmon on Mary's plate]
Mary: But I'm allergic to fish.
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This means that there is a unitary account of the semantics of the connective but that
can capture all its possible uses and interpretations. On the basis of my arguments in
section 5.6.3, I propose that this account is to be preferred to any accounts that
postulate ambiguity or polysemy.
Finally, one might object to my account of but that it is so general that it
should be possible to felicitously use but to connect just about any two clauses under
the sun. To this I would reply that, in the right context, just about any two clauses
under the sun can be connected by but with felicitous results. The acceptability of
the resulting utterance will, as always, depend on whether or not it is consistent with
the communicative principle of relevance. An utterance of P but Q will be judged
'infelicitous' if the hearer cannot decide which one df a range of possible accessible
assumptions the but-clause is supposed to deny or if he can't find a highly accessible
assumption the but-clause could conceivably deny. I would predict, however, that
that doesn't happen all that often in the real world (example sentences in academic
papers are, of course, another matter).
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CHAFFER 6
CONCESSIVES II: ALTHOUGH
6.1
	
Differences between but and although
In the introduction to chapter 5 I observed that (la) and (b) receive the same
'concessive' interpretation as (2).
(1) a.	 Peter went out although it was raining.
b.	 Although it was raining, Peter went out.
(2) It was raining but Peter went out.
This is reflected in much of the literature, where Q although P/Although P, Q is
treated as having a subset of the interpretations possible for P but Q. For instance,
Konig (1985) describes P but Q as the prototypical means of expressing an
'adversative' relation, while he sees Q although P/Although P. Q as the prototypical
'concessive' expression. According to him (1985: 4), concessives have the
properties in (3).
(3) typical form	 although P, Q
entailments:	 P,Q
(non-logical) implication: 	 Normally (if P, then not-Q)
He (1985: 6) analyses 'adversatives' in line with Anscombre & Ducrot's (1977)
account of denial but, i.e. in parallel to the account given of concessives above,
adversatives have the properties in (4). In other words, 'adversative' interpretations
are the same as what I called indirect denial interpretations of but in chapter 5 and
'concessive' interpretations amount to the same as direct denial. That is, concessives
are a special case of adversatives, which is reflected in their non-logical implications.
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(4) typical form:	 P but Q
entailments:	 P. Q
(non-logical) implications: P - R, Q -* not-R, Q carries more weight
This may make it seem as though Konig is claiming that but expresses an adversative
relation, while although expresses concessivity. However, he makes it clear that not
only can but express a concessive relation but although can express adversativeness.
So, do Q although P/Although P, Q and P but Q have the same meaning?
Konig certainly thinks that they do as far as truth-conditional content goes - the
entailments in (3) and (4) are exactly the same. Indeed, intuitions support this view:
The truth of P and the truth of Q are jointly sufficient for the truth of both, Q
although P/Although P, Q and P but Q. For instance, an utterance of (l'a) or (b) will
be true just in case Peter went out and it was raining. (5) shows that the embedding
test supports this - a speaker uttering this will be taken to say that the reason Peter
got wet is that it was raining and he went out at the same time, and the assumption
that Peter doesn't normally go out in the rain doesn't enter into the picture.
(5) Because Peter went out although it was raining, he got wet.
Given that but and although can express the same relation and that (1) and (2) seem
to receive the same interpretation, it looks as though there is no difference in
meaning, truth-conditional or otherwise, between Q although P/Although P. Q and P
but Q. So, it should be possible to give an analysis of the meaning although along
similar lines to the analysis I have proposed of the meaning of but. However, this
conclusion is, at best, hasty and, at worst, fallacious.
First of all, there are some clear syntactic and semantic differences between
but and although. Possibly, the most obvious one is that in order to achieve the same
interpretation for Q although P/Although P, Q and P but Q, but must introduce Q,
while although introduces P. If they both introduce the same clause, the although
utterance receives a radically different interpretation from the but utterance - as (6)
demonstrates.
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(6)	 a.	 It was raining although Peter went out.1
b.	 Although Peter went out, it was raining.
This may seem a painfully obvious point but it is, nevertheless, worth making,
particularly in the 'light' of Fraser's (1998: 314) insistence that (7a), (b) and (c) are
all equivalent.
(7)	 a.	 She fried the onions, but she steamed the cabbage.
b. She fried the onions. However, she steamed the cabbage.
c. She fried the onions, although she steamed the cabbage.
The second obvious difference between but and although is that the former is a co-
ordinating conjunction, while the latter is a subordinating conjunction. This
distinction is brought out by a number of syntactic tests. First, only subordinate
clauses can be preposed. For instance, while (ib) is perfectly acceptable, (8) is
clearly ungrammatical.
(1)	 b.	 Although it was raining, Peter went out.
(8)	 *But Peter went out, it was raining.
Second, according to Green (1976: 385), negative NP preposing, as in (9), is only
possible within a main clause.
(9)	 Not for a moment did she hesitate.
This test, too, brings out a clear difference between but and although: (10) is
perfectly acceptable, while (11) is ungrammatical.
(10) The cliff was high but not for a moment did she hesitate.
(11) *Although not for a moment did she hesitate, she was quite frightened.
This sentence might not stnke the reader as acceptable - at least at first, it seems to suggest that
Peter has the power to influence the weather (i.e. that the non-logical implication is Normally, if
Peter goes out, it isn't raining'). I will discuss this type of example at some length later on in this
chapter. For the moment, I'd like to point the reader to (6b) for an acceptable interpretation of this
combination of P and Q.
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These tests clearly show that but is a co-ordinating conjunction, while although is a
subordinating conjunction 2. This observation combined with the first one (i.e. that
for the same interpretation to be maintained, although must introduce P where but
introduces Q) provides sufficient reason not to analyse although along the same lines
as but. However, even without those observations, no one would want to claim that
but and although are completely synonymous, for it is only in a relatively restricted
subset of examples that although can replace but (obviously, once the necessary
syntactic changes have been made). This is illustrated in the next section.
6.2 Interpretations of Q although P/Although F, Q
6.2.1 When can Q although P/Although P, Q and P but Q receive the same
interpretation?
In order to bring out further differences between but and although I will look at the
range of interpretations that but can receive, as discussed in 5.2, and see whether
although can replace but in all cases, once the necessary syntactic changes have been
made. (1) and (2) have already shown that although can do duty for direct denial of
expectation but. (12) and (13) show that this also goes for indirect denial, where R is
I'll go for a walk, for instance. Here, there is an interesting difference between (13a),
where the subordinate clause is postposed, and (13b), where it is preposed. The latter
is slightly, but noticeably, more acceptable than the former. I will suggest an
explanation for this in section 6.5.
(12) It's raining but I need some fresh air.
(13) a.	 I need some fresh air although it's raining.
b.	 Although it's raining, I need some fresh air.3
2 For a discussion of further tests that distinguish between subordinate and co-ordinate clauses see
Rouchota (1998b: 45-47).
Note that even though can generally replace although without a change in meaning. However, some
people feel that the use of even though always makes a 'direct denial' interpretation more accessible.
For them, utterances like He has long legs, even though he is a bit short of breath border on the
unacceptable. I'll leave the question of whether although and even though are synonymous for
another time.
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As (14) and (15) illustrate, R. Lakoff's (1971) "semantic opposition" can also be
expressed using although, but this shouldn't be surprising since I argued that this use
can be reduced to denial of expectation. Again, there is a slight difference in
interpretation or acceptability between (15a) and (b) - the former is more likely to be
interpreted as involving direct denial, and the latter as involving indirect denial.
(14) John is tall but Bill is short.
(15) a.	 Bill is short although John is tall.
b.	 Although John is tall, Bill is short.
As (16) and (17) show, although doesn't have a correction use: (17a) is completely
unacceptable and (17b) is only acceptable on a denial of expectation reading (e.g.
one on which that isn't my sister is taken to imply something like that isn't one of my
relatives, which is then denied by that is my mother).
(16) She isn't my sister but my mother.
(17) a.	 *She is my mother although not my sister.
b.	 Although not my sister, she is my mother.
If, as I claimed in the last chapter, compensatory uses of but essentially amount to
(indirect) denial of expectation, one would expect these, too, to be able to be
expressed by although (with utterances of the form Although P, Q slightly more
acceptable than those of the form Q although P). (18) and (19) show that they,
indeed, are.
(18) He is a bit short of breath but he has long legs.
(19) a.	 He has long legs although he is a bit short of breath.
b.	 Although he is a bit short of breath, he has long legs.
It seems unlikely that although could replace but on its discourse use. Recall, that
discourse but is analysed as introducing a new paragraph and signalling a return to
the main topic of the discourse. Since although would actually have to introduce the
preceding paragraph to parallel the examples discussed so far, and, more importantly,
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since although is a subordinating conjunction and subordinate clauses can't stand on
their own, although couldn't do the job of but in contexts in which it receives a
discourse interpretation.4
Finally, utterance- and discourse-initial uses of but can't be replaced by
although for obvious reasons. As mentioned above, although actually has to
introduce the first clause, rather than the but-clause for the same interpretation to be
preserved when replacing but with although. However, in utterance- and discourse-
initial uses of but there is by definition no first clause. So, it is clear that there
couldn't possibly be a case of although replacing but in utterance- and discourse-
initial positions. Still, this doesn't rule out the possibility that an isolated although-
clause could occur utterance- or discourse-initially in its own right. However, this
doesn't seem to be possible. Mary's utterances in (20) and (21) are not exactly
acceptable.
(20) Mary [catching Peter munching his way through a box of chocolates]:
*Although you're on a dieti?Although you're on a diet?
(21) Peter: I think John is wonderful.
Mary: *Although he cheated on you./Although he cheated on you?
Notice, however, that (at least for some speakers) Mary's utterances can become
acceptable, particularly in (21), when uttered with the appropriate interrogative
intonation contour.
To sum up the discussion so far, it seems that although can do duty for but
just as long as the intended interpretation is one of denial of expectation and that
direct denial lends itself more to being expressed by Q although P than indirect
denial. So, it seems that although must be given its very own analysis, which must
take into account its status as a subordinating conjunction and which can explain why
although can be used to express some of the same things as but but not others.
'However, there might be something amounting to discourse although. Exchanges like that in (i) can
sometimes be observed.
(i)	 A: This is a really nice house.
B: Although, I'm not sure that it's structurally sound.
Of course, this could be a performance error or a shift in use.
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6.2.2 Although in three domains
Sweetser (1990: 78-79) sees what she calls 'adversative' connectives, such as
although and despite, and causal connectives, such as because and since, as being
able to function in three domains: real-world (or content), epistemic and speech-
act. (la) and (22) are examples of although and because operating in the real-world
or content domain. That is, the relations they express hold between states of affairs
in the real world.
(1)	 a.	 Peter went out although it was raining.
(22) Peter got wet because it was raining.
In the case of (22) this is relatively easy to see; the relation expressed is one of real-
world causality, i.e. the rain caused Peter to get wet. It's a bit harder to see in what
sense the 'adversative' relation expressed by although in (1) holds in the real world.
In order to make clearer the real-world nature of the connection in such examples
Sweetser (1990: 79) provides a paraphrase. Analogous to her own examples, the
paraphrase for (1), which is not one of the examples she considers, would be
something like (23).
(23) Peter's going out occurred in spite of the rain, which might naturally have led
to his not going out.
This shows that although doesn't actually express a real-world relationship between
two states of affairs in the way because does. Instead, the relationship although
expresses is one that exists in the speaker's mind and is based on her knowledge of a
real-world causal relation between the state of affairs described in the subordinate
clause and the negation of the main clause. In other words, the real-world
relationship in (1) doesn't hold between Peter's going out and the rain, but rather
between the rain and Peter's not going out. In fact, while real-world causality clearly
exists, it is doubtful whether there is such a thing as real-world 'adversativeness'.
Sweetser (1990: 103-104) herself speculates that there probably is no real-
world use of but, because there is no real-world relation of contrast. Given that she
is happy to accept that although has a real-world use, this seems quite curious.
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Particularly, since (2) shows that but can perfectly well be used to express the
relation expressed by although in (1).
(2)	 It was raining but Peter went out.
It seems to me that it is quite likely that there is no real-world use of although, at
least not in the same way in which there is a real-world use of because.
In (24), because operates in what Sweetser calls the epistemic domain.
(24) It's been raining, because Peter is wet.
That is, rather than expressing a causal relation between two events or states of
affairs in the world, it expresses a causal relationship between the speaker's
knowledge that Peter is wet and the conclusion that it's raining. Although in (6a)
could be seen as operating in the epistemic domain, too.
(6)	 a.	 It was raining although Peter went out.
Sweetser's (1990: 79) paraphrase of this example would be something like (25).
(25) The fact that it was raining is true in spite of the fact that Peter went out,
which might reasonably have led me to conclude that it wasn't raining.
Again, the epistemic relationship doesn't so much seem to hold between the two
conjuncts as it does between the subordinate clause and the negation of the main
clause.
Finally, (26) gives an example of because applying to Sweetser's speech-act
domain.
(26) Is it raining, because Peter looks wet.
Here, because expresses a causal relation between the state of affairs described in the
subordinate clause and the speech-act performed in the main clause. In other words,
the fact that Peter looks wet is the speaker's reason for asking whether it's raining.
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In (27), although applies to the speech-act domain. Sweetser's gloss for this kind of
example is given in (28).
(27) Is it raining, although I'll have to go out anyway.
(28) I ask you if it's raining in spite of the fact that I have to go out anyway.
It seems, then, that the question is what exactly do P and Q in Q although P and
Although P, Q stand for. From Sweetser's discussion one could conclude that she
would advocate that Q although P can have (at least) three different non-logical
implications, i.e. one of (29)-(3 1), where X is the proposition expressed by P and y
that expressed by Q, depending on whether although is understood as operating in
the real-world/content, the epistemic or the speech-act (SA) domain.
(29) Normally (X causes not-Y)
(30) Normally (X leads to the conclusion that not-Y)
(31) Normally (X causes the speaker not to SA that 1')
While I wouldn't want to go along with either Sweetser's postulation of these three
domains or her 'analysis' (if it can be called that) of although, she points out some
interesting examples of although utterances. Any adequate analysis of the meaning
of although should explain not just the interpretation of standard examples involving
although, such as (1), but also that of its 'epistemic' and 'speech act' uses. In what
follows, I'll briefly look at some analyses of although before I propose my own,
relevance-theoretic account.
6.3	 Traditional ways of accounting for the meaning of although
6.3.1 Winter & Rimon, Sidiropoulou
Like Konig (1985), Winter & Rimon (1994) don't actually propose a detailed
analysis of the meaning of although. Instead, they are concerned with giving a
semantics for what they call "contrastive conjunctions", of which although is one.
Nevertheless, their approach seems worth discussing, at least briefly, simply because
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they are among the few theorists who mention although at all and they have a view
on the difference between (denial) but and although.
According to Winter & Rimon (1994: 369), although can only express what
they call restricted contrast (which is the same as Konig's 'concessivity'), i.e.
although can only link P and Q if P implies not-Q. But, on the other hand expresses
general contrast, which they capture in terms close to A & D's (1977) account of
denial but, i.e. P implies not-R, Q implies R. This means that they would regard (13)
as unacceptable (unless it was interpreted as implying that the rain should stop the
speaker from wanting fresh air). However, they admit that some native speakers find
(32) acceptable when, for example, uttered by the doctor who operated on the son to
the father who is concerned that the operation wasn't successful.
(13) a.	 I need some fresh air although it's raining.
b.	 Although it's raining, I need some fresh air.
(32) Your son walks although he walks slowly.
In such a case P (your son walks slowly) would imply not-R (the operation wasn't a
success) and Q (your son walks) would imply R (the operation was a success). I
believe that Winter & Rimon may find although unacceptable in cases where Q
doesn't directly deny an implication of P because they only consider cases of the
form Q although P. As with the example above, I find (32) much more acceptable in
the guise of (33).
(33) Although your son walks slowly, he walks.
It will be seen in 6.5 that this difference can be explained in terms of the order in
which the clauses are processed.
Sidiropoulou's (1992) account is set in a different framework from Winter &
Rimon's (1994) and she believes that although has basically two interpretations.
According to her (1992: 204-206), Although P, Q can be given either a "Shared
Irnplicature Concession (SIC)" reading or a "Speaker's Attitude Concession (SAC)"
reading. SIC simply amounts to the same as Konig's 'concessive' reading, Winter &
Rimon's 'restricted contrast' and what I've called 'direct denial of expectation'.
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SAC, on the other hand, is a variety of Konig's 'adversative' reading, Winter &
Rimon's non-restricted contrast and my own indirect denial. According to
Sidiropoulou (1992: 206), SAC involves the
signaling of a change in the speaker's attitude with respect to what follows, or
precedes, the although conjunct. (Sidiropoulou's italics)
She, therefore, analyses although as indicating in these cases that the speaker either
has a positive attitude to P and a negative attitude to Q or the other way round. For
instance, she might analyse Winter & Rimon's example in (33) as conveying that the
speaker has a negative attitude to P (your son walks slowly) and a positive attitude to
Q (your son walks). Now, while this might be plausible for this particular example, I
find it difficult to see how (13) could be analysed along similar lines. It seems likely
that in this case the speaker will have a negative attitude towards P (it's raining), but
it's not clear that saying that the speaker has a positive attitude towards Q (I need
some fresh air) either does justice to the situation or is particularly enlightening.
Furthermore, this example clearly shouldn't get a SIC reading either (there is no
implication that the speaker doesn't normally need fresh air when it's raining).
The upshot of this very brief discussion of Winter & Rimon (1994) and
Sidiropoulou (1992) is that, apart from a proliferation of terminology, there is a
stunning lack of variety when it comes to analyses of the meaning of although. The
only point on which there seems to be some disagreement is whether or not although
can link P and Q in cases in which the contrast or incompatibility between them is
not direct. Whether a theorist believes that it can or can't seems to be entirely
dependent on whether the examples they consider are of the form Q although P or
although P. Q. Winter & Rimon predominantly consider the former and conclude
that although must express direct (or restricted) contrast, Sidiropoulou exclusively
considers the latter and concludes that although can express either direct or indirect
contrast. However, essentially, they all agree with Konig's (1985) analysis of Q
although P/Although P, Q, although, of course, their accounts differ in some of the
detail. None of them give a particularly satisfying account of what exactly it is that
although encodes.
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external
negation
63.2 A duality account
While the 'account' of although given by Konig (1986) doesn't go beyond stating
that Although P, Q is the prototypical concessive construction, Konig (1989) takes a
slightly more interesting approach. In this paper, he proposes that concessive
relations are the dual of causal relations. Clearly, this needs some (in fact, quite a lot
of) explanation. Konig (1989: 197) follows Löbner (1987, 1990) in defining the
semantic (i.e. truth-conditional) relation of duality as follows.
Duality is a relation that can hold between two propositions whenever there
are two possibilities for negating the proposition, internal and external. For instance,
negation can apply to all Fs are G either externally, as in not(all Fs are G), or
internally, as in all Fs are not-G. More generally, there are three ways of combining
negation with any proposition of the form X(Y): X(-'Y), -'X(Y), and -iX(-'Y). Konig
(1989: 197) represents these possibilities in the "duality square" in (34).
(34) X(Y)
-'X(Y)
internal negation
dual
internal negation
X(-'Y)
external
negation
-X(-'Y)
As this square indicates, the relation of duality holds between the positive
proposition and the external negation of its internal negation. For instance, all Fs are
G and not(all Fs are not-G) (= some Fs are G) are duals. The idea is now that the
relationship between all Fs are G and some Fs are G is paralleled by that between
because P. Q and although P. Q, i.e. that causal relations and 'concessive' relations
are duals of each other. If this is right, then not(because P. not-Q) should be (at least
truth-conditionally) synonymous with although P. Q. To illustrate this, I give the
duality square for because P. Q in (35).
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(35) (because P)Q	 internal negation	 (because P)-'Q
external	 N	 externaldual
negation	 negation
-'((because P)Q)	 internal negation	 -'((because P)-'Q)
(although P)-'Q	 (although P) Q
Konig (1989: 195-197) argues that such a close connection between causality and
concessiveness is well supported by intuitions. For instance, he refers to
Hermodsson (1978), who proposes to reanalyse (and rename) 'concessives' as
'incausals'. This is based on an intuition close to that of Sweetser (1990) who seems
to see the relation expressed by although as one between obstacle or impediment (the
content of the although-clause) and a consequence one would have expected to be
impeded or prevented from coming about in the light of the truth of the although-
clause. This means that causal utterances, such as (36), and concessive utterances,
such as (37), can be formed on the basis of one and the same underlying causal
connection.
(36) Peter got wet because it was raining. 	 Q because P
(37) Peter didn't get wet although it was raining.	 not-Q although P
Konig (1989: 196) captures these similarities in (38) and (39).
(38) a.
	
Since/because P. Q
b. P & Q	 (entailment)
c. if P, normally Q
	
(presupposition)
	
(39) a.	 Although/even though P, not-Q
b. P & Q	 (entailment)
c. if P, normally Q
	
(presupposition)
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There certainly is something plausible about this intuition. Furthermore, if there
really is a relation of duality between causal and concessive connections, this would
have one particular advantage. While, as Konig (1989: 201) points out, merely
stating that there is this relation between concessivity and causality doesn't amount
to giving an account of either, it does mean that, once one has an account of
causality, an account of (the truth-conditional properties of5) concessivity follows
automatically (assuming one has an account of negation). Of course, it should also
work the other way around, i.e. an account of concessivity should also yield an
account of causality. However, this is not very likely - the chances of getting a grip
on causality seem much better than those of getting a grip on concessivity.
Moreover, starting with an analysis of Although P, Q and simply analysing Because
P, Q as not(Although P. not-Q) isn't an option because although can't fall under the
scope of (external descriptive) negation. (40) does most decidedly not capture (41).
(40) It is not the case that although it was raining, Peter didn't get wet.
Not(although P. not-Q)
(41) Because it was raining, Peter got wet.
In this, the although/because pair differs markedly from other duals. For instance,
all Fs are G can be captured by not (some Fs are not-G).
Unsurprisingly, there are a number of problems with Konig's attempt at
accounting for the meaning of Although P, Q in terms of causality and duality.
Possibly the most fundamental one is that, at best, this account only captures the
meaning of Although P, Q in those cases where it receives a 'concessive'
interpretation, i.e. where there is a direct incompatibility between P and Q and it
(non-logically) implies normally(zf P, then not-Q). In other words, it doesn't apply
to 'adversative' uses of although. In fact, it seems doubtful that such an account
would even be an analysis of the meaning of although. At most, it seems, Konig's
duality account offers an analysis of the concessive relation. However, I have argued
in 5.1 that giving an analysis of a concessive relation is only interesting if it helps
account for the meaning of certain linguistic expressions, such as but and although.
The fact that neither but nor although always express a concessive relation indicates
Even if concessivity and causality were duals, it's doubtful whether this account, couched in purely
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that defining this relation doesn't lead to a full account of the meaning of these
expressions. Moreover, Iten (1997, 1998a) gives a range of arguments to show that
Because P, Q and Although P, Q don't stand in a relation of duality to each other,
even assuming that although is being used 'concessively'. Here, I will just reiterate
the strongest argument.
This argument against Konig's duality account of concessives is connected
with the truth conditions of because P. Q and although P. Q. It is generally accepted
that, while the truth of P and the truth of Q are necessary conditions for the truth of
Because P, Q, they are not sufficient. For an utterance such as (22) to be true it is
not enough that it was raining and that Peter got wet, but the rain must have been the
cause of Peter's getting wet.
(22) Peter got wet because it was raining.
This is shown nicely by (42), where the (descriptive) negation applies just to the
causal connection between the rain and Peter's getting wet.
(42) Peter didn't get wet because it was raining - it was raining, but he got wet
because he fell in the pond.
The 'concessive' relation between the rain and Peter's not getting wet expressed by
although in (37), on the other hand, is not a matter of truth conditions6. As
mentioned in 6.1, all it takes for an utterance like this to be true is the truth of each
conjunct.
(37) Peter didn't get wet although it was raining. 	 not-Q although P
The unacceptable (43) shows that it is impossible to negate (descriptively) just the
concessive relation.
logical terms, would shed any light on the relation's cognitive import.
6 Recall, however, that Bach (1999) would see although as contributing to what is said, at least on
some of its uses, because it passes his IQ test. For instance, an indirect quotation along the lines of
John said that Peter went out although it was raining is perfectly acceptable.
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(43) *peter didn't not get wet although it was raining — it was raining, but Peter
didn't get wet although he fell in the pond.
This difference raises some interesting points for Konig's duality account. For
instance, not(because P, Q) and although P. -Q should be equivalent according to
the duality square in (35). However, it is not immediately clear that they are.
Although P, 
-iQ is true just in case P is true and -'Q is true. In other words, the truth
of P and the truth of 
-'Q are necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the truth
of although P,-'Q. It is not obvious that the same conditions are necessary and jointly
sufficient for the truth of not(because P. Q). Of course, they are jointly sufficient for
the truth of not(because P. Q)
. 
However, they are not necessary. The truth of P and
-'Q is only one of four sets of propositions that are sufficient for the truth of
not(because P. Q). All four possibilities are given formally in (44).
(44) a.	 P, -'Q [and, therefore, -'(P causes Q)]
b. -'P, Q [and, therefore, -'(P causes Q)]
c. -'P. 
-'Q [and, therefore, -'(P causes Q)]
d. P, Q, -'( P causes Q)
To give a concrete example, assuming that the negation is understood as taking wide
scope, (45) could be true due to any of (46a)-(d).
(45) Peter didn't get wet because it was raining.
(46) a.	 It was raining, but Peter didn't get wet (and, therefore, the rain didn't
cause Peter to get wet).
b. It wasn't raining, but Peter got wet (the rain didn't cause Peter to get
wet).
c. It wasn't raining and Peter didn't get wet (and, therefore, the rain
didn't cause Peter to get wet)
d. It was raining and Peter got wet, but it wasn't the rain that caused
Peter to get wet.
In other words, for not(because F, Q) to mean the same as although P. not-Q, it has
to receive a very specific interpretation. Since this interpretation is one out of four
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possible ones, i.e. one out of four interpretations compatible with the semantics of
not(because P. Q), it follows that not(because P. Q) and although P. not-Q are only
going to receive the same interpretation in certain circumstances. This means that
their equivalence (if equivalent is what they are) is not a matter of their semantics but
it arises pragmatically. Therefore, Konig's conclusion that because and although are
semantically duals of each other is misguided. Nevertheless, there is something
interesting to be explained here, i.e. the fact that, at least sometimes, not(because P,
Q) and although P. not-Q really do seem to receive the same or a very similar
interpretation. For instance, Konig's (1989: 196) examples (47) and (48) are likely
to be interpreted along similar lines.
(47) This house is no less comfortable because it dispenses with air-conditioning.
(48) This house is no less comfortable although it dispenses with air-conditioning.
I believe (and will show) that this can be explained straightforwardly once one has an
adequate analysis of the encoded meaning of although.
Summing up, it has been shown that Konig's claim that because P, Q and
although P. Q are duals of each other, i.e. that not(because P. not-Q) and although P.
Q are truth-conditionally equivalent, is not tenable. Furthermore, even if it could be
shown that a relation of duality holds between causality and concessivity, this truth-
conditional account would be missing crucial cognitive differences. For, cognitively,
because P. Q and not(although P. not-Q) are certainly not equivalent.
6.4 Towards an RT account
6.4.1 Concept or procedure?
Given that although essentially only seems to have a single function (i.e. something
to do with direct or indirect denial) there might be an initial temptation to try and
treat it as encoding conceptual information. However, since it never contributes to
the truth conditions of utterances in which it occurs, it seems unlikely that this is the
case. In this section, I will use the three tests identified in 4.3.3 to argue that all
available evidence points in the direction of although encoding procedural
information.
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Let me start with cognition. It seems quite clear that most native speakers of
English would find it more than averagely difficult to say what although 'means'.
Even linguists who spent a lot of time thinking about although generally end up
saying how it is used rather than what it means. Furthermore, although is probably
not one of the easiest words for foreign learners of English to acquire.
The second argument involves truth-evaluability. Recall that expressions
which encode concepts are truth-evaluable whether or not they contribute to the truth
conditions of a particular utterance. For instance, although sadly doesn't contribute
to the truth conditions of A's utterance in (49), B's reply to it is perfectly acceptable.
(49) A:	 Sadly, my mother-in-law died.
B:	 That's not true, you're not sad about her death.
By contrast, the unacceptability of B's reply in (50) shows that the contribution
although makes to the meaning of an utterance is not truth-evaluable and its
meaning, therefore, not likely to be conceptual.
(50) A:	 Peter went out although it was raining.
B:	 *That's not true, he always goes out in the rain.
The final test concerns compositionality: While conceptual expressions freely
combine with each other to form larger conceptual representations, procedural
expressions don't combine with each other to form larger procedures and they can't
be modified by other procedures or by concepts. For although this is brought out by
examples, such as (51) and (52). These show that, while other subordinating
conjunctions, such as because, can be modified by an adverbial like mainly, a
combination of mainly with although has ungrammatical results.
(51) Peter went to the party mainly because he wanted to see Susan.
(52) *Susan went to the party mainly although she didn't want to see Peter.
Similarly, in (53) partly modifies because with a perfectly acceptable result, while in
(54) the same can't be said of an attempt to use partly to modify although.
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(53) Peter went to the party partly because he wanted to see Susan and partly
because he had nothing better to do.
(54) *Susan went to the party partiy although she didn't want to see Peter and
partiy although she had a lot of work to do.
Furthermore, (55) shows that one can use descriptive negation to negate just the
meaning of because, while (56) demonstrates that descriptive negation can't be
applied just to the meaning although. Obviously, where the negation is clearly
metalinguistic (or echoic), although can be negated, as in (57)7•
(55) Peter didn't go to the party because he wanted to see Susan but because he
had nothing better to do.
(56) *Susan didn't go to the party although she didn't want to see Peter but
although she had a lot of work to do.
(57) Susan didn't go to the party although she had a lot of work to do, but because
of it.
Clearly, there is no syntactic reason for these differences in acceptability between
(51) and (52), (53) and (54), and (55) and (56): because and although are both
subordinating conjunctions. It seems, therefore, likely that this difference is due to
the fact that the two conjunctions encode different types of meaning.
To sum up this section, all the available evidence points in the direction of
although encoding a procedure rather than a concept. In section 6.4.3, I shall suggest
a procedure which is likely to be what although encodes and this procedure will be
tested on the data discussed earlier. Before that, however, something ought to be
said about the explicit content of utterances of the form Q although P and although
P,Q.
6.4.2 The proposition(s) expressed
As mentioned in 6.1, the general consensus is that utterances of sentences of the
forms in (58) and (59) are true just in case P is true and Q is true. The question is
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whether this amounts to the claim that these utterances express the conjunctive
proposition in (60).
(58) Q although P
(59) Although P, Q
(60) P&Q
Obviously, if the proposition expressed were intended to capture nothing more than
pure truth-conditional content, then this question would be pointless. However,
recall that the proposition expressed, within the framework of Relevance Theory, is a
development of a logical form encoded by the utterance and that syntactic structure is
a crucial part of what is encoded. In other words, the question is whether the logical
form encoded by (58) and (59) is an and-conjunction. As demonstrated in section
6.1, these sentences involve subordination while and-conjunctions, such as (60),
have co-ordinate structure. It, therefore, seems highly doubtful that anything of the
form in (60) could correspond to a logical form encoded by any utterance involving
subordination. So, if the logical form encoded by (58) and (59) doesn't involve a co-
ordinate conjunction, what is its structure? I can imagine two possibilities. First, one
might want to find some way of representing subordination, say by using the symbol
"sub". In this case, the logical form encoded by (58) and (59) would be (61), where
Q' stands for the conceptually encoded content of the main clause and P' for that of
the subordinate clause.
(61) Q'subP'
For instance, for (1) the logical form might roughly look something like (62).
(1)	 a.	 Peter went out although it was raining.
(62) X WENT OUT sub if WAS RAINING8
For a discussion of metalinguistic negation see Horn (1985). For a Relevance Theoretic reanalysis
see Carston (1996b).
I'm working on the assumption that proper names, such as Peter, don't encode individual concepts,
but rather procedurally guide the hearer to supply such a concept on particular occasions of utterance.
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Alternatively, one might want to say that (58) and (59) don't encode a single logical
form at all, but, instead, that they encode the set of logical forms in (63).
(63) a.
b.	 P'
On the face of it, (63) has the advantage over (61). First, it allows one to account
relatively straightforwardly for examples that involve Sweetser's speech-act use of
although, such as (27).
(27) Is it raining, although I'll have to go out anyway.
It seems clear that someone uttering (27) will, probably among others, be likely to
communicate the higher-level explicatures in (64).
(64) a.	 The speaker is asking whether it's raining.
	
b.	 The speaker is saying that she'll have to go out anyway.
Now, recall that higher-level explicatures are nothing other than embeddings of the
proposition expressed under speech-act or propositional attitude descriptions.
Clearly, (64a) and (b) are embeddings of something under speech-act descriptions,
and, according to the RT definition, the something they embed must be the
proposition(s) expressed by the utterance. The proposition(s) expressed, in turn must
be a development of a logical form encoded by the utterance. If one assumes that
although utterances encode two logical forms, it is easy to see how each of them can
be developed into a proposition expressed and how each proposition expressed can
be embedded to form its own set of higher-level explicatures, e.g. those in (Ma) and
(b). If, on the other hand, the assumption is that such utterances encode one single
logical form comprising the conceptually encoded content of both its clauses, it is not
at all clear how this could be 'developed' into two separate propositions, each of
which is a development of only one of the clauses. Now, because there is something
maybe a bit marked and unusual about speech-act uses of although one might be
tempted to look for an alternative explanation and not take this very seriously as
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evidence for although utterances encoding two logical forms. However, this would
be a mistake.
Even perfectly 'ordinary' although utterances, such as (1), present a problem
for the assumption that they encode one single logical form. It seems uncontentious
that a speaker uttering (1) is communicating each of (65a) and (b) in its own right
and that she is, surely, doing so explicitly.
(65) a.	 Peter went out.
b.	 It was raining.
In other words, it is not just in speech-act uses of although that each clause must
come with its own set of explicatures. It seems, then, that (63) should be preferred to
(61), i.e. that although utterances should be seen as encoding two separate logical
forms and as having two separate sets of explicatures.
However, (63) also has a disadvantage, i.e. it makes it look as though the two
propositions, P and Q are completely unrelated syntactically. Quite obviously, that is
not the case. This is brought out particularly clearly by examples of the form
although P. Q, where the first clause may contain indexicals that are bound by
constituents of the second clause. For instance, he and it in the first clause of (66)
are bound by Peter and the spinach in the second.
(66) Although hej didn't like it, Peter1 ate [the spinach]
(67b) shows that it's not easily possible for pronouns in the first of two juxtaposed
sentences to be bound by constituents of the second sentence9.
(67) a.	 Peter1 ate [the spinach]. He 1 didn't like it.
b.	 Hej ate it. Peter 1111 didn't like [the spinach]*jn.
I've changed the order of the two sentences for the juxtaposed examples so as to rule out pragmatic
unacceptablility - Peter didn't li/ce the spinach. He ate it. doesn't make for a particularly acceptable
piece of discourse.
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These syntactic properties of utterances like (66) can be captured by (61) but not by
(63). It seems, then, that neither of the two alternatives to (60) is quite ideal. So,
what is one to do?
It is not clear to me how the claim that Q although P and although P. Q
encode two logical forms could be adapted to capture the syntactic properties of
these sentences. However, Carston (forthcoming b) offers a way of reconciling the
idea that these sentences encode a single logical form, maybe along the lines of (61),
with the fact that the main clause and the subordinate clause can each have their own
set of explicatures. In section 3.3.1, she considers examples such as (1) and proposes
a modification of the relevance-theoretic definition of explicature to account for the
undoubted intuition that, for instance, an utterance of (1) has the explicatures in (65).
Her new definition of explicature is given in (68).
(68) An assumption (proposition) communicated by an utterance is an
'explicature' of the utterance if and only if it is a development of (a) a
linguistically encoded logical form of the utterance, or of (b) a sentential
subpart of a logical form.
This definition makes it possible not only to explain how (65a) and (b) can both be
explicatures of (1), but also how (27) can have the higher-level explicatures in (64a)
and (b).
(27) Is it raining, although I'll have to go out anyway.
	
(64) a.
	
The speaker is asking whether it's raining.
	
b.	 The speaker is saying that she'll have to go out anyway.
In both of these cases, the explicatures in question aren't developments of a logical
form encoded by the utterance but developments of a sentential subpart of a logical
form encoded by the utterance. This raises the question of whether, in the case of
although-conjunction, the whole logical form ever is developed to form an
explicature. That is, do utterances of the form in (58) and (59) ever express a
proposition that is a development of the entire logical form. This is an interesting
question because it seems that in the case of other subordinating conjunctions, such
as because and when, this does happen. For instance, according to Carston
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(forthcoming b, section 3.3.1), because utterances, e.g. (22), standardly express three
propositions, e.g. (69a)-(c)'°.
(22) Peter got wet because it was raining.
(69) a.	 PETER GOT WET
b. Ii WAS RAINING
c. PETER GOT WET BECAUSE IT WAS RAINING
Similarly, an utterance containing when, such as (70), could, and should, be seen as
communicating the three propositions in (71)".
(70) It was raining when Peter went out.
(71) a.	 ITWASRAINING
b.	 PETER WENT OUT
C.	 IT WAS RAINING WHEN PETER WENT OUT
It seems clear that, in both these cases, the (c) proposition must be communicated
because both because and when actually contribute to the truth conditions of the
utterances in which they occur. However, if truth-conditionality is the criterion, then
one would expect there not to be a (c) proposition for although utterances. Indeed, it
is hard to see, as I have shown in the previous sub-section, what conceptual
constituent although could contribute to such a proposition. Although there isn't
anything inherently wrong with the idea that although utterances encode a single
logical form, but never communicate a proposition that is a development of the
whole of this logical form, there is something slightly strange about it. I believe that
there may be a way of avoiding this 'strangeness'.
It might be that utterances of the forms in (58) and (59) don't only express
propositions that are developments of sentential subparts of the logical forms they
encode but that they also express a propositions developed from the entire logical
forms. For instance, it doesn't seem entirely wrong to suggest that (1) also expresses
the proposition in (72).
'° In the Gricean spirit, I'm hideously oversimplifying these propositions.
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(72) PETER WENT OUT WHILE IT WAS RAINING
Indeed, the embedding test suggests that it is a proposition along these lines that
determines the truth conditions of an utterance of (la). Surely, a speaker uttering (5)
isn't conveying that the reason Peter got wet is that he went out and that it was
raining, but, crucially, that Peter went out while it was raining
(5)	 Because Peter went out although it was raining, he got wet.
Now, one might want to take this to mean that although actually encodes while plus
something else. However, this is clearly not tenable. For instance, rather than
expressing a proposition that contains while, it seems likely that an utterance of (73)
would express one like (74), which contains before.
(73) Peter got drunk although he had to give a lecture.
(74) PETER GOT DRUNK BEFORE PETER HAD TO GWE A LECTURE
Similarly, (75) seems likely to express a proposition containing after, along the lines
in (76).
(75) Peter went out although Mary told him not to.
(76) PETER WENT OUT AFTER MARY TOLD PETER NOT TO GO OUT
In other words, it's unlikely that although encodes anything like 'conceptual
subordinating conjunction plus something else' - the evidence presented in the last
section speaks against that quite strongly already. Instead, it is possible that its
syntactic function as a subordinating conjunction makes available a slot in the logical
form which is then pragmatically filled by a subordinating concept. Which concept
this will be is determined by the context, but also, indirectly, by the procedure
encoded by although, which, at the very least, must rule out because.
Seefn. 10.
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6.4.3 What procedure?
Since although seems to be able to replace but in all examples in which the second
clause denies an 'expectation' created by the first, one might want to try and
formulate a procedure for although along the lines of denial. However, this doesn't
seem to be an option. First, assuming that (1) and (2) both do involve denial of
expectation, but in (2) introduces the clause that does the denying, while although in
(la) and (b) introduces the clause whose implication is being denied.
(2)	 It was raining but Peter went out. 	 P but Q
(1)	 a.	 Peter went out although it was raining. 	 Q although P
b.	 Although it was raining, Peter went out. 	 Although P, Q
This means that although couldn't possibly encode a procedure that instructs the
hearer that the clause it introduces contradicts and eliminates an assumption.
Nevertheless, the although clause does seem to be doing some contradicting. For
instance, in (1) it could be seen as indirectly contradicting the assumption that Peter
went out. However, it clearly doesn't eliminate this assumption. It was observations
like these that led me to propose the procedure in (77) in Iten (1998b: 100)
(77) What follows (i.e. P) contradicts, but does not eliminate, X. X is an aspect of
the interpretation of Q.
According to this, although indicates that the clause it introduces contradicts an
aspect of the interpretation of Q without eliniirating it. In the case of (1), this aspect
of the interpretation of Q is the proposition expressed. However, in other examples it
could be a higher-level explicature or an implicature. The former takes care of
Sweetser's speech-act examples, while the latter explains Konig's 'adversative'
examples, where in the corresponding but utterance the denial of expectation would
be indirect. For instance, the idea is that in (27) what is contradicted without being
eliminated is the higher-level explicature in (78).
(27) Is it raining, although I'll have to go out anyway.
(78) The speaker is asking whether it is raining.
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Similarly, in (13) the although clause contradicts the implicature in (76) without
eliminating it.
(13) a.
	
I need some fresh air although it's raining.
b.	 Although it's raining, I need some fresh air.
(79) The speaker wants to go for a walk.
Iten (1998b: 100-105) shows in detail how the procedure in (77) combined with the
communicative principle of relevance can explain the whole range of examples
discussed by Konig and Sweetser.
However, while it may be doing a reasonable job of accounting for the
examples, this procedure has some weak points. For instance, it overlooks the fact
that the contradiction between P and X is never of a direct nature, i.e. it is never the
case that X = not-P. Instead, it is always the case that P one way or another implies
not-X. Indeed, Iten (1998b: 100) captures this by saying that the hearer is likely to
recover a contextual assumption (which is an implicated premise) along the lines of
(80).
(80) In general, -iX follows from P.
Another undesirable aspect of (77) is that it is quite cumbersome. Now, while this
certainly isn't a knockdown argument against it, it would be nice to find a more
elegant procedure. Finally, it is no longer clear to me that what goes on in an
although utterance is really a matter of the although clause contradicting an aspect of
the interpretation of the main clause. After all, the implication of the although clause
that contradicts an aspect of the interpretation of Q does not eliminate the
contradicted assumption, and it is this assumption, rather than the implication of F,
that ends up being communicated. It seems, therefore, that the procedure in (77)
invites the hearer to derive an assumption, i.e. not-X only to eliminate it
subsequently. In fact, in cases where the although clause follows the main clause,
the hearer would have to derive an assumption the negation of which he has already
processed. What really seems to go on in these utterances is that although prevents
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an inference from going through that would end up contradicting an aspect of the
interpretation of the main clause. I would therefore like to suggest that although, in
utterances of the form Q although P/although P, Q, encodes a procedure along the
lines in (81).
(81) Suspend an inference from what follows (P) which results in an unresolvable
contradiction.
Understood like this, although functions rather like a road sign warning of a cul-de-
sac, i.e. it warns the hearer of a possible inferential dead end. Its doing so has the
side effect of making accessible that assumption which, in combination with P, will
give rise to the contradiction. That is, the fact that the speaker indicates that the
hearer is to suspend an inference means that she believes that he is in some danger of
actually performing the inference because he may have a background assumption
accessible that would license it. It is a side of effect of the hearer's being warned of
a danger that the thing he is being warned of, in this case the inference that leads to a
contradiction, becomes manifest or more manifest to him. This means that,
sometimes, the assumption that leads to the contradiction only becomes manifest to
the hearer once he has processed the although clause (or maybe it becomes manifest
to him that the speaker thinks that the assumption is, or may be, manifest to him).
(1)	 a.	 Peter went out although it was raining.
For instance, in (la) the hearer first processes Q, i.e. Peter went out, then
although indicates that there is an inference from P (i.e. it was raining) that has to be
suspended because it would yield a contradiction. In this particular example, it is
quite conceivable that P (i.e. it was raining) gives immediate access to the
assumption that people don't go out if it's raining. This assumption licenses an
inference from it was raining to Peter didn't go out, which would obviously
contradict the proposition expressed by Q (i.e. Peter went out). Quite generally, the
most accessible assumption that could be contradicted in such examples is, of course,
one that has just been communicated, i.e. explicatures or implicatures of Q. In the
rest of this section I will show that the new procedure in (81) does at least as good a
job as (77) at accounting for all manner of examples, and, indeed, it will be seen in
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6.6 that it can explain when and why although utterances can be used to express
something similar to the corresponding but utterances.
I have already demonstrated above that the procedure in (81) can account for
what Konig calls 'concessive' uses of although and for cases where although
operates in Sweetser's real-world or content domain. As mentioned earlier, in (6),
repeated here, although applies to Sweetser's epistemic domain. However, it is still
'concessive', i.e., intuitively, although seems to indicate that P gives one reason to
conclude not-Q.
(6)	 a.	 It was raining although Peter went out.	 Q although P
b.	 Although Peter went out, it was raining.	 Although P, Q
My new procedure accounts for this type of example without any problems.
Although indicates that the hearer is to suspend an inference from P (Peter went out)
to an assumption that would contradict a communicated assumption. As always, the
most accessible assumption that could be contradicted is the proposition expressed
by Q (i.e. it was raining). Now, the inference from Peter went out to it wasn't
raining must be licensed by an accessible assumption and the only kind of
assumption that can license this inference is one that involves the possibility of
concluding that it isn't raining from the fact that Peter is going out - maybe because
he is the kind of guy who hates the rain so much that he avoids it at all cost. The
problem with this assumption is that it is less generally accessible than the
assumption that people don't go out if it's raining, because it involves more
idiosyncratic information about Peter. Furthermore, the fact that it is raining can be
the cause of somebody's not going out, while somebody's going out is most
decidedly not a possible cause of there being no rain. In other words, out of context
(1) is easier to process than (6) because the assumption that licenses the suspended
inference is more readily accessible in the case of (1). Of course, for people who
know Peter very well and maybe often joke about his dislike of rain (6) may well be
as easy to process as (1).
In the case of an utterance of (27), where although applies to the speech-act
domain in Sweetser's view, the suspended inference is from P (I'll have to go out
anyway) to the negation of a higher-level explicature of Q (i.e. I'm not asking you if
it's raining).
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(27) Is it raining, although I'll have to go out anyway.
This inference is licensed by assumptions such as people who have to go outside no
matter what the weather is like don't ask what the weather is like. This shows how
the procedure in (81) can explain 'concessive' uses of although quite easily.
'Adversative' uses of although, such as (13), can be explained along the
following lines.
(13) a.	 I need some fresh air although it's raining. 	 Q although P
b.	 Although it's raining, I need some fresh air. 	 Although P, Q
Again, although indicates that the hearer is to suspend an inference from P (it's
raining) to an assumption that contradicts a communicated assumption. Here, the
most likely candidate for the communicated assumption that is potentially
contradicted isn't the proposition expressed by Q (i.e. the speaker needs some fresh
air) or a higher-level explicature (e.g. the speaker is saying that she needs some fresh
air), but an implicature of Q (i.e. the speaker wants to go for a walk). The inference
from it's raining to the speaker doesn't want to go for a walk is licensed by a
relatively easily accessible and generally accepted assumption, such as people don't
normally want to go for a walk in the rain.
I believe that this has shown that the procedure in (81), not only makes it
possible to account for the whole range of examples involving although, but that it
can also explain why, at least taken out of context, some although utterances are
easier to process, and therefore more likely to be judged acceptable, than others.
In section 6.3.2 I promised to show later that an adequate analysis of although
is able to explain the fact that Konig's examples (47) and (48) seem to receive the
same interpretation. This is the point at which I should make good my promise.
(47) This house is no less comfortable because it dispenses with air-conditioning.
Not(Q because P)
(48) This house is no less comfortable although it dispenses with air-conditioning.
Not-Q although P
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Let me start with (48). As above, although indicates that the hearer is to suspend an
inference from P, here this house dispenses with air-conditioning, that leads to a
contradiction. In this case, it is plausible that not-Q, i.e. this house is no less
comfortable, is the assumption that would be contradicted and that an assumption
along the lines of (82) licenses the suspended inference.
(82) If a house dispenses with air-conditioning, it's less comfortable.
Surely, it's conceivable that what lies behind the assumption in (82) is a belief that a
house's lack of air-conditioning causes it to be less comfortable. Now, (47) can be
paraphrased as (83).
(83) It is not the case that the fact that this house dispenses with air-conditioning
causes it to be less comfortable.
In other words, someone uttering (47) is saying that, in this particular case, the
house's lack of air-conditioning doesn't cause it to be less comfortable. It seems,
then, that both, (47) and (48), involve the suspension of a potential move from cause
to consequence, i.e. from the house's lack of air-conditioning to its being less
comfortable. A speaker of (47) asserts that this move doesn't take place in the real
world, while a speaker of (48) uses although to indicate that it is to be suspended in
the hearer's mind.
6.5 Q although P vs. Although P, Q
At the beginning of this chapter I noted that, particularly when it comes to
'adversative' uses of although, there seems to be a difference in acceptability or ease
of processing between utterances of the form in (58) and those of the form in (59).
(58) Q although P
(59) Although P. Q
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In particular, I observed that there was a tendency to prefer (13b), (15b) and (19b) to
their corresponding (a) utterances.
(13) a.	 I need some fresh air although it's raining.
b.	 Although it's raining, I need some fresh air.
(15)	 a.	 Bill is short although John is tall.
b.	 Although John is tall, Bill is short.
(19) a.	 He has long legs although he is a bit short of breath.
b.	 Although he is a bit short of breath, he has long legs.
I believe that this difference can be explained in processing terms. The procedure in
(81) means that a hearer needs access to two assumptions in order to find an although
utterance acceptable, i.e. to be able to process it smoothly along the lines indicated
by although:
(i) the assumption that licenses the suspended inference; and
(ii) the assumption which the inference, if performed, would contradict.
This is necessary because the hearer needs to know which inference from P the
speaker intends him to suspend. Obviously, accessing (i) involves accessing (ii) and
accessing (ii) makes it easier to access (i). It is precisely in the order in which (i) and
(ii) are likely to be accessed that utterances of the form in (58) are different from
those of the form in (59).
In the standard 'concessive' examples, such as (1), even though (a) and (b)
are processed differently, given the different order of the clauses, there is no
noticeable difference in the processing effort that is required. Therefore, there is no
difference in acceptability between (la) and (ib).
(1)	 a.	 Peter went out although it was raining. 	 Q although P
b.	 Although it was raining, Peter went out. 	 Although P, Q
However, when it comes to 'adversative' examples, where the suspended inference is
from P to the negation of an implicature of Q, the difference in processing paths
leads to a difference in processing effort. For instance, consider (19).
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(19) a.	 He has long legs although he is a bit short of breath.	 Q although P
b.	 Although he is a bit short of breath, he has long legs. Although Q, P
Personally, I find (19b) considerably more acceptable than (19a). In parallel to the
interpretation suggested for the corresponding but utterance in chapter 5, I would
argue that the suspended inference goes from P (he is a bit short of breath) to the
negation of the implicature of Q given in (84). The assumption that combines with P
to license this inference might be something like (85).
(84) He is a good runner.
(85) If X is short of breath, X is not a good runner.
An utterance of (19a) or (b) is most likely to be given this kind of interpretation in a
scenario in which speaker and hearer are discussing who is a good runner or some
such thing. In such a scenario, a hearer of (19b) is very likely to form the correct
hypothesis as to which inference he is to suspend straightaway and he will have no
problems at all in processing the utterance along the lines intended by the speaker.
Hence, its undoubted acceptability.
Things are not quite as simple for a hearer of (19a), who processes Q first.
Such a hearer is quite likely to derive the implicature in (84) in the scenario
described and, therefore, should have no problems in realising which inference he is
to suspend. Nevertheless, because he will just have processed the encoded meaning
of Q (i.e. he has long legs), the proposition expressed by this clause will be highly
accessible and he is likely to consider first the hypothesis that this is the potentially
contradicted assumption. In other words, the hearer may well first access an
assumption which would license the inference from P (he is a bit short of breath) to
the negation of the proposition expressed by Q, e.g. fX is a bit short of breath, then
X doesn't have long legs. No doubt, he will discard this assumption as soon as he's
accessed it. However, his accessing it at all means that (19a) involves more
processing effort than (19b).
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6.6	 But vs. although - revisited
In the first two sections of this chapter I discussed some of the similarities and
differences between but and although. Now that I've proposed procedural analyses
of both, it should be possible to explain these similarities and differences in terms of
the procedures encoded by but and although. The procedure encoded by but is given
in (86), that encoded by although in (81), repeated below.
(86) What follows (Q) denies an accessible assumption.
(81) Suspend an inference from what follows (P) which results in an unresolvable
contradiction.
Both of these procedures can apply in cases where P implies not-Q: the but
procedure applies because in such a case Q denies not-Q; the although procedure
because the inference from P to not-Q has to be suspended in order to avoid a
contradiction. Similarly, in cases where P implies not-R and Q implies R both
procedures can apply: the but procedure because Q indirectly denies not-R, which is
accessible from P; the although procedure because the inference from P to not-R
must be suspended to avoid a contradiction between not-R and R.
These two procedures can also explain why but can give rise to many more
'interpretations' than although. The procedure but encodes is much simpler and
more general than that encoded by although. In particular, it is now possible to
explain why although can't occur discourse-initially. One possible reason for this is
explored by Rouchota (1998b: 47), who stresses that subordinate clauses quite
generally have to be embedded in main clauses and, therefore, can't occur in
isolation. No doubt, this observation is correct. However, the although procedure
suggested in this chapter also rules this out, at least for discourse-initial isolated
although clauses. Recall that although indicates that an inference from the clause it
introduces has to be suspended because it results in an unresolvable contradiction.
Such a contradiction can only arise where at least one other assumption is being
communicated by the same speaker. This also explains why utterance-initial
occurrences of isolated although clauses, such as Mary's utterance in (21), are only
acceptable when uttered with an interrogative intonation.
265
(21) Peter: I think John is wonderful.
Mary: *Although he cheated on you./Although he cheated on you?
As before, although indicates that the hearer is to suspend an inference from he
cheated on you because it leads to an unresolvable contradiction. The contradiction
is clearly between the proposition expressed by Peter's utterance and an implication
one would derive from John cheated on Peter and the cheated party doesn't usually
think the cheating party is wonderful. However, Mary isn't the one who
communicated the assumption that Peter thinks John is wonderful. So, there strictly
speaking isn't an unresolvable contradiction and it isn't actually up to Mary to
indicate that the inference should be suspended. All she can do, and what I believe
she does do by uttering the although clause as a question, is tentatively attribute the
suspension of this inference to Peter and hope that her pointing out that there is an
inference that has to be suspended in this way if one is to believe both that Peter
thinks John is wonderful and that John cheated on Peter. If Mary wanted to object to
Peter's thinking that John is wonderful more forcefully, she should have uttered (87),
where what she is denying might well be the assumption that it's okay for Peter to
think John is wonderful or, indeed, the clearly accessible assumption that John is
wonderful.
(87) But he cheated on you!
The final set of examples I want to consider come from R. Lakoff (1971:
137). She correctly observes that an utterance of (88) is perfectly acceptable, while
neither (89a) nor (b) can be uttered felicitously.
(88) John would be a doctor today, but he failed chemistry.
(89) a.	 *Although John would be a doctor today, he failed chemistry.
b.	 *John failed chemistry although he would be a doctor today.
R. Lakoff doesn't give an explanation of these differences but simply states that the
use of but involved doesn't seem to be either straightforward denial of expectation or
'semantic opposition'. I would argue that what's going on here is that the but clause
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in (88) denies the accessible, but clearly not manifest, assumption John is a doctor
today. The although examples are unacceptable because, to parallel the but
utterance, the suspended inference would have to go from P (i.e. John would be a
doctor today) to the negation of a communicated assumption - most probably (and
accessibly) the proposition expressed by Q (i.e. John failed chemistry). However,
the only accessible assumption that could license this inference is the completely
implausible (90).
(90) If someone would be a doctor today they didn't fail chemistry.
In this chapter I hope to have shown that a procedural account of the meaning of
although, on which it is seen as indicating that an inference has to be suspended
because it results in an unresolvable contradiction, is not only descriptively adequate
but also goes a long way towards explaining which although utterances are judged
acceptable and, in particular, when an although utterance can be used to achieve an
interpretation similar to a corresponding but utterance, and when it cannot.
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CHAPTER 7:
CONCESSIVE CONDITIONALS: THE CASE OFEVENIF
7.1	 Even and even if
At the beginning of chapter 5 it was observed that, given the right context, an even if
utterance, such as (la) or (b), can receive an interpretation similar to that of the but
utterance in (2) or the although utterances in (3a) and (b).
(1) a.	 Even if it's raining, Peter will go out.
b.	 Peter will go out, even if it's raining.
(2) It was raining but Peter went out.
(3) a.	 Although it was raining, Peter went out.
b.	 Peter went out although it was raining.
Konig (e.g. 1986) refers to such even if conditionals as concessive (or "irrelevance")
conditionals. According to him (1986: 234), concessive conditionals of the form Q,
even (f P or even if P, Q' entail Q and conventionally imply if P, then normally not-
Q. At a first glance, this seems roughly right. An utterance of (la) does indeed seem
to communicate that Peter will go out and that Peter wouldn't normally go out in the
rain. Similarly, if Mary says (4) to Peter, he will, no doubt, take her to communicate
that she won't marry him2.
(4) Even if you were the last man on earth, I wouldn't marry you.
In this, there is a marked difference between even if-conditionals and
'ordinary' conditionals, such as (5a) or (b).
There doesn't seem to be any difference in meaning between conditionals of the form Q, even if P
and those of the form even if P. Q, and I'm using the two interchangeably.
2 I find it slightly more doubtful that Mary would also be conventionally implicating that if he were
the last man on earth she would normally marry him, or that a woman would normally marry the last
man on earth.
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(5)	 a.	 If it's raining, Peter will go out.
b.	 Peter will go out if it's raining.
Quite clearly, someone uttering (5a) or (b) will not be taken to communicate either
that Peter will go out or that, if it's raining, Peter normally wouldn't go out. On the
contrary, a speaker might well utter either of the above on the basis of her
assumption that Peter normally goes out in the rain.
In Konig's view concessive conditionals share some properties with both
concessives and conditionals. Recall, that, according to him, concessives of the form
P but Q or although P. Q/Q although P entail both P and Q and conventionally
implicate if P. then normally not-Q. Conditionals of the form if P. then Q, on the
other hand, entail neither P nor Q. In other words, concessive conditionals are
similar to concessives in that they entail Q and in that they carry the same
conventional implicature, while they are similar to ordinary conditionals in that they
don't entail P.
If Konig's observations are right, and even if-conditionals do indeed entail
their consequents, then the presence of even makes a difference to the truth
conditions of the utterance. For instance, an utterance of (la) or (b) would be true
just in case Peter will go out. An utterance of (5a) or (b), on the other hand, is true
just in case Peter will go out if it's raining. In other words, even if P, Q isn't truth-
conditionally equivalent to if P, then Q. This means that there is a marked difference
between but and although, on the one hand, and even if, on the other: As mentioned
in the previous two chapters, neither but nor although makes a difference to the truth
conditions of the utterances in which it occurs. That is, (2) and (3a, b) will both be
true just in case Peter went out and it was raining.
Intuitively it isn't clear that Konig is right about the truth conditions of even if
P. Q. It seems at least strange that there should be such a lot of linguistic material,
i.e. the whole antecedent (including even and /), that doesn't make a contribution to
the truth-conditional content of the utterance3. For the moment, I'm leaving the
question of whether or not even makes a difference to the truth conditions of the
This only holds if Konig's claim is that Q is all that is entailed by even if?, Q. It isn't entirely clear
if this is, indeed, what Konig believes. It seems at least interesting (and somewhat strange) that
Konig's (1986: 234) list of entailments of if?, Q is empty.
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utterances in which it occurs. I will take it up again in 7.6.2. Even if even doesn't
have truth-conditional meaning, it seems clear that its addition to a conditional, in the
examples looked at so far, has a fairly dramatic effect on what is communicated. So,
what is this difference between even .conditionals and 'bare' conditionals down to?
Possibly the simplest (and the most attractive) hypothesis is that the
difference is entirely down to the meaning of even and how it interacts with the
conditional. In other words, the meaning of an even if-conditional is the
compositional4 result of the meanings of its constituents, including even and f This
is the kind of approach taken by most theorists who have concerned themselves with
even if, e.g. Bennett (1982), Lycan (1991) and Barker (1991, 1994). Of course, there
are exceptions to this rule. For instance, Poliock (1976) lists (subjunctive) even if
conditionals as a separate class of conditionals and seems to treat even if as an
"idiomatic lump", to use Bennett's (1982: 414) expression.
The 'compositionality' hypothesis is supported by the fact that by far not all
even f.conditionals fulfil Konig's criteria for concessive conditionals. There are a
o,-t
number of different ways in which even can interact with conditionals depending the
focus of even. For instance, compare Bennett's (1982: 410) example in (6) with my
own (4).
(6)	 Even if he drank just a little, his boss would fire him.
(4)	 Even if you were the last man on earth, I wouldn't marry you.
Clearly, (6) as uttered, for instance, by Jill about John's incredibly puritanical and
intolerant boss Sue, neither entails nor implies its consequent (not even weakly) - Jill
will not be taken to communicate that Sue will fire John by her utterance of (6).
Bennett explains this difference in implications as being a matter of the focus of
even: According to him, in (6), the focus of even is just a little, while, in (4), it is the
whole antecedent, including ,5• Bennett's account of even and even if will be
discussed in more detail shortly.
Note that the notion of 'compositionality' used here, is to be understood as covering more than the
conceptual compositionality tested for in previous chapters. That is, it includes cases where one or
more procedures operate on the conceptual content of an utterance.
The compositionality assumption is supported by the fact that even and if don't always have to
occupy adjacent positions for the utterance to receive a 'concessive conditional' interpretation. For
instance, I wouldn't marry you if you were the last man one earth, even is likely to receive the same
270
Because it seems that concessive even if-conditionals are most likely to be the
result of the compositional interaction between even and if, I will not only consider
even if conditionals in this chapter, but I will also look at a range of accounts of the
meaning of even and investigate how they explain its function in conditional
sentences. Needless to say, the compositionality assumption means that for a
complete account of the meaning of even if-conditionals what is needed is not just an
account of the meaning of even but also an account of the meaning of if. However,
providing such an account would almost certainly take up several more theses.
Nevertheless, at least Lycan (1991) and Barker (1991, 1994) do give accounts of the
meaning of if as well as even and I will briefly discuss these. Where my own
analysis is concerned, I will assume a more or less intuitive analysis of the
conditional and indicate how even could interact with it on this assumption.
However, my own analysis is compatible with any account of the meaning of
conditionals.
In what follows, I will begin by presenting a number of philosophical
accounts of even and even if, starting with Bennett's (1982) account, to which all the
others whose accounts will be discussed have reacted in some fashion. Before going
on to look at these other accounts I will give a general overview of the issues on
which most theorists agree and those on which they disagree. I will divide the
accounts under consideration into two groups: 'universal' and 'existential'. Finally, I
will explore the possibilities of analysis afforded by the cognitive approach of
Relevance Theory before ending with a summary of chapters 5 to 7 and some
observations concerning the generalisations that may be made about procedural
meaning on the basis of the procedural accounts of but, although and even proposed
in these chapters.
interpretation as (4). In this, even f clearly differs from even though, which is far more likely to be an
"idiomatic lump" - an utterance of I won't marry you, though you 're the last man on earth, even is not
acceptable and certainly wouldn't be interpreted in the same way as I won't marry you even though
you're the last man on earth.
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7.2	 A starting point: Bennett's (1982) 'non-truth-conditional' account6
Bennett (1982) gives an account of the meaning of even in non-truth-conditional
terms. That is, he believes that there is no truth-conditional difference between (1)
and (5) or between (7) and (8).
(1)	 a.	 Even if it's raining, Peter will go out.
b.	 Peter will go out even if it's raining.
(5)	 a.	 If it's raining, Peter will go out.
b.	 Peter will go out if it's raining.
(7) Even Max tried on the trousers.
(8) Max tried on the trousers.
According to him (1982: 404-405), a sentence like that in (7) can be uttered
felicitously just in case Max tried on the trousers, someone else tried on the trousers
too, and it is more surprising that Max tried on the trousers than that the other person
did. In order to capture these conditions slightly more formally, Bennett introduces
the following terminology: Assuming that S is a sentence containing even, S is S
without even, while the "neighbour" sentences of S are those that differ from 5* just
in the element that is the focus of even7. For an S like (7), where Max is the focus of
even, S is (8) and some possible neighbour sentences, S and Sk, are as follows:
S:	 Fritz tried on the trousers.
Sk:	 Moritz tried on the trousers.8
Bennett (1982: 405/6) now claims that an utterance of S will be felicitous if and only
if S* is true and there is a neighbour S such that:
6 Of course, there are earlier accounts of even than Bennett's (e.g. Horn 1969, Fauconnier 1975,
Anscombre & Ducrot 1976). I have chosen Bennett's account as my starting point because the other
analyses here discussed all react to it in one way or another.
' Somewhat confusingly, Bennett refers to this as the 'scope' of even.
notational conventions will be adhered to throughout the rest of this chapter.
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(i)	 is true, and mutually believed by speaker and hearer, and salient for them
(e.g. it has just been authoritatively asserted);
(ii) the truth of SK and that of S can naturally be seen as parts of a single more
general truth;
(iii) it is more surprising that S is true than that S is true.
Leaving aside any worries about the vagueness of the requirement that the two
sentences be part of the same "single more general truth", and the strictness of the
requirement that both speaker and hearer must believe the relevant neighbour
sentence, these conditions seem to capture intuitions about the use of even.
Bennett (1982: 412) makes it clear that the only condition for the truth of an
even sentence is that the corresponding sentence without even (i.e. 5*) be true. The
conditions in (i)-(iii) above are needed for a felicitous utterance of the sentence, but
their falsity (or their not obtaining), according to him, is not enough to render the
sentence false. Thus, he believes that an even utterance implies that the three
conditions hold, but it doesn't entail it. He (1982: 412) also stresses that the nature
of this implication is not the same as that of Grice's conversational implicatures,
but rather that it is "a fact about the meaning of the word even" that these things are
implied. In other words, to use Gricean terminology, even carries a conventional
implicature.
Since Bennett believes that there is no truth-conditional difference between
non-conditional S and S* and that even if-conditionals are the result of a
straightforward compositional combination of even and if, he also believes that there
is no truth-conditional difference between f P. Q and even if P. Q. Nevertheless, he
acknowledges that some even f utterances, such as (4), strongly imply their
consequents, while maintaining that others, for instance (6), don't.
(4)	 Even if you were the last man on earth, I wouldn't marry you.
(6)	 Even if he drank just a little1his boss would fire him.
He explains the difference between such examples in terms of the focus of even and,
consequently, a difference in neighbour sentences.
It seems reasonable to assume that in (6) just a little is the focus of even and
that a reasonably likely S for this example would be something like If he drank a lot
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his boss would fire him. The case of (4) is slightly more complicated. Intuitively,
the focus of even seems to be the antecedent, i.e. you are the last man on earth and If
you weren't the last man on earth I wouldn't marry you, or maybe If! were in love
with someone else I wouldn 't marry you, are possible Ss. If this were right, then an
utterance of (4) would imply that (at least) one of these Ss is true and more likely
than If you were the last man on earth, I wouldn't marry you. On its own, this
doesn't explain why an utterance of (4) is understood as implying that the speaker
won't marry the hearer. It will be seen later that it can explain this fact, once some
extra assumptions have been added. However, Bennett (1982: 411) opts for an
entirely different explanation.
He claims that, in cases like this, the whole of the antecedent, including if is
the focus of even and that S isn't conditional at all. Instead, he maintains that S in
the case of (4) is I won't marry you. The advantage of this account is that it captures
the fact that one feels that an utterance of (4) strongly implies that the speaker won't
marry the hearer: The truth of S, (I won't marry you) is necessary for a felicitous
utterance of (4). The disadvantage of this account is that it is counterintuitive. It will
be discussed in greater detail in the next section and in 7.4.4.
It becomes clear why Bennett claims that in examples like (4) the whole of
the antecedent including if is in the focus of even if one compares it with a case like
(9), where, according to him, the whole antecedent excluding if is the focus of even.
(9)	 Even if his wife smoked, his boss would fire him.
Imagine (9) being uttered in the same scenario as (6), i.e. one in which John's boss is
so puritanical that she not only won't tolerate any 'libertine' behaviour on the part of
her employees but her intolerance extends to her employees' friends and family.
Uttered in such a scenario, argues Bennett (1982: 410), (9) doesn't imply its
consequent. However, it is quite clear that the focus of even must be the whole
antecedent, i.e. his wife smoked, and (6) would be a possible S. Now, since all that is
needed for a felicitous utterance of (9) is the truth of SK (his boss would fire him if
his wife smoked) and the truth of a conditional S (e.g. f he drank just a little, his
boss would fire him), there is no reason to assume that it implies his boss will fire
him. Thus, on Bennett's account, it is the difference in focus between (4) and (9)
with its resulting difference in Ss that explains why the former implies its
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consequent while the latter doesn't. It will be seen in section 7.4.4 that this
explanation isn't viable.
7.3	 Points of agreement and points of contention
There seems to be general agreement in the (philosophical) literature that Bennett's
account captures the necessary conditions (or something approaching them) for the
felicitous use of even (where truth conditions are understood as a subset of felicity
conditions). More precisely, most theorists agree that an utterance of (7) not only
implies (and actually entails) that Max tried on the trousers, but also that someone
else tried on the trousers and that someone else's trying on the trousers is more (or
less) x than Max's doing so. In other words, there is widespread agreement that (the
use of) even involves existential quantification (e.g. there is an x #Max s.t. x tried on
the trousers) and scalarity (e.g. 'Ma.x tried on the trousers is more surprising than
Peter tried on the trousers'). However, there are a number of points on which the
different accounts diverge.
First, a number of theorists (e.g. Lycan and Barker) believe that even doesn't
just involve existential quantification but universal. According to them, (7) doesn't
just imply that someone other than Max tried on the trousers but that everyone (in a
certain group) did. Second, given that even sentences seem to have (at least) three
different implications, there is also a question as to which of these are entailments.
All theorists are agreed that S* is an entailment of S, but some theorists (e.g. Lycan)
believe that the existence of a universal or existential S (and possibly the scalar
implication that S* is more x than the Ss) is entailed, too, and not just implied non-
logically. Finally, there are differing opinions on what property x S possesses more
of than S, and how many Ss it is that S* is more x than.
Bennett's account fits into this picture as follows: He proposes a non-truth-
conditional 'existential' account, i.e. for him it's enough that one S be true and more
surprising than S*, and S* is the only implication of S that is an entailment.
There is further disagreement when it comes to the question of how the
meaning of even combines with the conditional. As just seen, Bennett believes that,
at least in certain cases, there is only one S for even if-conditionals, i.e. the
consequent. This means that his treatment of even in such conditionals isn't entirely
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parallel to his treatment of even in other cases: For instance, in the case of (7),
comparing the surprisingness of S* (Max tried on the trousers) with that of Sj (e.g.
Fritz tried on the trousers) is straightforward: Max was less likely than Fritz to try on
the trousers and so Max's trying them on is more surprising than Fritz's. In (4), on
the other hand, comparing the surprisingness of Sc (If you were the last man on
earth, I wouldn't marry you) with that of S, (i.e. I won't marry you) isn't very
straightforward at all. It will be seen in section 7.4.4 that Lycan takes up this point.
For (4) to receive the same treatment as (7), S should be something like If you
weren't the last man on earth, I wouldn't marry you or If I were in love with someone
else, I wouldn't marry you. Then, 5c would be more surprising than S3 because the
likelihood of the speaker not marrying the hearer in the circumstance that the hearer
is the last man on earth is smaller than that of her not marrying him in other
circumstances.
In what follows, I will start by looking at accounts that treat even in terms of
universal quantification, before considering a second 'existential' account. For all of
these accounts I will ask whether they treat any of the implications apart from S* as
entailments, and how they capture the detail of even's scalar nature and the
interaction of even with the conditional.
7.4	 'Universal' accounts
7.4.1 Lycan's first account
Lycan (1991) bases his analysis of the meaning of even if-conditionals on his account
of ordinary conditionals and on an intuitively correct paraphrase of sentences of the
form Q, even if P. According to him (1991: 125), conditionals of the form if P, then
Q should be analysed as "in any relevant event that is a "real" possibility relative to
this occasion and in which P. Q". More formally he renders this as (10).
(10) (e E R) (In(e, P) In(e, Q))
This means that conditionals crucially involve universal quantification. For instance,
(5) would be analysed as "in any relevant event that is a "real" possibility relative to
this occasion and in which it's raining, Peter will go out".
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(5)	 a.	 If it's raining, Peter will go out.
b.	 Peter will go out if it's raining.
Lycan (1991: 126) then stresses that the meaning of even in even if is no different
from its meaning anywhere else. In other words, he believes that even if is
compositional. He would, therefore, paraphrase (1), for instance, as (11), which, in
turn, he sees as roughly equivalent to (12).
(1)	 a.	 Even if it's raining, Peter will go out.
(11) Peter will go out even in events in which it's raining.
(12) Peter will go out in any event, including events in which it's raining.
A formal rendering of the example is given in (13) and a formal rendering of the
general case Q, even if P in (14).
(13) (e e R) (In(e, Peter will go out) & (fE R) (In(J it's raining) In(f Peter will
go out)))
(14) (e E R) (In(e, Q) & (fE R) (In(f P) In(f Q)))
(13) reads "In any event e that's a real and relevant possibility, Peter will go out, and
in any event f that's a real and relevant possibility, Peter will go out if it's raining"
or, slightly less complicated, "Peter will go out in any event, including any in which
it's raining" (Lycan 1991: 129-30). In other words, Lycan sees even as a universal
quantifier. As he (1991: 129) notes, his account of even if is a truth-conditional one,
that is, unlike for Bennett, for him, the truth conditions of Q even if P are different
from those of Q if P. That is, according to Lycan, (5) is true just in case Peter goes
out in any event in which it's raining, while the corresponding even if-conditional in
(1) is true just in case Peter goes out in any event, including one in which it's raining.
I will consider the question whether even makes a difference to the truth conditions
of utterances in which it occurs in 7.6.2. For the moment, there is more to be said
about Lycan's account of even and even if
It goes without saying that this analysis, as given above, is capable only of
accounting for even in combination with if, and, even in those cases, it doesn't allow
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for focus distinctions, i.e. while (14) may adequately capture the truth conditions of
an example like (1) or (4), it decidedly won't do for an example like (6).
(4)	 Even if you were the last man on earth, I wouldn't marry you.
(6) Even if he drank just a little his boss would fire him.
Quite clearly, an utterance of this sentence in the scenario described above (i.e. one
in which the boss is so puritanical she won't stand for any drinking at all) isn't
adequately paraphrased as "His boss would fire him in any event, including one in
which he drank just a little". For this reason, and in order to be able to account for
the meaning of even in general, not just when it co-occurs with a conditional, Lycan
(1991: 130) proposes the account in (15) to capture the truth conditions of any
sentence containing even. Note that he allows for the context-dependence of even
sentences by giving them conditional truth conditions, much like Higginbotham's
(1988) for sentences containing indexicals, which were discussed in chapter 1.
(15) Where S is a sentence containing even, C is the constituent of S and of its
corresponding S' that is the focus of even in S, unsaturated dashes "--------
indicate the result of subtracting even and C from 5, and G is a contextually
determined class containing at least one member ^ C: S is true iff every
member x of G including the referent of C is such that ----x----.
Lycan (1991: 130)
This means that, for instance, assuming that the focus of even is Max and that the
contextually determined class is, say, a group of friends including Fritz, Moritz and
Max, an utterance of (7) will be true if everyone in the group, including Max, tried
on the trousers.
(7) Even Max tried on the trousers.
In other words, the truth conditions of (7) are quite radically different from those of
(16), which will be true just in case Max tried on the trousers.
(16) Max tried on the trousers.
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This, again, makes it clear that, for Lycan, even is truth-conditional. In the light of
this, it is interesting to note, however, that he doesn't see every aspect of the meaning
of even as affecting truth conditions. He (1991: 122) points out that S* or, more
precisely, the element that is the focus of even must be an extreme point on some
scale, which doesn't necessarily have to be one of expectedness or likelihood. For
instance, for an utterance of (7) to be acceptable in a given context, Max, in this
context, must be less likely than, say, Fritz and Moritz, to try on the trousers.
However, Lycan (1991: 130) makes it clear that he doesn't see this scalar aspect of
even as part of its truth-conditional meaning, but rather as being conventionally
implicated or "lexically presumed".
Given the above account, it should now be possible to bring out the
difference between (4) and (6). In the case of the former, the focus of even quite
clearly is the whole antecedent (i.e. if you were the last man on earth), G will contain
a number of other conditions (e.g. f you weren't the last man on earth, if I were in
love with someone else, etc.). According to the schema in (15), an utterance of (4)
will be true iff under all the conditions in G (which will, presumably include all real
and relevant possibilities or, in terms of the account given earlier, R), including the
one in which the hearer is the last man on earth, the speaker wouldn't marry him.
This explains why (4) seems to entail or imply that the speaker won't marry the
hearer (at least not under any imaginable circumstances). By contrast, the focus of
even in (6), on the 'puritanical boss' interpretation, is just a little, G will contain
other amounts (e.g. a lot, quite a lot, a few glasses, etc.). An utterance of (6) will be
true if the boss would fire John if he drank any of the amounts in G, including just a
little. This explains why an utterance of (6), at least on the interpretation here
considered, doesn't imply or entail that John will be fired.
7.4.2 Counterexamples to Lycan's first account
Lycan's analysis of even as it has been given so far encounters a series of apparent
and real counterexamples. He (1991: 136-141) discusses four, dismisses two and
modifies his account to accommodate the last two (of which he deems the second
more important). I will here only briefly sum up the first counterexample and
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Lycan's treatment of it, before going on to look at the final two and the modifications
they lead to in some more detail.
The first potential counterexample to any theory of even, as discussed by
Bennett (1982: 408-410), is that even can be used as an intensifier of comparatives.
For instance, on what is probably the most natural interpretation of (17), even seems
to lead to the implication that both Bill and John are very tall.
(17) Bill is even taller than John.
Quite clearly, such an interpretation doesn't fit Lycan's schema in (15) (nor does it
fit Bennett's analysis). Lycan follows Bennett in dismissing examples of this sort
because they involve an even that is lexically different from the even their analyses
attempt to describe. Both theorists cite as supporting evidence the fact that in a
French translation of (17) even would be rendered as encore (as in (18)), while in the
examples discussed earlier, e.g. (7), even would be translated as même (e.g. as in
(19)).
(18) Bill est encore plus grand que John.
(19) Même Max a essayé les pantalons.
I have argued in 5.6.3 that, appealing though it may be, this line of argument isn't
compelling. It would, therefore, seem at least worth investigating whether this use of
even in English could be accounted for without positing a lexical ambiguity.
However, because this issue doesn't seem relevant to the combination of even with if,
I will concentrate exclusively on the uses of even described earlier.
Both of the last two counterexamples Lycan considers aim at the heart of his
account, i.e. at the idea that even universally quantifies over a contextually
determined class. The examples in question are given in (20) and (21).
(20) I'll be polite even if you insult me, but I won't be polite if you insult my wife.
(21) Even Bluto stayed home.
It's reasonably obvious why (20) is problematic for Lycan's account of even.
According to his schema, an utterance of the first conjunct of this sentence would be
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true just in case the speaker will be polite in every relevant event, including one in
which the hearer insults him, while the second conjunct will be true iff, in any event
in which the hearer insults the speaker's wife, the speaker won't be polite. In other
words, if Lycan's analysis is right, it seems that (20) should be contradictory, which
it clearly isn't.9
(21) only creates a problem in a very specific context. Consider the following
scenario: A large group of people are invited to a party, all of whom are quite likely
to attend. Of the whole group Gonzo and Bluto are the most likely to attend.
However, on the night of the party there's a flu outbreak and everyone feels pretty
horrible. Gonzo is the only person who drags himself to the party. In such a
scenario an utterance of (21) would be perfectly acceptable, even though not
everyone in the relevant group stayed at home. The same problem is posed by my
own example in (22), which is set up in such a way that the relevant group of people
is most likely to be the whole family or, at least, all the relatives at the wake and
therefore will include uncle Jack.
(22) Everyone came to the wake. Even Granny stayed sober. Only uncle Jack got
drunk.
I believe that this example is interesting because it is also problematic for Lycan's
revised analysis of even, which I will discuss now.
7.4.3 Lycan's revised account
As indicated above, examples such as (20) and (21) led Lycan to modify his analysis.
He considers two options, but I will only discuss the one he ultimately prefers.
Instead of saying that even means "every.. . including.. ." (e.g. "everyone including
Max tried on the trousers"), Lycan (1991: 147) suggests that even might mean
"every.. .plus...", where the domain of the quantifier is restricted to expected real
Lycan (1991: 138-140) considers a whole range of ways in which this counterexample could be
disposed of. One of these, is that the domain of relevant events is adjusted from the first clause to the
second. That is, that one might well assume in the first clause that the relevant events include those in
which the hearer insults the speaker's wife but the second clause makes it clear that it doesn't.
Because the solution to the problems posed by the next counterexample also solves those created by
the present one, I'm not discussing this possibility in any more detail.
281
and relevant possibilities (e.g. "everyone who was expected to, plus Max, tried on the
trousers").
This account can clearly deal with (20) and (21). The first clause of (20) is
no longer paraphrased as "I will be polite in every relevant event, including those in
which you insult me" but as "I will be polite in every relevant event in which you'd
expect me to be, plus in those in which you insult me". It seems reasonable to
assume that the hearer insulting the speaker's wife will not be one of the relevant
events in which the speaker would be expected to be polite and, so, there is no
contradiction between the two clauses. Similarly, (21) is no longer paraphrased as
"Everyone in the group, including Bluto, stayed home" but as "Everyone in the
group whom you would expect to stay home did, plus Bluto". This paraphrase is, of
course, perfectly compatible with a scenario in which Gonzo, whom one wouldn't
expect to, didn't stay home.
I've just shown that Lycan's revised account can deal with some of the
examples his initial account can't explain. However, his initial account had the
advantage of explaining straightforwardly why Q even if P seems to entail Q and he
(1991: 147) admits that his new "plus" theory of even predicts that Q even f P does
not entail Q. On the new account, Q even if P is rendered as "Q in any expected
event plus in the event that P". Now, quite obviously, the set of expected events will
not necessarily contain any actual events so that the truth of Q is not guaranteed by
that of Q even if P. Lycan (1991: 148) resigns himself to this consequence and says
that "it is no longer clear that the entailment holds in real life", because examples
along the lines of (20) can be found for every single utterance containing even if.
Therefore, he admits, it is probably too strong a claim that someone uttering Q even
f P asserts Q, or, indeed, that Q even if P logically entails Q. Instead, he (1991: 148)
consoles himself (and the concerned reader) with the fact that his new "plus" theory
of even does explain why Q even if P usually comes with a strong implication that Q:
As mentioned above, on the new analysis, Q even if P is rendered as "Q in any
expected real and relevant event, plus any in which P". As Lycan points out, this
does entail that Q is among the expected real and relevant possibilities, which he says
"is at least NEARLY to assert Q", at least in cases where there is no overt qualification
to the effect that Q is ruled out (1991: 148). It seems, however, that whether or not Q
is communicated is now a matter of pragmatics, i.e. it is no longer a direct result of
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the encoded meaning of even and it isn't clear whether Lycan would now see Q as
part of the truth-conditional content of Q even if P.
This shows that Lycan can, at a pinch, explain why an utterance of (4)
strongly implies its consequent. The question is whether he can also explain why an
utterance of (9) doesn't imply the truth of its consequent at all.
(9)	 Even if his wife smoked, his boss would fire him.
This is a particularly pertinent question because on Lycan's account there is no
difference in the focus of even between the two utterances, i.e. in both cases even
focuses on the antecedent excluding f and the relevant comparison class is one of
conditions in both cases. It seems that Lycan would paraphrase (9) as "In any
expected event that's a real and relevant possibility, his boss would fire him plus in
the event that his wife smokes". Quite obviously, this isn't how an utterance of (9)
in the scenario described above would be interpreted. A more appropriate paraphrase
of the intended interpretation would be something like "His boss will fire him in any
event in which he behaves in a 'libertine' manner plus any in which his wife
smokes." It seems, then, that, for Lycan's account to work for this example, the
comparison class of expected relevant and real possibilities has rto be restricted to a
greater extent than in the case of (4) and other examples that imply their consequents.
The question is why? To find an answer to this, let me reconsider an aspect of
Lycan's revised analysis.
As mentioned above, according to Lycan (1991: 147), an utterance of the
form Q, even if P is true just in case Q in any expected circumstance, plus any in
which P. In the light of the above question, the interesting aspect of this is that "any
expected circumstance" can be interpreted in two ways: It could be (a) any expected
circumstance at all, or (b) any circumstance one would expect to justify Q. In fact,
for these even if examples to be parallel to non-conditional even examples, the
paraphrases must contain (b). Recall that (7) is paraphrased as "Everyone you would
expect to try on the trousers did, plus Max". That is, the relevant comparison class
here includes people one would expect to try on the trousers and not people one
would expect, full stop. By analogy, the relevant comparison class for (4), for
instance, has to be circumstances in which one would expect the boss to fire John
and not circumstances one would expect in general. In other words, (4) must be
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paraphrased as "I wouldn't marry you in any event in which you would expect me
not to marry you, plus in any event in which you are the last man on earth".
Similarly, (9) must be paraphrased as "His boss would fire him in any event in which
you'd expect her to fire him, plus any in which his wife smokes". Now, it may not
be immediately obvious how these paraphrases can explain that an utterance of (4)
implies that the speaker won't marry the hearer, while an utterance of (9) doesn't
imply that John's boss will fire him.
The difference between the two cases is that, as far as circumstances in which
a woman won't marry a man are concerned, those in which he is the last man on
earth are about as extreme as it gets. That is, if there is any circumstance in which
one would expect a woman to marry a particular man, it is, at least according to
conventional wisdom, one in which he is the last man on earth. Therefore, if a
woman communicates that she wouldn't marry a man in this extreme circumstance,
it's more than likely that she wouldn't marry him in any other circumstance either
and, therefore, that she won't marry him, tout court. By contrast, of all the
circumstances in which John could be fired, that in which his wife smokes is fairly
extreme, but it is by far not the most extreme. It would, for instance, be far more
extreme if Sue fired John if he did everything she told him to do. In other words, the
circumstance in which John's wife smokes is simply not extreme enough for it to be
concluded from the fact that Sue would fire him in this circumstance that she would
fire him in all other circumstances, too, and, therefore, there is no implication that
she will fire him.
There is a further interesting difference between Lycan's two accounts.
Recall that his initial account doesn't include the relative degrees of expectedness in
the truth-conditional specification of sentences containing even. The new analysis,
however, does, at least to some degree, for now, given the new schema for the truth
conditions of even sentences in (23), an utterance of such a sentence can be given
truth conditions only if the element in the focus of even isn't a member of the set of
expected real and relevant possibilities.
(23) Where S is a sentence containing even, C is the constituent of S and of its
corresponding 5* that is the focus of even in 5, unsaturated dashes "--------
indicate the result of subtracting even and C from 5, and G is a contextually
determined class of expected, real and relevant possibilities containing at least
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one member: S is true iff every member x of G plus the referent of C is such
that----x----.
This observation highlights something that is intuitively right, i.e. that there is
something amiss if the element in the focus of even is among the class of expected
elements. For instance, there would be something very strange (and unacceptable)
about someone uttering (7) in a scenario in which one would expect Max to try on
the trousers. However, it seems doubtful that this strangeness should be down to the
fact that the utterance can't be given truth conditions in such circumstances.
7.4.4 Lycan or Bennett?
Lycan (1991) points out a number of problems with Bennett's account. One of them
is that Bennett's requirement that there has to be just one S that meets his three
conditions (i.e. that is "known", "related" and less surprising than S*) is not strong
enough. Lycan (1991: 142) envisages the following scenario: There's a party and
almost everyone who's been invited is very likely to go, with the exception of
Clarence, who is very shy, and James, who is virtually autistic and even less likely to
go to a party than Clarence. Now, imagine there's a flu outbreak and everyone stays
at home. Since James is more likely to have stayed home than Clarence, and James
stayed home is "known" and "related" to Clarence stayed home in the required ways,
an assertion of (24) should be felicitous according to Bennett's criteria.
(24) Even Clarence stayed home.
However, it is highly doubtful that such an utterance really would be felicitous in the
given scenario - I, for one, don't find it acceptable. At the very least I find an
utterance of (24) in this scenario misleading, because it implies that Clarence was
less likely (or less something) than everyone else who stayed home, which isn't the
case here. It seems, then, that, in particular, Bennett's requirement that there be just
one S that is more surprising than 5* isn't sufficient.
Lycan's revised account can explain the unacceptability of this example
along the following lines: As indicated above, on this new account, (24) can be
given truth conditions only if Clarence isn't one of the people whom one would
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expect to stay home. However, in the scenario described above, Clarence clearly
would be expected to stay home.
Another point in which Lycan sees a problem with Bennett's account is
connected with the latter's claim that the neighbour sentence (Si) for a sentence, such
as (4), is its consequent, e.g. (25).
(4)	 Even if you were the last man on earth, I wouldn't marry you.
(25) I won't marry you.
According to Lycan (1991: 120), this claim raises two questions: (i) how does S
meet the "relatedness" condition and (ii) how can a conditional and its free-standing
consequent be related as neighbours? The first question amounts to asking what
general truth e.g. If you were the last man on earth, I wouldn't marry you and I won't
marry you are part of. Question (ii) is more important, Lycan assumes that the
notion of a neighbour sentence is grounded in that of a "natural reference-class" of
items. For instance, in (7), where the focus of even is Max, this natural reference-
class would be the group of individuals who tried on the trousers.
(7)	 Even Max tried on the trousers.
The idea is then that Bennett's third condition (concerning the unexpectedness of 5*)
could be captured by saying that, compared with a salient other person (e.g. Montz)
who tried on the trousers, Max was less likely to do so. Lycan's problem with
Bennett's account of conditionals such as (4) is that it is not clear that in such cases
the conditional S* and the non-conditional S assumed by Bennett define a similar
reference-class: The conditional S* (e.g. If you were the last man on earth, I wouldn't
marry you) seems to suggest that the natural reference-class in question should be a
set of conditions in which the speaker won't marry the hearer. If this were the case,
the use of even in (4), for instance, would, among other things indicate that,
compared with other conditions under which the speaker won't marry the hearer, the
one in which he is the last man on earth is less likely. In other words, what is being
compared is the relative surprisingness of a class of conditions under which the
speaker wouldn't marry the hearer. The problem with Bennett's claim that S in this
case is I won't marry you, as Lycan sees it, is that this isn't a condition and that it's
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not possible to compare the expectedness of you were the last man on earth with that
of nothing. Obviously, Lycan's own account, as demonstrated in 7.4.3, provides a
more intuitively convincing explanation of these examples than Bennett's.
In sum, it seems that Lycan's analysis of even and even if should be preferred
on two counts: First, it has no trouble explaining the unacceptability of (24) in the
scenario described and, second, it gives a more intuitive account of how and why
examples like (4) imply their consequents. However, it's far from clear that Lycan's
analysis is correct. In particular, it is doubtful that even is linked with universal
quantification quite in the way he envisages.
The requirement that every member x of G (which now corresponds to the set
of expected real and relevant possibilities) has to be such that ----x----, e.g. that in (7)
everyone who is expected to try on the trousers has to have tried them on for an
utterance of the sentence to be true, still seems too strong.
(22) Everyone came to the wake. Even Granny stayed sober. Only uncle Jack got
drunk.
It seems to me that (22) could be uttered perfectly felicitously and truthfully even in
a scenario where the relevant comparison class includes uncle Jack and he is a
confirmed teetotaller and, therefore, most decidedly among the group of people
expected to stay sober. In other words, it seems that, far from being true iff everyone
who was expected to stay sober plus Granny (who wasn't) did stay sober, (22) can be
true in cases where not everyone who was expected to stay sober did, just as long as
Granny didn't get drunk. If this is right, then it is doubtful that even sentences imply
a universal quantification along the lines of (23).
(23) Where S is a sentence containing even, C is the constituent of S and of its
corresponding S* that is the focus of even in S, unsaturated dashes "---- --"
indicate the result of subtracting even and C from S, and G is a contextually
determined class of expected, real and relevant possibilities containing at least
one member: S is true if every member x of G plus the referent of C is such
that----x----.
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I will show later that there is a role for universal quantification here, just not quite at
the level at which Lycan sees it as applying.
7.4.5 Barker: a 'non-truth-conditional' universal account
Barker starts by discussing Bennett's account of even and even f and he appeals to a
number of counterexamples to show that the three conditions Bennett places on the
felicitousness of even-sentences, though they may be necessary, are not sufficient.
According to Barker (1991: 4-5), Bennett's three conditions on a neighbour sentence
S, (i.e. that it be "known", "connected" and less surprising than S*) are met in the
examples in (26)-(28), but the utterances containing even are still not felicitous.
(26) scenario: Looking out of the window A expects to see only family members
in the front yard, he sees three figures and remarks truly:
A: There's Pa and Grandma outside and even Ronald Reagan!
B: Even Reagan is outside!
(27) A: Only three people won a prize this year: Brain and Smart, as expected,
and, unexpectedly Smith, who is last year's worst student.
B: Even Smith won a prize!
(28) A: Out of a thousand people few died of the disease, two old ladies, a child,
a young woman, surprisingly, and even the man everyone thought
completely invulnerable.
B: Even he died of the disease!
As already mentioned, all three examples meet Bennett's three conditions for a
neighbour S (and S* is true in all cases, too). I will follow Barker in only
demonstrating this for (26). Here, in B's utterance, S' is Reagan is outside, and there
is at least one S (e.g. Grandma is outside) available which is (i) true and salient in
the context (A has just asserted it), (ii) (together with S*) part of a single more
general truth, i.e. there are three people outside, and (iii) less surprising than S*.
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From the existence of such counterexamples Barker concludes that Bennett's account
of even is insufficient and he moves on to propose an alternative account of his own.
According to Barker (1991: 10), the felicity conditions of an even-statement
are those given in (29). Note that these are assumptions that are necessary for an
even sentence to be uttered felicitously and not truth conditions. In other words,
neither (1) nor (ii) is entailed by an even utterance - they are both 'merely' implied.
(29) (i) S' and S, are asserted as universal instantiation cases of an implied or
stated S.
(ii) S* is an extreme instance of S.
On this account, a sentence like (7) can be uttered felicitously just in case Max tried
on the trousers (S*) and, say, Moritz tried on the trousers (Si) are asserted as
universal instantiation cases of an implied or stated S, e.g. Everyone in the group
tried on the trousers, and that Max tried on the trousers (S*) is an extreme case of
Everyone tried on the trousers (Sn).
(7)	 Even Max tried on the trousers.
There's an obvious problem with this, namely that the S in question (e.g. Peter tried
on the trousers) doesn't have to be explicitly asserted at all for an utterance of an
even sentence to be felicitous. (7), for example, can be asserted without any S being
asserted along with it'°. Giving the benefit of the doubt to Barker, I will assume that
by 'assert' he may mean nothing stronger than 'communicate' and it does seem right
that a speaker uttering (7) will at least be communicating that someone else tried on
the trousers too (though I'm not convinced that anything more specific than that, e.g.
that Moritz tried on the trousers, needs to be recovered by the hearer in order to
understand the utterance). However, if 'asserting' is merely understood as
'communicating', then an important difference in status between 5* and S is lost:
As many theorists have observed (e.g. Karttunen & Peters 1979: 12), if S* turns out
to be false, the whole utterance will have been false, while the falsity of S is
10 In claiming that S, must be asserted, Barker's account appears to echo Anscombre & Ducrot (e.g.
1983), who only seem to consider examples of the form F, and even Q and analyse even as indicating
that Q is the stronger argument than P for the same conclusion R (cf. 3.3.4).
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sufficient to make the utterance infelicitous but not false. However, these are
relatively minor considerations.
Whatever problems Barker's account might encounter, it looks as though he
can at least explain why the even utterances in (26)-(28) are not felicitous. For
instance, in (26) S is Reagan is outside, while the Ss are Pa is outside and Grandma
is outside. The problem is that it's hard to see what S these Ss could be
instantiations of. It can't be all members of A's family are outside and it can't be all
American citizens are outside. This explains why an even utterance in this scenario
is infelicitous. It seems clear that similar explanations can also be given for the even
utterances in (27) and (28). In the former, the S can be neither all students won a
prize nor all talented students won a prize and in the latter it can't be everybody died
of the disease or everybody weak died of the disease.
Let me now turn to the question of how Barker's account of even works in
cases like (4) where even combines with a conditional.
(4)	 Even if you were the last man on earth, I wouldn't marry you.
Analogous to other examples involving even, an utterance of (4) will be felicitous
just in case S' (If you were the last man on earth, 1 wouldn't marry you) and S, (e.g.
If I was in love with someone else, 1 wouldn't marry you) are instantiations of an
explicit or implied S (e.g. I wouldn't marry you under any circumstance) and S* is
an extreme case of S,. If this is, indeed, how Barker would account for the example
in (4), then it seems that he can explain with ease why an utterance of this sentence
implies that the speaker won't marry the hearer. If she won't marry him under any
circumstance, then she clearly won't marry him, full stop. What is more, it seems
that Barker's account can also explain why an utterance of (9) in the envisaged
scenario (i.e. one in which the boss is so puritanical she won't stand for any
'libertine' behaviour on the part of her employees or their families) does not entail
that his boss will fire him.
(9)	 Even if his wife smoked, his boss would fire him.
Here, Barker might claim, the implied S is not His boss would fire him in any
circumstance but rather His boss would fire him in any circumstance in which he or
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his family are behaving in a 'libertine' manner. As he himself (1991: 16) states, this
means that, in cases where an utterance of Q even if P 'entails' Q, this isn't due to its
logical form. Instead, it seems that the difference in implications between these two
examples is down to a difference in the domain of the universal quantification that is
implied by the use of even, i.e. in the case of (4) the speaker is understood to be
quantifying over all circumstances, while in (9) she is only understood to be
quantifying over circumstances in which John or his family behave in a 'libertine'
manner. Clearly, there is nothing semantic (i.e. encoded) that determines the domain
of quantification in each case. In other words, the hearer has to work out what it is
on purely pragmatic grounds.
Barker (1994) gives a more detailed account of the "consequent-entailment
problem" for even if-conditionals. In particular he (1994: 252 & 254) considers
cases where, according to him, the focus of even isn't on the whole antecedent but
only on one particular word in the antecedent. For instance, in (30) if is the focus of
even and in (31) it is does.
(30) Even if Basil turns up, the party will be fine.
(31) The party will be fine even if Basil does turn up.
In such cases, Barker believes, there is only one S available, namely the party will be
fine if Basil doesn't turn up and the universal quantification associated with even
quantifies over a domain of just two constituents: S" and S. In other words, the
universal quantification implied by (30) and (31) is that in (32).
(32) In either case, if Basil turns up or doesn't turn up, the party will be fine.
This means that Barker's analysis of at least some even if-conditionals is quite close
to Bennett's in that he treats them as implying only one neighbour sentence. Note,
however, that Barker avoids the difficulty for Bennett discussed in 7.4.4, because
both S* and S on his account are conditional and it is, therefore, possible to compare
straightforwardly their relative likelihoods (or to say that one is more extreme than
the other).
From the above discussion, it will be clear that Barker's (1991) account
shares much with Lycan's (1991), though the two were developed independently of
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each other. Not the least of their similarities is that they both see an important role
for universal quantification. However, they differ in that, for Lycan, the universal
quantification is a matter of the truth conditions of even sentences, while, for Barker,
it is merely a matter of felicity conditions. Furthermore, Barker's analysis is closer
to Lycan's initial account than to the account Lycan ultimately adopts. For this
reason, Barker's account encounters problems not just in the form of the
counterarguments to Lycan's revised analysis but also those to his initial analysis.
This is the case although Barker treats as non-truth-conditional much of what Lycan
treats as truth-conditional, because none of the counterarguments to Lycan's analyses
aim at their truth-conditional status.
Summing up, the proponents of the 'universal' accounts discussed in this
section highlight a number of counterexamples to Bennett's 'existential' analysis,
and their accounts are equipped to deal with them. However, neither Lycan's nor
Barker's analyses are entirely satisfactory themselves because they still can't
adequately account for the full range of examples involving even. In the next section
I will consider a further 'existential' account to see whether there are ways of
avoiding the difficulties with Bennett's analysis without having to buy into the
problematic idea of even as a universal quantifier.
7.5	 An 'existential' alternative: Francescotti (1995)
Francescotti (1995) offers an alternative to Lycan's and Barker's accounts of even in
'non-truth-conditional', 'existential' terms and, thus, an analysis much closer in spirit
to Bennett's. Like Bennett (and Barker), he doesn't believe that even affects the
truth conditions of the utterances in which it occurs, instead he believes that even
carries a conventional implicature. However, his analysis differs from Bennett's in
that it requires more than one true neighbour to be more likely (or less surprising)
than S*. The felicity conditions on the use of even, according to Francescotti (1995:
162 & 167), are those in (33).
(33) (i)	 for any contextually-determined, true neighbour S of S*, the truth of
5* and that of S, can naturally be seen as parts of a more general truth,
and
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(ii)	 there is some contextually-determined aspect X, such that S* is more
surprising than most Ss with respect to X.
This analysis avoids all counterexamples to accounts of even in terms of universal
quantification. For instance, recall (22) uttered perfectly felicitously and truthfully in
a scenario in which uncle Jack is a confirmed teetotaller. As I argued above, Lycan's
revised analysis can't account for this example - according to him, an utterance of
(22) is true just in case Granny stayed sober in addition to everyone whom one would
have expected to stay sober (a group which clearly includes uncle Jack in the
envisaged scenario).
(22) Everyone came to the wake. Even Granny stayed sober. Only uncle Jack got
drunk.
Barker's analysis, too, can't deal with this example adequately. According to him
the even sentence must be an extreme instance of a universally quantified assumption
and it isn't clear what this could be in this scenario. It certainly can't be all relatives
stayed sober or everyone at the wake stayed sober. In other words, both Lycan and
Barker would predict the even utterance in (22) to be infelicitous in the envisaged
scenario and Lycan would predict it to be false. Clearly, it is neither.
Francescotti's account can deal with this example without any problems.
According to him, an utterance of (22) is felicitous just in case the following two
conditions hold. (i), any contextually determined Ss (e.g. Auntie Jill stayed sober,
Dad stayed sober, Mum stayed sober, etc.) can be seen as forming part of a more
general truth together with S* (i.e. Granny stayed sober). In the envisaged scenario,
this general truth might be something like 'A great number of family members stayed
sober at the wake". (ii), there is some contextually-determined aspect X, such that
S* (Granny stayed sober) is more surprising than most of the Ss (Auntie Jill stayed
sober, Dad stayed sober, Mum stayed sober, etc) with respect to X (which might be
something like 'subjective likelihood').
"In my discussion so far I've been happily ignoring my very serious worries about this notion of
"single more general truth", first introduced by Bennett (1982) and adopted by Francescotti (1995). I
will address these worries in my evaluation of Francescotti's analysis below.
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Interestingly, this shows that Francescotti's analysis does involve universal
quantification. That is, his condition (i) states that any S, must form part of a more
general truth together with S*. Contrary to Lycan and Barker, he doesn't require
there to be universal quantification over a comparison class, i.e. there is no claim that
(22) should imply or entail that everyone in a particular group stayed sober. As it
stands Francescotti's account actually doesn't seem to require that anyone other than
Granny stayed sober either, but this is clearly an oversight. That is, his analysis
should, surely, specify that for the felicitousness of an even utterance at least one true
S fulfilling the conditions in (33) is needed - no doubt, he is implicitly assuming
this, but for a completely explicit and adequate analysis he would need to include this
as one of his felicity conditions. After all, the need for the truth of at least one
neighbour sentence for the felicitous utterance of an even sentence seems to be one
of the few points on which all theorists agree - nobody is claiming that an utterance
of (7) could be felicitous if Max was the only person who tried on the trousers
(though, of course, consensus on whether it could be true in the same circumstances
is less widespread).
(7)	 Even Max tried on the trousers.
Francescotti's account can also deal with Lycan's counterexample to Bennett, i.e.
(24) uttered in a scenario in which everyone stayed home and Clarence was slightly
less likely to stay home than James, but more likely than anyone else.
(24) Even Clarence stayed home.
Recall that the problem for Bennett was that there is one S (i.e. James stayed home)
that is true, known and less surprising than S* (Clarence stayed home).
Francescotti's condition (ii) means that he can deal with this example. As mentioned
above, this condition states that SF must be more surprising than most Ss. Now, the
difficulty with example (24) in the envisaged scenario isn't a lack of true or related
Ss (everybody stayed home, so there is a large supply of Ss - one for each member
of the group). The problem is that S* (Clarence stayed home) is more likely than
most of them and only less likely than one of them (i.e. James stayed home). In
other words, in this scenario, Francescotti's condition (ii) isn't met - Clarence wasn't
294
less likely to stay home than most of the others who did - and he would correctly
predict an utterance of (24) to be infelicitous in this scenario.
Let me now consider how Francescotti's account of even fares with the even
if examples (4), (6) and (9). The most important question is whether and how he
could explain why (4) 'entails' or implies its consequent while the other two don't.
(4)	 Even if you were the last man on earth, I wouldn't marry you.
(6)	 Even if he drank just a little his boss would fire him.
(9)	 Even if his wife smoked, his boss would fire him.
Intuitively, it seems to me that he might not find it entirely straightforward to explain
why (4) strongly implies that the speaker won't marry the hearer. If one ,\his (1995:
162 & 167) two conditions to (4), its utterance should be felicitous just in case the
conditions in (34) hold.
	
(34) (i)	 for any contextually-determined true neighbour Si (e.g. If I were in
love with somebody else, I wouldn't marry you; If! didn't like you, I
wouldn't marry you; etc.) of 5* (i.e. If you were the last man on earth,
I wouldn't marry you), the truth of S and S can naturally be seen as
parts of a more general truth, and
(ii) there is some contextually-determined aspect X, such that S* (i.e. If
you were the last man on earth, I wouldn't marry you) is more
surprising than most of the Ss with respect to X (which could be
something like 'generally accepted standards').
It seems to me that the only way in which this could predict that an utterance of (4)
'entails' or implies that the speaker won't marry the hearer is that the "more general
truth" S* and S, must naturally be part of is something like 'I wouldn't marry you in
any circumstance'. There is, however, absolutely nothing in this analysis that
indicates that the "more general truth" in question couldn't be something weaker, e.g.
'There are a number of circumstances in which I wouldn't marry you'. It seems then
that this analysis leaves it entirely up to pragmatics whether or not an utterance of Q
even if P implies Q or not. Now, given that not all utterances of Q even f P do seem
to imply the truth of Q, this doesn't strike me as an undesirable outcome.
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Nevertheless, the adequacy of an analysis that does leave this kind of question to
pragmatics to decide can be judged only once the pragmatic processes involved have
been accounted for - unfortunately, Francescotti (1995) doesn't provide such an
account.
Above, I have shown that Francescotti's has no problems in dealing with
Lycan's counterexample to Bennett's analysis. 	 However, things are less
straightforward when it comes to Barker's counterexamples. I'll here just look at
one of the three examples Barker (1991: 4-5) cites (they are all listed in 7.5.4).
(27) A: Only three people won a prize this year: Brain and Smart, as expected,
and, unexpectedly Smith, who is last year's worst student.
B: Even Smith won a prize!
According to Barker, B's utterance in (27) is infelicitous even though it fulfils
Bennett's three conditions. So, does it also meet Francescotti's two conditions or
does his account deal with this type of example adequately? On Francescotti's
account the felicity conditions for B's utterance here would be something like those
in (35).
(35) (i)	 for any contextually-detennined, true neighbour S (i.e. Brain won a
prize, Smart won a prize) of S* (Smith won a prize), the truth of S
and that of S can naturally be seen as parts of a more general truth,
and
(ii)	 there is some contextually-determined aspect X, such that S* (Smith
won a prize) is more surprising than most S,s (Brain won a prize,
Smart won a prize) with respect to X (which here might be
something like 'likelihood on the basis of previous performance').
Once more it seems to me that the key point is that of the "more general truth"
required by condition (i). One way in which one might explain why B's utterance in
(27) is not felicitous is by claiming that there is no "more general truth" that S' and
the 53s could naturally be seen as part of. If that were the case, then this wouldn't be
a counterexample to Bennett's account either. However, Barker takes care of this
possibility by maintaining that the more general truth in question could easily be
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'only three people won a prize'. Now, one way in which Francescotti (or Bennett,
for that matter) could respond to this is to say that, for one reason or another, 'only
three people won a prize' isn't the right kind of general truth. This, of course, is
begging the question. Francescotti (1995: 170-172) opts for a different response.
His first step is to argue against Barker's own analysis of even. Although he
does so convincingly and on perfectly good grounds, this course of action can hardly
be seen as dealing with the counterexample. He tackles this by arguing that the
infelicitousness of Barker's example has nothing to do with the use of even itself. He
first states that S* only has two true neighbours (Brain won a prize and Smart won a
prize) and that, therefore, Smith won a prize "is just barely in the majority"
(Francescotti 1995: 171). I am not entirely sure what he means by this, but I assume
that he must be referring to his condition (ii), according to which 5c has to be more
surprising than most of its true neighbours. If this is the case, what he must mean is
that Smith won a prize is only just more surprising than most of its true neighbours.
Quite obviously, that's not the case. As mentioned above, in this scenario Smith won
a prize has only two true neighbours, i.e. Brain won a prize and Smart won a prize,
and, as Francescotti (1995: 170) himself concedes, in the envisaged scenario it is
clearly more surprising than either of those. In other words, S* (Smith won a prize)
is not only more surprising than most of its true neighbours - it's more surprising
than all of them. So, this first step in Francescotti's reply to Barker's
counterexample is at best mysterious and at worst quite wrong.
The second step Francescotti takes is to argue that the use of even in B's
utterance in (27) is missing the speaker's point. According to him (1995: 171), this
utterance "would be appropriate only if the speaker were emphasising the
unexpectedness of Smith's winning relative to that of Brain and Smart" and he
further claims that A's utterance is doing something completely different, i.e.
stressing how few people won a prize and how surprising Smith's winning a prize is
given that so few people did. He maintains that (36), which captures the point that is
being made by A more accurately, is perfectly acceptable.
(36) You mean even Smith won a prize when so few were able to do so!
Whether or not this utterance is acceptable, this line of argument still doesn't address
Barker's worry. B still wouldn't be able to utter Even Smith won a prize in a
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scenario in which the content of A's utterance was true and known by B, but in
which A hadn't said anything and, therefore, there would be no point of A's
utterance for B's utterance to be missing. It seems, then, that these examples need an
explanation that isn't provided by Francescotti.
To conclude this section, although Francescotti gives an account that can
avoid all counterexamples to the 'universal' analyses discussed in 7.4, as well as
Lycan's counterexample to Bennett's account, Barker's counterexamples to
Bennett's account present a problem for Francescotti, too. In other words, none of
the accounts discussed so far can deal with the full range of examples. In the next
section, I will give a summary of these problematic examples, who they're
problematic for and why, before considering a question I have touched on without
trying to resolve it, i.e. whether the meaning of even makes a difference to the truth
conditions of the utterances in which it occurs.
7.6	 Taking stock
7.6.1 The problematic examples
As just mentioned, none of the accounts of the meaning of even discussed so far can
handle all the possible counterexamples that have been appealed to. It seems that
'universal' accounts equipped to deal with examples problematic for 'existential'
accounts run into problems avoided by 'existential' accounts and vice versa. In what
follows I will 'translate' all counterexamples into one scenario in the hope that it
may become clearer how to find an analysis of even that can handle them all.
Since what seems to be needed for all counterexamples is a group of people
who are ranked in some way according to the likelihood or surprisingness' 2 of their
doing something, I will stick with a group of students and the relative likelihoods of
each of their passing an exam. They are listed in (37), starting with the most likely to
pass.
12 Lycan (1992: 122) and Francescotti (1995: 164-168) both refer to Kay's (1990) arguments against
treating even as necessarily involving the notion of likelihood or unexpectedness. However,
Francescotti convincingly argues that Kay's (1990: 84) examples ultimately all can be accounted for
in terms of relative unexpectedness.
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(37) June, Mark, April, Julie, Augusta, Sebastian and Neville.
Now, Lycan's counterexample to Bennett can be translated as (A).
(A) Scenario: Everyone failed the exam, Sebastian and Neville are both more
likely to fail than the others and Neville is more likely to fail than
Sebastian.
Susan: ?Even Sebastian failed the exam.
This presents a problem for Bennett because his account doesn't require more than
that there be one S (in this case, Neville failed the exam) that is less surprising than
S*. As Francescotti shows, all that is needed to avoid this counterexample is a
strengthening of this to the requirement that SK be more surprising than most Ss,
which isn't fulfilled under the circumstances.
Barker's counterexample translated into these terms might come out
something like (B).
(B) Scenario: Only June, Mark and Neville pass the exam and the others don't.
Susan: ?Even Neville passed the exam.
Because Neville's passing the exam is more surprising than either of the others', this
example not only meets Bennett's conditions but also Francescotti's. In fact, set out
like this, this example might present a problem for Lycan's revised account, too. It is
at least conceivable that June and Mark were the only people expected to pass the
exam on this occasion and, therefore, that Lycan's truth condition is met, i.e. that
everyone who was expected to pass, plus Neville, did pass. So, the only account that
can deal with this example is Barker's own, which requires that Neville passed the
exam be an extreme instance of a universal quantification, such as everyone in the
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group passed the exam. Clearly, this requirement isn't met in the envisaged
scenario'3.
However, there are counterexamples to this account, too. Recall, for
instance, the counterexample to Lycan's first account. Applied to our group of
students, Susan's utterance is perfectly acceptable in the scenario in (C) even though
not everyone in the group passed the exam.
(C) Scenario: Everyone except Neville passed the exam.
Susan: Even Sebastian passed the exam.
Assuming that, in this scenario, everyone, except Neville and Sebastian, was
expected to pass the exam, Lycan's revised account can explain why this utterance is
acceptable (and would be judged true): it is, indeed, the case that everyone who was
expected to, plus Sebastian, passed the exam. Barker would find it more difficult to
deal with this example, because, for him, its acceptability requires that Sebastian
passed the exam be an extreme instance of a universal quantification. However, it's
difficult to see what this universal quantification could be. It can't be everyone in the
group passed the exam, because Neville didn't, and it can't be everyone who was
expected to passed the exam, because Sebastian isn't a member of the group of
people who were expected to pass and, therefore, Sebastian passed the exam couldn't
be an extreme instance of that quantification. It seems that the only alternative is the
tautologous everyone who passed the exam passed the exam.
Finally, there is my own counterexample to Lycan's revised account. This
can be translated as (D). Again, Susan's utterance is perfectly acceptable, even
though not everyone who was expected to pass did.
(D) Scenario: Everyone passed the exam with the exception of June, who failed
for mysterious reasons.
Susan: Even Neville passed the exam.
' It will be seen below that my adapting Barker's original examples makes it more difficult to account
for.
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In fairness to Lycan, it has to be said that Susan's utterance on its own, without her
adding that June failed would most likely be taken to be implying that everyone,
including June, did pass. The problem is more that such an overt qualification
doesn't result in any sort of contradiction, which casts doubt on Lycan's claim that
the universal quantification of "everyone who was expected to, plus Neville, passed
the exam" is a matter of the truth-conditional content of Susan's utterance in (D)
(this question will be discussed in greater detail in 7.6.2).
Since Barker doesn't claim that the universal quantification is anything more
than an implicature, it seems that this example doesn't present a problem for him.
After all, implicatures can be cancelled without contradiction. However, if Barker
sees the implication of a universal quantification as a matter of conventional
implicature, i.e. the encoded meaning of even, there might yet be a problem, because
it isn't normally possible to cancel a conventional implicature without contradiction.
For instance, (38), where the but-clause is intended to cancel the premise-conclusion
relationship conveyed by the use of therefore, sounds odd in way that (39), where the
but-clause cancels the assumption that everyone in the group passed the exam
doesn't.
(38) ?Peter is an Englishman and he is, therefore, brave, but I don't mean to imply
that his being brave follows from his being an Englishman.
(39) Even Neville passed the exam, but not everyone did.
Even if Barker could deal with this example, it has been shown that his account trips
up on (C).
Summing up, it seems that the most difficult example to accommodate is (B),
which is analogous to Barker's (26)-(28). Out of all the accounts considered only
Barker's own can explain why this is unacceptable. However, (C) (and conceivably
also (D)) present an insurmountable difficulty to Barker's account. The challenge,
then, is to find an account that is 'universal' enough to explain why Susan's utterance
in (B) is unacceptable, but not so 'universal' that it couldn't account for the
acceptability of (C) and (D).
301
7.6.2 Is even truth-conditional?
It was mentioned in the introduction to this chapter that Konig treats Q even if P as
truth-conditionally different from Q f P (and Q although P). It has also been seen
that Lycan treats even as making a difference to the truth conditions of the utterances
in which it occurs. Everyone else, however, sees the contribution of even roughly in
terms of conventional implicature 14. Since there is such a sharp divide between
accounts, it should be possible to choose between them, at least as far as the truth-
conditional status of even is concerned, by testing whether or not even affects the
truth conditions of its host utterances.
As mentioned before, a good way of sharpening one's intuitions about the
truth conditions of a given utterance is to embed the sentence in question in the scope
of a logical operator or a causal connective and see whether the element of meaning
in question falls under the scope of the operator. I'll start by considering the effect of
even when added to a conditional (when its focus is the whole antecedent). (41) is an
embedding of (40) and (43) is one of (42).
(40) Sue wouldn't marry Phil even if he had a beard.
(41) Because Sue wouldn't marry Phil even if he had a beard, he'd better not
propose to her.
(42) Sue wouldn't marry Phil if he had a beard.
(43) Because Sue wouldn't marry Phil if he had a beard, he'd better not propose to
her.
The question is whether a speaker uttering (41) is giving a different reason why Phil
had better not propose to Sue than a speaker uttering (43). There does, indeed, seem
to be a difference. A speaker uttering (41) seems to be saying that Phil shouldn't
propose to Sue because she would refuse him in any circumstance. A speaker
uttering (43), on the other hand, seems to be saying that the reason Phil shouldn't
propose to Sue is that she wouldn't marry him if he had a beard (and, therefore, that
14 Note that the notion of 'conventional implicature' intended here is to be understood in a weaker
sense than Grice's speech-act notion, i.e. simply as 'non-truth-conditional' encoded linguistic
meaning.
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she has an irrational prejudice against bearded men or, perhaps, that she doesn't
really love him, because she would be put off by something as trivial as his having a
beard). It seems, then, that even does make a difference to the truth conditions of the
conditional sentences it occurs in. The question is whether Konig is right and those
truth conditions are (or at least include) Sue won't marry Phil. If this were the case,
then a speaker uttering (41) should be taken to claim that the reason why Phil
shouldn't propose to Sue is that she won't marry him and there should be no
appreciable difference between an utterance of (41) and one of (44).
(44) Because Sue won't marry Phil, he'd better not propose to her.
Now, I'm not satisfied that there is no difference between these two utterances and
not even that they both give the same reasons why Phil shouldn't propose to Sue. It
seems that Konig doesn't get the truth conditions of 'concessive' conditionals right.
However, there is a difference between the reasons given in (41) and in (43) and,
therefore, in the truth conditions of (40) and (42). So, can the only other 'truth-
conditional' account, i.e. Lycan's, capture this difference?
Recall that, according to Lycan, even if P. Q is true just in case Q in every
expected circumstance plus in those in which P, while f P. Q is true just in case Q in
any circumstance in which P. This means that, on his account, (40) should be true
just in case Sue won't marry Phil in any circumstance in which one would expect her
not to marry him, plus in any circumstance in which he has a beard. This should also
be the reason why Phil shouldn't propose to her given in (41). By contrast, (42)
should be true if and only if Sue won't marry Phil in any circumstance in which he
has a beard and this should be the reason given in (44). Clearly, Lycan's account of
these examples comports with intuitions better than Konig' s. Nevertheless, it seems
to me that the reason given by a speaker uttering (41) isn't that Sue won't marry Phil
in any expected circumstance plus in any circumstance in which he has a beard, but,
rather, that Sue won't marry Phil in any circumstance (including any in which Phil
has a beard). In other words, Lycan's initial account seems better able to cope with
this example. However, as seen in 7.4.2, there are a number of good reasons for not
adopting this account. So, how can the difference between (41) and (43) be
explained? And, more specifically, does this difference really indicate that there is a
truth-conditional difference between (40) and (42)?
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If the answer to this last question is negative, then this has some serious
consequences for the usefulness of the scope test. That is, if it turns out that
something that clearly isn't part of the truth-conditional content of an utterance can,
nevertheless, fall under the scope of a causal connective, then falling under the scope
of a causal connective is no longer indicative of truth-conditionality. Worryingly, it
seems that this is possible. Consider Mary's utterance in (45).
(45) Peter: Would you like to go to the cinema?
Mary: I'm tired.
Quite clearly, Mary communicates that she doesn't want to go to the cinema with her
utterance. Equally clearly, Mary doesn't want to go to the cinema isn't part of the
truth conditions of her utterance of I'm tired - that utterance is true just in case Mary
is tired (to some specific degree). However, a speaker uttering (46) is surely
conveying that the reason why Peter won't book cinema tickets is that Mary won't
want to go to the cinema and not that she is tired.
(46) Because Mary is tired, Peter won't book cinema tickets.
In other words, because seems to take in its scope an aspect of the interpretation of
Mary is tired that clearly isn't part of its truth-conditional content. This means, that
embedding under the scope of because isn't as reliable a test for truth-conditionality
as previously assumed. Why could this be?
Looking for causal connections seems to be a central human pursuit (witness
the fact that and-conjunctions and juxtapositions of two sentences seem to be given
causal interpretations wherever possible). In fact, it isn't particularly surprising that
humans do pay so much attention to causal connections. After all, if it can be
established that there is a causal connection, say, between events of type A and
events of type B, then it will be possible to make reliable predictions about what is
going to happen once an event of type A has taken place. In other words,
assumptions concerning causal connections are valuable to a cognitive system
because they enhance its predictive power. Therefore, a possible explanation for the
fact that because can take in its scope more than just truth-conditional content is that
causal connections are so important to us. If this is the case, then the scope test
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might be saved if it is restricted to logical operators. However, causality is so
pervasive that if... then gets interpreted causally wherever possible, and (47) shows
that it, too, seems capable of taking scope over 'non-truth-conditional' aspects of
meaning.
(47) If Mary is tired, Peter won't book cinema tickets.
This only leaves the natural language equivalent to (exclusive) v, i.e. either.. .or (I'm
assuming that negation is ruled out because of its great metalinguistic potential). So,
the question is whether embedding (40) and (42) under the scope of either... or shows
a difference between them. If these two utterances are truth-conditionally equivalent
(and if either... or only takes scope over truth-conditional meaning) an utterance of
(48) has the logical form of either P or P and it should be unacceptable, because of
redundancy.
(48) ??Either Sue wouldn't marry Phil even if he had a beard or Sue wouldn't
marry Phil if he had a beard.
It's not clear that there is no redundancy here, and the utterance doesn't seem
particularly acceptable. However, this could be because if utterances can, in the right
circumstances receive an even if interpretation and having the even if sentence first
makes accessible this interpretation. Therefore, the order of the two should be
changed to exclude this possibility.
(49) ?Either Sue wouldn't marry Phil if he had a beard or Sue wouldn't marry Phil
even if he had a beard.
Interestingly, (49) doesn't seem particularly acceptable either (though perhaps
slightly more so than (48)). It seems, then, that even might not make a difference to
the truth conditions of the utterances in which it occurs after all. However, caution is
advisable even where either... or is concerned - (50) shows that this construction,
too, can be used metalinguistically.
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(50) Either you went to see the hippopotamuses or you went to see the
hippopotami.
The 'moral' of the discussion in this sub-section is that the embedding test
isn't as reliable as one might like to think. In fact, there might be a good explanation
for this. The claim that f. .then and either. ..or can only take scope over the truth-
conditional content of utterances seems to be based on the assumption that they
correspond to the logical connectives —k and v (exclusive). However, while this
might be true of their encoded meaning, there is absolutely no reason to assume that
this is all they convey when used in utterances. In other words, there seems to be far
too much 'interference' in the shape of inferred meaning for the scope test to work
reliably. This means that the conclusion of this sub-section is somewhat
unsatisfactory: it isn't clear whether even affects truth conditions or not. I will argue
in 8.3.2 that the questions of what the truth conditions are of a given utterance and
whether a particular expression contributes to them aren't at all important for a
cognitive account of utterance interpretation. What one should concentrate on,
instead, is (a) the totality of what is communicated by an utterance and (b) its
encoded meaning. Thus, I return to the question of the linguistically encoded
meaning of even.
7.7	 A cognitive approach to even and even if
7.7.1 Contradiction and elimination
Delgado (1999) proposes an account of even grounded in the framework of
Relevance Theory. According to her, even encodes a procedure which indicates two
things 15 : (a) that the utterance is to be processed in a context of assumptions that
differ from the proposition expressed (S*) only in the element in the focus of even
(i.e. a context of Ss); and (b) that the context must also contain the contradictory of
S. In other words, an utterance of S has the cognitive effect of contradicting and
eliminating an existing assumption, i.e. _iS*. For a case like (7) this means that the
arguments in favour of even encoding procedural, rather than conceptual, meaning, see 4.6.7.
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utterance is to be processed in a context that contains, for example, the assumptions
in (51).
(7)	 Even Max tried on the trousers.
(51)	 a.	 Moritz tried on the trousers.
b. Fritz tried on the trousers.
c. Max didn't try on the trousers.
In such a context, an utterance of (7) will achieve cognitive effects by contradicting
and eliminating the assumption in (Sic). Indeed, this seems to comport well with
intuitions. As mentioned above, there is a certain amount of consensus regarding
even utterances, particularly in two points: Most theorists are agreed that (a) even
provides access to a comparison class of entities similar to that in its focus and (b)
even indicates that there is something surprising or unexpected about S*. Delgado's
analysis captures both of these points of agreement: (a) is reflected in the fact that S
is to be processed in the context of at least one S and (b) in the fact that the negation
(or contradictory) of 5* is to be part of the context as well - in a context in which
-'S is manifest (or 'expected') S* will be unexpected or surprising. So far, it seems
that Delgado provides an adequate analysis of the meaning of even, but how does she
deal with the even if examples discussed above?
In dealing with even f Delgado's (1999) first step is to adopt Barker's (1994)
view of natural language if. He (1994: 256-257) argues that if should not be analysed
as a two-place connective (along the lines of material implication, for instance).
Instead, he proposes to follow Dudman (1989) in treating if as a monadic operator
taking P in its focus. On Barker's view, if P conventionally implicates that P is
being supposed by the speaker and the result of combining if P with Q is that it
signals that the speaker is asserting Q conditionally on P, i.e. the assertion is partly
based on the supposition of P. There is much that is wrong with this account.
However, I will leave aside any worries and continue with my presentation of
Delgado's analysis.
(4)	 Even if you were the last man on earth, I wouldn't marry you.
(6)	 Even if he drank just a little his boss would fire him.
(9)	 Even if his wife smoked, his boss would fire him.
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By analogy to her own example, she might analyse (4) along the lines in (52)
(52) S*: SUPPOSiTION (Peter is the last man on earth), Mary won't marry him.
S3: Since Peter isn't the last man on earth, Mary won't marry him.
Manifest assumption:
SUPPOSiTION (Peter is the last man on earth), Mary will marry him.
An utterance of (6) might be analysed as (53), and an utterance of (9) as (54).
(53) S*: SUPPOSiTION (John drinks just a little), his boss will fire him
S: SUPPOSiTION (John drinks a lot), his boss will fire him.
SUPPOSiTION (John drinks a massive amount), his boss will fire him.
STJPPOS1TION (John drinks any amount), his boss will fire him.
Manifest assumption:
SUPPOSiTION (John drinks just a little), his boss won't fire him.
(54) S*: SUPPOSITION (John's wife smokes), his boss will fire him.
S: SUPPOSITION (John himself smokes), his boss will fire him.
SUPPOSITION (John drinks), his boss will fire him.
SUPPOSITION (John behaves in what his boss would consider a
libertine manner), his boss will fire him.
Manifest assumption:
SUPPOSITION (John's wife smokes), his boss won't fire him.
Although Delgado (1999) doesn't explore this, the advantage her account has over
the other accounts considered in this chapter is that, because it is rooted in the
framework of Relevance Theory, it has a convincing story to tell about how the Ss
are selected, i.e. why in (52) there is only one S (if not-P, Q), while in (54) there are
a number of them (not f not-P, Q, but if X, Q; if Y, Q, [Z, Q, etc.). As with all
aspects of utterance interpretation, the communicative principle of relevance licenses
the hearer to follow a path of least effort in considering possible Ss and stopping as
soon as the expectation of relevance created by the utterance has been met.
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For instance, in the scenario in which Mary utters (4), the assumption that
Mary won't marry Peter if (as is, indeed, the case) he isn't the last man on earth is
easily accessible - more easily, at any rate, than any other possible Ss (e.g. If I was
in love with someone else, I wouldn't marry you). In the scenario in which Sue utters
(9), on the other hand, the assumption that Sue will fire John if his wife doesn't
smoke isn't all that easily accessible (and if it were, it would be quite likely to be
dismissed as false). Instead, Ss like If John smoked, his boss would fire him or If
John drank, his boss would fire him will be highly accessible (in fact, they, or similar
assumptions, are quite likely to have been mentioned explicitly before the utterance
in (4)).
It is a further advantage of Delgado's account (also one she herself doesn't
mention) that it seems able to avoid Barker's (1991: 4-5) counterexainples to
Bennett's account. For instance, while there are two easily accessible Ss to B's
utterance in (27), i.e. Brain won a prize and Smart won a prize, it seems that the
contradictory of 5* (i.e. Smith didn't win a prize) is no longer manifest by the time B
comes to make her utterance. On the contrary, after A's utterance (assuming that A
is trustworthy and B believes him), S* (Smith won a prize) is mutually manifest,
rather than its contradictory (Smith didn 't win a prize).
(27) A: Only three people won a prize this year: Brain and Smart, as expected,
and, unexpectedly Smith, who is last year's worst student.
B: Even Smith won a prize!
Since the other two examples Barker uses to argue against Bennett's account are set
up in a similar way, i.e. S is manifest in both of them prior to the unacceptable even
utterance, Delgado's analysis can deal with all of them.
7.7.2 Problems with Delgado's account
As already mentioned, at first blush Delgado's analysis of even seems to do justice to
intuitions and to at least some of the examples discussed in this chapter. However, I
have a number of worries about her account. There are two reasons for this: (a) I
believe that even utterances do not always have to (and in fact often don't) achieve
cognitive effects by contradicting and eliminating a manifest assumption, and (b) it
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seems that simply requiring that the contradictory of S* and at least one S be
available isn't quite enough.
Let me start with my first worry.
(55) scenario: A and B are discussing C's publicly and embarrassingly insisting
that Sydney is the capital of Australia.
A: That was a pretty stupid thing to do.
B: Well, even C makes mistakes.
It seems to me that B's utterance in the scenario in (55) is perfectly felicitous, even
though the contradictory of S* (i.e. C doesn't make mistakes) isn't manifest in the
context (on the contrary, S is already mutually manifest before B utters S).
Nevertheless, B's utterance in this scenario is perfectly felicitous. This example also
shows that Kay (1990: 84) is right in claiming that the use of even doesn't
necessarily imply the unexpectedness of S.
My second worry is reflected in the example in (56), which involves the by
now familiar group of students.
(56) scenario: As is mutually known to A and B, Sebastian is unlikely to pass
any exam, but kvUe.. is even less likely.
A: A miracle has happened - Neville passed the exam!
B: ?Even Sebastian passed the exam.
Quite clearly, B's utterance in (56) is not felicitous. However, all the ingredients of
Delgado's account are available: There's an easily accessible S (Neville passed the
exam) and the contradictory of S* (i.e. Sebastian didn't pass the exam) is manifest.
Still B's utterance is not okay in this scenario.
Note that the same is true of Susan's utterance in (B), my own 'translation' of
Barker's examples.
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(B)	 Scenario: Only June, Mark and Neville pass the exam and the others don't.
Susan: ?Even Neville passed the exam.
Recall that Neville is the least likely member of the group to pass the exam and that
there are two people (Jul siand Sebastian), more likely to pass than him, who didn't.
Clearly, in such a scenario there are not only two easily accessible Ss (i.e. June
passed the exam and Mark passed the exam) but it also stands to reason that the
contradictory of 5* (i.e. Neville didn't pass the exam) will be accessible in this
context. Still, Susan's utterance isn't felicitous.
In other words, to use language closer in spirit to the philosophers whose
work has been discussed in the earlier sections of this chapter than to Relevance
Theory, Delgado's requirements that the context must contain at least one S, and that
the contradictory of S* must be manifest for an even utterance to be 'felicitous' (i.e.
for it to be processed smoothly along the lines indicated by even) are neither jointly
sufficient, nor is the latter necessary.
Nevertheless, her account captures at least some of the intuitions about the
meaning of even and her analysis seems able to deal with most of the standard
examples. The question is whether it can be modified to avoid the kinds of problems
I have just described.
7.7.3 An alternative RT analysis
It was stated above that Delgado's account captures intuitions about the meaning of
even adequately. However, she does not accommodate one of the points of
agreement mentioned in 7.3, namely the scalarity of even. All the other analyses
discussed in this chapter see even as indicating that S* is more (or less) something
than all (or most) Ss. By contrast, Delgado (much like Konig, it seems) sees even as
indicating that S* is unexpected (because its contradictory is manifest) in absolute
terms. My example (55) has shown that this requirement is too strong. I believe that
the scalar nature of even is the key to a successful analysis.
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Taking a leaf out of Fauconnier's (1975) and Kay's (1990)16 book as far as
scalarity is concerned, I would like to suggest that even encodes a procedure along
the lines in (57).
(57) Process the proposition expressed (S*) in a context in which it is the strongest
on a scale of assumptions that comprises S and at least one S (different from
S only in the focussed element).
(58) gives a definition of what it is for a given assumption to be stronger than
another.
(58) S* is the stronger assumption than S iff in any situation in which S* is
manifest to degree x, S, is manifest at least to the same degree, because any
evidence for the truth of S is also evidence for the truth of S3 (but not vice
versa).
This means that a speaker who communicates that the proposition expressed is true,
also indicates that any Ss will be true in the same context. On this account, for
instance, someone uttering (7) indicates that the proposition expressed, i.e. MAX
TRIED ON THE TROUSERS is the strongest on a scale of assumptions so that all other
assumptions on the scale will be at least as manifest.
(7)	 Even Max tried on the trousers.
Since an utterance of (7) actually communicates that Max tried on the trousers, i.e. it
indicates that the speaker thinks it is true, it also implies that the speaker believes that
any Ss are true. As always, the hearer follows the relevance-theoretic
comprehension strategy in accessing the scale of assumptions that is implied by the
use of even. That is, he will follow a path of least effort in accessing or constructing
the scale, stopping when his expectation of relevance has been met. So, which (and
how many) Ss the hearer infers depends entirely on what is easily accessible to him.
For instance, a hearer who knows that Max went to the clothes shop with Moritz and
'6 FOr a full discussion of Fauconnier (1975) and Kay (1990) see Iten (forthcoming).
312
Fritz and that Max hates trying on clothes, so that Max's trying on any garment gives
a good indication of Moritz and Fritz also having tried it on, has immediate access to
a scale of the sort implied by even. Such a hearer will be highly likely to take the
speaker as communicating not just that Max tried on the trousers, but also that Moritz
and Fritz did. If, on the other hand, the hearer doesn't know anything about Max (or
the other two), he is most likely to infer nothing more specific than that there is
someone else who tried on the trousers and that Max may not be that likely to try on
trousers (or maybe any other garment), because the speaker must have a reason to
believe that someone else must have tried on the trousers in any situation in which
Max did. In the rest of this sub-section I will show how this analysis can account for
the full range of examples. Let me start with my own counterexamples to Delgado's
account.
The problem with my first counterexample (55), repeated below, was that the
contradictory of the proposition expressed is not available in the context in which B
makes her even utterance.
(55) scenario:	 A and B are discussing C's publicly and embarrassingly
insisting that Sydney is the capital of Australia.
A: That was a pretty stupid thing to do.
B: Well, even C makes mistakes.
Clearly, my own analysis requires no such thing. Even merely indicates that A is to
process the proposition expressed by B's utterance, i.e. C MAKES MISTAKES, in a
context in which it is the strongest assumption on a scale containing it and at least
one other assumption differing from it only in the element in the focus of even. In
the given scenario, such a context shouldn't be too hard to access for A. Possible
other assumptions are A MAKES MISTAKES and B MAKES MISTAKES, for instance. A
possible reason for C MAKES MISTAKES being stronger than these other assumptions
is that C is the kind of person who always knows everything and strives for
perfection, while A and B are more fallible.
The problem my second counterexample, (56), posed for Delgado's account
was that all the ingredients needed for smooth processing of B's utterance are there,
and yet it isn't felicitous.
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(56) scenario:	 As is mutually known to A and B, Sebastian is unlikely to pass
any exam, but Ntv e is even less likely.
A: A miracle has happened - Neville passed the exam!
B: ?Even Sebastian passed the exam.
On my analysis, B's utterance is predicted to be infelicitous for the following
reasons. B's use of even indicates that SEBASTIAN PASSED THE EXAM is the strongest
on a scale of assumptions, i.e. that any of the other assumptions on the scale will be
true whenever it is true. Now, A's utterance makes highly accessible the assumption
that Neville passed the exam. That is, A is bound to attempt to access a scale that
contains this assumption. However, in this scenario, SEBASTIAN PASSED THE EXAM
isn't stronger than NEVILLE PASSED THE EXAM. In other words, the most accessible
scale isn't one on which the proposition expressed by B's utterance is the strongest.
This shows that my analysis can deal with my own counterexamples to Delgado's
account. Let me now turn to how it can deal with (A)-(D).
Let me start by considering (A).
(A)	 Scenario: Everyone failed the exam, Sebastian and Neville are both more
likely to fail than the others and Neville is more likely to fail than
Sebastian.
Susan:	 ?Even Sebastian failed the exam.
In this scenario, Susan's utterance isn't felicitous because a hearer familiar with the
facts is most likely to have accessible a scale of assumptions containing not just
SEBASTIAN FAILED THE EXAM and NEvIIIE FAILED THE EXAM but also AUGUSTA
FAILED THE EXAM, JULIE FAILED THE EXAM, .. .JUNE FAILED THE EXAM. The problem
is that on such a scale SEBASTIAN FAILED THE EXAM is not the strongest assumption.
That is, the fact that Sebastian failed the exam may provide evidence for the fact that
Neville failed, too, but it doesn't provide evidence for any of the others' failing.
Susan's utterance in (B) is problematic for slightly different reasons.
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(B) Scenario: Only June, Mark and Neville pass the exam and the others don't.
Susan:	 ?Even Neville passed the exam.
The problem here is that any hearer familiar with the group of students in question,
will assume that the implied scale contains a set of assumptions ranging from
NEViLLE PASSED THE EXAM to JUNE PASSED THE EXAM, including all intermediate
possibilities. This is plausible because on the basis of everyone's likelihood of
passing exams, in any situation in which Neville passed, everyone else is likely to
have passed, too. So, the speaker's communicating that Neville did pass will lead the
hearer to conclude that all the others passed, too. However, this is not the case in the
given scenario. In other words, Susan will be seriously misleading her hearer by her
utterance. This means that my analysis can deal with the examples that have posed
problems for 'existential' accounts of even. Now, let me demonstrate that it can also
handle (C) and (D), which are problematic for 'universal' accounts.
The problem (C) poses for universal accounts is that Susan's utterance is
felicitous even though not everyone passed the exam.
(C) Scenario: Everyone except Neville passed the exam.
Susan: Even Sebastian passed the exam.
It should be clear that my own account doesn't require that everyone must have
passed the exam for her utterance to be felicitous. All even indicates is that
SEBASTIAN PASSED THE EXAM is the strongest on a scale of assumptions. Now, a
hearer familiar with our group of students would know that NEVILLE PASSED THE
EXAM is stronger than SEBASTIAN PASSED THE EXAM, i.e. that in any situation in
which the former is true, the latter is likely to be true, too, but not vice versa. I
believe that the fact that the speaker chooses to utter something that expresses the
weaker of the two propositions will lead the hearer to assume that the speaker is
either unable or unwilling to assert the stronger. That is, he is likely to conclude that
Neville didn't pass the exam, but that everyone else did. Susan's utterance is
acceptable because there is an easily accessible scale of assumptions on which
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SEBASTIAN PASSED TIlE EXAM is the strongest, i.e. one that doesn't contain NEVILLE
PASSED THE EXAM.
Finally, Susan's utterance in (D), too, is acceptable although not everyone
passed the exam.
(D)	 Scenario: Everyone passed the exam with the exception of June, who failed
for mysterious reasons.
Susan:	 Even Neville passed the exam.
As mentioned above, I believe that a hearer familiar with the group of students would
conclude from Susan's utterance here that everyone passed if Susan didn't overtly
qualify her utterance, say, by uttering however, June failed. The problem
encountered by Lycan is that such a qualification should result in a contradiction,
which it clearly doesn't. On my account, a hearer would be likely to conclude that
June passed the exam, but this assumption would be merely an implicature that could
be cancelled without contradiction. This holds in spite of the fact that the implicature
arises as a result of the use of even, because even doesn't encode the implicature
itself, but merely constrains the context in such a way that a hearer is likely to derive
the implicature. The overt qualification simply results in the hearer's changing the
accessed scale of assumptions from one that contains JUNE PASSED THE EXAM to one
that doesn't. So far, I have, hopefully, shown that my account of the procedure
encoded by even can deal with the full range of non-conditional examples. It
remains to be shown that and how it can explain the properties of even if-
conditionals.
First, let me consider (4).
(4)	 Even if you were the last man on earth, I wouldn't marry you.
As always, even indicates that the hearer is to process the proposition expressed (IF
PETER IS THE LAST MAN ON EARTH, MARY WON'T MARRY PETER) in a context in
which it is the strongest assumption on a scale and it's truth implies the truth of all
other assumptions on the scale. Now, it's relatively easy to see what weaker
assumptions there could be on the scale. It could be anything from IF MARY IS IN
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LOVE WiTH SOMEONE ELSE, MARY WON'T MARRY PETER to IF MARY CAN'T STAND
PETER, SHE WON'T MARRY PETER, etc. However, it is also relatively easy to access a
context in which IF PETER ISN'T THE LAST MAN ON EARTH, MARY WON'T MARRY
PETER is 'weaker' than the proposition expressed by (4): It's not difficult to imagine
a context in which in any situation in which Mary won't marry Peter if he's the last
man on earth, she also won't marry him if he isn't the last man on earth. In other
words, Mary's utterance of (4) implies that Mary won't marry Peter whether or not
he is the last man on earth.
As above, if Jill utters (9) in a scenario in which she is discussing how
unreasonably puritanical John's boss is, she won't be taken to imply that John will be
fired.
(9)	 Even if his wife smoked, his boss would fire him.
Again the use of even indicates that the proposition expressed (IF JOHN'S WIFE
SMOKED JOHN'S BOSS WOULD FIRE JOHN) is the strongest on a scale of assumptions.
Now, it isn't very easy to find a context in which IF JOHN'S WIFE DIDN'T SMOKE,
JOHN'S BOSS WOULD FIRE JOHN is weaker than the proposition expressed. That is, it
isn't plausible that in any situation in which Joan fires John if his wife smokes, she
would also fire him if his wife didn't smoke. Instead, the range of weaker
assumptions available in this context will contain assumptions such as IF JOHN
SMOKED, HIS BOSS WOULD FIRE HIM and IF JOHN DRANK, HIS BOSS WOULD FIRE HIM.
In other words, the fact that Jill asserts that John's boss would fire him if his wife
smoked doesn't mean that she also implies that John's boss would fire him if his wife
didn't smoke and her hearer will not be justified to take her to be communicating that
John will be fired.
In this sub-section I have proposed a procedural analysis of the meaning of
even, which takes its cue from the scalar accounts of Fauconnier (1975) and Kay
(1990) but is cast in relevance-theoretic terms. I hope to have demonstrated that this
analysis can account for the full range of examples involving even on its own and
when combined with if.
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7.8	 Procedural meaning revisited
I said in 4.3.2 that it would only be possible to make more precise observations about
the nature of procedural meaning once a number of expressions with procedural
meaning had been analysed. In the last three chapters I have proposed procedural
accounts of three different linguistic expressions: but, although and even. The three
procedures are repeated in (59)-(61).
(59)
Process what follows (i.e. Q) as a denial of an accessible assumption.
(60) although
Suspend an inference from what follows (i.e. P) which results in an
unresolvable contradiction.
(61)
Process the proposition expressed (S*) in a context in which it is the strongest
on a scale of assumptions that comprises S' and at least one S, (different from
SK oniy in the focused element).
It should now be possible to say a little bit more about the nature of procedural
meaning by comparing the procedures I have suggested for these three expressions.
It seem relatively easy to see what the procedures encoded by but and
although have in common. Both of these procedures essentially indicate what
inferential path the speaker intends the hearer to take in deriving the implicatures of
the utterance. That is, it is clear that but and although both affect the implicit side of
communication.
Even, on the other hand, seems slightly different. Rather than indicating to
the hearer which inferential path the speaker intends her to take, even indicates the
nature and range of assumptions in the context of which the speaker intends the
hearer to process her utterance. It is at least possible that this constraint on
contextual assumptions not only affects the inferential processes involved in the
derivation of implicatures, but also those involved in deriving explicatures. Indeed,
this meshes well with the observation made in 4.6.7 and 7.6.2 that even seems
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capable of making a difference to the proposition expressed by an utterance
containing it, at least in some circumstances.
Summing up, the analyses given in the last three chapters point towards the
existence of two distinct types of procedural meaning: There are procedures that
highlight an inferential path and there are procedures that highlight contextual
assumptions. Of course, inferential paths and contextual assumptions don't exist
independently of each other. Pursuing a particular inferential path will necessarily
involve accessing a certain range of contextual assumptions, and accessing a
particular range of contextual assumptions will allow an individual to pursue certain
inferential paths, but not others. In other words, what both types of procedures have
in common, as predicted by Blakemore, is that they constrain the inferential
processes involved in deriving the intended interpretation of an utterance, thus saving
the hearer the unnecessary processing effort of going down an inferential path not
intended by the speaker. But and although constrain these inferential processes
directly by indicating a particular inferential route, while even places an indirect
constraint on inference by making accessible certain contextual assumptions above
any others. It will be interesting to see in future research whether all procedural
meaning falls into one of these two categories.
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CHAPTER 8
FINAL REMARKS ON CONCESSIVITY AND ON TRUTH CONDITIONS
8.1	 Looking back
There are two main strands to this thesis: (a) 'non-truth-conditional' linguistic
meaning and the question of the relationship between truth conditions and linguistic
semantics, and (b) 'concessivity'. The first four chapters were devoted to (a), while
the last three dealt with three members of the sub-class of 'concessive' 'non-truth-
conditional' linguistic devices: but, although and even if In this final chapter, I will
consider some residual issues concerning each one of these strands in turn, starting
with 'concessivity'.
8.2	 'Concessive' interpretations and ways of achieving them
8.2.1 What makes an interpretation 'concessive'?
At the beginning of chapter 5 I argued that not much can be gained by first
attempting to define a notion of concession or a concessive interpretation and then
trying to analyse the meaning of certain expressions, such as but, although and even
if, on the basis of that definition. Instead, I argued, one should start by analysing the
linguistic meaning of such expressions and then see if there are any significant
generalisations to be made. In the last three chapters, I have looked at vanous
accounts of the meanings of but, although and even if and I've suggested my own
relevance-theoretic analysis for each of them. Now the question is whether there are
any interesting generalisations to be made about 'concessive' interpretations, or the
notion of concession, in general.
It was shown in 5.1 that for Quirk et al. (1972) concession is all about the
denial of an expectation, i.e. in an example like (1) the truth of the second clause is
unexpected in the light of that of the first.
(1)	 It was raining but Peter went out.
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Other theorists have defined the notion of concession along similar lines. As
indicated in 5.1, most coherence theorists define a relation of concession, which they
take to hold between two discourse segments. For instance, according to Mann &
Thompson (1986: 65), the concession relation
arises when a speaker acknowledges, in one part of the text, the truth of a point
which potentially detracts from a point in another part of the text.1
Hovy & Maier (1994: 10) define their own concession relation in terms of denial of
expectation. According to them, two discourse segments stand in a concession
relation to each other if "one of the text segments raises expectations which are
contradicted/violated by the other". Finally, Oversteegen's (1997: 63) definition of
the concession relation is based on Anscombre & Ducrot's (1977) account of denial
but. That is, according to her, two clauses are related by concession just in case from
the first clause not-R can be inferred and R can be inferred from the second clause.
Rudolph (1996) defines the kind of relation marked by but, although and even
f in terms compatible with the definitions mentioned so far. According to her, these
connectives can all mark contrast (she calls co-ordinate contrastive structures
'adversative' and subordinate ones 'concessive'). She (1996: 31) defines contrast as
involving the simultaneous validity of two propositions and a broken off causal
chain. For instance, in (1) it was raining and Peter went out are simultaneously valid
and there is a broken off causal chain from it was raining to Peter didn't go out.
However, the broken-off causal chain doesn't have to be between the first
proposition and the negation of the second. It can equally well exist between the first
proposition and any other plausible proposition. Rudolph (1996: 31) symbolises this
definition of contrast as in (2), where A and B are the two propositions that hold
simultaneously and the broken line indicates the broken-off causal chain linking A
and C.
A bit later, Mann & Thompson (1988: 254) redefine the concession relation in somewhat more
complicated and less intuitive terms. However, for the present discussion their earlier definition is
sufficient.
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(2)
All of these definitions of 'concession' seem to have one feature in common, i.e. they
all see it as involving the denial of some expectation raised by earlier discourse2.
Now, I hope to have shown in the last three chapters that but can be interpreted as
indicating denial of expectation in some, but crucially not all, instances, while
although and even if are better analysed in slightly different ways. Therefore,
'concession' on the definitions just discussed doesn't capture the linguistic meaning
of any of these expressions.
However, there is something shared by but, although and even if They all
have meaning that in some way involves the idea of negation or denial. In the case
of but the denial is straightforward, i.e. denial is what but signals. In the case of
although, the denial is indirect, i.e. although indicates that the hearer is to suspend an
inference, and this suspension could be seen as resulting in the denial of the
assumption that would have been the outcome had the inference gone through.
Finally, an even if utterance could be seen as involving denial in the sense that the
consequent clause expresses a proposition one would not expect to hold in a situation
in which the antecedent holds. For instance, before encountering an utterance of (3),
a hearer may well expect that the speaker would pass the exam in a situation in
which she studied all night. However, the conditional indicates that the speaker
believes that she will fail the exam in any situation in which she studies all night,
which denies this expectation.
(3) Even if I studied all night, I'd fail the exam.
This example highlights an interesting and important difference between but and
although, on the one hand, and even if, on the other. In the case of the former, where
2 Rudolph's breaking off of a causal chain can easily be reinterpreted as a denial of expectation: If a
speaker holds a causal background assumption along the lines of A causes C, then her uttering A but
B, will indicate that she believes that B denies the expectation of C created by A.
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there are two clauses, one of them could be seen as (directly or indirectly) denying an
implication of the other. In the latter, on the other hand, the combination of the two
clauses denies an assumption that links the antecedent with the negation of the
consequent. In all three cases, however, two assumptions are presented as holding at
the same time against a background of assumptions that would justify the expectation
that only one of them holds. If there is such a thing as a 'concession' relation, or a
'concessive interpretation', then I think it's something like this: The speaker is
(explicitly) communicating the simultaneous truth of two assumptions along with a
contextual assumption that would justify the conclusion that only one of the
explicitly communicated assumptions can hold at any one time.
8.2.2 Communicating concessivity without encoding it
The question I want to ask in this section is under what circumstances a speaker can
achieve such a 'concessive' interpretation without using linguistic devices, such as
although, but or even whose encoded meaning guides the hearer along this sort of
inferential path. The obvious ingredients seem to be a combination of two
communicated assumptions and a context in which an assumption is easily accessible
that means that the two communicated assumptions shouldn't really co-exist. I
believe that this last requirement is hard to meet. First, an assumption that means P
and Q aren't likely to be true together ought to be of the form if P then not-Q or if Q
then not-P or, more strongly, because P. not-Q or because Q, not P. Now, there
aren't many assumptions of this form that are held so strongly that an assertion of P
and Q wouldn't lead one to abandon them. For instance, say I believe that John
always wears green socks on Wednesday and you utter (4).
(4)	 It's Wednesday and John is wearing red socks.
In this scenario your utterance will make me question my assumption concerning
John's sock-wearing habits and I'm very likely to either abandon it completely or
hold it less strongly as a result of your utterance. However, if you'd uttered (5)
instead, I would be inclined to hold on to my assumption that John wears green socks
on Wednesdays because your use of although indicates that I am to suspend the
inference from it's Wednesday to John is wearing green socks, which also indicates
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that you believe the inference (and the assumption that licenses it) to be valid in
general.
(5) Although it's Wednesday, John is wearing red socks.
The only types of assumption of the form if P then not-Q or because P. not-Q that
are likely to survive an assertion of P and Q are those where there is either a strong
real-world causal connection between P and not-Q or where there is a strongly held
belief that P leads to the conclusion not-Q. For instance, for most people there is a
real-world causal connection between a glass falling from a height of more than a
few centimetres and it breaking. For this reason, I believe that the and-conjunction
in (6) can be given a roughly 'concessive' interpretation.
(6) The glass fell off the table and it didn't break.
Similarly, in Western cultures it's a widely held belief that someone's not being an
employee of a company is a very good reason for them not having a key to the
company sale. For this reason, (7) can be interpreted 'concessively'.
(7) Peter isn't an employee of the bank and he has a key to the safe.
Note, however, that in both these cases, but particularly in (7), stress and intonation
play a crucial role in getting across a 'concessive' interpretation. Quite generally, it
seems that to ensure that a hearer interprets an utterance 'concessively', speakers
must mark this in some way. In this, 'concessivity' differs in an interesting way
from causality. For instance, the conjunction in (8) receives a causal interpretation as
readily as (9), where the causal connection is linguistically encoded by because.
(8) Peter fell off his bike and broke an arm.
(9) Because Peter fell off his bike, he broke an arm.
The connectives discussed in the last three chapters all encode 'concessivity' by
indicating actual or potential denial or contradiction. However, another way of doing
it is to stress the fact that an assumption continues to hold in circumstances in which
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one might not expect it to do so. The use of still in utterances like (10) and yet in (9)
may be explained in this way.
(10) It was raining. Peter still went out.
(11) It was raining. Yet Peter went out.
Utterances with a structure like (12) are also standardly used to convey concession.
(12) Much as I like teaching, I'm always glad when term is over.
I believe that such examples, due to their scalar nature, not only share something
with but and although utterances, but also with those involving even if For instance,
(12) could be glossed as any of (13a)-(c).
(13) a.	 I like teaching very much, but I'm always glad when term is over.
b. Although I like teaching very much, I'm always glad when term is
over.
c. I'm always glad when term is over although I like teaching very
much.
In other words, the speaker conveys the two assumptions that she likes teaching to a
great degree and that she is always glad when term is over. Furthermore, there is an
implication that if she liked teaching to degree x, where x is smaller than the extent to
which she actually likes teaching, then she would also always be glad when term is
over, or maybe that anybody who likes teaching less than she does is (more) likely to
be glad when term is over.
Finally, non-restrictive relative clauses, such as those in (14) and (15). can
also sometimes receive broadly 'concessive' interpretations.
(14) The glass, which fell off the table, didn't break.
(15) Peter, who isn't an employee of the bank, has a key to the safe.
Here, just as in the conjoined examples (6) and (7), the speaker (explicitly)
communicates two assumptions against the background of a third assumption which
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means that the two assumptions communicated shouldn't really both be true.
Interestingly, it is slightly easier to get a concessive interpretation with these
examples than it is with their conjunctive counterparts (6) and (7). Nevertheless,
even in the case of this type of construction, 'concessivity' must be encoded (or
marked in some other way, e.g. by stress or intonation) if the speaker wants to make
sure that the intended (concessive) interpretation is accessed. As with and-
conjunction, it seems that a causal connection between the relative clause and the
main clause will be inferred wherever possible. This is shown particularly clearly by
the examples in (16) and (17), where, in each, case the event described in the relative
clause is understood as the reason for the event in the main clause, even though there
is nothing in the events described that precludes a 'concessive' reading.
(16) Peter, who had seen John wearing a red shirt, asked his mother to buy him
one.
(17) Peter, who had seen John wearing a red shirt, asked his mother not to buy him
one.
That is, nothing precludes the possibility that Peter might ask his mother to buy him
a red shirt in spite of the fact that he had seen John wearing one. It is also possible
that Peter might ask his mother not to buy him a red shirt in spite of having seen
John wearing one. It seems, then, that a speaker who intends her utterance to be
interpreted 'concessively' would do well to encode this. Causality, on the other
hand, seems to be easily inferrable. Why is this?
I believe that there are two factors that could explain this difference. First, as
mentioned in 7.6.2, assumptions concerning causal connections are very valuable to
cognitive systems, i.e. they achieve a high number of cognitive effects. Therefore,
causal interpretations always have a good chance of being optimally relevant,
particularly, since they also tend to be highly accessible. Second, 'concessivity' is a
complex inferential relation between assumptions that doesn't exist in the real world.
In other words, it is likely to be far less accessible than, say, a causal connection on
any given occasion. Thus, it isn't very surprising that hearers hardly ever recover
'concessive' interpretations unless the speaker has used a means of indicating that
this is what she intended.
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8.3	 (Not quite) the last word on truth conditions
8.3.1 What are 'the truth conditions' of the utterance?
In section 4.5.2 I discussed the idea that for each simple utterance there is a single
proposition that has to be true for the utterance to be judged true and that this truth
condition of the utterance is the core of its meaning. In doing this, I also noted that,
as theorists but, presumably, also as ordinary speakers and hearers, we should trust
our intuitions when it comes to deciding what the truth conditions of a particular
utterance are. This approach is made particularly explicit in Recanati's (1993: 246-
250) Availability Principle. According to this principle,
In deciding whether a pragmatically determined aspect of utterance meaning is
part of what is said, that is, in making a decision concerning what is said, we
should always try to preserve our pre-theoretic intuitions on the matter.3
(Recanati 1993: 248)
The problem with this is that in many cases our intuitions are far from clear. For
instance, there is a fair amount of disagreement among theorists, but also among
ordinary speakers and hearers, as to whether or not utterances of (18) and (19) are
true in the indicated scenarios.
(18) The man drinking a martini is a famous philosopher. [where the man
indicated is indeed a famous philosopher but isn't drinking a martini]
(after Donnellan 1966/1977: 48)
(19) Napoleon, who recognised the danger to his right flank, personally led his
guards against the enemy position. [where Napoleon didn't recognise the
danger to his left flank, though he did lead his guards]
(Frege 1892: 44)
Since intuitions are not always straightforwardly clear, it is standard practice in RT
to use what has been termed the 'scope test' to sharpen intuitions. Indeed, relevance-
theorists have generally relied on this test, where Recanati has used his Availability
Note that, for Recanati, 'what is said by the utterance' = 'the truth-conditional content of the
utterance'
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Principle4. Recall that the scope test involves the embedding of the utterance in
question in the scope of a logical operator, such as if.. then or or, or, alternatively,
under the scope of a causal connective, such as because. The idea is that a given
aspect of meaning is part of the truth-conditional content of the utterance (the
proposition expressed, or Recanati's what is said), if it falls under the scope of the
operator. For instance, it was raining is part of the truth-conditional content of (20),
because it falls under the scope of because in (21), and if in (22). In the former, it is
understood to be part of the cause of Peter's getting wet, while, in the latter, it is part
of the circumstances in which Peter will have got wet. As seen in 6.1, although
doesn't fall in the scope of either of these operators and is, therefore, 'non-truth-
conditional'.
(20) Peter went out although it was raining.
(21) Because Peter went out although it was raining, he got wet.
(22) If Peter went out although it was raining, he'll have got wet.
Apart from the difficulties discussed in 7.6.2, the problem with the scope test is that
not all utterances can be embedded under a logical operator with grammatical results
(see Ifantidou 1994: 140-14 1). Furthermore, even in cases where an embedding
yields grammatical results, the resulting intuitions in many instances are far from
clear. Finally, for cases like (18) and (19) the scope test gives a clear result, which
is, however, different from many people's intuitions regarding the unembedded
utterances. For instance, many people would say that someone uttering (18) in a
scenario in which the man referred to is a famous philosopher but only looks as if he
is drinking a martini has said something true and something false. However, when
this utterance is embedded as in (23), the definite description doesn't seem to fall
under the scope of because.
(23) a.	 Because the man drinking a martini is a famous philosopher, you
should treat him with respect.
b.	 Because the man drinking a martini is a famous philosopher, he
doesn't need another drink yet.
For a detailed discussion of the Availability Principle, the scope test and related matters, see Carston
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In other words, someone uttering (23a) is saying that the reason the hearer should
treat a certain person with respect is that he is a famous philosopher - the fact that he
is drinking a martini doesn't enter into the picture. (23b) shows that, even if the
embedding is set up in such a way that the man's drinking a martini is potentially
important, it doesn't come across as being in the scope of because. That is, here the
man's drinking a martini might well be a reason for his not needing another drink
yet, but an utterance of (23b) still conveys that the reason for his not needing another
drink yet is that he is a famous philosopher.
Similarly, there is a widespread intuition5 that someone who utters (19) in a
scenario in which Napoleon didn't recognise the danger to his right flank (but he did
personally lead his guards against the enemy position) has said something true and
something false at the same time. Again, if one embeds this utterance as in (24), the
non-restrictive relative clause doesn't seem to fall in the scope of because.
(24) a.	 Because Napoleon, who recognised the danger to his right flank,
personally led his guards against the enemy position, he won the
battle.
b.	 Because Napoleon, who recognised the danger to his right flank,
personally led his guards against the enemy position, I believe that he
was as vigilant as ever.
That is, in both (24a) and (24b) the reason for the state of affairs described in the
main clause is understood to be that Napoleon personally led his guards against the
enemy position. The fact that he recognised the danger to his right flank doesn't
enter the picture even in (24b), where the main clause has been chosen so as to make
it more likely that his recognition of the danger is part of the reason for the speaker's
belief that Napoleon was as vigilant as ever.
In recent literature it has been suggested, e.g. by Neale (1999) and Bach
(1999), that the fact that people's intuitions in these cases vary so much can be
explained if one drops the assumption that examples like those above express one
(1998, chapter 3; forthcoming b, chapter 3).
Neale (1999: 56) and Bach (1999: 345) both note that intuitions on the truth conditions of such
utterances vary greatly. More will be said about their approaches below.
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and only one proposition. Instead, these philosophers argue, such utterances express
two or more propositions, each of which comes with its own truth condition.
Crucially, the idea is not that such utterances express the conjunction of all these
propositions. On this picture, not all the propositions expressed by an utterance are
equally important and which one is the most important on a given occasion is
determined by contextual factors. Bach and Neale maintain that people will agree
that an utterance can be true in case only one proposition is true and the others are
false only when they are forced to decide whether the whole utterance is true or false.
In such a case, the utterance will be judged true just in case the most important
proposition expressed is true.
The idea that what seems to be a single utterance (and, in some cases, even a
single sentence) can express multiple propositions meshes well with my own
observations in 6.4.2, where I argued that utterances of the form Q although P and
although P. Q express three propositions: Q, P and Q sub P, where sub is doing duty
for any subordinating conjunction. But how does the idea that utterances can express
multiple propositions mesh with the scope test (and the notion of 'the truth
conditions of the utterance')
It seems that the scope test does a reasonably good job of pinpointing the
most important proposition expressed. However, operators such as . . then, or and
because can only take single propositions in their scope - (25), which constitutes an
attempt at embedding two non-conjoined propositions in the scope of because, is
ungrammatical.
(25) *Because Peter went out. It was raining, he got wet.
Because, according to Bach and Neale, utterances like (18) and (19) express multiple
propositions (rather than a single conjunctive proposition), the scope test is not a
suitable tool for determining whether a given assumption is a proposition expressed
by such utterances or an implicature - or and because can only ever take scope
over a single proposition. So, if Bach and Neale are right, and simple utterances can
express multiple propositions, then it is no longer true that a given aspect of meaning
is part of the (or a!) proposition expressed by an utterance just in case it falls in the
scope of or or because when the utterance is embedded under one of these
operators. This means that a different method for deciding which communicated
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assumptions are propositions expressed and which implicatures must be found.
Having such a method is particularly important for semantic and pragmatic accounts
that rely on the notion of 'the truth conditions of the utterance', which, in the case of
multiple proposition utterances, would presumably amount to the truth conditions of
the totality of propositions expressed.
It seems, then, that the notion of 'the truth conditions of the utterance',
whether what is meant by this is the truth conditions of a single proposition
expressed by the utterance or whether it is the truth conditions of the totality of
propositions expressed, is problematic. Therefore, any account of utterance meaning
and interpretation that doesn't rely on this notion must be at an advantage. So, what
role, if any, does it play in the framework of Relevance Theory? This is the question
I want to consider in the next sub-section.
8.2.2 Doing without 'the truth conditions of the utterance'
Let me start by looking at what truth conditions have been used for in accounting for
utterance meaning in RI. The main question a theory of utterance interpretation
must answer surely is 'how does the hearer recover what the speaker intended to
communicate by uttering what she did in the particular circumstances in which she
made her utterance?'. In other words, in RT terms, what is crucial is the content of
the speaker's communicative intention, i.e. the set of assumptions she intends to
make manifest or more manifest by her utterance. Clearly, this includes the whole
range of communicated assumptions comprising explicatures and implicatures alike.
As discussed in 4.5, all of these assumptions, which are entertained as mental
representations, can be given truth conditions. Now, from a hearer's point of view it
may well not matter all that much whether a given assumption has been
communicated explicitly or implicitly (i.e. whether it is an explicature or an
implicature of the speaker's utterance). Certainly, as far as recall is concerned it
doesn't: Impressionistically, people remember the main import of an utterance, i.e.
those implications it has that achieve the greatest number of contextual effects, but
they don't, on the whole, remember what the speaker 'said', i.e. which of the
communicated assumptions were explicatures. Indeed, it would be interesting to
check this impression in empirical research, maybe along with the hypothesis that
people might judge that a speaker may not have been truthful, even though the
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alleged 'truth-conditional content' of the utterance was true, if it turns out that an
assumption strongly implicated by the speaker was false. For instance, I believe that
most hearers of Mary's utterance in the scenario in (26) would at least feel that they
had been misled, if not lied to, if it turned out that she had no intention of posting
John's letter.
(26) John: This letter urgently needs posting and I don't have a minute to do it.
Mary: I've got to go to the post office anyway.
Clearly, this isn't an explicature of Mary's utterance, but it certainly is a very strong
implicature. This shows that ordinary speakers and hearers may well not distinguish
between explicit and implicit communicated assumptions when making judgements
about the truth or falsity of utterances.
However, from the theorist's point of view, there is an interesting and
important distinction to be made between the explicatures and the implicatures of a
linguistic utterance. This is particularly true in the framework of Relevance Theory,
where the linguistically encoded content of an utterance, i.e. its logical form, is seen
as the (sub-propositional) input to a number of inferential processes, constrained by
the hearer's (unconscious) search for optimal relevance, which result in the recovery
of the set of communicated assumptions. Although there may be (and, I suspect,
often is) a process of mutual adjustment6 and fine-tuning between explicatures and
implicatures, the finished picture, as it were, has to look as in (27).
6 See Sperber & Wilson (1998: 193-194) and Wilson & Sperber (forthcoming: 19)
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(27) the logical form
is developed into
are embedded under speech-act
higher level
descriptions to form
and propositional attitude
are combined with implicated premises to yield
implicated conclusions
In other words, basic explicatures (i.e. communicated propositions expressed)
depend on the logical form, higher-level explicatures depend on basic explicatures
and neither implicated premises nor implicated conclusions can be derived without
explicatures. This means that there is an important difference between explicatures
and implicatures (i.e. implicated premises and conclusions): While the former are
developments of the logical form(s) encoded by the utterance and always function as
'premises' or input to inferential processes that lead to further communicated
assumptions, the latter are not developments of the logical form(s) and only some of
them function as premises. The diagram in (27) also shows that the notion of 'the
truth conditions of the utterance' plays no role at all on the RT view of utterance
interpretation. So, why is this notion retained in the theory?
As far as I am aware, the only purpose for which relevance theorists have
occasionally relied on intuitions about 'the truth conditions of the utterance' is when
it comes to deciding whether a given aspect of the meaning of an utterance is
communicated explicitly or implicitly. For instance, the fact that (28a) and (b) seem
to differ in what it takes for them to be judged true (where (28a) corresponds to (29a)
and (28b) to (29b)) can be used as an argument in favour of (29a) and (b) being
communicated explicitly by utterances of (28a) and (b) respectively, rather than
being implicatures of these utterances7.
' Note, however, that the scope test is incapable of distinguishing between implicatures and higher-
level explicatures, because the latter don't fall in the scope of logical or causal operators either. For
instance, the reason for not talking to Peter given by a speaker uttering Because Peter is frankly a
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(28) a.	 Joan dropped the teapot and Mary screamed.
b.	 Mary screamed and Joan dropped the teapot.
(29) a.	 Joan dropped the teapot and, as a consequence, Mary screamed.
b.	 Mary screamed and, as a consequence, Joan dropped the teapot.
So, the question is whether there is a way of showing that the causal connection
between the two conjuncts in such examples is part of what is communicated
explicitly that doesn't make use of the notion of 'the truth conditions of the
utterance'. I believe that there is, and I will briefly discuss some of the possibilities
in what follows.
One possibility is connected with the RT definition of explicatures as
communicated assumptions that are developments of a logical form encoded by the
utterance. I am assuming that there are ways of determining what a given utterance
encodes. So, if there were a clear-cut way of distinguishing what is a "development"
of a logical form from what isn't, there would also be a way of determining whether
or not a given aspect of utterance meaning has been conveyed explicitly. However,
the notion of "development" is notoriously difficult to pin down. Still, it is at least
possible to decide whether or not a given assumption is likely to be a development of
an encoded logical form. This plays an important part in the second option I want to
consider.
This option is connected with the difference in the role played by explicatures
and implicatures. In particular, the important point is that the explicatures of an
utterance have to play a role, i.e. act as premises, in the process of deriving
implicated conclusions 8. This requirement follows straightforwardly from the
definition of relevance (in absolute terms). Recall that any stimulus is relevant if and
only if it yields at least one contextual effect and that contextual effects are achieved
only if new information interacts with given information. Now, in the case of a
linguistic utterance this new information can only be an explicature - implicated
premises are assumptions already manifest to the hearer and implicated conclusions
never derive just from implicated premises (if they did, they, too, would already be
bore, I'm not talking to him is that Peter is a bore, and not that the speaker is telling the hearer frankly
that Peter is a bore.
8 This option was first explored by Carston (1988: 157-158).
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manifest to the hearer). So, it is the explicatures of an utterance that have to interact
with old information to yield contextual effects if the utterance is to achieve
relevance. This means that the theorist can work out (post hoc) whether or not a
given aspect of meaning is communicated explicitly. I will demonstrate how this can
be done using an example.
For instance, imagine Jack uttered (28a) in a conversation about Mary's
attitude to her crockery (people do talk about some strange things...).
(28) a.	 Joan dropped the teapot and Mary screamed.
Let's assume (not unreasonably, I think) that Jack thus communicates assumptions
along the lines of (29a) and (30).
(29) a.	 Joan dropped the teapot and, as a consequence, Mary screamed.
(30) Mary is extremely attached to her crockery.
Now, obviously, the question is whether (29a) is an explicature or an implicature of
Jack's utterance (assuming, of course, that he intended to communicate it). I believe
that a reconstruction of how the hearer, say Jim, works out that Jack intends to
communicate the assumptions mentioned above can shed light on this question.
Let me start with how I believe Jim is likely to arrive at the assumption in
(30). It seems clear that, to warrant a conclusion such as this, what is needed is a
premise of the form f P then x is extremely attached to their crockery. Now, what is
P likely to be here? Quite conceivably it could be something like x screams as a
consequence of their crockery being dropped so that (31) is one of the many
implicated premises Jim has to access in order to derive the implicated conclusion in
(3Ø)9
(31) if x screams as a consequence of y dropping x's crockery, theTi x is extremely
fond of her crockery.
There is no question as to the implicit status of this assumption: It's simply impossible to envisage
how Mary is extremely fond of her crockery could be a development of the logical form encoded by
Joan dropped the teapot and Mary screamed.
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This shows that the assumption in (29a), which expresses a causal connection
between Joan's dropping the teapot and Mary's screaming, plays an important role in
the derivation of the implicature in (30) - without the causal connection this
conclusion couldn't be reached. It also shows that the only other alternative
candidate for the (basic) explicature of Jack's utterance of (28a), i.e. the simple
assumption that Joan's dropping the teapot and Mary's screaming both happened,
doesn't play a role in the derivation of the implicature in (30) at all. In fact, it's not
even clear that the simple conjunction is communicated in this scenario. In other
words, there is every reason to believe that (29a) is an explicature of Jack's utterance
in (28a). This conclusion is supported further by the fact that it is relatively easy to
see how something like (29a) could be a development of a logical form encoded by
(28a).
Summing up, it seems that a communicated assumption is likely to be an
explicature of a given utterance just in case it can conceivably be a development of a
logical fonn encoded by the utterance and it plays a crucial role in the derivation of
further communicated assumptions. In other words, the notion of 'the truth
conditions of the utterance' isn't needed in RT at all. At this point I should stress
that all of the above discussion merely concerns a heuristic for the theorist to
determine whether or not an assumption is likely to be an explicature. As far as
actual hearers are concerned, they simply follow the relevance-theoretic
comprehension strategy of accessing interpretive hypotheses (at every level) in order
of accessibility and stopping when their expectations of relevance have been met.
On the whole, hearers don't need to know, and probably don't care, whether a given
assumption they believe the speaker has communicated is an explicature or an
implicature and they certainly don't need to know what 'the truth conditions of the
utterance' are in order to understand it.
8.4 Looking forward
I started this thesis by arguing against truth-conditional approaches to linguistic
semantics, i.e. against the idea that there is such a thing as 'the truth conditions of the
sentence', and ended it by arguing that the notion of 'the truth conditions of the
utterance' serves no useful purpose in a cognitive theory of utterance interpretation.
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In between, I have discussed a number of linguistic expressions whose meaning
couldn't be accounted for in truth-conditional terms, even if such an approach to
linguistic semantics were viable. Although there is no useful distinction to be drawn
between 'truth-conditional' and 'non-truth-conditional' meaning, I have argued that
there are two fundamentally different types of linguistic meaning: conceptual and
procedural. In chapters 5, 6 and 7, I have proposed procedural analyses of but,
although and even, and, at the end of chapter 7, I have made some observations
concerning procedural meaning in general.
Future research will show if these generalisations hold beyond the
expressions discussed in this thesis. It will be particularly interesting to investigate
how the natural language equivalents of the logical operators -', &, v, and -, namely
not, and, or and if... then fit into this conceptuallprocedural framework. Furthermore,
there are some important questions regarding the syntax-semantics interface level of
logical form, e.g. how to detennine how many logical forms an utterance encodes,
or, indeed, what exactly constitutes an utterance or processing unit for the relevance-
theoretic comprehension strategy. Finally, as shown in the last three chapters, but,
although and even constrain the inferential processes that result in the recovery of
implicatures. It seems worth investigating further the nature of the procedural
meaning encoded by pronouns (and, conceivably, illocutionary and attitudinal
particles) which constrains the inferential processes that lead from the logical form(s)
of an utterance to its explicatures. Studying the similarities and differences between
these two 'functionally' different kinds of procedural meaning will ultimately deepen
our understanding of procedural encoding in general and its role in utterance
processing.
337
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abraham, W. 1979. But. Studia Linguistica 33: 89-119.
Almog, J., H. Wettstein & J. Perry (eds.).1989. Themes from Kaplan. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Anscombre, J.-C. & 0. Ducrot. 1976. L'argumentation dans la langue.
Langages 42: 5-27.
Anscombre, J.-C. & 0. Ducrot. 1977. Deux mais en français? Lingua 43: 23-
40.
Anscombre, J.-C. & 0. Ducrot. 1983. L'argumentation dans la langue.
Brussels: Pierre Mardaga.
Anscombre, J.-C. & 0. Ducrot. 1986. Argumentativité et informativité. In M.
Meyer (ed.). De la métaphysique a la rhétorique. Brussels: Mardaga.
Anscombre, J.-C. & 0. Ducrot. 1989. Argumentativity and informativity. In
M. Meyer (ed.). From Metaphysics to Rhetoric. Dordrecht: Kiuwer
Academic Publishers. 7 1-87. English translation of A & D (1986).
Atlas, J. 1984. Comparative adjectives and adverbials of degree: An
introduction to radically radical pragmatics. Linguistics and
Philosophy 7: 347-377.
Atlas, J. D. 1989. Philosophy without Ambiguity: A Logico-Linguistic Essay.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Austin, J. L. 1962. How To Do Things With Words. Oxford: OUP.
Bach, K. & R. M. Hamish. 1979. Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts.
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Bach, K. 1987. Thought and Reference. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Bach, K. 1994. Conversational impliciture. Mind and Language 9: 124- 162.
Bach, K. 1999. The myth of conventional implicature. Linguistics and
Philosophy 22: 327-366.
Barker, S. 1991. Even, still and counterfactuals. Linguistics and Philosophy
14: 1-38.
Barker, S. 1994. The consequent-entailment problem for even if. Linguistics
and Philosophy 17: 248-260.
338
Bell, D. M. 1998. Cancellative discourse markers: A core/periphery approach.
Pragmatics 8.4: 515-541.
Bennett, J. 1982. Even f Linguistics and Philosophy 5: 403-418.
Berckmans, P. 1993. The quantifier theory of even. Linguistics and
Philosophy 16: 589-611.
Berlin, I. et al. (eds.). 1973. Essays on I. L. Austin. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Blakemore, D. 1987. Semantic Constraints on Relevance. Oxford: Blackwell.
Blakemore, D. 1989. Denial and contrast: a Relevance Theoretic account of
but. Linguistics and Philosophy 12: 15-37.
Blakemore, D. 1997. On non-truth conditional meaning. Linguistische
Berichte. Sonderheft 8: 82-102.
Blakemore, D. 2000. Indicators and procedures: nevertheless and but. Journal
of Linguistics
Burge, T. 1974. Demonstrative constructions, reference, and truth. The
Journal of Philosophy 71: 205-223.
Carston, R. 1988. Implicature, explicature, and truth-theoretic semantics. In
Kempson (1988). 155-181.
Carston, R. 1996a. Enrichment and loosening: complementary processes in
deriving the proposition expressed? UCL Working Papers in
Linguistics 8: 61-88. Reprinted 1997 in Linguistische Berichte.
Sonderheft 8: 103-127.
Carston, R. 1996b. Metalinguistic negation and echoic use. Journal of
Pragmatics 25: 309-330.
Carston, R. 1998. Pragmatics and the Explicit-Implicit Distinction.
University of London PhD thesis.
Carston, R. 1999a. The semantics/pragmatics distinction: A view from
Relevance Theory. In Turner, K. (ed.). The Semantics-Pragmatics
Interface from Different Points of View. 85-125. Oxford: Elsevier.
Carston, R. 1999b. Negation, 'presupposition' and metarepresentation: a
response to Noel Burton-Roberts. Journal of Linguistics 35: 365-389.
Carston, R. forthcoming a. Explicature and semantics. In Davis, S. & B.
Gillon (eds.). Semantics: A Reader. Oxford: OUP.
339
Carston, R. forthcoming b. Thoughts and Utterances: The Pragmatics of
Explicit Communication. Oxford: Blackwell.
Carston, R. & C. Iten. forthcoming. The myth of 'what is said'.
Clark, W. 1991. Relevance Theory and the Semantics of Non-Declaratives.
University of London PhD thesis.
Dascal, M. & T. Katriel. 1977. Between semantics and pragmatics: The two
types of 'but' - Hebrew 'aval' and 'eta'. Theoretical Linguistics 4:
143-172.
Davidson, D. 1967. Truth and meaning. Synthèse 17: 304-323. Reprinted in
Davidson (1984). 17-36.
Davidson, D. 1984. Inquiries into Truth & Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Davis, S. (ed.). 1991. Pragmatics. A Reader. Oxford: OUP.
Delgado LavIn, E. 1999. Even as a constraint on relevance: The interpretation
of even-if conditionals. Talk delivered at the Sixth International
Colloquium on Cognitive Science, San Sebastian.
Donnellan, K. 1966. Reference and definite descriptions. Philosophical
Review 77: 281-304. Reprinted in Schwartz, S. (ed.). 1977. Naming,
Necessity and Natural Kinds. 42-65. Cornell University Press.
Ducrot, 0. 1980. Les echelles argumentatives. Paris: Minuit.
Ducrot, 0. 1984. Le dire et le dit. Paris: Minuit.
Ducrot, 0. 1993. Pour une description non-véritative du langage. Actes du
con grès de linguistique de Seoul. 86-98
Dudman, V. H. 1989. Vive Ia Revolution! Mind 98: 59 1-601.
Dummett, M. 1981. Frege: Philosophy of Language. 2uid edition. London:
Duckworth.
Fauconnier, G. 1975. Pragmatic scales and logical structure. Linguistic
Inquiry 6/3: 353-375.
Fillmore, C. J. & D. T. Langendoen (eds.). 1971. Studies in Linguistic
Semantics. New York: Holt Rinehart & Winston.
Fodor, J. 1983. The Modularity of Mind. An Essay on Faculty Psychology.
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
340
Fodor, J. 1985. Fodor's guide to mental representation. Mind 94: 76-100.
Reprinted in Fodor, J. 1990. A Theory of Content and Other Essays.
3-29. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. [Page references are to Fodor
(1990)].
Fodor, J. D. 1977. Semantics: Theories of Meaning in Generative Grammar.
Hassocks: The Harvester Press.
Foolen, A. 1991. Polyfunctionality and the semantics of adversative
conjunctions. Multilingua 10-1/2: 79-92.
Francescotti, R. M. 1995. Even: The conventional implicature approach
reconsidered. Linguistics and Philosophy 18: 153-173.
Fraser, B. 1998. Contrastive discourse markers in English. In Jucker & Ziv
(1998). 301-326.
Frege, G. 1892. Uber Sinn und Bedeutung. Zeitschrtft für Philosophie und
philosophische Kritik 100: 25-50. Translated as 'On sense and
reference' in Geach & Black (1970). 56-78.
Frege, G. 1918. Der Gedanke. Eine logische Untersuchung. Beitrage zur
Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus 1: 5 8-77. Translated as
'Thought' in McGuinness (1984). 35 1-372.
Geach, P. T. 1972. Logic Matters. Oxford: Blackwell.
Geach, P. & M. Black. 1970. Translations from the Philosophical Writings of
Gottlob Frege. 3' edition. Oxford: Blackwell.
Geirsson, H. & M. Losonsky (eds.). 1996. Readings in Language and Mind.
Oxford: Blackwell.
Green, 0. 1976. Main clause phenomena in subordinate clauses. Language
52: 382-397.
Grice, H. P. 1957. Meaning. The Philosophical Review 66: 377-388.
Reprinted in Grice (1989). 213-223.
Grice, H. P. 1961. The causal theory of perception. The Aristotelean Society:
Proceedings, Supplementary Volume. Vol. 35: 12 1-152.
Grice, H. P. 1968. Utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning.
Foundations of Language 4: 225-242. Reprinted in Grice (1989). 117-
137.
341
Grice, H. P. 1969. Utterer's meaning and intentions. The Philosophical
Review 78: 147-177. Reprinted in Once (1989). 86-116.
Grice, H. P. 1975. Logic and conversation. In Cole, P. & J. Morgan (eds.).
Syntax and Semantics. Vol. 3. 41-58. New York: Academic Press.
Reprinted in Grice (1989). 22-40.
Grice, H. P. 1978. Further notes on Logic and Conversation. In In Cole, P. &
J. Morgan (eds.). Syntax and Semantics. Vol. 9. 113-127. New York:
Academic Press. Reprinted in Grice (1989). 41-57.
Grice, H. P. 1989. Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press.
Gross, S. 1998. Essays on Linguistic Context-Sensitivity and its Philosophical
Significance. Harvard University PhD thesis.
Grote, B., N. Lenke & M. Stede. 1997. Ma(r)king concessions in English and
German. Discourse Processes 24: 87-117.
Haiman, J. & Thompson, S. A. (eds.) 1988. Clause Combining in Grammar
and Discourse. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Hare, R. M. 1952. The Language of Morals. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hermes, H., F. Kambartel, F. Kaulbach (eds.). 1969. Gottlob Frege:
Nachgelassene Schrzften. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag.
Hermodsson, L. 1978. Semantische Strukturen im kausalen und konditionalen
Bereich. Uppsala: Amquist & Wiksell.
Higginbotham, J. 1988. Contexts, models, and meanings: a note on the data
of semantics. In Kempson (1988). 29-48.
Hobbs, J. R. 1978. Why is discourse coherent? Technical note no. 176, SRI
International, Menlo Park.
Horn, L. 1969. A presuppositional analysis of only and even. In Binnick, R. I.
et al. (eds.). Papers from the Fifth Regional Meeting of the Chicago
Linguistics Society. 98-107. Chicago, flhinois: University of Chicago.
Horn, L. 1985. Metalinguistic negation and pragmatic ambiguity. Language
61: 121-174.
Horn, L. 1989. A Natural History of Negation. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Horn, L.R. 1996. Presupposition and implicature. In: Lappin 1996. 299-3 19.
342
Hovy, E. & E. Maier. 1994. Parsimonious or profligate: How many and which
discourse structure relations? Unpublished manuscript.
Ifantidou-Trouki, E. 1993. Sentential adverbs and relevance. Lingua 90: 69-
90.
Ifantidou, E. 1994. Evidentials and Relevance. University of London PhD
thesis. Revised version to be published by John Benjamins.
Iten, C. 1997. Because and although: a case of duality? UCL Working Papers
in Linguistics 9: 55-76.
Iten, C. 1998a. Because and although: a case of duality? In Rouchota, V. &
A. H. Jucker (eds.). Current Issues in Relevance Theory. 59-80.
Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Iten, C. 1998b. The meaning of although: a relevance theoretic account. UCL
Working Papers in Linguistics 10: 8 1-108.
Iten, C. 2000. The relevance of Argumentation Theory. Lingua 110: 665-699.
Iten, C. forthcoming. Even and even if from a cognitive perspective.
Jucker, A. & Y. Ziv (eds.). 1998. Discourse Markers: Descriptions and
Theories. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Kaplan, D. 1989a. Demonstratives. In Almog, J., H. Wettstein & J. Perry
(1989). 481-563.
Kaplan, D. 1989b. Afterthoughts. In Almog, J., H. Wettstein & J. Perry
(1989). 565-614.
Kaplan, D. 1998. What is meaning? Talk given in Paris.
Karttunen, L. & S. Peters. 1975. Conventional implicature in Montague
Grammar. BLS 1:266-278.
Kay, P. 1990. Even. Linguistics and Philosophy 13: 59-111.
Kempson, R. 1975. Presupposition and the Delimitation of Semantics.
Cambridge: CUP.
Kempson, R. (ed.). 1988. Mental Representations: The Interface between
Language and Reality. Cambridge: CUP.
Konig, E. 1985. On the history of concessive connectives in English.
Diachronic and synchronic evidence. Lingua 66: 1-19.
Konig, E. 1986. Conditionals, concessive conditionals and concessives: Areas
of contrast, overlap and neutralization. In Traugott (1986). 229-246.
343
Konig, E. 1988. Concessive connectives and concessive sentences: Cross-
linguistic regularities and pragmatic principles. In: Hawkins, J.A.
(ed.). Explaining Language Universals. 145-166. Oxford: Blackwell.
Konig, E. 1989. Concessive relations as the dual of causal relations. In: D.
Zaefferer (ed.). Semantic Universals and Universal Semantics. 190-
209. Dordrecht: Foris.
Konig, E. 1991a. The Meaning of Focus Particles. A Comparative
Perspective. London and New York: Routledge.
Konig, E. 199 lb. Konzessive Konjunktionen. In Stechow & Wunderlich
(1991). 63 1-639.
Konig, B. & P. Eisenberg. 1984. Zur Pragmatik von Konzessivsätzen. In:
Stickel, G. (ed.) Pragmatik in der Grammatik. 313-332. Düsseldorf:
Schwann.
Lahav, R. 1989. Against compositionality: the case of adjectives.
Philosophical Studies 57: 261-279.
Lakoff, G. 1971. The role of deduction in grammar. In: Fillmore &
Langendoen (1971). 62-70.
Lakoff, R. 1971. If's, and's and but's about conjunction. In: Fillmore &
Langendoen (1971). 114-149.
Lang, E. 1984. The Semantics of Coordination. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Lappin, S. (ed.). 1996. The Handbook of Contemporary Semantic Theory.
Oxford: Blackwell.
Larson, R. & G. Segal. 1995. Knowledge of Meaning. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Levinson, S. 1979. Pragmatics and social deixis: reclaiming the notion of
conventional implicature. BLS 5: 206-223.
Levinson, S. 1983. Pragmatics. Cambridge: CUP.
Löbner, S. 1987. Quantification as a major module of natural language
semantics. In: Groenendijk, J. et al. (eds.) Studies in Discourse
Representation Theory and the Theory of Generalized Quantifiers. 53-
85. Dordrecht: Fons.
Löbner, S. 1990. Wahr neben Falsch. Duale Operatoren als die Quantoren
natürlicher Sprache. Tübingen: Niemeyer.
344
Lycan, W. 1991. Even and even f Linguistics and Philosophy 14: 115-150.
Lycan, W. 1999. Philosophy of Language: A Contemporary Introduction.
London & New York: Routledge.
Lyons, J. 1977. Semantics. Vol. 1. Cambridge: CUP.
Mann, W. C. & S. A. Thompson. 1986. Relational propositions in discourse.
Discourse Processes 9: 57-90.
Mann, W. C. & S. A. Thompson. 1988. Rhetorical Structure Theory: Toward
a functional theory of text organisation. Text 8: 243-281.
McCawley, J. 1991. Contrastive negation and metalinguistic negation.
Chicago Linguistics Society 19: The Parasession on Negation: 189-
206.
McGuiness, B. (ed.). 1984. Gottlob Frege. Collected Papers on Mathematics,
Logic and Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell.
Miller, A. 1998. Philosophy of Language. London: UCL Press.
Moeschler, J. 1989. Modélisation du dialogue. Paris: Hermes.
Moeschler, J. & A. Reboul. 1994. Dictionnaire encyclopédique de
pragmatique. Paris: Seuil.
Neale, S. 1992. Paul Grice and the philosophy of language. Linguistics and
Philosophy 15: 509-559.
Neale, S. 1999. Colouring and composition. In Murasugi, R. & R. Stainton
(eds.). Philosophy and Linguistics. 35-82. Boulder: Westview.
Nyan, T. 1998. Metalinguistic Operators with Reference to French. Bern:
Peter Lang.
Oversteegen, L. 1997. On the pragmatic nature of causal and contrastive
connectives. Discourse Processes 24: 51-85.
Papafragou, A. forthcoming. Modality: Issues in the Semantics-Pragmatics
Interface. Oxford: Elsevier Science.
Perry, J. 1977. Frege on demonstratives. Philosophical Review 86: 474-497.
Reprinted in Davis (1991). 146-159.
Perry, J. 1998. Indexicals, contexts and unarticulated constituents. In Aliseda,
A. et al. (eds.). Computing Natural Language. 1-11. CSU
Publications.
Pollock, J. 1976. Subjunctive Reasoning. Dordrecht: Reidel.
345
Quirk, R. et al. 1972. A Grammar of Contemporary English. London:
Longman.
Recanati, F. 1987. Meaning and Force. The Pragmatics of Perfonnative
Utterances. Cambridge: CUP.
Recanati, F. 1993. Direct Reference: From Language to Thought. Oxford:
Blackwell.
Recanati, F. 1998. Pragmatics. In Craig, E. (ed.). Routledge Encyclopaedia of
Philosophy. 620-633. London: Routledge.
Recanati, F. forthcoming. Open quotation.
Rieber, S. 1997. Conventional implicatures as tacit performatives. Linguistics
and Philosophy 20: 51-72.
Rouchota, V. 1990. 'But': Contradiction and relevance. UCL Working Papers
in Linguistics 2: 65-8 1.
Rouchota, V. 1998a. Procedural meaning and parenthetical discourse
markers. In Jucker & Ziv (1998). 97-126.
Rouchota, V. 1998b. Connectives, coherence and relevance. In Rouchota &
Jucker (1998). 11-57.
Rouchota, V. & A. H. Jucker (eds.). 1998. Current Issues in Relevance
Theory. Amsterdam: John Benjaniins.
Rudolph, E. 1996. Contrast: Adversative and Concessive Expressions on
Sentence and Text Level. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Searle, J. R. 1965. What is a speech act? In M. Black (ed.). Philosophy in
America. 22 1-239. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Searle, J. R. 1968. Austin on locutionary and illocutionary acts. Philosophical
Review 77: 405-424.
Searle, J. R. 1969. Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language.
Cambridge: CUP.
Searle, J. R. 1979. Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech
Acts. Cambridge: CUP.
Sidiropoulou, M. 1992. On the connective although. Journal of Pragmatics
17: 201-221.
Sperber, D. 1994a. Understanding verbal understanding. In Khalfa, J. (ed.)
What Is Intelligence? 179-198. Cambridge: CUP.
346
Sperber, D. 1994b. The modularity of thought and the epidemiology of
representations. In Hirschfeld, L. & S. Gelman (eds.). Mapping the
Mind: Domain Specificity in Cognition and Culture. 39-67.
Cambridge: CUP.
Sperber, D. & D. Wilson. 1978. Les ironies comme mentions. Poétique 36:
399-412.
Sperber, D. & D. Wilson. 1981. Irony and the use-mention distinction. In
Cole, P. (ed.). Radical Pragmatics. 295-318. New York: Academic
Press.
Sperber, D. & D. Wilson. 1986. Relevance: Communication and Cognition.
Oxford: Blackwell.
Sperber, D. & D. Wilson. 1995. Postface. In Sperber, D. & D. Wilson.
Relevance: Communication and Cognition.	 edition. 255-279.
Oxford: Blackwell.
Sperber, D. & D. Wilson. 1998. The mapping between the mental and the
public lexicon. In Carruthers, P. & J. Boucher (eds.). Thought and
Language. 184-200. Cambridge: CUP.
Stalnaker, R. 1974. Pragmatic presuppositions. In Munitz, M. & P. Unger
(eds.). Semantics and Philosophy. 197-2 14. New York: New York
University Press. Reprinted in Davis (1991). 471-48 1.
Stanley, J. 2000. Context and logical form. Linguistics and Philosophy 23:
391-434.
Stechow, A. von & D. Wunderlich. (eds.) 1991. SemantikiSemantics. Em
internationales Handbuch der zeitgenossischen Forschung/ An
International Handbook of Contemporary Research. Berlin & New
York: Walter de Gruyter.
Strawson, P. F. 1971. Logico-Linguistic Papers. London: Methuen.
Strawson, P. F. 1973. Austin and 'locutionary meaning'. In Berlin et al.
(1973). 46-68.
Sweetser, E. E. 1990. From Etymology to Pragmatics. Metaphorical and
Cultural Aspects of Semantic Structure. Cambridge: CUP.
Takeuchi, M. 1998. Cause-consequence conjunctive Particles in Japanese. In
Rouchota & Jucker (1998). 8 1-103.
347
Tarski, A. 1944. The semantic conception of truth and the foundation of
semantics. Philosophy and phenomenological research 4: 341-375.
Reprinted in Geirsson & Losonsky (1996). 36-64.
Traugott, C. E. et al. (eds.). 1986. On Conditionals. Cambridge: CUP.
Van der Auwera, J. 1986. Conditionals and speech acts. In Traugott (1986).
197-214.
Van der Sandt, R. A. 1988. Context and Presupposition. London: Croom
Helm.
Veltman, F. 1986. Data semantics and the pragmatics of indicative
conditionals. In Traugott (1986). 147-168.
Wilson, D. 1975. Presuppositions and Non-Truth-Conditional Semantics.
New York/London: Academic Press.
Wilson, D. unpublished a. Varieties of non-truth-conditional meaning.
Wilson, D. unpublished b. Semantic theory lecture notes. UCL 1998-9.
Wilson, D. & D. Sperber. 1988a. Mood and the analysis of non-declarative
sentences. In Dancy, J., J. Moravcsik & C. Taylor (eds.). Human
Agency: Language, Duty and Value. 77-101. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press.
Wilson, D. & D. Sperber. 1988b. Representation and relevance. In Kempson
(1988). 133-153.
Wilson, D. & D. Sperber. 1992. On verbal irony. Lingua 87. 1/2: 53-76.
Wilson, D. & D. Sperber. 1993. Linguistic form and relevance. Lingua 90: 1-
25.
Wilson, D. & D. Sperber. 1998. Pragmatics and time. In Carston R. & S.
Uchida (eds.). Relevance Theory: Applications and Implications. 1-22.
Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Wilson, D. & D. Sperber. forthcoming. Truthfulness and relevance.
Winter, Y. & M. Rimon 1994. Contrast and implication in natural language.
Journal of Semantics 11: 365-406.
Zagar, I. Z. 1999. Argumentation in the language system: Between particles
and polyphony. Talk delivered at PRAGMA 99 in Tel Aviv. (ms.
Educational Research Institute, Slovenia).
348	 (i)
